THE SALT II TREATY
HEARINGS
BBFORB THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
NINETY-SIXTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
ON
EX. Y, 96-1
THE TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
AND THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS ON THE
LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS AND THE PRO-
TOCOL THERETO, TOGETHER REFERRED TO AS THE SALT
II TREATY, BOTH SIGNED AT VIENNA, AUSTRIA, ON JUNE 18,
1979, AND RELATED DOCUMENTS
SEPTEMBER 6, 7, 10, 11, AND 12, 1979
PART 4
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations
THE SALT II TREATY
HEARINGS
before: thb
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
NINETY-SIXTH CONGKESS
FIRST SESSION
ON
EX. Y, 96-1
THE TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
AND THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS ON THB
LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS AND THE PRO-
TOCOL THERETO, TOGETHER REFERRED TO AS THE SALT
II TREATY, BOTH SIGNED AT VIENNA, AUSTRIA, ON JUNE 18,
1979, AND RELATED DOCUMENTS
SEPTEMBER 6, 7, 10, 11, AND 12, 1979
PART 4
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations
y4'f 76/z:^f2/shlf
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
<8-260O WASHINGTON ; 1979
For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office
Washington, D.C. 20402
Stock No. 052-070-05135-3
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
FRANK CHURCH, Idaho. Chairman
CLAIBORNE PELL, Rhode Island
GEORGE McGOVERN, South Dakota
JOSEPH R. BIDEN, Jr., Delaware
JOHN GLENN, Ohio
RICHARD (DICK) STONE, Florida
PAUL S. SARBANES, Maryland
EDMUND S. MUSKIE, Maine
EDWARD ZORINSKY, Nebraska
JACOB K. JAVITS, New York
CHARLES H. PERCY, Illinois
HOWARD H. BAKER, Jr., Tennessee
JESSE HELMS, North Carolina
S. I. HAYAKAWA, California
RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana
WiLUAM B. Bader, Staff Director
Albert A. Lakeland, Jr., Minority Staff Director
(U)
CONTENTS
Hearing days: ^^^
September 6, 1979 1
September 7, 1979 149
September 10, 1979 275
September 11, 1979 397
September 12, 1979 435
Statement of:
Baugher, Peter Vincent, past chairman and present member, national
governing board, Ripon Society, Washington, D.C 166
Brennan, Donald, director, national security studies, Hudson Institute 363
Carey, John, past national commander. The American Legion, Washington,
D.C 157
Corterier, Peter, Grermany, Rapporteur, Political Committee, North Atlan-
tic Assembly 312
de Vries, Klaas G., Netherlands, Rapporteur, Military Committee, North
Atlantic Assembly 318
Earle, Hon. Ralph, II, Chairman of the U.S. SALT delegation 435
Hoffmann, Prof. Stanley, Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass 277
Karber, Phillip A., vice president, BDM Corp 253
King, Mrs. Coretta Scott, member, Americans for SALT 87
Kirkland, Lane, secretary-treasurer, AFL-CIO, Washington, D.C 191
Krol, John Cardinal, Archdiocese of Philadelphia, on behalf of the U.S.
Catholic Conference, Washington, D.C 116
Lodal, Jan, executive vice president, American Management Systems 398
May, Michael, associate director, Lawrence-Livermore Laboratory, Liver-
more, Calif 406
Mclntyre, Hon. Thomas J., Jr., president, Americans for SALT 84
Moorer, Adm. Thomas (retired), cochairman. Coalition for Peace Through
Strength, Washington, D.C 39
Nitze, Hon. Paul, former Deputy Secretary of Defense and former Secre-
tary of the Navy 402
Panofsky, Dr. Wolfgang, director, Stanford Linear Accelerator Center 351
Perry, Hon. William J., Under Secretary for Research and Engineering,
Department of Defense 438
Randall, Dr. Claire, general secretary. National Council of Churches 131
Rostow, Eugene, chairman, executive committee. Committee on the Pres-
ent Danger, Washington, D.C 1
Schlafly, Phyllis, American Conservative Union 202
Schmidt, Robert D., president, American Committee on East-West Accord,
Washington, D.C 149
Scoville, Herbert J., Jr., member, governing board. New Directions, Wash-
ington, D.C 176
Teller, Dr. Edward, Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace 231
Thyness, Paul, Norway, president. North Atlantic Assembly 298
Vorspan, Albert, vice president. Union of American Hebrew Congrega-
tions 139
Wall, Patrick, United Kingdom, Chairman, Military Committee, North
Atlantic Assembly 307
Warnke, Hon. Paul, former Director, Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency and former Chief, SALT negotiations 345
Winn, Brig. Gen. David W. (retired), policy board. Institute of American
Relations, Washington, D.C 79
Yost, Ambassador Charles W., cochairman of Americans for SALT 90
(ffl)
IV
Insertions for the record: ^^^
Letter from Professor Rostow to Senator Church, dated September 27, 1979,
in regards to amendments, reservations and understandings 15
Foreign Relations Committee staff memorandum of June 25, 1979 on SALT
II legal and procedural issues 18
Prepared statement of Prof. Eugene V. Rostow 31
Prepared statement of Adm. Thomas H. Moorer, USN, Retired 60
Prepared statement of Hon. Thomas J. Mclntyre, Jr 86
Prepared statement of Ambassador Charles W. Yost 92
Prepared statement of John Cardinal Krol 127
Prepared statement of Dr. Claire Randall 136
Prepared statement of Albert Vorspan 143
Prepared statement of Robert D. Schmidt 153
Prepared statement of John Carey 160
Prepared statement of Peter V. Baugher 170
Prepared statement of Herbert J. Scoville, Jr 178
Prepared statement of the AFL-CIO executive council 193
Prepared statement of Phyllis Schlafly 219
Prepared statement of Charles L. Teevan 228
Prepared statement of Dr. Edward Teller 239
Prepared statement of Phillip A. Karber 264
Prepared statement of Prof. George F. Kennan 276
Prepared statement of Prof. Stanley Hoffmann 289
Prepared statement of Paul Thyness 302
Prepared statement of Patrick Wall 309
Prepared statement of Peter Corterier 314
Prepared statement of Klaas G. de Vries 321
Prepared statement of Ambassador Paul C. Warnke 349
Prepared statement of Dr. Wolfgang Panofsky 357
Prepared statement of Donald Brennan 369
Passage from General Rowny's prepared statement of July 12, 1979,
supplied by Donald Brennan 380
Ambassador Warnke 's responses to additional questions submitted for the
record • 385
Dr. Panofsky's responses to additional questions submitted for the
record 387
Mr. Brennan's answers to additional questions submitted for the record ... 393
Prepared statement of Hon. Paul H. Nitze 403
Prepared statement of Michael M. May 411
Letter from Senator Church to Secretary Vance, dated July 16, 1979,
regarding Soviet views concerning multiple protective structure basing
for M-X missile, and his response thereto 433
Production rate of ALCM's, supplied by DOD 454
Protocol limitations on GLCM's and ALCM's, supplied by DOD 455
Prepared statement of Hon. William J. Perry 474
Ambassador Earle's and Dr. Perry's responses to additional questions
submitted for the record 480
Appendix:
Comparison of the Russian and English texts of the SALT II Treaty 487
Ambassador U. Alexis Johnson's responses to additional questions for the
record of July 16, 1979, part 2 491
Additional comments submitted for the record by General Rowny 492
Additional statements received for the record:
Statements of Dr. Wes Schwemmer Cady, Katherine Eaton, and Dr. J.
David Edwards, on behalf of the American Association of University
Women, Washington, D.C 494
Statement of Raymond Nathan, director, American Ethical Union, Wash-
ington, D.C 497
Statement of Walter Hoffmann, chairman, Campaign for U.N. Reform,
Wayne, N.J 497
Statement of Glenn E. Watts, president. Communications Workers of
America, Washington, D.C 502
Statement of Edward F. Snyder, executive secretary of the Friends Com-
mittee on National Legislation, Washington, D.C 503
Statement of Stephen E. Seadler, president. Ideological Defense Center,
New York, N.Y 504
Statement of Bishop Thomas J. Gumbleton, president. Pax Christi USA,
Chicago, 111 509
Page
Statement of Dr. Alan Geyer, representing the Council of Bishops and the
Board of Church and Society of the United Methodist Church, Washing-
ton, D.C 512
Statement of Col. Phelps Jones, U.S.A. (retired), director, National Security
and Foreign Affairs, Veterans of Foreign Wars of the United States,
Washington, D.C 516
Statement of The Woman's National Democratic Club, Political Action
Committee, Washington, D.C 520
Statement of Lester H. Ahlswede, representing Citizen-Taxpayers, Silver
Spring, Md 520
Statement of Benjamin M. Becker, Highland Park, 111 523
Statement of Roger A. Singerling, Hackettstown, N.J 525
Statement of Joseph E. Tracey, Jr., Wheaton, Md 526
SALT II TREATY
THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 6, 1979
United States Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, D.C.
The committee met, at 10:03 a.m., pursuant to notice, in room
318, Russell Senate Office Building, Hon. Joseph Biden presiding.
Present: Senators Church, Biden, Stone, Zorinsky, Javits, and
Hayakawa.
Also present: Senator Cranston.
Senator Biden. The hearing will come to order, please.
opening statement
This morning the Senate Foreign Relations Committee begins its
final series of hearings on the SALT II Treaty. Today and tomor-
row spokesmen for public groups will be testifying on this agree-
ment. Unfortunately, we will not be able to hear from all such
groups who have requested an opportunity to testify, but we have
asked for written statements from those not scheduled to appear
before this committee.
This morning we will hear from three groups critical of the
SALT II agreement, the Committee on the Present Danger, the
Coalition for Peace Through Strength, and the Institute of Ameri-
can Relations.
First, we will hear from Eugene Rostow, speaking as chairman of
the executive committee of the Committee on the Present Danger.
After questioning from the committee, we will hear from Adm.
Thomas Moorer on behalf of the Coalition for Peace Through
Strength. I understand that accompanying Admiral Moorer to re-
spond to questions is Lt. Gen. Daniel Graham, former head of the
Defense Intelligence Agency.
Finally, we will hear from retired Gen. David W. Winn and Dr.
Victor Fediay, who will speak on behalf of the Institute of Ameri-
can Relations.
Professor Rostow, would you please proceed?
STATEMENT OF EUGENE ROSTOW, CHAIRMAN, EXECUTIVE
COMMITTEE, COMMITTEE ON THE PRESENT DANGER, WASH-
INGTON, D.C
Mr. Rostow. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
First, I want to express my own thanks and that of the Commit-
tee on the Present Danger for your invitation to appear today to
testify on the ratification of the SALT II Treaty. I am appearing on
' See page 31 for Mr. Rostow's prepared statement.
(1)
behalf of the Committee on the Present Danger, as you said. You
have the two formal statements we have issued, as well as related
materials, and the statement prepared for these hearings.
The conclusions in our July 19 statement prepared for the hear-
ing before your subcommittee. Senator Biden, states: We believe, a
positive and affirmative program for putting SALT II and the
SALT negotiating process into the context of our foreign and de-
fense policy as a whole. I emphasize that these conclusions are the
basis for our approach, and we have repeated them in the begin-
ning of the statement prepared for my submission this morning.
I thought that my brief opening remarks today would be most
useful to you if I supplemented our earlier work on this subject by
commenting on some of the key issues which have emerged in the
hearings so far.
The strongest argument for SALT II which has thus far been put
forward by the administration was summed up by a distinguished
Senator in these terms, "To reject SALT II would be to go over the
abyss." The variations on this theme are infinite. Some years ago I
counted a couple of hundred remarks of this tenor and then gave
up counting. President Carter has said that those who oppose the
treaty as it stands are warmongers and opponents of detente. Sec-
retary of State Vance is reported by the press to have said that he
would resign rather than preside over the end of detente and the
revival of the cold war. ,
The notion that the cold war is over, the notion that Soviet-
American relations have improved in recent years is, in our opin-
ion, a dangerous symptom of autointoxication. The cold war is
worse today than it has ever been, featured by Soviet threats and
thrusts far more sophisticated in character and on a far greater
scale than those of the simple days of the Berlin airlift and the
attack on Greece. But, as things get worse, many Americans tell
each other that they are getting better. o * t m tt
SALT II is a case in point. If ratified in its present form, SALT II
would be an act of submission on our part, legitimizing Soviet
superiority and military superiority in all spheres. It would be a
great Soviet victory in the cold war and would be so perceived
everywhere in the world. But we keep repeating to ourselves that
SALT II would be a step toward stability, detente, and peace.
This statement is made so often that we accept it as self-evident.
But it is not self-evident. The SALT I package was ratified in 1972
on the basis of the same litany of arguments which have been
offered to the Senate and the American people this year, offered
under very different political and military circumstances, but of-
fered nonetheless.
The period since 1972 has been the worst period of the cold war.
It has been the period in which the agreements made for peace in
Indochina were openly violated. The promises made to President
Nixon in May 1972, with respect to peace in the Middle East were
openly violated. It has been the period of the Soviet campaign in
Africa and Asia and even of Soviet attempts to penetrate the
Caribbean, as we have noticed suddenly in the last few days.
In view of the betrayal of every promise and every expectation
on the basis of which SALT I was ratified, how can these argu-
ments be put forward and how can they retain their plausibility?
The fact that they do recalls President Kennedy's celebrated quip
that if you are cheated once, it is their fault, but if you are cheated
a second time, it is your own.
Many of those who believe that rejecting SALT II, as it stands,
would be "going over the abyss" attribute nearly magic influence
to arms limitation agreements. Nothing in the history of such
agreements gives the slightest encouragement for such beliefs.
The Treaty of Versailles was the most important of modern arms
limitation agreements. It set limits on German armaments and it
prescribed the demilitarization of the Rhineland, which was also
guaranteed by the Locarno Treaty. If Britain had been willing to
join France in enforcing that treaty, World War II would never
have taken place. But when the treaty was violated — secretly at
first, then openly when Hitler introduced conscription in 1935 and
marched into the Rhineland in 1936 — Great Britain and France did
nothing but wring their hands and try to persuade Hitler to sign
new treaties limiting arms.
The second most important arms limitation agreement of modern
times was the Washington Naval Treaty of 1922 and its successors
of the early 1930's. Our experience under that treaty, too, was
hardly more inspiring than the record of Versailles.
I could mention other instances, even more depressing: the agree-
ments for demilitarized zones in Korea and Vietnam, for example;
the Laos accord of 1962, or the arrangement to keep the PLO out of
southern Lebanon.
The argument that to reject SALT would be to go over the abyss
has another dimension, the notion that such action on our part
would make the Soviet Union more aggressive than it is. The claim
betrays a misunderstanding of the nature of the Soviet Union and
of the serious and devoted men who govern it. They are already
behaving as badly from our point of view as they dare. They take
every opportunity to expand, and they manufacture several. There
is no use getting excited about it. That is the nature of their policy.
As a distinguished professor at Princeton has said, they are still in
the mood of imperialism of the eighteenth century which we in the
west have long since given up.
There is only one argument which can deter Soviet expansion
and that is the calm confrontation of unacceptable risks. This
factor prevailed in a dozen crises since 1945, from the Berlin block-
ade to the Cuban missile crisis of 1962. It is the visible erosion of
that conviction since 1972 or so which has invited a series of Soviet
thrusts on every continent and every ocean. In recent years, the
pace of Soviet expansion has increased as a result of the shock of
Vietnam and Watergate to American public opinion and the per-
ception in the Soviet Union of President Carter as a weak Presi-
dent.
The claim that it would cost us more money to refuse ratification
of SALT at the present time or to ratify it only on the conditions
that we have outlined here is equally specious. Administration
spokesmen have taken many different positions on this question.
Paul Warnke has said that it would cost more money if we ratified
SALT, but that the increase could not be ratified. Secretary of
Defense Brown has testified that it would cost perhaps between $1
billion and $2 billion a year for 4 or 5 years. Now he offers higher
estimates. Mr. Gelb has recently written that saving money is the
main argument for ratifying SALT. The fact is that in an area of
complex and rapidly changing technology, none of these estimates
is of much consequence.
Ambassador Harriman has offered a variant of the abyss argu-
ment. Not to accept SALT, he said, would lead to the election of a
hardliner to succeed Mr. Brezhnev. The notion that Mr. Brezhnev
is a moderate in any sense that we can recognize is denied by
anything he has said and done since he became a public figure. He
is the author of the Brezhnev doctrine. He claims the right to
intervene in any country at any time in behalf either of a socialist
government or of a progressive movement, that is to say, a move-
ment he regards as progressive. He is the author of the attacks on
°the Middle East in 1967 and 1973, and of the attack on Czechoslo-
vakia in 1968. To call Brezhnev a moderate is an abuse of the
English language.
Of course, there are differences within the Kremlm, and there
probably are groups and sects within the Kremlin, but according to
any information we have or have seen, they do not concern Soviet-
American relations, nor is there any evidence that any Soviet
leader accepts our definition of detente. Of course they all want to
see SALT II ratified. They made enormous progress under SALT I,
and they expect to make even more under SALT II. Furthermore,
if we ever do wake up and decide to restore the military balance,
they would surely lose as a consequence, because their economy is
so much smaller and weaker than our own. But these are hardly
reasons to take the treaty as it stands.
The second best argument offered by the administration for the
treaty is that it would not do much harm and should therefore be
ratified to demonstrate to our friends and our adversaries that we
really do have a government. It is an argument which appeals very
strongly to all Americans. For the best of reasons, we tend to rally
to the flag when it is under fire, and President Carter is surely
under fire.
The fatal flaw in this argument, however, is that the treaty is
not harmless. It would do a great deal of harm. It would lock us
into a position of strategic inferiority which would also be unstable
and unverifiable, the perfect recipe for Soviet nuclear blackmail
during the period of our greatest relative weakness in the early
and middle 1980's.
Moreover, it would prevent us from redressing the military bal-
ance during that period. No spokesman for the administration has
as yet seriously addressed the principal issues raised in this con-
nection by its critics. All studies of the problem agree that if
present trends continue just a few years longer, the Soviet Union
will have significant nuclear superiority in the early 1980's, the
capacity, that is, to make a pre-emptive first strike by destroying
our ICBM's, our planes on the ground, and our submarines in port
with a fraction of their nuclear force, holding enough accurate
missiles in reserve to neutralize the whole of our own nuclear
This possibility has been on everybody's mind as a nightmare for
years. The prospect that these risks will materialize has become
very much worse because President Carter has canceled, postponed.
or stretched out the programs initiated by his predecessors to deal
with them. The answer of the administration to this analysis is
that we could use our submarines in response to any such threat
and we could therefore deter it.
Some have even come so far £is to argue — Secretary Vance did
so — that we might launch our ICBM's on warning within a few
moments of receiving a radar signal that such an attack was on its
way. Then, finally they say that when the M-X missile becomes
available in significant quantities in 1989, it will provide an answer
to the vulnerability of our ICBM force. But what are we supposed
to do in the meantime, between now and 1989, or between the
period in the early 1980's when this possibility becomes a somber
prospect?
The administration answers this question by ignoring it.
Under these circumstances, we should be vulnerable to nuclear
war or nuclear blackmail. We should face a condition of diplomatic
impotence and be totally unable to use our conventional forces.
That is the linkage between the nuclear balance and the whole of
the rest of our foreign policy, which can never be escaped.
What would we do if there were a Macedonian uprising in
Greece, for example, supported from Bulgaria? If Iceland or
Norway were pushed somehow out of NATO? If we were told by
the Soviet Union to get our fleet and our forces out of the Mediter-
ranean? Under such circumstances, would either the Soviet Union
or our allies believe in the possibility of reprisal from submarines
which in turn would be suicidal for us? That was the argument,
you will recall, that General DeGaulle made some years ago about
the credibility of our nuclear weapons, and it is an argument which
is becoming more and more visible in the minds of our allies as
well as in the minds of the Soviets.
The only answer thus far from President Carter and his aides
has been a reiteration of their blind faith in the doctrine of mutual
assured destruction, the McNamara doctrine, by which we have
lived for more than a decade. It is the heart and nearly the whole
of the administration case for SALT II.
As former Secretary of State Kissinger emphasized in Brussels
last Saturday, that argument is losing its intellectual and political
plausibility. We simply must move and move rapidly to counter-
force strategies.
But the treaty would prevent us from undertaking the most
feasible and perhaps the only credible and practical counterforce
program that could preserve our second strike capability during
the early and middle 1980's: to reopen the Minuteman III produc-
tion lines which the President has recently closed, to make a great
many Minuteman Ill's; and to deploy them in multiple vertical
protected shelters, the so-called shell game.
The Soviets take the view that any such approach on our part is
prohibited by article IV of the treaty and by the provisions of the
treaty banning deliberate concealment. They say that each shelter
would be considered a fixed launcher, whether or not it contained a
missile, and in any event it would be a form of concealment in
their view which the treaty prohibits.
On either theory it would be banned. It may be an impracticable
approach for another reason under the treaty, because the number
required would be too great for the quotas of the treaty. That is,
Minuteman III is much smaller than many of the Soviet weapons,
and it carries only three warheads.
The administration has not, to my knowledge or to the knowl-
edge of any of my colleagues who have followed these things close-
ly, addressed the issue of a possible quick fix approach. Indeed, the
administration seems to assume that any program for protecting
our fixed ICBM's and other ground-based launchers in the early
eighties is impossible.
There are many other features of this treaty which are far from
harmless. The provisions with respect to heavy missiles, for exam-
ple; or the Backfire bomber; or the common understanding in
paragraph 8 of article IV which deals with the relationship of the
SS-16 intercontinental missile, and the SS-20 missile; or the cruise
missile problem, too, which has been much discussed.
Here we find the answer offered by the administration in these
hearings to be either nonexistent, or unresponsive and unsatisfac-
tory. This is true as well of what the administration has said on
verification. The administration has concentrated on the possibili-
ties of verifying the testing of new weapons, but has not answered
the questions which we and others have raised about the possibility
of counting missiles in warehouses and the absence of any re-
straints or any possible monitoring of restraints on the manufac-
ture of missiles rather than the deployment of launchers.
Our committee has recommended that the Senate should not
give its consent to the ratification of SALT II unless the most
important deficiencies of the treaty are modified by amendment
and the President and the Congress are firmly committed to a
specific program that would achieve and maintain essential equiv-
alt^nce and adequate deterrence. Among the deficiencies of the
treaty requiring amendment I should list first our right to deploy
ICBM's in modes and in numbers we deem necessary to insure the
survival against surprise attack; the equal right of the two sides to
use heavy missiles; the inclusion of the Soviet Backfire and the SS-
20 within the numerical limits of the treaty; and provision for the
adoption of programs which would reverse the present ominous
situation of Soviet strategic superiority in Europe, including
change in the provisions regarding the range of land- and sea-based
cruise missiles and a clarification of the transfer of technology
issue causing so much concern to our allies.
In closing, Mr. Chairman, let me stress that the responsibility of
the Senate in voting on SALT II is unique in our history. Every
American shares the goal of achieving true detente with the Soviet
Union, which can only be defined, in my opinion, as a policy of
scrupulous and reciprocal respect for the rules of the charter of the
United Nations regarding the international use of force. True de-
tente in this sense is a central objective of the Committee on the
Present Danger and, I am sure, of the American people. Every
President and Congress since 1945 have gone to great lengths to
reach that goal, but President Carter's quest for detente with the
Soviet Union has been based on the misconception that acts of
unilateral disarmament on our part and other unilateral conces-
sions will induce the Soviet Union to follow suit.
As a result, President Carter has sacrificed our defenses and
weakened our alliances and abdicated his responsibility for the
security of the Nation. Under our Constitution, that responsibility
therefore falls on the Senate with respect to this treaty and ulti-
mately on the whole Congress and the people. We have not faced
decisions of such moment since the Presidency of James Buchanan.
President Carter likes to compare the debate over SALT II with
the controversy over the League of Nations in 1919, but the anal-
ogy is misleading. If you go back and look at it, the League vote
was not the result of the blind opposition of a small group of
willfuU men who prevented the ratification of the treaty. It was
President Wilson himself who urged the Democrats who followed
his lead on this matter, and there were 23 of them, to vote against
the treaty, with the reservations which had been negotiated by
Senator Henry Cabot Lodge of Massachusetts as the leader. If only
seven more Democrats had refused to follow the President's lead
and had voted their convictions, the course of history might well
have been very different.
In the second place. President Wilson was proposing full and
responsible American participation in world politics. The position
today is just the opposite. President Carter is conducting a policy of
retreat to isolationism, and unless that policy is promptly reversed,
it will soon be beyond our power to do so.
The coming decade will be as difficult and as dangerous as any
we have faced in our past. We have a very short time in which to
protect our future through allied diplomacy and deterrence rather
than through war. A two-ocean navy cannot be restored in a day or
a year, nor can the other programs we require to achieve effective
deterrence at every relevant level. It will be a ticklish time, calling
for cool nerves and a firm grasp of the problem.
The Soviet Union will not view an American awakening with
equanimity. It can be expected to take full advantage of positions
of relative superiority and the presence in office of a President
whom it perceives as weak.
The time to begin is now, and the place to begin is here. Normal-
ly, we look to our President to take the lead in decisions of this
order. It is now clear that President Carter is firmly committed to
another view. What is at stake, Mr. Chairman, is not the balance
of power alone, but the future of liberty. Democracy cannot survive
in the world unless America plays its full part in assuring its
future.
Forty years ago, as the doubts and vacillations of the thirties
were being swept away by events, a speaker rose to his feet in the
House of Commons to address the great issue of the looming war.
Leopold Amery, one of Churchill's companions in the political wil-
derness, shouted a remark from his seat before the speaker began:
"Speak for England," he said. In that spirit, I say to you, speak and
vote for America.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Biden. Professor, I am not sure where to begin.
First of all, I think your characterizations of President Carter
retreating to isolationism and abdicating his responsibility are a
little bit, to say the least, exaggerated. If we are in all the trouble
8
we are in, is because of the President, it is amazing to think he was
deft enough to do it all within 2 ¥2 years.
It reminds me a little bit of Henry Kissinger's testimony. He
came up here and told us all about what was wrong. Somehow I
just had the impression that he had been around when all this was
taking place.
ARMS UMITATION NOT A WISE WAY TO PROCEED
It seems as though you have made a very strong case for the
position that arms limitation treaties, regardless of the form, are
essentially useless documents. Isn't it really your position and the
position of the committee that arms limitation under any circum-
stances is not a wise way to go?
You give us the Treaty of Locarno. You go back and talk about
naval agreements. You offer through a historical analysis of how
every treaty related to arms limitation really was a useless docu-
ment. Isn't that what you are saying?
Mr. RosTOw. No. The Committee has said that it is m favor of
fair and verifiable and balanced arms limitation agreements.
Senator Biden. But do you really mean that?
Mr. RosTOW. Yes, we really mean it. I have pointed out that
there was one very famous arms limitation agreement, which has
worked very well, that is the agreement with Great Britain about
the demilitarization of the Great Lakes, which was made back at
the time of the War of 1812, just after that war. It has lasted for a
long time. t i • 1 t
Senator Biden. I think I am getting the picture. I think I am
beginning to understand.
Mr. RosTOW. The point is, if you have arms limitation treaty
arrangements between people who fundamentally agree with each
other, they can be very useful, or if you have arms limitation
agreements between people who do not at all agree with each
other, or who agree with each other about the meaning of the
terms, they could be useful.
Senator Biden, you suggested that I couldn't possibly mean what
I said, that I was attacking the President unfairly. I should like to
respond to that if I may for a moment.
Senator Biden. Please try to do it as briefly as I did, because I
have other questions.
Mr. RosTOW. I had only 15 minutes in which to open this morn-
ing.
Senator Biden. Right, I only have 10 minutes.
Mr. RosTOW. I wanted to focus on the issues that have emerged
in this debate over the ratification of the treaty. In a great many
other statements over the years, I have severely criticized the
administrations of President Nixon and President Ford with great
impartiality for various things which they did and did not do. I
think the responsibility, for example, for initiating the notion that
detente had replaced the cold war goes to President Nixon, who
claimed much too much for his policy of rapprochement in negotia-
tions with the Soviet Union. But remember. Senator Biden, my
primary responsibility in life is that of a professor, and our respon-
sibility, I believe profoundly, is to call the shots as we see them.
I do think that the President's foreign policy, and particularly
his action in canceling and postponing the B-1 bomber and the
neutron enhanced radiation warhead, his treatment of the M-X
Minuteman III, the Trident, and all the rest of that sad story is
very costly and has been a very damaging series of moves.
REOPEN MINUTEMAN III PRODUCTION UNES
Senator Biden. Professor, you stated that the United States
should reopen the Minuteman III production line and deploy the
Minuteman in multiple vertical shelters, but the Defense Depart-
ment says if the Minuteman III were modified and made mobile, it
would be ready only a year ahead of the M-X. It would also have
considerably less capability than the M-X, because it would not be
capable of handling 10 MIRVed vehicles. So it really would not
change our strategic position in the early 1980's.
Do you agree with that or not?
Mr. RosTOw. Certainly if the M-X could be produced earlier I
would not be in the slightest bit interested in reopening the Min-
uteman production lines. I am trying to fill this gap with the
Minuteman, but my understanding was that it would not take so
long to resume the production of Minuteman III as it would take
now to perfect the M-X, which has been delayed for so long, but
the fundamental point is whether under a forced draft we could
move ahead quickly either with the M-X or the Minuteman III.
I should, of course, be in favor of the one the experts thought
was most effective.
Senator Biden. The experts tell us that is the M-X.
Mr. RosTOW. The basic point is, the treaty would prevent either
solution.
Senator Biden. How can you say that? Why would the treaty
prevent either solution? I just came back after 6 days in Moscow.
We raised the M-X question with the Soviets. We told them we
would be going forward with the M-X. They are fully aware of its
going forward. Nobody in the whole world has any real doubt about
what the intentions are. There was no indication that there was, as
you have indicated, a firm position taken that that would absolute-
ly violate the SALT agreement. I don't know where you get your
information. I have not been able to find any of that information. I
have not been able to find any information that any of our allies —
any of our allies, any of them, including the military people with
whom I met, from General Rogers to the German Command —
doubt that we are going ahead.
I don't know where you get your information. I don't know
where it comes from. You make these bald assertions. Quite frank-
ly, I find no s)mipathy for them. Please tell me what we can't do. I
have asked you this question before. What can we not do that you
feel needs to be done if this SALT Treaty goes forward and is
ratified?
Mr. RosTOW. Well, I just testified, and I put into my prepared
statement. Senator Biden, that the Russian view of the matter is,
and I have in front of me a State Department paper prepared for
Senator Stennis and the Armed Services Committee confirming
that
Senator Biden. Please read it to me. It would be helpful.
10
Mr. RosTOW. Yes.
MPS System in Relation to The Treaty Discussion. This issue was raised by the
Soviet delegation in Geneva in July 1978, referring to newspaper accounts concern-
ing the multiple aim point system using vertical shelters. The Soviets stated that it
appeared such a deployment would violate both the ban on construction of new
fixed ICBM silo launchers and the ban on deliberate concealment measures.
The United States delegation replied that no decision had been made regarding a
basing mode, but that whatever mode the United States adopted would be one that
violated neither of the provisions cited by the Soviets.
They further stated that:
A draft agreement expressly provided for the deployment after protocol expiration
of an ICBM system in which missiles and their launchers are moved from point to
point. The subject matter was not addressed again by the delegations.
Senator Biden. Right. That was 1978, a year ago. Since then we
have signed a treaty. Didn't you say that was July 1978?
Mr. RosTOW. Yes; that is what it says.
Senator Biden. All right. That was 1 year ago. In the meantime
there was a great deal of negotiation and the treaty was signed.
Mr. RosTOW. It says this issue was never raised again.
Senator Biden. But it was raised by us publicly. It was raised by
us throughout the world. We made what we are going to do clear.
There has been no response to it, indicating the Soviets objection.
Mr. RosTOW. Do you think that constitutes Soviet acceptance?
Senator Biden. I don't think the Soviets have to accept it. We go
forward with what we tell the world we are going to do, and what
we tell them we are going to do prior to the treaty's ratification.
Mr. RosTOW. Then they will say we violated the treaty,
Senator Biden. If they then say we have violated the treaty and
they want to pull out, then they can pull out. We have stated our
position. If in fact they respond by not saying anything and do not
physically or verbally respond to it, and we are able to go forward,
then they have acquiesced.
Mr. RosTOW. But Senator Biden, how do you reconcile these fixed
shelters with the definition of the launcher in article IV?
Senator Biden. Actually the way I reconcile it is that our De-
fense Department tells us we should not go the way you suggest
anyway. We should go the M-X route.
Mr. RosTOW. Well, very well, but on the M-X route, which mode
of deployment has the administration adopted as of August 1?
Senator Biden. They have not adopted one.
Mr. RosTOW. That is right.
Senator Biden. But the point is, we will adopt whatever our
military indicates to us is the best mode to adopt.
Mr. RosTOw. Within the limitations of the treaty.
Senator Biden. And all of them are within the limitations of the
treaty.
Mr. RosTOW. Well, Senator, I am sorry, but I cant agree with
you. I think that the Soviet analysis of the treaty is correct. To get
into a position under a treaty before it is ratified in which you
have a dispute with the Soviet Union as to its meaning on an
absolutely fundamental point is in my opinion a most unwise pro-
cedure. It may be, as you say, that this would put the onus of
abrogating the treaty on the other fellow, but that is not the object
of going into a treaty.
11
The object of going into a treaty of arms limitation is to clarify
things as much as possible and to help build mutual good faith and
trust.
Senator Biden. Precisely. We would clarify that.
My time is up. I will come back to that if there is time.
Senator Javits?
Senator Javits. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
RIGHT TO DEPLOY ICBM's IN NUMBERS WE DEEM NECESSARY
Professor Rostow, I notice in your statement you say something
which I would like to read into the record. You give your conclu-
sions, and the second conclusion reads:
That the Senate withhold its consent to the ratification of the treaty the Presi-
dent has submitted unless and until it is modified to meet its demonstrated deficien-
cies and the President and the Congress are firmly committed to a specific program
that will achieve and maintain essential equivalence and adequate deterrence.
I then look further in your statement in which you say that:
The Senate should not give its consent to the ratification of SALT II unless the
most important deficiencies of the treaty are modified by amendment: "Among the
deficiencies of the treaty requiring amendment, I should list first our right to deploy
ICBM's in modes and numbers we deem necessary to ensure survival against sur-
prise attack."
Now, isn't it a fact that if we ask for that, the Russians will too?
This is not a one-party game. In other words, they will ask for the
right to deploy whatever ICBM basing mode and numbers they
please. Mr. Rostow, is that a treaty, or are you engaging in a
charade with us?
You know very well, as well as I do, that there is no treaty the
minute they deploy as many as they want and we deploy as many
as we want. What are we talking about?
Mr. Rostow. I am not talking about a charade. I am not very
good at charades. Senator Javits. I am talking about a negotiation
to adjust the modes and numbers provided for in the treaty so that
we can deal with the problem of the vulnerability of the ICBM's
which has been so much discussed. I want to solve that problem
through agreement with the Russians. You ask whether the Soviets
won't ask for equal priviledges, of course. But they are already
deploying variable range mobile SS-20 missiles which are MIRVed,
and can reach the United States, but are not covered by the treaty.
The Soviet Union now has the capacity through its SS-20's in
Europe to reach the United States by a simple device, well, by two
simple devices, either by adding an extra booster to the SS-20 and
making it into an SS-16, or by substituting a single warhead on the
SS-20.
Now, we raise the question here as well in paragraph 3, to clarify
those points, of including the Soviet Backfire and the SS-20 within
the numerical limits of the treaty for that reason. We are trying
simply to point out consequences of this treaty as we analyze it
which would make it a much fairer, more equal, more balanced,
and more livable treaty. This is not a charade at all. This is dealing
with the most vital subject of our national security, the question of
whether the strategic balance on which the possibility of diplomat-
ic influence and the use of conventional force depends is going to
be tipped adversely to our interests.
1+8-260 0-79 Pt.4 - 2
12
Senator Javits. Professor, I asked you directly this: if we want to
build all the ICBM's that we choose to build under a treaty, don't
you expect the Russians to get the same right? Would you say yes
or no to that?
Mr. RosTOw. Senator Javits, I cannot say yes or no to that
because that is not what I said. I didn't say that we want to deploy
all the ICBM's we want. We want to deploy ICBM's in modes and
numbers we deem necessary to insure their survival, and we are
talking about negotiating an agreement with the Russians on that
point.
Senator Javits. And that is not equivalent to all we want as you
define it?
Mr. RosTOw. No, I am talking about negotiation. There is no
limit on ICBM production in the treaty. We are talking about using
them and being very direct with the Soviet Union. I am talking
about amendments, not unilateral declarations.
SIMPLY AGAINST THE TREATY
Senator Javits. My dear friend, you are talking about no treaty.
What I am trying to get you to say, because that is what you do
say, whether you are trying to avoid it or not, is, you are simply
against the treaty. You want no treaty. Why do you give us this
nonsense about renegotiation of a treaty with amendments when
you know that you are taking the whole heart out of the treaty
when there is no limit on us and no limit on them? We are just
playing with words.
Mr. RosTOW. Well, I haven't characterized the administration in
that way, but yes, I think it is a fair characterization.
Senator Javits. I am not saying it is the administration. I am
saying it is you, not the administration.
Mr. RosTOW. Well, there can be two opinions about that. I am
talking here, or was trying to talk here. Senator Javits, about
renegotiating this treaty. The treaty is not the essential point. The
essential point, as we tried to make clear in our statement is to
have a foreign policy and a defense policy that would secure the
interests of the Nation.
A fair and balanced and verifiable treaty might do that, but we
do not think that this treaty is fair, balanced, and verifiable, and
we think it would be a profound mistake for the Senate to approve
its ratification, to consent to its ratification in its present form.
Now, you can characterize that position as anything you like, of
course, but we have tried to make it clear in a succession of
statements going back to 1976 exactly what we are saying and why.
ARMAMENTS TREATY BETWEEN NATIONS THAT AGREE
Senator Javits. I have already given my view as to what you are
trying to do to this treaty. I wish that your organization, like other
organizations, would simply be frank about it and say you are
against it, and you believe that the only eventuality is for us to
make the maximum degree of preparation as rapidly as we can.
You gave your own analogy, and please correct me if I am wrong,
the only treaty that you believe can be an effective treaty to limit
13
armaments is between people who essentially agree with each
other. That excludes all treaties with the Russians.
So, should we just forget it and arm to the teeth and expect the
atomic war which is sure to come, as all of history has shown since
man began?
Mr. RosTOW. Senator Javits, in my reading of history war comes
when people feel they are losing control of the situation and when
one side becomes very much stronger than the other. Then they
strike out in desperation. The point was never better put than by
Thucydides about the causes of the Peloponnesian War, which
destroyed Greek civilization. He said, there were all sorts of epi-
sodes preceding that war, but the real cause of the war was the rise
in the power of Athens and the fear which this caused in Sparta.
Now, it is that fear which we are trying to overcome by urging
preparations for deterrent strength that would prevent war. The
Romans used to say, if you want peace, prepare for war, and we
say that in dealing with the Russians, there is no use getting
excited about it. The only way to deter them is to present, very
calmly, unacceptable risks. That is what we did in the Cuban
missile crisis in 1962. That is what we did in Berlin in 1948, and in
Greece, and in Turkey, and in a dozen other crises of the period.
We stood firm. We used conventional forces, and in the end, we
prevailed.
Now, the risk of war in my opinion is just the reverse of what
you say. I don't think that a SALT II Treaty would advance the
cause of peace any more than the SALT I Interim Agreement did.
The SALT I Interim Agreement was signed, and I think it was very
reasonable to sign it under the expectations of that period. I sup-
ported it. I support it now. But we have to recognize that all the
expectations on the basis of which we signed that treaty have been
betrayed.
That is to say, we were promised peace in Indochina and peace in
the Middle East, instead of which we got the reverse.
Senator Javits. All right. I see that my time is up. We can get
back to this.
Senator Biden. I will yield to you my time to keep up this line of
questioning.
Senator Javits. Thank you.
LEGAUTY OF ATTACKING RESERVATIONS
I am not yet myself committed to this treaty, but the administra-
tion, I think, has put it to us on the basis that we do not lose the
opportunity to go forward, but we put a cap at least on where we
both are. I don't see that you have answered that at all, and 1 will
tell you why, if I may.
I do not think that we are defining terms in the same way. Let
me give you a practical example. I notice in your testimony which
you made when you appeared before us in July, you were asked by
Senator Biden, "The vertical shelter game can be done, assuming
that we pass a reservation interpreting the verification provision so
as to allow the vertical shelter game." At that point you interrupt-
ed: "Mr. RosTOW. Mr. Chairman, a reservation has the same legal
effect as a letter from my mother."
Now, do you still maintain that position?
14
Mr. RosTOW. Yes.
Senator Javits. Why?
Mr. RosTOW. In the context of this kind of a treaty; that is, as
compared with a tax treaty or a multilateral treaty, a reservation
would have the most ambiguous and uncertain effect on the other
side. The Russians have said very openly that they would regard
such a reservation as a unilateral, domestic matter and would not
treat it as significant.
Senator Javits. Let me interrupt you. I would like to give you an
historical analogy. When the Russians signed the Non-Proliferation
Treaty, they announced publicly that they would not consider a
unified Europe to be a nuclear power even though France and
Britain were both nuclear powers and would be part of it. We
announced exactly the contrary at exactly the same time. That did
not invalidate the Non-Proliferation Treaty, did it? We both are
going to wait for the eventuality, and if either of us wanted to pull
out, we could.
Mr. RosTOW. My clear recollection is that we told the Russians
that if they said that a united Europe could not become a nuclear
power by virtue of the doctrine of succession in international law,
that the treaty was abrogated. That is the background of the
unilateral interpretations controversy over the 1972 agreement.
Now, it is not my recollection that the Russians ever made any
public announcement. I may be wrong — indeed, I often am — but
my recollection is that the Russians kept quiet on the issue after
both Rusk and Rogers testified.
Senator Javits. Well, there is no use in our arguing that, be-
cause that will just have to be corrected from the record, but my
recollection is exactly the contrary.
Mr. RosTOW. Very well.
INSISTENCE ON AMENDMENT TERMINOLOGY
Senator Javits. Now, the reservation proposition is a declaration
which is put into the instrument of ratification so that when we
ratify, we ratify with that reservation, and when they ratify they
ratify with that reservation in it. I don't understand why you want
the amendment business, except that you know as well as I do that
now the Russians have to face the proposition on amendments.
Brezhnev and Gromyko have said: "If you call it an amendment,
forget it, we can't take it, there is no treaty," so we are going to
call it a reservation. What is the difference? Do you just want to
call it an amendment to torpedo the treaty? Is that why you insist
on it?
Mr. RosTOW. After my exchange with Senator Biden, which you
just quoted, I checked with my colleagues, with professors of inter-
national law at the Yale Law School. They agree with me that a
reservation under these circumstances would not be binding on the
other party unless it were accepted, that silence would not be
acceptance, and therefore the reservation could not be regarded as
more than a unilateral statement for this kind of treaty.
There is no possibility that these issues would go to the courts. In
one of the leading American cases on the distinction between reser-
vations and amendments, the Court of Appeals for the Second
15
Circuit in New York threw out a reservation for a treaty on the
ground that it was not germane to the subject matter.
CIRCUMSTANCES MAKING RESERVATION INOPERATIVE
Senator Javits. Well, I think you are qualifying it. Now I am a
lawyer, too, and I don't know what circumstances you are talking
about. What are they? What are the particular circumstances that
make a reservation inoperative under this matter?
General Winn. Mind you, they have been included in the resolu-
tion of ratification which the President must do. He has no choice,
and therefore they will be part of the ratification papers of both
parties. I just do not understand that particular effort to attack
this matter.
UNILATERAL MATTER NOT BINDING SOVIETS
Mr. RosTOW. The Russians have already said that this is a uni-
lateral matter and it would not bind them.
Senator Javits. Professor Rostow, if this treaty is ended because
we don't agree on an interpretation, doesn't that suit you fine? You
wouldn't be complaining about it. You would love it. You are
against the treaty. Why are you debating with us as to what we
want to put in if we are for it? You are against it. So if it blows up,
you are delighted. You think it is good for the country.
Mr. RosTOW. Senator Javits, first of all, I have spent a large part
of my life trying to make agreements with the Russians. I was the
lend lease desk officer in the State Department during the war,
and developed the plan for the first reconstruction loans to the
Russians. Second, as you know very well, I am a professor. I cannot
resist the lure of an issue.
Senator Javits. Right, and I don't think you can resist the lure
of your own thinking either, whatever may be the realities of the
situation.
Mr. RosTOW. Well, that is a sin from which we all suffer. Sena-
tor. [General laughter.]
Senator Javits. Would you be good enough to submit a memo-
randum to us, a legal memorandum by you and your associates as
to why you believe that a reservation in this treaty has the same
legal effect as a letter from my mother?
Mr. RosTOW. All right, I shall be glad to do that. I shall be happy
to submit a legal memorandum to you. Senator.
[The following information was subsequently received for the
record:]
Yale Universit\-, Law School,
New Haven, Conn., September 27, 1979.
Senator Frank Church,
Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations,
U.S. Senate, Washington, D.C.
Dear Mr. Chairman: On September 6th, I was asked by Senator Biden, the
Acting Chairman, and by Senator Javits to comment on the staff analysis of the
comparative legal status of "amendments", "reservations", and "understandings"
with which the Senate might decide to qualify its consent to the ratification of
SALT n. The staff analysis appears in two memoranda sent to me by Frederick S.
Tipson, Esq., on September 14th. Mr. Tipson's letter and its enclosures arrived here
on September 24th. Mr. Tipson also called my attention to the Administration
position on these questions contained in an exchange between you and Secretary
16
Vance at p. 182 of Part 1 of your Hearings on the SALT II Treaty, and in answers to
questions on the subject at pp. 606-607 of the same volume.
I have consulted my colleagues Professors Myres S. McDougal, Robert H. Bork,
Joseph W. Bishop, Leon Lipson, and W. Michael Reisman on this issue, and I am
authorized to say that they join me in this letter.
Both our own usage and international practice have employed a number of words
to identify conditions imposed on the ratification of treaties, as the undated memo-
randum of Mssrs. Glennon and Tipson points out: amendments, reservations, unilat-
eral or common understandings, declarations, explanations, clarifications and so on.
Some may deal only with domestic legal or political problems, or indeed with
problems not germane to the subject matter of the treaty. For example, if the
Senate should condition its consent to the ratification of SALT II on an increase in
our own defense budget of 3%, 5%, or 10%, that condition— however it is labelled—
would not concern the Soviet Union, and obviously would not require its agreement.
On the other hand, the issues listed in my testimony on September 6th as
problems which should be clarified by the Senate before ratification do concern the
substance of the Treaty. They are matters on which the utmost precision is desir-
able in the interest of the great national objectives sought through the negotiation
of SALT IL ^ ^.
The heart of our disagreement with those who would deal with questions of this
order through "reservations" or "understandings" rather than "amendments" ap-
pears on p. 8 of the Glennon-Tipson memorandum, where the authors say that if
"reservations" or "understandings" adopted by the Senate as conditions to its con-
sent to ratification are included in the instrument of ratification, and if the Soviet
Union "proceeds with the exchange of instruments of ratification, its silence consti-
tutes assent to the treaties as modified by the United States." We believe it is
impossible to state the idea as a universal rule in this absolute form. Neither
international law nor political prudence justify placing so heavy a burden on the
interpretation of Soviet silence.
The supposed rule of assent through silence urged in the Glennon-Tipson memo-
randum does not correspond to the rule stated in Sections 124 and 126 of the
American Law Institute Restatement of the Foreign Relations Law of the United
States and in many other authoritative comments on International law. There is no
assurance that the construction favored by your advisers is widely accepted for the
modification of bilateral treaties. Even more important, there is every indication
that the Soviet Union does not accept such a rule, but continues to rely on -more
formal distinctions among amendments, reservations, and other forms of treaty
modification. . ,,
Soviet spokesmen say repeatedly that they do not care what reservations we
adopt, since "reservations" are entirely internal in their effect. SALT II concerns
matters of the highest possible importance to the security of the United States and
of many other nations. International law on this subject, never clear cut, is now in
flux, in large part because of the influence of certain obscure, potentially inconsist-
ent, and controversial provisions of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.
To assume that the future of SALT II would be governed by so simplistic a rule as
that stated in the Glennon-Tipson memorandum would be risky at best, and, on
matters essential to the security of the United States, foolhardy.
Traditionally, both international law and our own practice used different words to
identify somewhat different procedures for altering a Treaty during the ratification
process. "Amendment" was the least ambiguous word customarily used. When the
Senate consented to ratification with an amendment, it was understood that the
President would submit the proposed change in the text of the Treaty to the other
party or parties, and obtain his or their consent to the amendment prior to ratifica-
tion. "Reservation", on the other hand, was a more ambiguous word used in a
variety of contexts. Section 124 of the Restatement defines the word "reservation"
as "a formal declaration made by a signatory before it becomes bound by an
international agreement that the agreement will not be binding upon it except upon
terms that it regards as changing the effect of the agreement under international
law." International and American usage is, however, less strict than the Restate-
ment definition. Often, the word "reservation" denotes unconditional consent by the
Senate to ratification, subject to a proviso which could have different consequences
in different settings. It is most often used in connection with multilateral treaties.
"Understanding" and "interpretation" have been used in even more fluid ways.
Since the Glennon-Tipson memorandum seems to rely heavily on a paragraph of
Article 20 of the Vienna Convention, it should be noted that in this regard the
Convention is having a regressive effect on international law. It seems to lump all
forms of treaty emendation and alteration together as "Reservations". Thus it
multiplies doubts and ambiguities, and reduces clarity. Some experts believe that
17
the provisions of the convention on reservations apply only to multilateral treaties.
Others believe the purpose of the Convention is to deal with the problem universal-
ly. But all must concede that the purport and scope of the provisions are uncertain.
(The text of Articles 19 and 20 of the Vienna Convention appears in an Appendix
to this letter.)
In their language and range of reference, Sections 2-4 of Article 20 seem to refer
only to multilateral treaties. And the Commentary of the International Law Com-
mission on the Draft which became the Vienna Convention is clearly of the view
that the Convention would apply only to multilateral treaties, on the ground that "a
reservation to a bilateral treaty presents no problem, because it amounts to a new
proposal reopening the negotiations between the two states concerning the terms of
the treaty. If they arrive at an agreement whether adopting or rejecting the reser-
vation— the treaty will be concluded. If not, it will fall to the ground."
If however, these provisions of the Vienna Convention should be interpreted to
apply to bilateral treaties like SALT II, would Section 2 govern? Section 5? If they
do not apply, under what circumstances should agreement to a reservation be
inferred from silence during the ratification process, even after twelve months?
Customary international law is full of episodes of controversy, doubt and confusion.
In view of the unsettled character of international law on the subject at this time,
we believe that if the Senate wishes to condition its consent to the ratification of
SALT II on certain modifications, clarifications, or interpretations of the text before
it, it should proceed only upon the express condition that the Soviet Union formally
and explicitly agree to each of our proposals for change in its instrument of
ratification.
It is, however, clear both in Secretary Vance's comments to you at p. 182 of the
Hearings and from the State Department's statements on pp. 606-607 that the
Administration is rel3ring heavily on Soviet "silence" as an important part of the
cement of this Treaty, and on our capacity to denounce the Treaty as the sanction
behind our views. But where is the evidence that the Soviet Union accepts "silence"
as a modality for binding itself to solemn international agreements? Whatever
evidence we have seen goes the other way.
The melancholy history of the "unilateral interpretations" of the Interim Agree-
ment on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms put forward by Administration
spokesman in 1972 is enough to warn against reliance on such a procedure. In that
case the Soviet Union remained silent while we expounded our interpretations of
the Agreement. They then violated the agreement as we interpreted it. Despite our
repeated statements to the contrary, we did not denounce the Agreement. Too much
was deemed to be at stake to make such a course advisable. Furthermore, our
capacity to denounce such a Treaty at will was thought to be at least doubtful, in
the absence of a violation of an unambiguous and major term of the Treaty by the
other party. Gray v. United States, 21 Ct. CI. 340 (1886).
It is clear from the debate that many people prefer to label Senate conditions to
its consent as "reservations" rather than "amendments", despite the uncertainties
such a course would generate, because they are afraid that the Soviet Union would
simply refuse to negotiate any further in order to resolve questions which might be
raised by the Senate. It is almost inconceivable that the United States Senate would
adopt such a posture after mature reflection. As President Kennedy once said, "the
United States should never negotiate out of fear, and should never be afraid to
negotiate." Surely we should never knuckle under to a position of "Take it or leave
it", or any other form of ultimatum.
"The Senate should reach its conclusions about SALT II in terms of its analysis of
the Treaty's impact on our foreign and defense policies as a whole. If it finds there
are certain issues on which it would be desirable to alter the text, or to obtain
clarification from the Soviet Union, it should proceed to state those points in a form
that would require the unequivocal and explicit concurrence of the Soviet Union.
The notion that we should hesitate to raise fundamental questions for further
discussion with any nation out of fear is repugnant to our nature and to our history.
If the Soviet Union were as arbitrary and unreasonable as some spokesmen for the
Administration seem to think, no agreement with it would be worth having.
Yours sincerely,
Eugene V. Rostow.
The signatories to this letter, all members of the Yale Law School faculty, are:
Myres S. McDougal.
Robert H. Bork.
Joseph W. Bishop.
Leon Lipson.
William M. Reisman.
Eugene V. Rostow.
18
Appendix— Vienna CkJNVENTiON on the Law of Treaties
ARTICLE 19 — formulation OF RESERVATIONS
A State may, when signing, ratifying, accepting, approving or acceding to a
treaty, formulate a reservation unless:
(a) The reservation is prohibited by the treaty;
(b) The treaty provides that only specified reservations, which do not include
the reservation in question, may be made; or
(c) In cases not falling under sub-paragraphs (a) and (b), the reservation is
incompatible with the object and purpose of the treaty.
ARTICLE 20 — ACCEPTANCE OF AND OBJECTION TO RESERVATIONS
1. A reservation expressly authorized by a treaty does not require any subsequent
acceptance by the other contracting States unless the treaty so provides.
2. When it appears from the limited number of the negotiating States and the
object and purpose of a treaty that the application of the treaty in its entirety
between all the parties is an essential condition of the consent of each one to be
bound by the treaty, a reservation requires acceptance by all the parties.
3. When a treaty is a constituent instrument of an international organization and
unless it otherwise provides, a reservation requires the acceptance of the competent
organ of that organization.
4. In cases not falling under the preceding paragraphs and unless the treaty
otherwise provides:
(a) Acceptance by another contracting State of a reservation constitutes the
reserving State a party to the treaty in relation to that other State if or when
the treaty is in force for those States;
(b) An objection by another contracting State to a reservation does not pre-
clude the entry into force of the treaty as between the objecting and reserving
States unless a contrary intention is definitely expressed by the objecting State;
(c) An act expressing a State's consent to be bound by the treaty and contain-
ing a reservation is effective as soon as at least one other contracting State has
accepted the reservation.
5. For the purposes of paragraphs 2 and 4 and unless the treaty otherwise
provides, a reservation is considered to have been accepted by a State if it shall
have raised no objection to the reservation by the end of a period of twelve months
after it was notified of the reservation or by the date on which it expressed its
consent to be bound by the treaty, whichever is later.
Foreign Relations Committee Staff Memorandum of June 25, 1979 Referred
TO IN Mr. Rostow's Letter
Memorandum to: Members, Committee on Foreign Relations.
From: Michael J. Glennon and Frederick S. Tipson.
Subject: SALT II— Legal and Procedural Issues.
This is a preliminary summary of legal and procedural issues relating to the
SALT II Treaty. It attempts to clarify certain basic questions regarding Senate
consideration of the treaty and identifies other issues for more detailed considera-
tion in subsequent memoranda. Still other issues will undoubtedly arise in the
course of the debate and we will respond to particular inquiries as quickly as
possible.
The following subjects are addressed:
1. The Treaty and Associated Documents.
2. Consideration by the Senate.
3. Presidential Alternatives after Senate Action.
4. Soviet Ratification and Modification.
I. THE treaty and RELATED DOCUMENTS: LEGAL STATUS AND ANALYSIS
President Carter signed the SALT II Treaty in Vienna on June 18. As a signatory,
the United States is not legally bound to the terms of the treaty, but under
international law it is generally accepted that a treaty signatory undertakes in good
faith a) to proceed with the process of ratification in accordance with its own
constitutional law, and b) to refrain from acts which would defeat the object and
purpose of the treaty during a reasonable interim period.
The President has asked for Senate advice and consent only to the Treaty and
Protocol, presented as a single document. The Protocol is regarded as an "integral
part" of the treaty itself and is distinguished by its earlier expiration date: 1981
rather than 1985. (The 1972 SALT Interim Agreement contained a Protocol on
19
submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and the 1972 ABM Treaty was amended with
a Protocol in 1974.)
The President's formal letter of transmittal contains, in addition to the Secretary
of State's report on the purpose and provisions of the agreement, the following
documents:
1. Agreed Statements and Common Understandings, relating to particular articles
in both the Treaty and the Protocol;
2. A Memorandum of Understanding by the two sides certifying the figures on
their present numbers of strategic offensive systems, in accordance with article 17(3)
of the Treaty;
3. A Joint Statement of Principles agreed upon by Presidents Carter and Brezhnev
representing their general objectives with respect to further SALT negotiations;
4. A memorandum from the Secretary of State communicating the exchange of
statements on the Soviet "Backfire" bomber which took place at the Vienna summit
meeting in June.
These four documents, according to the President's letter of transmittal, have
been transmitted "for the information of the Senate," not for its advice and consent.
Under Senate precedent, such instruments are not susceptible of amendment in the
strict sense.' However, the Senate could "reach" such documents by conditioning its
advice and consent in one of several ways. First, it could amend the Treaty to
incorporate the terms of a collateral agreement (or an amended version thereof^
within the text of the Treaty itself — as it did in the case of the Carter-Torrijos
"Joint Statement" regarding the Panama Canal Neutrality Treaty. Second, it could
insist in a reservation that the terms of a collateral agreement be modified in
accordance with its instructions prior to ratification. Third, it could announce in a
reservation or understanding that it regards the provisions of a collateral agree-
ment or assurance as equal in status to the Treaty itself and consents to ratification
subject to that understanding. All such conditions, of course, would have to be
accepted by the Soviet Union prior to the exchange of the instruments of ratifica-
tion.
In the absence of explicit conditions attached by the Senate, the status and effect
of collateral or derivative agreements would be governed by international legal
principles of treaty interpretation. Thus, the Treaty would be interpreted in light of
the negotiating context including those agreements made or assurances offered in
connection with its conclusion. Subsequent agreements between the parties regard-
ing the interpretation or application of treaty provisions would also be taken into
account.
1. The Agreed Statements and Common Understandings comprise, in effect, a set
of supplementary agreements designed to elaborate the meaning of particular arti-
cles in both the Treaty and the Protocol. Earlier in the negotiations, "Agreed
Statements" were considered to have a somewhat higher standing than "Common
Understandings," but the Administration no longer suggests that there is any legal
or political basis for distinguishing between them. Similar terms were used in
connection with the SALT I agreements, but unlike SALT I, there are no "unilater-
al statements" by either side and all Agreed Statements and Common Understand-
ings have been signed by both sides.
2. The Memorandum of Understanding on the Establishment of a Data Base on
the Numbers of Strategic Offensive Arms relates to Article 17(3) of the Treaty. By
the terms of that article, the Parties agree to maintain such a data base on an
ongoing basis through the Standing Consultative Commission. The "M.O.U." itself
contains figures on strategic arms as of November 1, 1978. In accordance with an
earlier understanding, these figures were updated as of the date of treaty signature
(June 18, 1979), and these updated figures are contained in accompanying submis-
sions of each side.
3. The Joint Statement of Principles and Basic Guidelines for Subsequent Negotia-
tions on the Limitation of Strategic Arms, though agreed to by both sides, is not by
its nature a binding legal agreement. It represents a set of general common objec-
tives rather than specific undertakings. A comparable joint statement of principles
' The chair noted on March 24, 1922, during the consideration of a treaty with the British
Empire, France and Japan concerning their insular possessions in the Pacific Ocean, that a
declaration of the signatories as to their understanding and intent made at the time the treaty
was signed was not a part of the treaty and not subject to amendment. Cong. Rec, March 24,
1922 at p. 4496. Similarly, the chair (Vice President Mondale, presiding), in response to a
parliamentary inquiry by Sen. Allen at the outset of the debate on the Panama Canal Treaties,
stated that only "the body of the treaty, including all of the articles, annexes thereto, protocols
to it, et cetera, is before the Senate for consideration and therefore amendable." Cong. Rec, Feb.
8, 1978 at p. SiSOO. "Other documents," the chair stated, "would not be subject to amendments."
Id.
20
for the SALT II negotiations was issued at the Washington summit meeting of June
21, 1973.
4. The section of the President's submission to the Senate headed "Soviet Backfire
Statement" comprises, in effect, a memorandum of the Secretary of State certifying
the exchange of statements (written and oral) regarding Soviet production and
deployment of the Backfire (TU-22M) bomber which took place at the summit
meeting in June. The form of the exchange apparently was negotiated in advance,
with the U.S. signature of the Treaty conditioned upon Soviet acceptance of the
restrictions contained in their written statement on the Backfire. The nature of this
agreement raises a number of legal questions. Because of the special role of the
Secretary of State in negotiating and communicating this exchange, it will be
important to clarify his own expectations regarding the Backfire statements.
Unilateral written or oral declarations can provide the basis for binding commit-
ments under international law and diplomatic practice, especially if the State
making them expects another State to rely upon them. In this case, U.S. reliance
upon the Soviet assurances is made explicit. However, it is not clear whether the
Soviets would regard the violation of this understanding as equivalent to a violation
of the Treaty itself. It is also not clear whether the Soviet undertakings are limited
to the period of the Treaty only— i.e., whether their effective date and termination
date are identical to those of the Treaty.
Finally, the Secretary of State's Report to the President refers to President
Carter's affirmation "that the United States has the right to an aircraft comparable
to Backfire" (p. 35), but this affirmation does not appear in the Secretary's memo-
randum recording the exchange of statements in Vienna (p. 73). In view of the
careful orchestration of these statements, it is not evident why it was not included.
Therefore, it is not apparent whether U.S. development and deployment of a compa-
rable bomber would be subject to the same restrictions on capability and production
rate as the Backfire.
II. SENATE CONSIDERATION OF THE TREATY
Upon transmittal to the Senate, the Treaty will be routinely referred to the
Committee on Foreign Relations, which has exclusive jurisdiction over all treaties
under Rule 25. Ij of the Standing Rules of the Senate. While another Committee
may hold hearings on certain aspects of the agreement, treaties are never referred,
jointly or sequentially, to any Committee other than Foreign Relations.
A. Consideration by the committee
Committee rules make no special provision for the handling of treaties. Thus,
unless the Committee determines otherwise, the same procedure followed during the
consideration of other measures will be followed in considering the SALT II Treaty.
The Committee will have before it two items: the text of the Treaty (including the
Protocol and perhaps other documents considered part of the Treaty), and the
Resolution of Ratification. The latter can be introduced beforehand or reported as
an original resolution; the procedural difference is described in part B below.
The Senate may grant its advice and consent conditionally, and if the Committee
wishes to recommend that it do so, two kinds of conditions are available. The first is
an amendment to the text of the Treaty itself. The second is an amendment to the
Resolution of Ratification. Amendments to the Resolution are typically designated
reservations, understandings, interpretations, declarations, and statements. These
are also discussed in more detail below. If it approves the Treaty, the Committee
will thus report two instruments to the Senate: (1) the Treaty itself, with or without
amendments; and (2) the Resolution of Ratification, with or without amendments-^
Treaties are placed on the executive calendar of the Senate in the order reported
and are taken up in that order. A motion to proceed to the consideration of
executive business is in order at any time and is not debatable unless any other
treaty is already on the executive calendar, in which case a motion to proceed to
consideration of the SALT Treaty would be debatable.
^ During consideration of the Panama Canal Treaties, the Carter-Tornjos Joint Statement was
incorporated in the Neutrality Treaty in the form of two "leadership amendments. The
Committee had declined to adopt these amendments formally so as to allow other Senators the
opportunity to join in their co-sponsorship; instead, it voted to recommend to the Senate that it
incorporate the amendments. The procedural effect was minimal; the amendments were as a
result noor amendments, rather than Committee amendments. Thus, they were not moved by
the Floor Manager and did not have priority over other amendments (see part B below).
21
B. Senate floor action
I. Types of conditions
As discussed above, two types of conditions may be imposed by the Senate upon
its consent: amendments to the text of the Treaty itself, and amendments to the
Resolution of Ratification.
a. Textual amendments. — An amendment to the text of a treaty is in one sense
similar to an amendment to a bill — it may strike out certain language in the treaty
and insert other language in lieu thereof; it may do the same with respect to
numbers appearing in the treaty; or, it may add new articles or sections, or delete
entire articles or sections. On the other hand, unlike a bill a treaty is not directly
modified by the Senate; rather, the Senate gives its consent upon the condition that
an amendment be made, and the treaty is actually amended by the President, who
does so upon bringing the treaty into force.
b. Amendments to the Resolution of Ratification. — Amendments to the Resolution
of Ratification may be designated as follows:
i. "Reservation". — A reservation modifies or limits the substantive effect of one or
more of the treaty provisions. It in effect adds something of substance to the treaty
or takes something of substance from it, and gives notice that the United States will
not, in that respect, give effect to the treaty except in accordance with the reserva-
tion.
The text of a treaty thus need not be amended explicitly in order to effect a
change in its substance. An implicit but equally effective amendment may be
achieved through a reservation or even an understanding (see below). The Senate
may provide by reservation, for example, that a certain provision will be without
force and effect; such a reservation would be the functional legal equivalent of an
amendment to the text of the treaty which strikes out the provision line by line.
ii. "Understanding". — An understanding is a statement which is not intended to
modify or limit any of the provisions of the treaty. Rather, it is intended to clarify
or explain a treaty provision or to deal with some other matter incidental to the
operation of the treaty in a manner other than in a substantive reservation. Some-
times an understanding is no more than a statement of policies or principles or an
indication of general procedures for carrying out provisions of the treaty. An under-
standing may relate to the rights and obligations of either party; like a reservation,
it need not be limited to the rights and obligations of the party entering the
understanding. Understandings are also on occasion called "interpretations". As
noted above, however, their practical effect may be the same as a reservation.
iii. "Declarations" and other statements. These are used most often when it is
considered essential or desirable to give notice of certain matters of policy or
principle, without an intention of derogating from the substantive rights or obliga-
tions stipulated in the treaty. "Explanations", "clarifications", and "recommenda-
tions" are other designations which occasionally have been used.
2. Procedure
Rule 37 of the Standing Rules of the Senate (attached) governs the consideration
of treaties. The procedure to be followed in the Senate, and options available to it if
it wishes the Treaty modified, are as follows:
The Senate will first consider the Treaty as in "Committee of the Whole." (The
Committee of the Whole procedure may be avoided only by unanimous consent or
by suspension of the rules.) At this stage, the Senate will go through the Treaty
article by article, at which time amendments to each article may be offered; there is
no vote on each article as such. Amendments recommended by the Committee on
Foreign Relations will be considered first, after which other amendments may be
offered. The Treaty is amendable in two degrees (i.e., amendments to amendments)
and all votes are by a majority of those present.
Only actual amendments to the text of the Treaty will be in order during the
Committee of the Whole proceeding. Amendments to the Resolution of Ratifica-
tion— i.e., reservations, understandings, etc. — are therefore not in order at this
stage. Articles of the Treaty are considered in numerical order, with consideration
of the Protocol following considering of the Treaty. Amendments may not be offered
to Articles that have not yet been taken up, but may be offered to Articles previous-
ly considered once the entire treaty has been considered in the Committee of the
Whole proceeding.
After the Senate has considered each article of the Treaty for possible amend-
ment, it will, in effect, "dissolve itself from the Committee of the Whole and then
vote a second time on each of the amendments (if any) passed earlier. (The Senate
may accept all the amendments by a single vote only with unanimous consent.)
Entirely new amendments may also be offered at this stage.
22
Following a wait of one day, the Resolution of Ratification is taken up, which will
automatically incorporate any amendments to the text of the Treaty. At that point,
amendments to the Resolution of Ratification itself are in order. Amendments to
the Resolution must be approved by a simple majority. Like amendments to the text
of the Treaty, they are amendable in only one degree. The vote on advice and
consent, which requires the approval of two-thirds of those present and voting,
occurs after the Senate has concluded consideration of the Resolution of Ratifica-
tion. All votes on amendments, reservations, understandings, etc., require only a
majority vote for approval.
Several additional procedural matters should be noted at this point.
Cloture.— The cloture and germaneness provisions of Senate Rule 22 (attached)
apply to the consideration of treaties. Thus, in the absence of cloture, an amend-
ment to a Treaty article need not be germane to that article. Cloture, if invoked,
would pertain to all aspects of the process: the Committee of the Whole and action
on both the Treaty and the Resolution of Ratification. The rule of germaneness
would then apply. .. . , , j .
Closed sessions.— A motion to consider the Treaty in secret ( with closed doors )
may be made at any time by any Senator and requires only a second. In accordance
with Senate rule 35 (attached), no vote is taken on such a motion; in contrast, a
motion to return to open session, while non-debatable, requires a majority vote.
Recommittal.— The concept of "recommittal" has been used, somewhat loosely, in
reference to two quite different procedural steps: returning the Treaty to the Com-
mittee on Foreign Relations for reconsideration (possibly with instructions), and
returning it to the President for renegotiation with the Soviets. The former repre-
sents a simple "motion to recommit" and is in order at any time prior to the final
vote on the Resolution of Ratification. The latter is more complex: a treaty may be
returned to the President only through the adoption of an order by unanimous
consent, or a resolution by simple majority. However, such a resolution would
normally be referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations.
III. PRESIDENTIAL ALTERNATIVES AFTER SENATE ACTION
Senate action on the SALT II Treaty could take any one of a number of courses,
each of which presents the President with various alternatives.
A. Senate consent without conditions
The Senate may grant its consent without imposing any conditions, as is done
with the great majority of treaties. If so, the President may then proceed immedi-
ately to ratify the Treaty. Contrary to popular impression, the Senate does not
"ratify" treaties as such— it gives its "consent" to ratification by the President.
Senate consent constitutes authorization, rather than a directive, to bring the treaty
into force. The President may, moreover, withdraw a treaty for which he has
requested Senate consent at any time prior to the final vote on advice and consent.
Ratification occurs upon the exchange of "instruments of ratification' with the
other signatory; these are documents indicating each state's intent to be bound and
containing any conditions either state may impose. In the case of bilateral treaties.
United States practice has been to execute a "Protocol of Exchange" as well, which
is a document signed by both states indicating that each has examined the instru-
ments of a ratification tendered by the other and that each accepts the conditions, if
any, imposed by the other.
B. Senate consent with conditions
In the event that the Senate conditions its advice and consent upon the accept-
ance of certain amendments, reservations, or understandings, the President has
several options: ,,,. .. .c 4.u rr +
1. Consider the conditions unacceptable and decline to ratify the Ireaty;
2. Reopen negotiations with the Soviet Union and seek their acceptance of the
conditions;
3. Submit a new Treaty to the Senate; or
4. Resubmit the original Treaty.
Several additional issues arise in connection with the various conditions which
the Senate may impose upon its consent: xu o i *•
Presidential objection to the resolution.— Frior to the final vote on the Resolution
of Ratification, the President may decide that amendments or other conditions
already attached to the Resolution make it unacceptable to him. He may then
request those siding with him to vote against the Resolution, rather than to risk
Senate advice and consent with unacceptable conditions. (This situation occurred
when the Versailles Treaty failed to receive a two-thirds vote because of President
Wilson's opposition to Senate approval with the so-called "Lodge Reservations. )
23
Requirement of Presidential transmittal. — With the possible exceptions of a condi-
tion relating solely to a matter of domestic concern (e.g., that a given treaty will be
non-self-executing) and a statement not germane to the treaty, the President is
required to include each Senate-added condition in the instrument of ratification
given the other signatory. "That such conditions must be so included," the Commit-
tee said in its report on the Panama Canal Treaties, "is as much a part of custom-
ary constitutional law in this country as the right of the Senate to grant conditional
consent." Ex. Kept. No. 95-12, Feb. 3, 1978 at p. 11.
Acceptance of United States conditions by the Soviet Union. — Instruments of ratifi-
cation are not exchanged until the views of the other government concerning
United States conditions have been obtained. If the Soviet Union proceeds with the
exchange of instruments of ratification, its silence constitutes assent to the treaties
as modified by the United States. If the Soviet Union objects to any such condition,
however, the treaty may not, in accordance with traditional United States practice,
be brought into force by the President. The United States practice of executing a
"Protocol of Exchange" incorporating any conditions attached prior to final ratifica-
tion makes certain that Soviet acceptance or rejection of Senate conditions will be
clear.
Right of rejection by the Soviet Union. — Any condition imposed by the United
States upon its consent to a treaty gives rise to a right of rejection by the Soviet
Union which has agreed tentatively only to the version it signed. A condition is thus
analogous to a counteroffer in the law of contracts. It may, if the "offeree" so
chooses, require that negotiations be reopened, be rejected outright, or, if the offeree
accepts it, bring a legally different agreement into effect.
Significance of the label. — From a strictly legal standpoint the particular label
attached to a condition is not determinative. Whether called an "amendment,"
"reservation," "understanding," "declaration," or something else, any condition im-
posed by the United States upon its consent to be bound may be rejected by the
Soviet Union as incompatible with the original agreement. Alternatively, once
accepted, every condition becomes binding along with the provisions of the treaty
itself. The significance of a label, as distinguished from the substance of the condi-
tion, is therefore more "political" than legal. While a condition designated an
"understanding" or an "interpretation" would be no less effective legally in condi-
tioning United States ratification than the same condition labeled a "reservation,"
or even one cast in terms of an amendment to the Treaty text, it might be regarded
by the Soviets as less offensive politically and thus be more easily accepted by them.
Practically speaking, therefore, it is the Soviet leadership which will judge the
acceptability of any condition attached to the Treaty, which may be influenced by
its designation (see part IV below.)
C. Senate inaction
The Senate may simply decline to act on the Treaty, as it has in the case of a
number of other treaties. In such event, a treaty simply remains on the Senate's
Executive Calendar unless and until withdrawn by the President or returned to him
by the Senate.
D. Senate rejection
The Senate may decline to approve the Treaty by failing to accord it the requisite
two-thirds vote of approval. This has occurred only 11 times in our history, the most
recent occasion being in 1960.^ Where a final vote on the resolution of ratification
fails to achieve the requisite two-thirds, the Senate customarily adopts a resolution
returning the treaty to the President.
The Treaty may, of course, be resubmitted thereafter by the President. Two
additional options have lately received some attention in the press. One would be to
resubmit the SALT agreement for approval by joint resolution — i.e., as a so-called
Congressional-Executive agreement. The SALT I Interim Agreement on offensive
weapons was handled this way from the outset and might be cited as a precedent.
However, the Senate may take a dim view of this approach.
The other option occasionally mentioned would be for the President to issue a
unilateral statement announcing the intention of the United States to adhere to the
provisions of the defeated Treaty. Prior to the October 1977 expiration of the SALT
I Interim Agreement on offensive arms, the United States and the Soviet Union
each declared its intent to observe the limitations of the agreement as long as the
other did so. While the Administration did not claim that such parallel declarations
constituted commitments "binding" the United States, and some Senators defended
the President's action as within his Constitutional power, others criticized the
' The Dispute Settlement Protocol to the 1958 Conventions on the Law of the Sea.
24
approach as a circumvention of appropriate constitutional procedures, and a viola-
tion of section 33 of the Arms Control and Disarmament Act.^
Concern about such an approach to SALT II has centered not only on Presidential
declarations following rejection of the treaty, but also on any attempt by the
Administration to extend the limitations of the Protocol beyond its expiration date
at the end of 1981. The Administration has conceded on several occasions (most
recently during testimony before the Committee on the treaty termination issue)
that treaties and treaty provisions may not be formally extended or amended by
executive agreement or parallel declarations.' This issue will be considered in a
later memorandum.
IV. SOVIET TREATY RATIFICATION AND MODIFICATION
It is not clear whether the Soviets will proceed to ratify the SALT II Treaty in
advance of Senate consideration. Treaties are ratified for the Soviet Union by the
Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, the country's parliament. While this procedure is
generally deemed to be merely a formality, it is probably the stage at which the
Soviets would attach conditions of their own in response to conditions that might be
imposed by the Senate. In the case of the SALT I Agreements, the Presidium did
not act until the Senate (on the ABM Treaty) and the Senate and House (on the
Interim Agreement) had approved them.
With the possible exception of a matter of purely domestic concern or a statement
not germane to the treaty, if the Soviet Union ratifies the SALT II Treaty subject to
a condition, the text of the condition must be communicated to the President of the
Senate to obtain Senate approval for the acceptance thereof (if the President wishes
to accept the reservation or amendment). If, prior to receipt of notification concern-
ing the condition, the Senate has already given its consent to ratification of the
SALT II Treaty, the express consent of the Senate to acceptance of the condition
must be obtained before proceeding to exchange the instruments of ratification. If
the Senate still has the Treaty under consideration at the time the notification is
given, the Senate's consent to acceptance of the reservation may be either express
or implied; that is, if the Senate, with knowledge of the reservation, advises and
consents to United States ratification without reference to a Soviet reservation of
which it is aware, Senate approval may be inferred. (See page 23 for discussion of
the procedure for Soviet acceptance of Senate conditions.)
Senator Biden. After Senator Stone asks his questions, I will
read you our legal memorandum relating to reservations.
Senator Stone?
Senator Stone. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
USE OF MPS FOR EXISTING LAND-BASED MISSILES
Professor Rostow, regardless of the niceties of the form in which
a modification of this SALT II Treaty ought to take and which we
will explore, the substantive issue here is, should we modify the
treaty to specifically permit the use of multiple protective shelters
for our existing land-based missiles? Is it correct that your position
is that we need to do that because of the vulnerability of our land-
based missiles to first strike by the Soviet Union during the life of
this treaty?
Mr. RosTOW. Yes, sir.
DETERRENCE OF SOVIET FIRST STRIKE
Senator Stone. People say, why should we spend all of this
money to protect these existing missiles. Really, don't we have
* Section 33 provides that "no action shall be taken under this or any other law that will
obligate the United States to disarm or to reduce or to limit the Armed Forces or armaments of
the United States, except pursuant to the treaty-making power of the President under the
Constitution or unless authorized by further affirmative legislation by the Congress of the
United States."
= See, e.g., the testimony of the Justice Department spokesman on page 220 of the Committee's
"Treaty Termination" hearings.
25
enough other missiles apart from those that could be destroyed in a
first strike to deter the Soviets from even contemplating a first
strike? What is your answer to that?
Mr. RoSTOW. My answer to that is this: It is a question of
numbers. The threat to blow up Soviet cities and population had a
certain credibility during the period of our nuclear monopoly, and
then of our very great nuclear superiority, but as former Secretary
Kissinger has emphasized, both in his statement here and in his
statement in Brussels last week, as Soviet nuclear parity was ap-
proached, and then as Soviet nuclear superiority is threatened,
that possibility of retaliation in that way steadily loses its credibil-
ity.
I have never been much impressed with the possibility that an
American President would actually do it, but I think he certainly
would not do it, and no one would believe that he would do it,
knowing that the Soviet Union had enough accurate missiles in
reserve to blow up our own cities. That would be suicidal and
irrational and no one would believe it would be done. The threat to
do it would have no deterrent effect, and if we ever allowed such a
situation to develop, we should be impotent.
REASON FOR DEPLOYMENT OF MOBILE MISSILES
Senator Stone. Is that the reason why the administration is
proposing to build and deploy mobile missiles, the M-X missile?
Mr. RosTOW. Yes.
Senator Stone. Precisely what you just said?
Mr. RosTOw. That is exactly right.
Senator Stone. And is what you are saying that that same
doctrine must be extended to the period of our vulnerability in the
early and mid-1980's?
Mr. RosTow. That is correct.
PROVOKE SOVIETS TO GO FOR MULTIPLE PROTECTIVE SHELTERS
Senator Stone. Suppose we did it. Suppose we did take for our-
selves the legal right to deploy our existing land-based missiles in
multiple protective shelters or in a multiple mode during the eight-
ies? It is then said by opponents of this option that we would
provoke the Soviets into doing likewise and more so, and that that
would lessen our security and increase our risk. What is your
answer to that?
In other words, they will go for the multiple protective shelter.
They will hide even more effectively in their closed society than we
will hide, and we will therefore be more at risk than before. What
about that?
Mr. RosTOW. As I brought out in my colloquy with Senator
Javits, the Soviets are now deploying mobile MIRVed SS-20's
which are causing great alarm in Europe and which can readily be
converted into missiles that can reach the United States as well.
Mobile missiles are very difficult for us to target and very difficult
for us to knock out. When you add this capacity to the Soviet
stockpile of extra missiles stored in unknown sites, in effect, they
are already doing the equivalent of what we are proposing.
26
Now, it may be, as many people have contended, that the devel-
opment of technology, nuclear technology, has made security
through verifiable arms control methods nearly impossible, and
that soon, hopefully as soon as possible, the Soviet Union the
United States, and other nations which have become nuclear
powers will recognize the folly of the entire development and go
back to the ideas of the Baruch plan which we proposed immediate-
ly after the war, a very wise proposal of which I am very proud.
We, while holding a nuclear monopoly, proposed to international-
ize nuclear weapons and nuclear science. They are becoming very
complicated. They are becoming very dangerous, and they are pro-
liferating all over the place. I have always favored and will always
favor such an approach as soon as the Soviet Union is ready to
accept it.
Senator Stone. Professor Rostow, may I say that I completely
agree with protecting our land-based missiles with multiple protec-
tive shelters of one kind or another during the period of our
vulnerability. I agree with that, but I want to address these argu-
ments that have been raised so that whatever form it takes, the
committee, the Senate, and the country will feel, as you do and as I
do, that we ought to do this.
CHANGE FROM MAD STRATEGY TO COUNTERFORCE
You are saying that we should convert our strategy from a
mutual assured destruction strategy in which our missiles kill
people and their missiles kill people to where, since their missiles
can now in the next year or two destroy our missiles, then our
missiles should be able to destroy their missiles as opposed to
people. That is counterforce strategy, right?
Mr. RosTOW. Right.
Senator Stone. So I return to this issue which I just raised with
you. If they can go mobile more effectively than we can, how can
they by putting in the MPS have a good counterforce? Will it be
sufficiently a counterforce if we protect our current land-based
missiles to give us a credible counterforce at all, or have we gotten
so far behind that we don't even get that with the multiple protec-
tive shelter?
Mr. Rostow. I am not now, nor have I ever been an expert on
arms, and I do not pretend to be, but my experience has been on
this side of the river in the State Department, and I am concerned
with the political effect of these weapons, but the people I know
best who are experts on arms tell me that they believe that for this
transition period this is the most feasible and quickest way to
assure our ICBM's against the possibility of destruction, which
could be the basis of nuclear coercion and nuclear threat.
Their arguments seem to be reasonable, as a practical matter.
EQUAL CREDIBILITY IN OUR STRATEGIC POSTURE
Senator Stone. Professor, is what you are arguing for equal
credibility in our strategic posture as compared to the Soviets'
credibility as to their strategic posture? You are not arguing for
firing any of these things?
Mr. Rostow. No, I am arguing for a stalemate.
27
Senator Stone. You are arguing for a proper stalemate or for
what they call these days a rough equivalency, but in this case a
rough equivalency of counterforce credibility.
Mr. RosTOW. That is absolutely correct. We are arguing for a
stalemate, for the nonuse of these weapons, to guarantee against
their either being used or being brandished.
Senator Stone. During the life of this treaty?
Mr. RosTOW. During the life of this treaty, and above all during
the period of the early 1980's when, as a result of a series of
decisions made by President Carter we face what everyone seems
to agree are very grave risks. How do we deal with those risks in
this period, and how do we deal with these risks in the long run?
BASIC FIREPOWER WOULD BE CREDIBLE DETERRENT
Senator Stone. Doesn't that also provide somewhat of an answer
to the question I raised about the capability of the Soviets to deploy
mobile missiles during the period, and that is that during this
period, the basic firepower would be a credible deterrent because of
the number of mobile missiles that the Soviets could deploy during
the period, during the treaty period?
Mr. RosTOW. Absolutely.
Senator Stone. Thank you. I see that my time is up.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Biden. Professor, I have several questions. First, I have a
question from Senator Percy, who cannot be here this morning. He
would like me to ask it of you and of Admiral Moorer when he
testifies.
television coverage of the salt DEBATE
His question is whether or not the groups which you gentlemen
represent, in this case the Committee on the Present Danger, favor
television coverage of the SALT debate. That is the question. Does
your group favor television coverage of the SALT debate on the
floor of the Senate?
Mr. RosTOW. The group has taken no position on the question,
and therefore I cannot speak for the executive committee of the
Committee on the Present Danger, but personally I do favor such
coverage.
Senator Biden. Thank you.
BINDING EFFECT OF SENATE RESERVATIONS ON U.S.S.R
Now, with regard to the binding effect of Senate reservations on
the U.S.S.R., let me read to you from a memorandum, and then we
can exchange memoranda.
Mr. RosTOW. I shall be grateful for a copy of it.
Senator Biden. It says:
Under U.S. treaty practice, all reservations which the Senate attaches to a resolu-
tion of ratification are included in instruments of ratification which are exchanged
with the Soviet Union and are signed by the Soviet Union. It is this exchange under
article XIV of the treaty which brings the treaty into force. The protocol of ex-
change itself reads that the treaty will be carried out by both parties in accordance
with the reservation or other conditions contained therein.
Therefore, in agreeing to go forward with the exchange, the Soviets must accept
the conditions contained in the protocol of exchange. They can, of course, refuse to
H8-260 0-79 Pt.U - 3
28
go forward with the exchange, if they do not like one or more of the conditions
contained in the instrument, but if they do go forward, they are clearly bound and
clearly bound in law.
Now, I would be anxious to hear what your friends at Yale will
say.
Mr. RosTOW. I shall be very grateful for a copy of this document.
Senator Biden. We will give you a copy.
Mr. RosTOW. I can say now with great respect that that is a good
recitation of black letter law on the subject, but it does not meet a
very important qualification which has developed in a good many
cases, which is that the courts have sometimes said that the reser-
vation is incompatible with the treaty and outside the power of the
treaty-making process, and therefore can be disregarded.
That kind of control would not be available, of course, in this
sort of treaty.
SOVIET CONVERTING OF SS-20 TO SS-16
Senator Biden. I will not debate with you now, sir. You are
concerned that the SS-20 will be converted in effect to an SS-16
and be able with a single warhead to strike the United States. The
Soviets have approximately 100 SS-20's deployed. One thing I do
agree with you about, after extensive discussions over the last 6
months with European political and military leaders, is that they
are concerned about the SS-20. But I don't understand why in the
world the Soviets would ever consider converting the SS-20, either
through adding the extra stage or lightening the payload by substi-
tuting one warhead for three when to do so would give them only a
relatively few extra ICBM warheads, while denuding their theater
capability.
It seems that you double-count that SS-20 argument. You use it
in the theater to whip that one up, and then you also use it as it
relates to central systems, the same with the Backfire bomber.
Mr. RosTOW. Isn't that true of Backfire?
Senator Biden. Yes, as I said, as you do with Backfire.
Mr. RosTOW. I can't help it that the wretched things have multi-
ple purposes.
Senator Biden. Yes, but you can only use them one way. You
can't use the same missile two ways. Once it is used it is used.
Mr. RosTOW. I agree with you completely you can't shoot them
twice.
Senator Biden. Right. I am glad we have agreed on something.
Mr. RosTOW. We have agreed on many things. Senator Biden.
Senator Biden. I want the record to show we agree on very little.
Mr. RosTOW. All right. .
Senator Biden. That is important to me, as it probably is to you.
[General laughter.]
PROGRAMS united STATES NEEDS THAT TREATY PROHIBITS
Senator Biden. You mentioned one possible basing mode of the
M-X being inconsistent with the treaty.
Is there anything else that the United States must do in your
opinion to insure its security but cannot do because of the treaty?
You have mentioned the M-X. Is there anything else?
29
Mr. RosTOW. Well, I mentioned the multiple basing mode. It is
the verification problem under this treaty which presents a very,
very difficult problem for me, rather than the question of what we
should do to rebuild our strength.
Senator Biden. But on that one point, before we get to verifica-
tion, is there anything that we can't do if this treaty is passed
which your Committee has recommended?
Mr. RosTOW. Well, I would say certainly the rapid deployment of
an alternate basing mode is the first item we have mentioned. I
have mentioned also the range on cruise missiles which is mattter
of great importance.
Senator Biden. The range on ground-launched, on sea-launched
cruise missiles, but is that range affected after the expiration of
the protocol? Once the protocol expires on December 31, 1981, is
there anything we cannot do with regard to cruise missiles that
you would like done?
Mr. RosTOW. Well, about the protocol, we had a very unfortunate
experience with the expiration of the Interim Agreement which the
President has perpetuated by Executive agreement. Now, therefore,
the expiration of the protocol date and the effectiveness of that
against the possibility of similar action on the part of the President
of that period is a matter of some concern.
Senator Biden. You would agree, though, that the U.S. Senate
can bind this President or any future President of the United
States on that issue, wouldn't you?
Mr. RosTOW. Well, the whole U.S. Congress did in the ACDA
statute. In section 33, it said that no limitation on our arms shall
be effective unless accomplished by treaty or statute. The President
has perpetuated the Interim Agreement by Executive agreement.
Senator Biden. Don't you agree that if the U.S. Senate passes a
resolution specifying that under no circumstances can the Presi-
dent of the United States continue the protocol beyond December
31, 1981, that he would be bound by that?
Mr. RosTOW. Yes; but I think he is equally bound by section 33 of
the ACDA statute, and it has not proved effective.
ABIUTY TO deploy GLCM AND SLCM AFTER EXPIRATION OF
PROTOCOL
Senator Biden. Do you have any doubt about the ability to
deploy ground-launched and sea-launched cruise missiles after the
expiration of the protocol? Is there anything in the treaty that
would prevent us from deploying the type of ground- or sea-
launched cruise missiles that we would need, in your opinion?
Mr. RosTOW. Well, not for ourselves, I suppose. I am not quite
certain, but the transfer of technology point might affect the use of
such instruments by our allies.
Senator Biden. I specifically went to Moscow with six of my
colleagues for that very purpose, and met with their military com-
mand, with the members of the Supreme Soviet, and with Mr.
Kosygin for 3 hours, and made it very clear that certain things
were going to be done by the Senate. I will read from my prepared
text and tell you what their response was:
In my view and on the basis of my work as Chairman of the European Affairs
Subcommittee, there must be a clarification of Article XII of the treaty,
30
the one to which you referred, non-transfer.
This provision concerns the issue of non-circumvention. Here I want all concerned
to be put on notice, our allies, the American people, you in the Soviet Union, that
nothing, absolutely nothing in that treaty or protocol can or will inhibit existmg
patterns of collaboration between the United States and its allies.
I then went on to specify that with regard to the protocol:
Finally, I know you will see a condition of the treaty that makes clear that the
protocol means what it says, that is, that it ends in 1981, period, and that there is no
possibility of continuing that protocol beyond that date, and at that time the
ground-launched and sea-launched cruise missile will be deployed.
I can tell you that the Soviet reaction at all levels was that this
was our right under the treaty, that there is nothing that prevents
that. They did say they hoped we would continue to discuss that
with them but they understood full well that was our right. It
seems to me you raise an awful lot of red herrings.
Mr. RosTOW. But, Senator, with great respect, I don't think you
have answered my question. Of course, you are under no obligation
to do so, as I am, but still, you have not answered my question
about what happened to section 33 of ACDA.
Senator Biden. There was no formal extension.
Mr. RosTOW. Oh, please, sir. The United States and the Soviet
Union made simultaneous and identical announcements that they
were unilaterally extending the agreement. Are you suggesting
that there was no prior agreement to do that?
Senator Biden. I am suggesting that if the U.S. Senate specifical-
ly tells this President or whomever will be President in the year
1981 that he cannot, absent affirmative action by U.S. Senate,
extend, then he cannot extend the protocol.
Now, obviously, any President at any time can refuse to take
action.
A President can engage in inaction.
Mr. RosTOW. But with regard to section 33, it was not a question
of inaction. It was a question of action.
Senator Biden. What I am saying is that can be specifically
handled by a specific reservation by the U.S. Senate on that specif-
ic issue.
Mr. RosTOW. But doesn't section 33 of the ACDA statute do so
already?
Senator Biden. The answer is, I don't know.
Mr. RosTOW. All right.
Senator Biden. My time is up once again. If there are no further
questions, we thank you very much, Professor. We appreciate your
testimony.
Senator Zorinsky, do you have any questions of this witness.''
Senator Zorinsky. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I do have one
question.
BETRAYAL OF PROMISES AND EXPECTATION IN SALT I
Mr. Rostow, in your testimony you allege the Soviet betrayal of
every promise and expectation on the basis of which the SALT I
package was approved. Would you enumerate what these promises
and expectations were and who made them?
Mr. Rostow. Yes. In the agreement of May 1972, between Presi-
dent Nixon and Mr. Brezhnev, cooperation was assured to put out
31
fires all around the world, to work together specifically in the
Middle East to assure agreement in conformity with Security Coun-
cil Resolution 242, to cooperate in ending the war in Indochina on
favorable terms, and to give warning when certain kinds of events
occurred or were threatened. Instead of cooperating to end the
conflict in the Middle East, the Soviet Union had agreed with
President Sadat the month before President Nixon came to Moscow
in May 1972, that is, in April 1972, to cooperate with President
Sadat in launching a war in 1973 and to send all the necessary
equipment, experts, and so forth for that purpose.
So far as Indochina is concerned, of course, the Soviets cooperat-
ed in obtaining the agreements of January and of March 1973,
which from our point of view were satisfactory and reaffirmed the
Laos Agreement of 1962, but they cooperated with the North Viet-
namese in breaking those agreements and every aspect of those
agreements, and in denying their essential purpose.
Those are the two chief items I recall, and I think they are
sufficient to indicate that the agreements were not made in all
sincerity and were not carried out.
Senator Zorinsky. Thank you, Mr. Rostow.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. That is all I have.
Senator Biden. Thank you very much. Professor.
Mr. Rostow. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[Mr. Rostow's prepared statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Professor Eugene V. Rostow
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your invitation to testify on the ratification of the
SALT II Treaty. I am here in behalf of the Committee on the Present Danger, a
nonprofit, nonpartisan citizens' committee which began to function on 11 November
1976. Our position on SALT II has been stated on two occasions. In July, 1977, our
Executive Committee issued a pamphlet called "Where We Stand on Salt," which
was later approved by the Board of Directors. And in July of this year, the Execu-
tive Committee adopted a statement which was submitted to your Subcommittee on
Europe on 19 July 1979. Both those documents, together with related materials, are
before you. They are the basis of what I shall say.
Our conclusions on the Treaty as it stands are summed up on pp. 2-3 of our 19
July statement. They constitute, we believe, a positive and affirmative seven-point
program for action, which puts the SALT Treaty and the SALT negotiating process
into the context of our foreign and defense policy as a whole.
Permit me to recall those conclusions for ready reference:
"In view of the gravity of the issues raised by the Treaty now before you, and all
that has happened since the SALT I package was approved in 1972, we recommend:
(1) That the Senate advise the President and the nation of the need to seek a more
positive, forward looking, and effective foreign and defense policy, and state the
goals and principles on which that policy should be based; and (2) that the Senate
withhold its consent to the ratification of the Treaty the President has submitted
unless and until it is modified to meet its demonstrated deficiencies, and the
President and the Congress are firmly committed to a specific program that will
achieve and maintain essential equivalence and adequate deterrence.
"The Committee on the Present Danger is the first to recognize that withholding
the Senate's consent for the SALT II Treaty now before you is not in itself a foreign
and defense policy. We have concluded, however, that the action I have just outlined
is a necessary condition for developing a sound and prudent policy. And it is the
only available way to convince the President that the SALT II Treaty he signed in
Vienna fails both as a means for protecting our national security, and as an arms
limitation measure.
"It is our conviction that what the country needs above all else is to turn a sharp
corner in our foreign and defense policy. To recall the language of President
Carter's speech of July 15th, we believe the nation should start on a new course,
based on a clear recognition of the truth. Such a course, in our view, should include
these elements: (1) To shake off our post-Vietnam depression about foreign affairs
and the yearning for isolation which is implicit in it; (2) to reach a bipartisan
32
consensus on what our national interests in this turbulent world really are; (3) to
rebuild conventional and nuclear force deterrence so that we can protect those
interests by political means or by the use of conventional forces if we have to; (4) to
cooperate closely and continuously with our allies and other nations whose interests
in a peaceful and stable world political order and economic system are parallel to
our own; and (5) on that basis to continue negotiating with the Soviet Union about
the limitation of nuclear arms, including both intercontinental and intermediate
range nuclear weapons like those threatening Europe and other areas of great
importance to us.
There is still time for that great task to be accomplished in peace. As a group,
the NATO allies, Japan, China and other like-minded nations have more than
enough power and potential power to contain the Soviet drive for domination. But
that power is dispersed and inchoate. It is not being mobilized ir/o forms which can
become political power— naval squadrons and armored divisions; planes, reserves
and research formations. The potential power of the nations which favor a peaceful
world order cannot be brought to bear on world politics unless the energy, optimism
and intelligence of the American people are liberated and harnessed once again in
considered programs designed to restore the peace and prosperity of the nation. In
the bipolar world of nuclear weapons and nuclear blackmail, no coalition to guard
the peace can act without the protection of the American nuclear umbrella and
confidence that our nation is willing and able to meet its commitments."
II
I thought I could be most useful to you today if this opening statement supple-
mented our earlier statements by commenting on some of the key issues which have
emerged in the SALT hearings so far. President Carter's case for SALT rests on
something more than complacency about our ovm strength and an underestimation
of Soviet power and Soviet intentions.
The strongest argument for SALT II thus far put forward by the Carter Admmis-
tration is an argument of political myth. It was summed up by a distinguished
Senator in these terms: "To reject SALT II would be to go over the abyss."
The variations on this theme are infinite. One hears it said everywhere that to
reject SALT, or to ratify it with amendments or on conditions, would be to "end"
detente and revive the "Cold War." The President has said that those who oppose
the Treaty as it stands are war-mongers and opponents of "detente." The Secretary
of State is reported to have said that he would resign rather than preside over the
end of "detente" and the revival of the "Cold War." Some years ago, I counted a
couple of hundred remarks of this tenor, and then stopped counting.
The notion that Soviet-American relations have improved in recent years, that
the Cold War is over, and that negotiation has been substituted for confrontation is
a dangerous symptom of auto-intoxication. The Cold War is not over. On the
contrary, it is worse than ever, featured by Soviet threats and thrusts on a far
greater scale than those of the simple days of the Berlin airlift and the crisis in
Greece. But as things get worse, many Americans insist on telling each other that
they are getting better. SALT II is a case in point. If ratified in its present form, it
would be an act of submission on our part, legitimizing Soviet superiority— a great
Soviet victory in the Cold War, and so perceived everywhere in the world. But this
Administration keeps repeating that SALT II would be a step towards stability,
detente, and peace. . j ^ n.
This Delphic assertion is made so often that we tend to accept it as self-evident. It
implies that the Russians would behave even worse than they are behaving now if
SALT II is not ratified in its present form; that it would cost us more to keep up
with them in such an event; and that the process of negotiating with the Soviet
Union about nuclear weapons somehow contributes to peace and stability. In 1972,
the SALT I package was ratified under different geo-political circumstances, but on
the basis of this same litany of arguments. The period since 1972 has been the worst
and most disastrous period of the Cold War, featured by Soviet deception of the
United States in Indochina and the Middle East; the Soviet campaign in Africa and
Southern Asia; and an extraordinary Soviet military buildup, far greater than that
of the United States and its Allies. In view of the betrayal of every promise and
expectation on the basis of which the SALT I package was approved, it is difficult to
understand why these arguments are still so popular. But they are. As President
Kennedy once remarked, "If you are cheated once, it is their fault. But if you are
cheated a second time, it is your own."
The contention that the failure to ratify SALT II in its present form would be
"going over the abyss" is not really an argument, but an appeal to fear which
attributes nearly magic influence to arms limitation agreements. Those who are
swayed by this appeal are hypnotized by the SALT negotiating process as MacDon-
33
aid, Baldwin, and Chamberlain were hypnotized by the chimera of disarmament
forty-five years ago.
Nothing in the history of arms limitation agreements gives the slightest encour-
agement for such beliefs. The Treaty of Versailles was the most important of
modern arms limitation agreements. It prescribed strict limits on German arma-
ments and the demilitarization of the Rhineland. If Britain had been willing to join
France in enforcing that Treaty, the Second World War could never have taken
place. But when the Versailles limits on arms were violated, secretly at first, and
then openly; when Hitler introduced conscription in 1935 and marched into the
Rhineland in 1936, Britain and France did nothing except wring their hands and try
to persuade Hitler to sign new treaties limiting armaments. We can see parallels to
this behavior nearly every week in our reaction to Soviet behavior raising serious
questions about whether they are violating the Test Ban Treaty, the SALT I
agreements, or the agreement of 1962 about the Soviet presence in Cuba.
The second most important arms limitation agreement of modern times was the
Washington Naval Treaty of 1922. Our exp)erience under that agreement and its
successors is hardly more inspiring than the record of Versailles. Lulled by the
delusive security of the Treaty, we, the British, and the French persistently kept
our navies relatively low, while Japan and later Germany built to the limits of the
Treaty and beyond.
There is another aspect of the Administration's argument that to reject SALT II
would be "to go over the abyss": the notion that such action on our part would
make Soviet policy even more aggressive than it is. The claim betrays a misunder-
standing of the nature of the Soviet Union and of the serious and devoted men who
govern it. The Soviet Union is already behaving as badly as it dares. It is moving as
rapidly as it deems prudent toward the strategic and political goals of its policy. It
takes advantage of every opportunity to expand its sphere of influence. There is no
use getting excited about this fact. It is simply a fact. As Professor Bernard Lewis
has remarked, the Soviet leaders are still in the imperial mood of the seventeenth
and eighteenth centuries, which the West has long since abandoned with relief. In
the interests of our own survival, we have to persuade the Soviet Union that this
ruthless and cynical process must stop before it results inevitably in war.
There is only one argument that can deter expansion — the conviction on their
part that a given action would expose them to unacceptable risk. That is the factor
which made our diplomacy persuasive and effective in a dozen crises since 1945,
from the Berlin Blockade to the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962. It is the visible erosion
of that conviction since 1972 which has invited a series of Soviet thrusts on every
continent. In recent years, the Soviet Union has increased the pace of its expansion
because of the impact of Vietnam and Watergate on American policy, and now
because it perceives President Carter as weak. As a result, the Soviet Union is
moving forward with incredible boldness in several areas of the world, including
even the Caribbean.
Some who accept this view of Soviet policy argue for SALT II nonetheless on the
ground that under SALT II it would be easier for us to verify Soviet behavior, and
confine the Soviet impulse to expand. I shall comment later on the verification
controversy as such. Suffice it to remark at this point that there is no reason to
suppose that we should have any more confidence in our knowledge of Soviet
activities under SALT II than we have had under SALT I. Since our intelligence
estimators have recently confessed to being in error by a factor of 100 percent, that
is not a comforting thought.
The claim that the ratification of SALT II would save us money is equally
specious. Short of general mobilization, it is hardly feasible for the Soviet Union to
spend more on military hardware than it has been spending for the last fifteen
years or so. I have heard General Jones say that the task of restoring the military
balance between the United States and the Soviet Union will cost the same with or
without SALT II — an estimate which may be erroneous in a perverse way, because
some programs — M-X, for example — may cost a good deal more than otherwise if
SALT should be ratified, in order to meet its verification standards. Administration
spokesmen have offered a variety of opinions on the cost consequences of not
ratifying SALT. Paul Warnke has said that the rejection of SALT would be costly,
but that its cost could not be quantified. Leslie Gelb has written recently that
saving money is the chief reason for ratifying SALT. Others have said quite differ-
ent things on the subject. The fact is that in an area of complex and rapidly
changing technology, none of these estimates are of much consequence.
Averell Harriman and George W. Ball have offered a variant of the "abyss"
argument which brings out its basic weakness. Not to accept SALT II, they have
told you, would help lead to the election of a "hard-liner" to succeed Brezhnev. The
notion that Brezhnev is a "moderate" in any sense we can recognize, or that he
34
believes in our concept of detente, is denied by everj^hing he has said and done in
all the years of his high office. Brezhnev was the architect of the attack on Czecho-
slovakia in 1968, and on our whole Middle East position in 1967 and 1973. He is the
man who broke his solemn agreements with us about Indo-China and the Middle
East. In the name of the Brezhnev Doctrine, he claims the right to use force
internationally in order to protect or promote regimes or revolutions he regards as
socialist or progressive. To call him a "moderate" is an abuse of the English
language.
There are of course differences within the Kremlin and no doubt there are
groupings among its members. But there is no serious evidence that any of these
differences concern Soviet-American relations. Of course all the Soviet leaders want
SALT II ratified. They have never made so much progress as they did under SALT
I, and they expect SALT II to be at least as productive for them. And they know
that if the United States ever does wake up, and decide to restore the military
balance, both in strategic and in conventional forces, they would lose ignominiously.
Their economy is only half as large as ours. But these are hardly reasons for us to
take the Treaty as it is.
There is thus nothing in the contention that to reject SALT would be "to go over
the abyss." The leaders of the Soviet Union are patient realists. They will negotiate
with us so long as it is in their interest to do so. And it will be in our mutual
interest to negotiate about strategic weapons only when we have fully restored
essential equivalence and adequate deterrence at every level relevant to our inter-
ests.
Ill
President Carter's second best argument for his Treaty is that it wouldn't do
much harm, would not prevent us from restoring the military balance, and should
therefore be ratified to demonstrate to our friends and adversaries that we really do
have a government. This argument appeals strongly to all Americans. For the best
of reasons, we tend to rally to the flag when it is under fire. Foreigners have their
own view of our government, based on their daily experience on a dozen issues. In
my talks with the leaders of friendly foreign governments in recent years, it became
clear that what they want from us is a policy of vigorous and imaginative resistance
to the process of Soviet expansion. I am confident that the program our Commiteee
has outlined would be well received by friendly nations, and fully respected by our
adversaries abroad.
There is, however, a fatal flaw in the argument which would wrap SALT II in the
flag of patriotism. The SALT II Treaty is not harmless; it would do a great deal of
harm; it would make it far more difficult for us to redress the military balance; and
no spokesman for the Administration has as yet seriously addressed the principal
issues raised in this connection by its critics.
All studies of the nuclear balance agree that if present trends continue just a few
years longer, the Soviet Union will have significant nuclear superiority in the early
1980's authorized by the SALT II Treaty — the capacity, that is, to make a preemp-
tive first strike by destroying our ICBM's, our planes on the ground, and our
submarines in port with a fraction of their nuclear force, leaving enough accurate
missiles in reserve to neutralize our own nuclear arsenal. If we should ever allow
such a position to develop, the military doctrine of Mutual Assured Destruction on
which we have relied since Secretary McNamara's time would become obsolete, and
our submarines and other less accurate missile launchers would be ineffective.
Facing such threats, we should be unable to use conventional forces, and our
diplomacy would be without influence.
Slowly and reluctantly, the Administration has conceded that at a given point
fairly soon our ICBM's and other ground based-launchers will become vulnerable to
a Soviet first-strike attack. Some Administration spokesmen say that such a devel-
opment would not mean the end of the world, because we could always strike back
from our submarines, or, in an argument of desperation, even launch our ICBM's on
warning. It is hard to believe, but Secretary of State Vance himself has expressed
this bizarre view. Others say that our allies must realize that there are limits to our
nuclear umbrella: that is, in plain words, that the American nuclear guarantee
would be worthless. The official Administration doctrine is that the concerns of
SALT critics about our vulnerability to a preemptive first strike are valid, but that
they will be cured by the M-X missile, long delayed by President Carter. A decision
on its mode of deplojTnent was supposed to have been made by August 1, but has
not yet been announced.
But the M-X missile cannot be ready, the Administration says, before 1989 at the
earliest, even if President Carter finally solves the problem of reconciling its mode
of deployment with the SALT II Treaty.
35
What are we supposed to do in the meantime — that is, during the period of the
1980's when everybody agrees we shall be in a position of maximum exposure to
nuclear war or nuclear blackmail? If the Soviet Union gains sufficient superiority in
the early 1980's to threaten our land-based missile launchers with one-third or one-
fifth of their force, would it be rational or even conceivable for an American
President to use our submarine-launched missiles to destroy Soviet cities, knowing
that the Soviets had enough missiles in reserve to blow up a very large fraction of
our population in reprisal? Calculations of these gruesome scenarios are affected of
course by Soviet active and passive air defense programs and absence of such
programs on our part. Such calculations are currently most unfavorable to the
United States. In effect, they would reverse the position of the two nations at the
time of the Cuban Missile Crisis. Under those circumstances, would the Soviet
government believe in the possibility of American retaliation to a first strike, and
be deterred by it? Such retaliation would be suicidal for us. No one could believe in
so irrational a policy.
This is the key question to consider in evaluating the nuclear balance and its
bearing on the political influence of both the Soviet Union and the United States. I
have been unable to find an answer on the part of any proponent of the Treaty
beyond a blind reiteration of faith in the continued vitality of the McNamara
Doctrine of Mutual Assured Destruction. This is indeed the heart and nearly the
whole of President Carter's case for SALT II. As former Secretary Kissinger empha-
sized in Brussels last Saturday, this position will soon be intellectually and political-
ly untenable. We simply must move to counterforce strategies or abandon the
notion of nuclear deterrence altogether.
But the Treaty would prevent us from undertaking the most feasible, perhaps the
only credible counterforce program that could preserve our second-strike capability
during the early and middle 1980's: to reopen the Minuteman III production lines,
which President Carter has recently closed, and deploy Minuteman Ills in multiple
vertical protected shelters. Such shelters would be considered "fixed launchers"
under Article IV of the Treaty, and would be prohibited. And the number of
Minuteman Ills required for such a program would exceed the quotas established by
the Treaty, since Minuteman III carries only three warheads. Here again, the
Administration has simply not addressed the issue. It is still struggling with its
attempt to reconcile the M-X missile with the provisions of the Treaty — a problem
that doesn't seem to worry the Soviet Union, which continues to develop and deploy
large numbers of mobile intermediate range missile launchers that can be converted
into intercontinental missiles by the addition of an extra stage.
There are many other aspects of SALT II which are far from harmless — aspects
which have been repeatedly called to the attention of the Administration, and
ignored or evaded in these hearings. The strange provision of the Treaty allowing
the Soviet Union more than 300 heavy missiles, while we can have none, has been
much discussed, but it has not been explained. These heavy missiles of enormous
throw weight are designed primarily as first-strike weapons against hardened tar-
gets. The essence of the Soviet Union's capacity for a credible first strike is the fact
that if present trends continue they will be able to destroy a large part of our land-
based missile force with one-third or one-fifth of their missiles. It is quite true that
another combination of weapons might also threaten our land-based missiles and
submarines in port. But there is all the difference in the world between a strike
which would require one-fifth of the Soviet force and one requiring four-fifths of
that force. In the strange calculus of nuclear terror, the difference is decisive. It is
what is left after the first strike that counts both politically and militarily.
Similarly, the provisions of the Treaty regarding the Soviet Backfire bomber have
been vehemently discussed, but the Administration's answer is totally unconvincing.
There is no doubt now that the Backfire is capable of reaching targets throughout
the United States from the Soviet Union, and that it can be refuelled in the air and
land in Cuba. Why is it not counted among the launchers covered by the Treaty,
like our B-52's or B-l's? We have to count even mothballed B-52's, cannibalized for
spare parts. The Administration does not answer the question, but asks us to be
content with Mr. Brezhnev's assurance that the Soviet Union will make no more
than 30 Backfires a year. Why 30 a year is to be considered de minimis in a Treaty
which purports to limit launchers to some 2,000 on each side isn't immediately
apparent, even if there were any way we could monitor these limits. How much
damage could 30, 60, or 90 Backfires do from Cuban bases?
Further, the restrictions of the Treaty and its protocol on the development of
cruise missiles, especially of land- and sea-based cruise missiles, and the ambiquities
of the Treaty about our capacity to transfer cruise missile technology to our Allies,
are both dangerous to our security and without any justification. Here again, the
testimony offered by the Administration is both unresponsive and unconvincing.
36
As for the verification provisions of the Treaty, I can find no answer in the
testimony thus far available to the facts pointed out on pp. 17-18 of our July 19
statement. My distinguished colleague Paul H. Nitze testified on this aspect of the
problem on July 30 before the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate. I
have included a copy of his Prepared Statement in my submission, and call it
particularly to your attention.
IV
The Executive Committee of the Committee on the Present Danger has recom-
mended that the Senate should not give its consent to the ratification of SALT II
unless the most important deficiencies of the Treaty are modified by amendment,
and the President and the Congress are firmly committed to a specific program that
would achieve and maintain essential equivalence and adequate deterrence. Among
the deficiencies of the Treaty requiring amendment, I should list first our right to
deploy ICBM's in modes and numbers we deem necessary to ensure their survival
against surprise attack; (2) the equal right of the two sides to use heavy missiles; (3)
the inclusion of the Soviet Backfire and the SS-20 within the numerical limits of
the Treaty; (4) provision for the adoption of programs which would reverse the
present ominous situation of Soviet strategic superiority in Europe, including
changes in the provisions regarding the range of land- and sea-based cruise missiles
and the transfer-of-technology which is causing so much concern to our Allies.
There are other deficiencies and ambiguities noted in our earlier statements, and
in the studies of my distinguished colleagues who have written, spoken, and testified
on these matters during the last few years. And there are many which have come to
the surface in your hearings and those of other committees of the Senate. These too
should be given serious consideration before the Treaty is ratified.
In closing, permit me to stress the extraordinary responsibility of the Senate in
voting in SALT II. The arguments put forward for the SALT I package were the
same as those advanced for SALT II today. Under the political and military circum-
stances of 1972, they were plausible arguments. But there is no rational way to
accept them as the basis for policy in 1979. It is simply too late to entertain such
views. Too much has happened to contradict them.
Therefore, the burden of responsibility on the Senate with respect to the Treaty is
unique in our history.
Every American shares the goal of achieving true detente with the Soviet iJnion,
which can only be defined, in my opinion, as a policy of scrupulous and recipr':'cal
respect for the rules of the Charter of the United Nations regarding the internation-
al use of force. True detente is a central objective of the Committee on the Present
Danger, and, I am sure, of the American people. Every President and Congress since
1945 have gone to great lengths to reach that goal. But President Carter's quest for
detente with the Soviet Union has been based on the misconception that acts of
unilateral disarmament on our part, and other unilateral concessions, will induce
the Soviet Union to follow suit. As a result, President Carter has sacrificed our
defenses and our alliances, and abdicated his responsibility for the security of the
nation. Under our Constitution, that responsibility therefore falls on the Senate
with respect to this Treaty, and ultimately on the whole Congress and the people.
We have not faced decisions of such moment since the Presidency of James Bu-
chanan.
President Carter sometimes compares the controversy over the ratification of
SALT II to the battle over our entry into the League of Nations after the First
World War. The analogy is misleading.
In the first place, despite the pervasiveness of the political legend, it cannot be
said that "a small group of willful men" blocked the ratification either of the
Covenant of the League or of the Security Treaty with France which had been
promised to France in order to induce its acceptance of the League, and was
therefore brigaded with the League Covenant. President Wilson gave up and indeed
strongly opposed the Treaties when he realized that he would have to compromise
with the Senate to obtain ratification. In the end, and at President Wilson's urgent
request, twenty-three loyal Democratic Senators voted against ratifying the League
Covenant with the reservations negotiated by Senator Lodge. History might well
have been different if seven members of the Senate had voted then for their
convictions. The Treaty with France never came to a vote. President Wilson was
always the kind of man who refused half or two-thirds of a loaf when he couldn't
get the whole thing. And at the time of the fight in 1919, he was seriously ill as
well.
37
Secondly, President Wilson was proposing full and responsible American partici-
pation in world politics, which some members of the Senate were resisting. The
position today is just the opposite. For nearly three years. President Carter has been
conducting a retreat to weakness and isolation. Unless that policy is promptly
reversed, it will soon be beyond our power to do so. We should then be squeezed into
a position of passive dependence on the Soviet Union. The program the Committee
on the Present Danger is recommending to you today, on the contrary, is one
through which we could remain what we have been and are, the bastion of democra-
cy, and a responsible member of the society of nations, capable with our allies and
associates of maintaining the balance of world power on which the future of human
freedom depends.
It is therefore not hyperbole to say that the state of the union for the next decade
at least, and perhaps for much longer, will be determined by the outcome of your
vote on the Treaty.
Your vote on SALT is important because the Treaty is important, and in our
judgment dangerous to the security of the nation. It would lock us into a position of
strategic inferiority which would also be unstable and unverifiable — a perfect recipe
for Soviet nuclear blackmail during the period of our greatest relative weakness in
the early and middle 1980's. President Carter found that possibility staring him in
the face when he took office in 1977. He made the situation worse by cancelling or
postponing the programs which his predecessors had initiated to prevent the prob-
lem from arising: B-1, the enhanced radiation warhead, M-X, and the rest of the
sad story.
Your vote on SALT II is important for another reason. It is the only chance you
are likely to have to pass judgment on President Carter's foreign and defense policy
as a system: his abandonment of the United Nations Charter as the lodestar of our
policy, and many other contradictions, paradoxes, and retreats.
These aspects of President Carter's foreign policy are not extrinsic to the merits
of the SALT Treaty. They are what the Treaty is all about. SALT II is not
concerned with a remote and upleasant subject of interest only to experts. It is not
limited to assuring the immunity of the United States from nuclear attack. The
United States has vital security interests beyond Fortress America. There is no
escaping the "linkage" between SALT II and the rest of our foreign and defense
policy. The state of the nuclear balance between the Soviet Union and the United
States is the fulcrum on which the entire process of world politics is poised. The
visible and unquestioned availability of usable force has always been the key to
effective diplomacy. This maxim has never been more obviously true. Unless we
restore and maintain our clear second strike strategic nuclear capability, and our
naval and other conventional forces, the American nuclear umbrella will lose all
credibility, our political influence will continue to decline, and we shall be unable to
use either conventional or nuclear forces anywhere in the world if such action on
our part should be required. The pattern of our diplomatic impotence during the
last few years will become our normal condition, until it is succeeded by something
infinitely worse.
Many have compared the policies of the Carter Administration revealed in its
defense of SALT II to the posture of the ostrich taken by Great Britain and to a
lesser extent by France during the Thirties, when they failed to act together in time
to prevent the Second World War. The comparison is fair. In the Thirties, British
policy was determined by wishful thinking and a nearly suicidal paralysis of will.
Thus far, these two attitudes have dominated the foreign policy of the Carter
Administration. But there is one fundamental difference between the dilemma faced
by the United States today and that of Britain and France a generation ago. Even
in the darkest days of the Second World War, Britain and France could always hope
that the United States and the Soviet Union would somehow be drawn into the fray,
so that victory would become possible. There are no great powers in that position
now, no nations in the wings who might help to turn the tide if we persist in our
folly as Britain and France did during the Thirties, until it was too late to do
anything but fight. If we allow the Soviet rush for dominance to continue un-
checked; if we allow Europe to be enveloped and reduced, through the Middle East
or the Northern seas or both, Japan, China, and many other countries would fall
under Soviet control. We should then be truly isolated, living in a state of siege, and
confronting the pressures of a hostile Soviet foreign policy backed by an overwhelm-
ing array of force. Under such circumstances, if history is a guide, an episode trivial
in itself^the murder of an Archduke or the sinking of another Lusitania — would
prove again to the flash point of war. This is the nightmare probability at stake in
your vote on SALT II.
Some will say that I am too gloomy about the way things are going. The Russians
are not ten feet tall, we are frequently reminded. But for decades now the Soviet
38
Union has been keeping the living standard of its people low in order to support an
arms buildup and a foreign policy geared to indefinite expansion. This has hardly
been done in a fit of absent-mindedness. You have only to compare the map today
with the map in 1945 or 1972 to realize what extraordinary gains the Soviet Union
has made in its quest for geopolitical mastery. One after another, the old naval
bases of the nineteenth century imperial system are being taken over by the Soviet
Union. This process has to be faced and evaluated, not denied or ignored.
Let me appeal directly to those among you who believe that the Soviet Union is a
conservative, peaceful power, that the Cold War is over, and that active military
and political efforts on our part are not needed to preserve the world balance of
power and restore the vitality of the United Nations Charter. In Cromwell's famous
words, "Consider that ye may be wrong." If our analysis is correct, isn't it better
and more prudent to take precautions now than to be sorry later? If President
Carter is wrong, we shall face, over and over again, the choice of surrender or war
against bitter odds, alone and unprepared.
President Carter's case for SALT II is the same mixture of incompatible themes,
myths, and moods one finds in reviewing the history of the years before the Second
World War. The finest study of Pearl Harbor, that of Roberta Wohlstetter, com-
ments that in going over the record one is faced time and time again on the
American side "by the paradox of pessimistic realism coupled with loose optimism
in practice." If you read what President Carter has said on these problems, you can
see exactly what Mrs. Wohlstetter meant. On several occasions, President Carter
has described the Soviet arms buildup as offensive in character, and incompatible
with any theory of defense. But he has also characterized the Soviet position as
defensive in nature, based on exaggerated anxieties about the risks the Soviet
Union faces. Clearly, both the President's policies and his actions are based on the
second hypothesis, that of an essentially harmless, conservative, and defensive
Soviet Union. How he reconciles this view with his daily diplomatic and intelligence
reports is a mystery beyond my understanding. It is true that the President is prone
to boast that our military power is greater than that of any other nation, despite
the statistics, and what Secretary of Defense Brown says. We are left with the
disquieting thought that President Carter's defense budgets and policies are based
on jejime complacency and on the assumption that the Soviets have feet of clay.
The coming decade will be as difficult and dangerous as any we have faced in the
past. We have a very short time in which to protect our future through allied
di ilomacy and deterrence rather than through war. A two-ocean Navy cannot be
restored in a day or a year. Nor can the other programs we require to achieve
effective deterrence at every level. It will be a ticklish time, calling for cool nerves
and a firm grasp of the problem. The Soviet Union will not view an American
awakening with equanimity. It can be expected to take full advantage of positions of
relative superiority, and the presence in office of a President whom it perceives as
weak.
The time to begin is now. And the place to begin is here. Normally, we look to our
President to take the lead in decisions of this order. It is now clear that President
Carter is firmly committed to another view.
What is at stake, Mr. Chairman, is not the balance of power alone, but the future
of liberty. Democracy cannot survive unless America plays its full part in assuring
its future.
The tide has been running against us now for nearly a decade. The leaders of the
Soviet Union are pursuing a program of break-neck expansion, and treating our
interests everywhere with open contempt.
Forty years ago, as the doubts and vacillations of the Thirties were being swept
away by events, a speaker rose to his feet in the House of Commons to address the
great issue of the looming War. Leopold Amery, one of Churchill's companions in
the political wilderness, shouted a remark from his seat before the speaker began.
"Speak for England," he said. In that spirit, I say to you, "Speak and vote for
America."
Senator Biden. Our next witness is Adm. Thomas Moorer, co-
chairman of the CoaUtion for Peace Through Strength. Admiral
Moorer is accompanied by Lt. Gen. Daniel Graham, cochairman of
the Coalition for Peace Through Strength.
Gentlemen, thank you for coming. Admiral, please proceed in
any way that is most comfortable.
39
STATEMENT OF ADM. THOMAS MOORER (RETIRED), COCHAIR-
MAN, COALITION FOR PEACE THROUGH STRENGTH, WASH-
INGTON, D.C., ACCOMPANIED BY LT. GEN. DANIEL GRAHAM
(RETIRED), COCHAIRMAN, COALITION FOR PEACE THROUGH
STRENGTH »
Admiral Moorer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I am honored to
have the opportunity to testify again before this committee on the
SALT II Treaty. Today I am testifying as chairman of the executive
committee of the Coalition for Peace Through Strength.
The Coalition for Peace Through Strength is a bipartisan alli-
ance of 105 national organizations, 204 Members of Congress and
other pro defense leaders across America. The American Security
Council, which I serve as a member of the board of directors, is the
program secretariat for the coalition.
The purpose of the coalition is to work for the adoption of a
national strategy of peace through strength. The perception of
weakness on our part in 1941 prompted the Japanese to attack
Pearl Harbor. Mr. Chairman, at the end of World War II, I was a
member of the strategic bombing survey sent to Japan to investi-
gate the Japanese decisionmaking process that led to the attack on
Pearl Harbor, as well as other matters.
Since I was at Pearl Harbor when the Japanese attacked, I was
charged with investigating this particular question. Why did the
Japanese attack Pearl Harbor? I discussed this matter with the
Prime Minister, with all the military leaders, the seniors in the
Japanese Government, and all without exception said the same
thing. They said that the Congress had refused to pass the draft
initially, and then they passed it only by one vote. They had
refused to fortify Wake and Guam Islands, and that the U.S. Army
was in Louisiana training with wooden guns, all of which was a
fact, and consequently they did not think that we had the military
capability or the will or determination to oppose them.
So, they decided to attack Pearl Harbor.
My point is, if the relative balance as perceived by the potential
enemy gets to a point where they think they can attack and
succeed, then the country is in danger.
Senator Biden. Do you think it has reached that point. Admiral?
Admiral Moorer. I think we are just at that point, yes, sir.
It is our belief that if the U.S. Senate consents to the SALT II
Treaty, as now configured, it would make the adoption of such a
strategy most unlikely.
We did prepare a detailed study entitled "An Analysis of SALT
II." Copies are available to you, and I urge every member of the
committee to study the report. However, since this is a 78-page
document and thus too long for me to cover in the time alloted
today, I will ask permission at this time simply to read a 3-page
joint statement signed by 1,678 general and flag officers from all of
the armed services. A list of the names of these officers is being
provided to the members of the committee. I have the list right
here, sir.
Senator Biden. Are they all retired, Admiral?
' See page 60 for Admiral Moorer's prepared statement.
40
Admiral Moorer. Yes, they are all retired. As you know, active
duty military leaders are not permitted to flatly oppose SALT II.
This is why we at the Coalition for Peace Through Strength have
sought out the views of retired military leaders who are now free
to speak out.
From my conversations with active and retired military leaders,
I believe that the overwhelming majority oppose SALT II as writ-
ten. This has been confirmed by the fact that only four of the
retired officers contacted so far have declined to join in the state-
ment because they support SALT II as written. Another 33 de-
clined for such reasons as that they were undecided, ill, or thought
that the statement should be written differently.
We are continuing to circulate the statement and will later give
each Senator a copy of the statement with a list of all the signers
at that time.
With your permission, sir, I will now read the letter that we
have written to the chairman of this committee:
Hon. Frank Church,
Chairman, U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations.
Dear Senator Church: We, the undersigned retired and reserve general and flag
officers of all U.S. Military Services respectfully request you to oppose ratification of
SALT II.
We are in full agreement with most of our fellow Ar^ericans in preferring inter-
national cooperation and equitable arms limitation agreements to hostility and
competition. But we cannot agree that we can wish this congenial state of affairs
into being by blinding ourselves Lo the stark realities of our strategic situation and
our closely related conventional situation. In our view, SALT II as now written
epitomizes the refusal of some Americans to face the facts. The facts which must be
faced are these:
Ten years of U.S. restraint in the strategic nuclf ar field rooted in our faith in the
SALT process has not been reciprocated by the Soviet Union. Rather, the Soviets
have pursued an unprecedented buildup of nuclear offensive and defensive capabili-
ty which, as^ Secretary of Defense Brown points out, is aimed at a war-winning
capability. In this pursuit, the Soviets have stretched to the limit or broken when
they felt it desirable solemn agreements such as weapons test restraints aimed at
slowing down nuclear expansion. This leaves them now with a technical base that
we cannot match.
The concept of mutual assured destruction which has shaped U.S. policy since the
1960's was never accepted by the Soviets and has been completely negated by their
massive strategic defensive effort, including civil defense. The aggressiveness of
Soviet behavior throughout the world has increased ominously as the military
balance has tilted in favor of the U.S.S.R. This behavior is part of an overall grand
design of which SALT negotiations are an integral part.
Angola, Mozambique, Ethiopia, South Yemen, Iran, and now combat troops and
fighter pilots in our own back yard, Cuba, are examples of what I am talking about.
Certainly I commend the chairman of this committee. Chairman Church, for taking
a strong position in opposition to this action by the Soviets here on our side of the
globe. U.S. intelligence capabilities to verify Soviet compliance with arms control
agreements have been seriously eroded through compromise of satellite reconnais-
sance systems and loss of key monitoring facilities.
It seems to us, Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, that there is little
disagreement inside or outside government that these are the facts, yet the Senate
has been asked to ratify a treaty which apparently ignores these facts. We are told
by defenders of SALT II that while this treaty does little to slow down the Soviet
military surge, it is necessary to ratify it to preserve the process.
The proponents insist that SALT III and SALT IV will cure the inequities of
SALT I and SALT II, and in my view this ignores Soviet behavior since SALT I. The
Soviets have become harder, not easier to deal with, and as they gain confidence
from obvious superioiity, I predict they will become even harder. The proponents of
SALT II insist that we will improve our security through ratification because the
situations would be worse without SALT II. We find it hard to believe (hat the
Soviets could significantly accelerate their current arms buildup in light of the fact
that they are already spending 15 percent of their gross national product on arms,
41
and we find it even harder to believe that ratification of SALT II would be followed
by vigorous U.S. efforts to close the widening gap between U.S. and Soviet military
capabilities.
It is almost certain that Senate ratification of this treaty would commit the
United States to another seven years of pursuing peace through trust of the Soviets
and adherence to the obviously bankrupt doctrine of mutual assured destruction.
This means further decline of our capability to declare war or to defend ourselves.
We respectfully submit that the arms control process has become dominated by
persistent U.S. refusal to face the reality of a failure of the twin policies of detente
and disarmament.
SALT II doesn't even limit arms. SALT II is only a set of rules for building arms
and some of these rules are nonenforceable. The image of limitation is provided by
alleged equal numbers of launchers and aircraft, not to the real destructive ele-
ments of nuclear force — missiles and explosive power — where the Soviets have been
allowed a heavy advantage. To make matters worse, the "equal" numbers are
contrived by failing to count Soviet delivery systems such as the Backfire, the most
advanced strategic bomber in the operational inventory of either side, or the SS-20.
We also find the treaty as written unverifiable and attempts to finesse this issue
by redefining terms most disturbing. SALT II is much more complex than SALT I
and covers qualitative as well as quantitative aspects of nuclear armaments enor-
mously more difficult to monitor. Given the compromise of our key verification
satellite systems and the loss of vital monitoring stations in Iran, we cannot ensure
against Soviet circumvention of the treaty provisions.
State Department documents describing SALT II now redefine verification. Where
adequate verification once required an assurance from U.S. intelligence that at-
tempts by the Soviets to circumvent would be detected, it now requires only that we
can detect cheating on such a large scale that it alters the strategic balance in time
to assure an appropriate U.S. response.
This new definition completely finesses the problem of adequacy of our intelli-
gence capability since it is totally dependent upon one's view of what constitutes a
strategic balance and an appropriate response. For those who find the actual bal-
ance of strategic capabilities irrelevant and believe that a single U.S. Poseidon
submarine is an adequate deterrent, regardless of the size of the Soviet forces, SALT
II can be considered adequately verifiable with no U.S. intelligence capability at all.
We agree with the Secretary of Defense, Dr. Brown, that the Soviets are building
forces capable of fighting and winning a nuclear war with the United States and its
allies, but we strongly disagree with his view that this aim can be thwarted by
ratifying SALT II. Soviet participation in SALT, or any other arms control treaties,
is primarily designed to further this goal and to elicit U.S. acquiescence and even
cooperation in creating the necessary imbalance of power required by that goal.
I should point out at this time, Mr. Chairman, that like you, I also have been
traveling. I spent the last weekend in Brussels at the NATO meeting commemorat-
ing the 30th anniversary of NATO. This meeting was attended by very influential
legislative leaders in Europe as well as Senators Roth, Morgan, and Garn, and
Representatives Zablocki, Beard, and others. I can say that you and I obviously do
not talk to the same people, because the facts are that whereas the leaders in
NATO have supported SALT II, there is considerable concern within the rank and
file of the leadership of NATO, and I can tell you why.
They see this imbalance that has developed with our strategic forces. No longer
do they believe that the United States in case NATO is attacked by Russia will be
willing to generate or initiate a major nuclear exchange between the United States
and Russia because Europe was attacked by the Russians.
Consequently, I think this makes the restraints of the protocol very important,
because the NATO nations at this time should begin immediately acquiring a
capability to respond to a Soviet nuclear attack on NATO by an attack from Europe
on Russia.
I talked to Lord Chalfonte, who is the publisher of the London
Times, and in fact he mentioned this. He noted that Pravda had
recently said words to the effect that the Americans have the
rather forlorn idea that the protocol will cease in 1981, but they
say it is not the case, it will be extended. This is the Russians
talking in Pravda.
I think that this point was discussed by you and by the previous
witness here with respect to what happened with the SALT I
interim agreement. It was extended. Now, I am not a lawyer and
42
cannot debate with you about what it means for Senate passage
and resolution, but I am just saying that there are many people
who fear that the protocol will be extended.
Mr. Chairman, in sum, we urge the Senate of the United States to consider the
grave consequences of ratifying a treaty which will commit this country to the
continuation of disarmament policies and philosophy which, however promising
when adopted, have imperiled the security of the United States and its allies and
encourage ever more aggressive Soviet behavior. The SALT process is not so sacro-
sanct that we must accept a lopsided and unverifiable agreement simply to show
progress. We who know war cherish peace. We are not warmongers, as all who
oppose SALT II have been dubbed by some.
As military professiuiials, and with all due resp)ect for our more circumscribed
colleagues still bound by their active service, we strongly urge you to reject SALT II
as currently written as being injurious to the security interests of the United States
and its allies.
That is signed by me with grave concern.
Senator Biden. Thank you very much, Admiral.
CONCERN OF NATO ALLIES ON PROTOCOL EXTENSION AND
NONCIRCUMVENTION
I would like to proceed with two lines of questioning, one con-
cerns the attitude of our NATO allies. I am not quite sure that we
disagree. You say that our allies express grave concern, and then
you point out what that concern is. The concern really relates to
the extension of the protocol and the noncircumvention provision,
doesn't it?
Admiral Moorer. Yes.
Senator Biden. Did anyone suggest to you that the central ele-
ments of the treaty concerned them, and that the United States
should not ratify the treaty?
Admiral Moorer. They did that by inference, in the sense that
they feel that the treaty as now constructed further enhances their
insecurity. They have what I would call a crisis of confidence.
Senator Biden. Sure. Doesn't that crisis of confidence relate to
the theater nuclear force relationship between NATO and the
Soviet Union and not to the central systems? You have already
said to us that you believe it was amplified in what they said that
they do not believe that the United States would engage its central
systems?
Admiral Moorer. So say them.
Senator Biden. Yes. If that is the case, isn't really their concern
the theater?
Admiral Moorer. Of course, and I think that the protocol inhib-
its, in my view, the development in the theater of the kind of
capability that they have.
Senator Biden. How did it do that. Admiral? How does it inhibit?
Admiral Moorer. Well, as I see it, it restricts the range.
Senator Biden. It restricts the deployment.
Admiral Moorer. Yes. In other words, the protocol as I read it
restricts the United States and has no impact on the Soviets.
DEPLOYMENT OF CRUISE MISSILE AFTER DECEMBER 1981
Senator Biden. Isn't it true that we can continue research and
development, we can do all we are capable of doing short of deploy-
ing, and we are not capable of deploying until December 1981
43
anyway. Isn't that true? I mean, even if we wanted to deploy the
ground-launched and sea-launched cruise missile tomorrow, we
don't have that capability, do we, to deploy?
Admiral Moorer. Well, I think it depends entirely on what we
feel is urgent. As a matter of fact, when we built the Polaris
submarines under a posture of urgency, we turned them out at one
a minute. If this becomes an overriding objective, if you view what
happened in World War II, certainly we can deploy the missiles
before 1981.
Senator Biden. I see, and is it your firm belief that a significant
portion of our NATO allies wish us to reject the treaty?
Admiral Moorer. I think they certainly wish it to be significant-
ly modified.
CHANGES NATO WANTS AMENDED OR CHANGED
Senator Biden. Is there anjrthing beyond those two provisions
that they believe has to be amended or changed? Do you hear
anybody suggest that unless we include the Backfire bomber, we
should reject the treaty? Have you heard anybody say that?
Admiral Moorer. Yes.
Senator Biden. You did?
Admiral Moorer. Yes. They feel that the Backfire bomber and
SS-20 should be part of the overall package and is not counted.
Senator Biden. They think they should be counted as part of the
central systems?
Admiral Moorer. Yes; because this in effect, withdrawing them
from the Soviet numbers, changes the relative balance between the
weapons systems, the central system.
Senator Biden. How does it do that?
Admiral Moorer. It degrades the U.S. willingness as part of this
crisis of confidence that you and I just mentioned.
including backfire in central systems
Senator Biden. I see. I thought their concern was that they be
able to move forward with TNF modernization, introduce the long-
range Pershing, have access to cruise technology, and deploy their
ground-launched or sea-launched cruise, and that that was the only
prospect that would have any impact in countering the Soviet
theater systems, the theater systems being the Backfire bomber
and the SS-20.
Now, I am at a loss to understand the argument you have just
put forward, that by including them in the central systems, we
would in any way alleviate their concern. I don't understand that.
They are still sitting there. They are still there directed toward the
theater, not toward the United States.
By the way, I spoke to military people in NATO, and they know
what the Backfire bomber is for. Not a military man in Europe
whom I have run across doesn't know what the Backfire bomber is
intended for.
It is not intended for intercontinental use. It is intended for
them, and they know it, so they are very worried. How does includ-
ing it in the central systems affect that at all?
48-260 0-79 Pt . 4
44
Admiral Moorer. Well, Senator Biden, I don't know how much
experience you have had in military planning, but when you begin
to plan any kind of military strategy on the basis of predicting
what the intentions of the other sides are, you are in deep trouble.
You have to look at the capabilities of the other side and not the
intentions.
Senator Biden. Precisely. The capability of those aircraft and
what they are designed for. I don't know of any military men in
Europe who believe the primary capability and design purpose of
these aircraft is for anything but the theater; do you?
Admiral Moorer. Instead of the word "primary" I think it is
probably true that they are primarily devoted to European targets,
but they have an easy capability for reaching the United States,
and we have no air defense worthy of the name, as you well know.
Senator Biden. You know, we can do all kinds of things with any
kind of weapon, but it seems to me that you have to look at the
purpose, the primary purpose for which they are constructed. Obvi-
ously, you can do anything with almost any weapon. I have not run
across anybody in Europe, any military people who have any doubt
about the Backfire bomber being a theater weapon.
I see that the General is shaking his head no. General, do you
know of any military men in Europe who say that is not the
purpose?
General Graham. I know a lot of military men in Europe who
would say: "Good for you. United States," sarcastically. You don't
count the Backfire bomber because you hope they are going to use
them on us. I don't think that causes much confidence, and when
you come around to say what it was built for, the Backfire bomber
is the best bomber the Soviets have ever built for attack on the
United States. We are counting 50- to 60-year-old prop jobs in the
SALT Treaty, and the Soviets are going to have 400 of these new
jobs, and we are not counting them because some believe, and
apparently you believe, that they were not built for attack on the
United States.
I don't know how you possibly can come to that conclusion.
PRIMARY purpose OF BACKFIRE BOMBER
Senator Biden. General, let me ask you the question again, if I
could. Are there military people in Europe that you know who
believe that the primary purpose for which the Backfire bomber is
being built is for use against the United States, or do they believe
that the primary purpose of the bomber is for use in the theater?
General Graham. Military men both on this side of the Atlantic
and on the other side of the Atlantic look at weapons systems in
terms, as the Admiral said, of their capability. They know that it is
capable both of attacking peripherally and attacking the United
States. Every bomber in anybody's inventory is better for attacking
closer targets than farther targets.
Senator Biden. Now you are begging the question, sir. Let me
ask it in another way. What do the military men in Europe whom
you know believe is the mission for which the Backfire is presently
tasked? What do you think?
General Graham. I don't know of anybody who says they know
what the mission of the Backfire is on this side of the water or over
45
there. It is, of course, a bigger threat to anything to which it is
closer, and that is Europe, Japan, and China. It is a lesser threat if
it has a distance to go, but so are the Soviet bombers that we are
counting in SALT, and this is a better bomber than any of them.
Senator Biden. So the SS-18, because it has less distance to go to
get to Bonn, is also more of a threat to Europe than here.
General Graham. No, sir. There is a difference between aircraft
and missiles.
Senator Biden. Well, tell me the difference in terms of the ra-
tionale that you just put forward. You said any target ^hat is closer
is obviously more vulnerable. Isn't Bonn therefore more vulnerable
to the SS-18 than we are?
General Graham. Yes, sir; but you can get to Bonn without
refueling the Backfire, and you have to refuel the Backfire to go to
some farther distant target, so there is a great deal of difference
how you look at a missile and how you look at an aircraft.
Senator Biden. My time is up. Ihank you, gentlemen.
Senator Javits?
Senator Javits. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Gentlemen, two questions occur to me, and I would like to ask
them of you. I apologize for having to run over to the floor of the
Senate while you were reading your statement, but I gather you
read the letter of your organization into the record. Is that correct?
Admiral Moorer. Yes, sir. It is in the record.
SALT I effect on U.S. ARMAMENT BUILDUP
Senator Javits. I notice you make the point which is probably
summed up in these words: "The Soviets have become harder not
easier to deal with after SALT I." Would you say that there was
anything in the SALT I Treaty which prevented us from taking the
same steps forward in armaments that the Soviets did during that
time?
Admiral Moorer. No, sir, Senator Javits, and as I have said
many times, as you recall I am sure, when I as Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff discussed the content of the SALT I Interim
Agreement on offensive systems, I had telephone calls between
Washington and Moscow on this matter as they were coming down
to the fine wire to sign the treaty. We came up with what we
called conditions, if you will, or assurances that we felt were neces-
sary in order to make SALT I viable.
The administration, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of De-
fense, if you read the testimony, strongly supported the assurances
that were requested by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. That is a mattter
of record, but subsequent to that time, the B-1 bomber has been
canceled, and many other of the actions with respect to the cruise
missile, for instance — now, we have agreed to place a restraint on
the cruise missile range for land-based and sea-based missiles, and
overall the general thrust of what we have been talking about has
been slowed down.
I agree with you that we were not restricted from doing any of
those things, but I believe you will agree that SALT I created a
kinc! of euphoria in the Congress and in the eye of the public, and
consequently people more or less kind of sat back in their chairs
46
and the progressive buildup of the Soviets continued while ours
went down.
DIFFERENCE IN TIME PERIODS FOLLOWING SALT I AND SALT II
Senator Javits. I think that is a very fair statement, Admiral.
Let me refer to another sentence in the letter which reads as
follows:
And we find it even harder to believe that ratification of SALT II would be
followed by vigorous U.S. efforts to close the widening gaps betwen U.S. and Soviet
military capabilities.
I ask you this question. Is there any difference between this
period which will follow a SALT II ratification if we do ratify and
the period which followed SALT I? In other words, will we still be
in the same position where we could, if we wanted, build up to the
Soviets or get way ahead of them? What is there in this treaty, in
your judgment, aside from the euphoria which you feel will contin-
ue, which will block us from taking the action we should have
taken, assuming your argument after SALT I? What is there in
this treaty that will prevent us from moving forward if we wish to
with the same vigor and the same strength that you prescribed
after SALT I?
Admiral Moorer. You are really asking me two questions. First,
what is different about the time today and the time back in 1972? I
think there is a radical difference. I think that the rapid buildup
by the Soviets in all phases of military equipment, missiles, and
conventional forces, and so on, has put them in a far stronger
position. That is the first point. I think in 1972 they would not
have dared to put troops and fighter pilots in Cuba. I think they
are just thumbing their nose at us.
I think they know that they can move ahead and we are not
going to do anything about it, so there is a major difference be-
tween 1972 and 1979.
Now, so far as the specific treaty is concerned, what can't we do?
I have already mentioned what I think are the unnecessary re-
straints imposed on the United States by the protocol which im-
posed no restraints on the Soviets, and in my view will slow down a
buildup of the NATO countries which is mandatory.
Second, you have such things in the treaty as article IX, I believe
it is that article, which restricts us from putting ballistic missiles
on ships. Now, if we are a maritime power and the Soviets are a
land power, why did we agree to accept a disadvantage which I do
not think is necessary? The Soviets were the ones who suggested
this. Obviously, they have IVz times the land area that we do. I
think there is another aspect of this about which people do not talk
very much, Senator Javits, but if you will look at a map, you will
see that our ballistic missiles are west of the population centers of
the United States, namely, the Chicago-Boston-Washington trian-
gle, and if the Soviets would undertake a counterforce attack on
our land-based missiles, the fallout would come right across the
most densely populated area of our country.
Conversely, the Soviet missiles are on the east side of Soviet
Russia, and if we were to attack them, as we well know, the fallout
would go over Japan and China.
47
So, I think that we should not just agree to remove an option
which could possibly remove the target from the center of the
United States.
FEASIBILITY OF BALLISTIC MISSILES ON SHIPS
Senator Javits. Have ballistic missiles on ships ever been consid-
ered by you as the Chief of Naval Operations as a feasible proposi-
tion?
Admiral Moorer. Yes, sir, many times. This was at a time, of
course, when we were beginning to get seriously concerned about
the accelerated Soviet buildup that was taking place subsequent to
the Cuban missile crisis in 1962. This was looked on very seriously
in the Pentagon as an alternative means of rapidly increasing our
missile capability.
Senator Javits. We will inquire into that. Admiral. So far as I
know, it is the first time this has been raised. We will inquire into
it.
Admiral Moorer. But the treaty does prohibit this.
Senator Javits. Yes, I see that. We will include article IX in the
record at this point, and we will investigate it.
[The information referred to follows:]
Article IX — Special Prohibitions on Weapon Systems
This Article prohibits or restricts certain types of weapon systems.
Subparagraph 1(a) prohibits the development, testing, and deployment of ballistic
missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometers for installation on water-
borne vehicle other than submarines, and of launchers of such missiles. This provi-
sion prohibits the development of a long-range ballistic missile system for surface
ships. The United States has no plans for such a system. An Associated Common
Understanding declares that this prohibition does not affect current practices for
transporting ballistic missiles, such as would be used in supplying missiles to
operating bases.
Subparagraph (b) of paragraph 1 of Article IX prohibits the development, testing,
and deployment of fixed ballistic or cruise missile launchers for emplacement on the
seabed or on the beds of internal waters, or mobile launchers of such missiles which
move only in contact with the beds of such waters, as well as missiles for such
launchers. The effect of this provision is: (a) to extend the prohibitions of the Seabed
Arms Control Treaty ' to the entire territorial waters and internal waters of the
Parties; and (b) to extend its obligations to include development and testing in
addition to deployment. The Seabed Arms Control Treaty essentially prohibits Par-
ties from emplacing nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction as well
as structures, launching installations or any other facilities specifically designed for
storing, testing or using such weapons, on the seabed and the ocean floor (or its
subsoil) beyond a 12-mile coEistal "seabed zone" measured from the baseline of the
territorial sea. An associated Agreed Statement makes clear that the obligation
contained in this subparagraph applies, inter alia, to all areas covered by the
Seabed Arms Control Treaty.
The prohibition on mobile launchers which can move only in contact with the
seabed does not include launchers on submarines, as submarines need not be in
contact with the seabed in order to move.
Subparagraph 1(c) of Article IX prohibits the development, testing and deploy-
ment of systems for placing into earth orbit nuclear weapons or any other kind of
weapons of mass destruction, including fractional orbital missiles. This subpara-
graph expands the obligations of the Outer Space Treaty,^ in that the Outer Space
' The Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons
of Mass Destruction • the Seabed and the Ocean Floor a. id in the Subsoil Thereof, signed at
Washington, London ani. Moscow Feb. 11, 1971, 23 UST 701, TIAS 7337. The United States and
Soviet Union are both Parties to this Treaty.
^ Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer
Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, signed at Washington, London and
Moscow Jan. 27, 1967, 18 UST 2410, TIAS 6347. The United States and Soviet Union are both
Parties to this Treaty.
48
Treaty prohibits only the actual placement in space of weapons of mass destruction,
and does not cover fractional orbital missiles.
An associated Common Understanding states that the prohibition on fractional
orbital missiles does not require dismantling or destruction of existing launchers of
either Party. However, under the Second Common Understanding to paragraph 2 of
Article VII the Soviets have agreed to dismantle or destroy twelve SS-9 launchers
at the Tyura-Tam test range which have been used to test a fractional orbital
bombardment system (FOBS) several times in the past. Moreover, any fractional
orbit missiles in existence must be dismantled or destroyed pursuant to the obliga-
tion of paragraph 4 of Article XI, and such missiles cannot be developed in the
future.
Subparagraph (d) of paragraph 1 prohibits the development, testing, and deploy-
ment of mobile launchers of heavy ICBMs. This obligation complements what is in
effect a ban on additional fixed launchers of modern heavy ICBMs contained in
Article IV. Heavy ICBMs are defined in paragraph 7 of Article II.
Subparagraphs (e) and (f) prohibit heavy SLBMs and their launchers and heavy
ASBMs. These subparagraphs in effect define heavy SLBMs and heavy ASBMs in
language parallel to that for the definition of heavy ICBMs in paragraph 7 of
Article II. A heavy SLBM or ASBM is one with a launch-weight or throw-weight
heavier than that of the Soviet SS-19 ICBM. The First and Second Agreed State-
ments defining launch-weight and throw-weight and the Common Understanding
concerning "other appropriate devices" for SLBMs and ASBMs also parallel those
under paragraph 7 of Article II. The mutual understanding of the Parties on the
terminology related to the definition of throw-weight set forth in the plenary
statements by both Parties on October 29, 1976 (stated above), applies here as well.
The second paragraph of this Article prohibits the flight-testmg and deployment
on heavy bombers of long-range cruise missiles equipped with multiple independent-
ly targetable warheads. An Agreed Statement to paragraph 2 defines "independent-
ly targetable" warheads of cruise missiles. This definition is similar to that of
MIRVs, which are defined under paragraph 5 of Article II. This definition does not
include cruise missiles equipped with "cluster warheads"; nor does it include a
recoverable, single-warhead cruise missile which can attack independent targets on
separate flights.
Admiral Moorer. I am just saying that we should not voluntar-
ily accept the restraint that the Soviets are not going to use
an3rway. * i • i
Senator Javits. Well, I know, but it takes two to tango. Admiral.
We are not going to have everything our way, if we have a treaty.
If we are not going to have a treaty, we and they will each go our
own way. That was my argument with Professor Rostow, and that,
of course, is another very different matter.
Admiral Moorer. Yes, sir, but I think you can carry that only so
far, or you will wind up as the low man on the totem pole.
EFFECT ON NO ARMAMENTS PROGRAM OF SALT IS DEFEATED
Senator Javits. But that depends on the will of the United
States. That is what I am trying to get from you. I am asking you
this question. Suppose we do not enter into this treaty and we are
still in a state of euphoria. Are we then worse off or better off. In
other words, we remain in the same state of euphoria then, but do
not make the treaty. You gentlemen will have been successful in
defeating the treaty, but if you are not successful in an armament
program, then what?
Admiral Moorer. Well, in the first place, I think I emphasize
two or three times that we are not opposed to arms limitations. I
have never known a military man who was. Second, what we are
opposing is the contents of this particular document. We are not
opposing disarmament. .
Senator Javits. If I may have just 2 more minutes. Admiral, let
me say that we are now in a very particular situation. You have no
49
guarantee whatever, believe me, that if we reject this treaty the
Congress is going to vote all the things you want or that you think
we ought to have. I should not say "things you want;" you are not
capricious. You are one of our military leaders.
Admiral Moorer. I am a retired man.
Senator Javits. That is all right, but I have known you for years,
and I still honor you. I would not take away one whit from you.
You cannot assure us of that at all. If we reject the treaty and are
still euphoric, aren't we then much worse off?
Admiral Moorer. Senator Javits, I think that the treaty can be
put in such a form that it would be a far more balanced and
equitable treaty, and we have discussed some of the points here.
Senator Javits. Well, Admiral, then you are superimposing your
judgment on that of the President, the negotiators, and the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, and saying that we can negotiate a better deal if we
turn this down. Now, that is a big question, a very big one. You
can't guarantee that.
Admiral Moorer. Of course not, but I feel it would be better to
try than to accept this treaty verbatim as written.
Senator Javits. By turning it down, whatever may be the conse-
quences?
Admiral Moorer. I think it should be negotiated further.
Senator Javits. I know, but that is turning it down. Sir, great
nations cannot bluff. The Senate is going to vote on this treaty, and
it is going to turn it down if you win. Then where does that leave
us? In my opinion, it threatens to leave us with the same euphoria,
with no treaty, with an exacerbated situation in the world, and
with far more scared European powers than they are today.
Admiral Moorer. Sir, I think you also have to ask the question
of where does it leave us if we sign it. That is what concerns me.
You can say that it is a matter of opinion, but I think the facts
speak for themselves. I think the Soviets have reached a point now
that they really do not care what we think. Otherwise, thej'
wouldn't be down in Cuba today.
Senator Javits. Well, we will see about Cuba, sir. You are too
much of a professional to jump at first assumptions. I do not know
what Cuba amounts to, but believe me, we will dig into it carefully.
There is indirect linkage for me between Cuba and SALT, and I
believe there is for everybody else. There is no use in kidding
ourselves about that. However, we are not at the bottom of that
story yet.
AGREEMENT TO SALT I TIED TO ADMINISTRATION PRESSURE
You say at the end of your letter. Admiral: "As military profes-
sionals, and with all due respect for our more circumscribed col-
leagues still bound by their active service." Admiral, did you agree
to SALT I because the administration wanted you to or because
you were convinced it was the right thing to do? In other words,
are you attributing a standard to the present Joint Chiefs of Staff
which is lower than yours?
Admiral Moorer. No, sir, certainly not, but I can tell you this.
Based on years and years of experience in our system of govern-
ment, we are the only nation to my knowledge that requires a man
in uniform to testify before the legislative branch of the Govern-
50
ment. I do know from my experience that it makes no difference,
and I am not getting political on this at all, it makes no difference
whether it is a Republican or a Democratic administration. There
are pressures brought to bear on the military people which I think
are probably proper in an executive pyramid, but they do not have
an opportunity to speak as I am speaking to you today.
This is an absolute fact in our system. Now, I do not oppose that.
I think in an executive branch, whether it is in the executive
branch of the U.S. Government or in the structure of General
Motors, that the chairman of the board, or the President, or who-
ever happens to be the chief executive officer, in all honesty and
fairness should ask his assistants, his vice presidents, or his joint
chiefs of staff what they think about this issue.
Then, he might say, I hear you but I am going to do it another
way. I have done that many times myself with my own staff. I am
sure you have, too. Senator Javits, but once the chief executive
makes the decision, then the staff is obligated to do everything it
can to support that decision. These people have two options, to
either support or to resign. That is the way the system works. I do
not think it should be changed or that it can be changed.
RELIABILITY OF JCS TESTIMONY
Senator Javits. Admiral, you would have us believe, and perhaps
this is the most portentious part of your testimony, that in order to
get the truth out of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, we have to wait until
they retire, and they are then no longer Joint Chiefs of Staff?
Admiral Moorer. No; I did not say that at all, and I hope you
are not suggesting that I am accusing the Joint Chiefs of Staff of
lying.
Senator Javits. No; I did not mean to do that at all. You are
absolutely right to object, and I apologize, but in order to get what
they really think, you tell us we will have to wait until they resign
and they are no longer Joint Chiefs of Staff; therefore we cannot
rely upon the Joint Chiefs of Staff. That is probably the most
serious thing that has been evidenced in this whole hearing.
Senator Biden. Or the political leadership you pointed out of the
Western World. n c^ rr i.
Senator Javits. Let's talk about the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the
professionals, and you were one of them. Did you want us to rely
on you when you were Chairman?
Admiral Moorer. Certainly.
Senator Javits. You did? Well, why do you not want us to rely
on the present Joint Chiefs?
Admiral Moorer. I did not say that. I said you must take the
lead of the Chief Executive, and all the people who work for him
are required to support him. That is what I said. That is what they
all do. . u . T
Senator Javits. Well, sir, this is where you are an expert, but 1
must say in my opinion you leave our country in an extremely
exposed and vulnerable position to tell us that we can't really
know what they think. They will somehow rationalize or conform
to the Chief Executive when they are the Joint Chiefs of Staff. You
have to face that. Admiral. There is no way of ducking it. That is
what you are telling us, in my opinion.
51
Admiral Moorer. Senator Javits, let me say that the Joint
Chiefs of Staff sent several memoranda to the Secretary of Defense
on SALT II and they expressed essentially the same concerns that I
have expressed today. As a matter of fact, I think some members of
this committee remarked at the time the Joint Chiefs were sitting
right here that what you are doing is damning the treaty with
fai!.t praise. If you are fair about it, if you read what they said, I
don't think that they just can't wait until this treaty is signed.
Senator Javits. Sir, I am sorry. They are men of authority and
decision. I am not a professional, but I have served, too. I know
that military people know how to decide and how to give an order,
whatever may be their reservations, and they have stated them.
They have been given an order. They have said, we are for this, so
ratify it. I will say that you worry me very much about many,
many things, and not just this particular treaty, but major deci-
sions which involve the very existence of our country,
QUESTION OF VERIFICATION
Senator Biden. Let me follow on that one point. You mentioned
the question of verification, General, and Admiral. I sit on the
Intelligence Committee. I have for a year now heard the testimony
of the very men who are the experts both in the military and
outside of the military. I have heard Admiral Inman, who is an
incredibly qualified fellow. I have heard the heads of our intelli-
gence community come before us and say that we can verify this
treaty. I have only one source for classified information. I cannot
even go to you any longer. You don't have the access.
The very eminent retired generals and admirals whom you have
listed do not have the access to up-to-date information which the
people who are now charged by our Government with our security
have. They have said to us that this treaty is verifiable. Barry
Goldwater says this treaty is verifiable, after listening to them. We
all must rely at some point on experts. We are not talking about
political questions in terms of verification. We are asking them,
can you see X, Y, and Z, and the experts say, yes, we can. You are
telling us in your statement, and all of these retired people appar-
ently agree, that it is not verifiable. You go on to tell us that the
rank and file of the military in Europe have much deeper reserva-
tions about the treaty than the present military leadership. You go
on to say that the political leadership is strongly for SALT, but
underneath there is really no support.
It seems to me that you have made the most damning indictment
of political and military leadership and expertise not only in this
country but in the entire alliance that I have ever heard. You are
right that I don't have the experience with strategic planning that
you do. I am a 36-year-old U.S. Senator, not a retired Admiral with
a very distinguished career. But because of what I am, I look to the
people who supposedly know, the leadership in the military, the
leadership in the intelligence community, the leadership in the
alliance, and uniformly they tell me, with reservations that have
been expressed, that we should ratify this treaty. And you are
sajdng to us that retired people know better, that we should listen
to them, and you, and not to this leadership. And you imply that
they are really not telling us what they think.
52
If that is true, you don't leave us much to rely on, not just in this
treaty, but in anything relating to our military establishment.
Admiral Moorer. Senator Biden, I don't wish to leave it in those
terms. It is true, as I said before, that we do have a different
system which was established by the Congress in the Defense Reor-
ganization Act of 1958 as well as the National Security Act of 1927,
I believe. You might want to take a look at that. But when you get
to technical matters, in terms of the capability of the intelligence
system or the capability of our own equipment, of course, you get
the greatest detail in this, but when you get into a flat question of,
do you approve of the Vietnam conflict, which I did not, and I said
so many times, nevertheless, we also talk all the time about civil-
ian control. I'll bet I have heard that term a thousand times, the
term "civilian control." We do have civilian control in this country.
I have never known a military man who does not support the
Constitution, but I think there are pressures put on military people
to go along with the administration's policy, and that is just a fact.
I think if you were President, you would do the same thing.
Senator Biden. Sure, there is pressure, and I would attempt to do
the same thing if I believed it were right, but honorable military
men are faced with the same choice that honorable men in politics
are, and that is that they can't go along with it if they really
believe the security of the country is being jeopardized. Then they
would have an obligation to resign. That is a real obligation, not a
fictitious one.
You are implying that this treaty truly jeopardizes the security
of the United States, and that the military men who are telling us
otherwise know that. Now, it seems to me for them to continue in
office if they believe that means they would be dishonorable men,
regardless of the pressure. If I in fact totally disagree with a
position my party takes, my State takes, or my constituency takes,
i don't have an obligation to go along. I have an obligation to
follow my conscience, and I should resign if I can't go along with it.
These men, you are saying to us, know that this treaty jeopar-
dizes the security of the United States of America but because of
political pressure they are not coming forward.
Admiral Moorer. No, sir; I didn't say that. I said that what they
told you, I am sure, was their opinion, but I think that this treaty,
as I say in my statement, is ill-advised in its present form. I am not
like you in the sense that I do not have access to the intelligence
reports that you have. General Graham was director of the intelli-
gence agency, and so far as the verification capabilities are con-
cerned, he is an expert.
Senator Biden. I know that. I am not suggesting that General
Graham cannot disagree with Admiral Inman.
General Graham. I don't think I do, as a matter of fact. One of
the problems I think for a Senator getting briefed on verification
is, you may not know what questions to ask because you don't
know enough about it. Have you questioned this part of the treaty
that says the Soviets will not produce an SS-16 missile, will not
produce the third stage of it, will not produce the warhead? I don't
know of an honest intelligence man, Bobby Inman included, who
will say, yes, I can verify that they are not producing the warhead
for an SS-16. He knows they can't do that.
53
I'll bet you if you ask him bluntly, can you tell me, Bobby, can
you verify whether or not the Soviets are producing a warhead for
an SS-16, he will tell you he doesn't know. I will bet you Admiral
Turner, who knows a lot less about it than Bobby does because he
hasn't been in it as much, will also tell you no, and General Tighe
will tell you know if you ask the right question.
Senator Biden. You are a very interesting fellow. General, to
imply that after a Senator spends a full year, involving several
hundred hours of reading and briefings, that he is not able even to
ask the right questions. You guys make such an incredible indict-
ment of the system that I just find it absolutely difficult to believe
you are saying it.
Senator Stone. Don't go away mad, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Biden. Oh, no, I won't do that.
INTRODUCTION OF COMBAT TROOPS IN CUBA
Senator Stone. Admiral Moorer, on July 17, you and Admiral
Zumwalt testified before this committee and for the first time the
issue of Soviet military buildups was raised by me in questioning
you. I asked you was it not the case that Soviet Golf II submarines
carry nuclear misssiles, and that if servicing such a submarine
took place in Cuba, it would be a violation, and you said it would ' I
asked you both this question: I would like to ask either or both of
you whether you think a direct or indirect effort to establish a
military base would be established by the introduction of a large
number of combat troops of the Soviet Union into Cuba.
Admiral Zumwalt said there is no question in his mind. You,
Admiral Moorer, said absolutely, yes, sir. I then asked, would you
say that if other than advisers, the Soviet Union attempted to
introduce as much as a brigade of combat troops into Cuba, that
that would constitute a direct or indirect effort to establish a base.
Well, since that time, within a day, the administration witnesses
denied that the Golf II submarine does or did carry nuclear mis-
siles, but within a week admitted it, and it is in the record. Within
3 or 4 weeks after that, they have now conceded and now they
assert that there is a Soviet brigade of combat troops in Cuba.
My final question to you was this: "I have already inquired about
the Soviet submarine visits. I have already inquired about the Mig-
23 and Mig-25 presence in Cuba. If in addition to that there were a
major introduction of Soviet combat troops into Cuba, could there
be any further doubt that we just do not care about protecting our
hemisphere against Soviet military bases in this hemisphere?"
At that time you said, Admiral Moorer: "None whatsoever, none
whatever, and I think it would be the height of folly for the United
Stated to permit that to happen, sir."
It has now happened. What is your suggestion to our policy-
makers at this juncture? And I would like the opinion of you.
Admiral Moorer, and also General Graham, of you.
Adi.Jral Moorer. In my opinion this is directly linked, as I
pointed out, this action by the Soviets — as a matter of fact, I
predicted this was going to happen when I testified on the Panama
Canal issue. I stated that there was a Torrijos-Moscow-Castro axis,
■ See the SALT II Treaty hearings, part 2, pp. 178-180.
54
and that the Senate should not be surprised if we did not find an
expansion of Soviet activity in Cuba in very short order.
I was sitting right here in this very room, I believe.
In the first place, I believe this is part of the overall effort of the
Soviets to gain major influence worldwide. I think there is no way
that you can unlink this from the SALT discussion. As I said this
morning, I think it is all part of an overall grand design on their
part.
In the first place, I think the SALT discussions should be halted
until the Soviets reconcile this point. If they refuse to do that, then
I think there are several courses of action open to us. Of course, I
am not in a position to decide on these.
Certainly I think we should make it crystal clear to the Soviets
and to the world at large that we are not going to tolerate this
gradual creeping injection of Soviet forces all around the world. I
mentioned Angola, Mozambique, Ethiopia, Yemen, and other areas.
Obviously, we will give the perception to the world at large that we
are engaged in a massive program of worldwide retrenchment.
Senator Stone. Thank you, Admiral.
General Graham?
General Graham. When I heard about the brigades. Senator
Stone, the chill that went through me was related to the fact that I
was one of the key analysts at the time of the 1962 missile crisis,
which is the last time that the Soviets had a brigade in Cuba.
We were thinking about deploying our troops. As a matter of
fact, we did deploy our troops down in Florida to go in. The
question put to the intelligence people was, what are those Soviet
troops going to do? Why are they there? Some of the theses were,
well, maybe they put them there to try to deter us from attacking
Cuba, but we said one brigade will not deter us from moving
against Cuba.
Then maybe they are there to help make sure Castro stays in
power as sort of a palace guard. That was rejected. The final
analysis from all knowledgeable Sovietologists is that they were
there to guard nuclear weapons because the Soviets have never
allowed nuclear weapons to get in the hands of even their most
trusted satellites. This is a consideration that should be taken very
much to heart by the Senate of the United States, because it does
have to do with strategy. This business about saying, well, don't
worry about them, they are not going to invade Florida, no, they
are not going to invade Florida, but the last time a group like that
was there, the Government of the United States decided, and the
intelligence organs of the United States decided they were there to
guard nuclear weapons.
INTRODUCTION OF NUCLEAR CAPABLE AIRCRAFT INTO CUBA
As you brought out, and much to your credit. Senator, you did
raise your voice when the Soviets introduced new nuclear capable
aircraft into Cuba that were better nuclear delivery systems than
the ones that Jack Kennedy said they had to take out at the time
they took out their missiles. They had some old IL-28's in there,
much poorer aircraft than what they put in there now that are
nuclear capable, and then there was a chat about, well, this is not
the right model, and we don't know whether they are wired and so
55
forth, but I will tell you, every one of those aircraft that is de-
ployed opposite NATO is counted by the NATO people as a nuclear
threat to NATO.
Senator Stone. Are you speaking of the Mig-23's?
General Graham. Yes, the Mig-23's, the floggers. So, this is an
extremely serious business, and it should not be handled simply
through an expression of concern. I believe something must be
done about checking what may be just the tip of the iceberg. This
is what we see now in Cuba. What else is in Cuba? Once again, we
are getting the kind of reports that one of your colleagues. Senator
Keating, was getting before the Cuban missile crisis. They said,
watch out, something very sinister is going on down there in Cuba.
We could say, well, this is just Cuban exiles having their say again,
but now we had better pay some attention to them, as we did not
pay attention to them in those days until we took pictures and
found out what was going on.
There is one other aspect of this, and here I agree with Henry
Kissinger, and sometimes Henry Kissinger and I have not agreed
on things. Dr. Kissinger always insisted that we continue to fly
reconnaissance flights over Cuba while some of my colleagues even
in the Pentagon said that for cost purposes we are getting enough
pictures with satellites, so why send aircraft? He said, t^e day you
stop sending the aircraft over Cuba, you are going to py:2 a signal
to the Soviet Union that it is now open season for Hem to do
anything they want in Cuba.
When this administration came into power, I regret to say those
reconnaissance flights were stopped. I think that makes Henry
Kisssinger something of a prophet on this particular occasion.
Senator Stone. Mr. Chairman, may I have an additional 2 or 3
minutes?
Senator Biden. Yes, sir.
Admiral Moorer. Senator Stone, please permit me to make an
additional comment. I have been extremely concerned about the
Soviet pilots in Cuba because I feel that in the short term they are
more destabilizing than the troops were, because should they inter-
cept an American plane in the vicinity of Cuba, a situation would
be generated which can bring about a confrontation. For them to
have their pilots in Cuba, I think, is another matter that should be
taken up with the Soviets by the strongest means available.
Senator Stone. Thank you. Admiral.
General, I have another question on this point. How recently did
you retire as head of the Defense Intelligence Agency? In what
year was that?
General Graham. It was January 1, 1976.
SECRETARY VANCE's ASSERTION — BRIGADE IN CUBA SINCE 1975
Senator Stone. 1976. As of that time, could you comment on the
Secretary of State's assertion of yesterday that the brigade prob-
ably was there in 1975 or even earlier?
General Graham. If that is so, then there was absolutely no
evidence of that when I was Chief of Military Intelligence.
Senator Stone. And you were conducting the aerial reconnais-
sance then?
56
General Graham. That's right. In those days we were looking a
lot better than we have been in the last V-k years.
Senator Stone. Well, in the last V-k weeks we did conduct the
appropriate reconnaissance, the administration says. That is what
a lot of them do, piece the jigsaw puzzle together. What you are
saying is that that same or equivalent surveillance, up until Janu-
ary 1, 1976, had not produced that kind of evidence or anything
like that kind of evidence?
General Graham. That is correct. The most that we could find in
those days of evidence of Soviet presence was that they had con-
structed some facilities for Soviet sailors coming into Cienfuegos.
We could see the recreation facilities and some barracks there.
They put up some kind of sports fields that— I forget which it
was — Cubans don't play, so we know it was Soviets.
Senator Stone. Gentlemen, I am saying, as I have said repeated-
ly in the last weeks, that what you saw then in Cienfuegos as a few
recreational facilities is considerably, substantially, and in a major
way more than what is seen now in Cienfuegos. Isn't that a fair
comment, from what you know?
General Graham. Yes, sir, that is right. I was amazed to see in
the newspapers where somebody said, well, those troops have been
there for 5 or 6 years. If they were, we sure missed them, and we
were covering Cuba very well. I believe that these troops are part
of the pattern that you have begun to see with Mig-23 aircraft
arrriving, with the Soviet pilots in their flying combat missions in
allegedly Cuban forces, and now this brigade. We are only seeing
that which is hard to hide, and we had better take this extremely
seriously.
Senator Stone. Thank you, gentlemen.
Mr. Chairman, thank you.
Admiral, I particularly want to thank you for assisting with the
disclosure and discovery of what General Graham calls the tip of
the iceberg, but which had to come out, and which is now out.
General Graham, I thank you for clarifying this question of
when this test substantially began. Thank you.
Senator Biden. Thank you. Senator Stone.
Senator Hayakawa?
Senator Hayakawa. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
soviet successful first strike possible by 1982-83
There seems to be general agreement that regardless of whether
or not we ratify SALT II, by about 1982 or 1983, the Soviets will be
able to make a successful first strike.
General Graham. Yes, sir.
Admiral Moorer. Yes.
Senator Hayakawa. Now, the M-X will not be fully deployed
before 1988. Is that right?
General Graham. I believe it is 1986, sir. If everything stays on
track, you will get some of them in 1986.
57
WHAT UNITED STATES SHOULD DO TO COUNTER SOVIET STRATEGIC
SUPERIORITY
Senator Hayakawa. What could or should the United States do
now, promptly, in order to counter the danger of Soviet strategic
superiority by 1982 or 1983?
What are the things we should be doing?
Admiral Moorer. Well, Senator Hayakawa, I have always felt
that you cannot uncouple the conventional capabilities from the
strategic capabilities, so in my view, in answer to your question, we
should start now to redress this imbalance in both the conventional
and the strategic areas. Now, some people will say that we can't do
an5^hing about that until the treatj' expires, so what is the use?
However, firm action that is clearly perceived by the world at large
that this is what we are doing in itself would have, in my view, a
deterrent effect. Had we done this a year ago, I don't think the
Soviets would have put troops in Cuba or built them up as they
have.
separation of strategic AND CONVENTIONAL PREPARATION
Senator Hayakawa. Admiral, possibly to ask another question,
you say that strategic preparations and conventional ones cannot
be separated from each other. Is that so?
Admiral Moorer. That's right.
Senator Hayakawa. Are we not being asked in considering the
SALT 11 Treaty to consider the strategic elements only and to
ignore ever3d;hing else that is going on in conventional weaponry
and conventional warfare?
Admiral Moorer. That is correct. I have felt from the outset and
have said that SALT 11 should be a national security debate and
not just a SALT debate. SALT should be merely a part of the
debate.
General Graham. May I add to that, Senator?
Senator Hayakawa. Please do.
NEED TO ERADICATE CLASH OF STRATEGIC PHILOSOPHY
General Graham. The fundamental problem is to get rid of this
crazy notion that we have been pursuing for 15 years called mutual
assured destruction [MAD]. You in the Senate, in your hearings,
have produced some evidence of a profound clash of doctrine in the
Pentagon. On July 9, Secretary of Defense Brown said that mutual
assured destruction was the bedrock of our strategic doctrines. On
July 16, when the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff was asked,
what do you think of mutual assured destruction, he said, it is an
extremely dangerous idea, and we in the military, no matter how
much our civilian masters think that is a good idea, have not
followed it.
So, until that clash of philosophy or clash of strategy is removed,
it seems to me that we are not going to make the kind of military
moves that we must in order to defend this country. There are
things that are never mentioned. Why don't we go ahead and
defend the American people? Under the MAD concept, we have
gotten rid of all our defense. We have encouraged the Soviets to
58
come up with a Backfire bomber by getting rid of all of our de-
fenses against bombers.
Civil defense is not a long leadtime item, and that in itself would
help greatly to rectify the gross imbalance in power, but if we only
stare at that little piece of the military problem which is called
intercontinental delivery, nuclear systems, and then insist on ex-
cluding some of them because they get in the way of making an
agreement, we aren't even looking at the U.S. military problem.
We are not even looking at our strategic problem. We are certainly
not looking at the total complex of economic, political and military
matters that should be a national strategy.
Instead, we are picking this tiny thing and arguing about cruise
missiles, accuracies, and so forth. While we stare at that little piece
of the picture, we find the whole Western position crumbling away
at an ever increasing rate.
DEGREE OF SCHIZOPHRENIA NEEDED TO DISCARD LINKAGE THEORY
Senator Hayakawa. General, I am grateful to you for confirming
my worst suspicions. The insistence on the part of both the Soviets
and our own administration that we consider the SALT agreement
in isolation with no linkage between that and Soviet adventurism
in Yemen, Angola, Ethiopia, and so on, we are not supposed to
think about at all, they say, but that seems to require of us a
degree of schizophrenia of which I am not quite capable.
General Graham. I think there is a gross illogic in that position,
too. I am on the road all the time with the administration SALT
sellers to try to offset them. When they talk to the people, they
say, look, there is no linkage between Soviet past and present
behavior and SALT. SALT is in an area all by itself. Then the next
speaker gets up and says, we have to have SALT because the
Soviets will behave better with it and worse without it, so in the
future there is linkage, but in the present and past there is no
linkage. These people have no logic to their positions whatsoever.
SUSPENSION OF SALT DISCUSSIONS UNTIL CUBAN PROBLEM IS
RESOLVED
Senator Hayakawa. General, didn't I understand you to say that
our response to the presence of that Cuban brigade should be to
suspend the discussion of the ratification of SALT II?
Admiral Mooorer. That is what I said. In my opinion, we should
suspend it until this issue is settled. If this is a manifestation of
what the Soviets are planning overall in conjunction with the
revolutionaries in Cuba, this is only the beginning. We have seen
Nicaragua go down the drain, and I think certainly effort is now
going to be focused on all of Latin America and South America too,
here, right in our own backyard, where the Panama Canal is one of
the maritime gateways of the world, it connects the U.S. Western
States with the east coast, but the whole objective, in my view, of
the Soviets from the outset has been to control the approaches to
that Panama Canal for the same reason they are working on the
Suez Canal. Now that they have gone into Cam Ranh Bay, which is
the best naval base in all of the Pacific they have the Malacca
Straits in Singapore staring down their throat.
59
So, they are working hard all the time to control maritime traffic
from one ocean of the world to the other.
Senator Hayakawa. Thank you very much, Admiral. I think you
will be happy to learn that at a press conference in response to
press inquiries yesterday as to what I thought ought to be done
about the presence of Cuban troops, I said we should call off the
SALT negotiations altogether.
Admiral Moorer. Senator, I think you are absolutely right.
Senator Hayakawa. Thank you.
Senator Stone [presiding]. Thank you. Senator Hayakawa.
Admiral, General, thank you very much.
[Admiral Moorer's and General Graham's prepared statements
follow:]
48-260 0-79 Pt . U - 5
60
Prepared Statement of Adm. Thomas H. Moorer, USN, Retired
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee,
I am honored to have the opportunity to testify again before
this Committee on the SALT II treaty.
Today, I am testifying as Chairman of the Executive Committee of
the Coalition for Peace Through Strength.
The Coalition for Peace Through Strength is a bipartisan
alliance of 105 national organizations, 204 Members of Congress and
other pro-defense leaders across America. The American Security
Council, which I serve as a member of the Board of Directors, is the
program secretariat for the Coalition.
The purpose of the Coalition is to work for the adoption of a
national strategy of Peace Through Strength.
It is our belief that if the United States Senate consents to
the SALT II Treaty, it would make the adoption of such a strategy
most unlikely.
We did prepare a detailed study called AN ANALYSIS OF SALT II.
However, this is a 78-page document and thus too long for me to
cover in the time allotted to us today.
Instead, I ask permission to read a three-page joint statement
signed by 1678 retired general and flag officers from all the armed
services.
As you know, active duty military leaders are not permitted to
flatly oppose SALT II. This is why we at the Coalition for Peace
Through Strength have sought out the views of retired military
leaders who are now free to speak out.
From my conversations with active and retired military leaders,
I believe that the overwhelming majority oppose SALT II as written.
This has been confirmed by the fact that only four of the retired
officers contacted so far have declined to join in the statement
because they support SALT II as written. Another thirty-three
declined for such reasons as that they were undecided, ill, or
thought that the statement should be written differently.
We are continuing to circulate the statement and will later give
each Senator a copy of the statement with a list of all the signers
at that time.
61
COALITION FOR PEACE THROUGH STRENGTH
Program Secretariat: American Security Council
Educational Secretariat: American Security Council Education Foundation
September 6, 1979
The Honorable Frank Church, Chairman
U.S. Senate
Committee on Foreign Relations
Dear Senator Church:
We, the undersigned retired and reserve general and flag officers
of all U.S. Military Services respectfully request you to oppose
ratification of SALT II.
We are in agreement with most of our fellow Americans in pre-
ferring international cooperation and equitable arms-limitation agree-
ments to hostility and competition. But we cannot agree that we can
wish this congenial state of affairs into being by blinding ourselves
to the stark realities of our strategic situation. In our view, SALT
II as now written epitomizes the refusal of some Americans to face the
facts. The facts which must be faced are these:
Ten years of U.S. restraint in the strategic nuclear field
rooted in our faith in the SALT process has not been recipro-
cated by the Soviet Union; rather, the Soviets have pursued an
unprecedented buildup of nuclear offensive and defensive
capability which, as Secretary of Defense Brown points out, is
aimed at a war-winning capability.
The concept of Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) which has
shaped U.S. policy since the 1960 's was never accepted by the
Soviets and has been completely negated by their massive stra-
tegic defensive effort including civil defense.
The aggressiveness of Soviet behavior throughout the world has
increased ominously as the military balance has tilted in favor
of the USSR.
U.S. intelligence capabilities to verify Soviet compliance with
arms-control agreements have been seriously eroded through com-
promise of satellite reconnaissance systems and loss of key
monitoring facilities.
Washington Office: 499 South Capitol Street, Washington, D.C. 20003
Washington Communications Center: Boston, Virginia 22713
62
It seems to us that there is little disagreement inside or outside
government that these are the facts, yet the Senate has been asked to
ratify a treaty which apparently ignores those facts. We are told by
defenders of SALT II that while this treaty does little to slow down
the Soviet military surge, it is necessary to ratify it to preserve the
"process." They insist that SALT III and SALT IV will cure the
inequities of SALT I and SALT II. This ignores Soviet behavior since
SALT I. The Soviets have become harder, not easier, to deal with.
The proponents of SALT II insist that we will improve our security
through ratification because the situation would be worse without
SALT II.
We find it hard to believe that the Soviets could significantly
accelerate their current arms buildup in light of the fact that they
are already spending 15 percent of their gross national product on
arms. And we find it even harder to believe that ratification of
SALT II would be followed by vigorous U.S. efforts to close the
widening gaps between U.S. and Soviet military capabilities. It is
almost certain that Senate ratification of this treaty would commit the
United States to another seven years of pursuing peace through trust of
the Soviets and adherence to the obviously bankrupt doctrine of Mutual
Assured Destruction (MAD) . This means further decline of our capa-
bility to deter war or to defend ourselves.
We respectfully submit that the arms-control process has become
dominated by a persistent U.S. refusal to face the reality of a failure
of the twin policies of detente and disarmament.
SALT II doesn't even limit arms. The image of limitation is pro-
vided by alleged equal numbers of launchers and aircraft, not to the
real destructive elements of nuclear force — missiles and explosive
power — where the Soviets have been allowed a heavy advantage. To make
matters worse, the "equal" numbers are contrived by failing to count
Soviet delivery systems such as the Backfire, the most advanced stra-
tegic bomber in the operational inventory of either side.
We also find the treaty as written unverifiable and attempts to
finesse this issue by redefining terms most disturbing. SALT II is
much more complex than SALT I and covers qualitative as well as quan-
titative aspects of nuclear armaments enormously more difficult to
monitor. Given the compromise of our key verification satellite
systems and the loss of vital monitoring stations in Iran, we cannot
insure against Soviet circumvention of the treaty provisions. State
Department documents describing SALT II redefine verification. Where
adequate verification once required an assurance from U.S. intelligence
that attempts by the Soviets to circumvent would be detected, it now
requires only that we can detect cheating on such a large scale that it
alters the strategic balance in time to assure an appropriate U.S. re-
sponse. This new definition completely finesses the problem of
63
adequacy of our intelligence capability since it is totally dependent
on one's view of what constitutes a "strategic balance" and an "appro-
priate response." For those who find the actual balance of strategic
capabilities irrelevant, and believe that a single U.S. Poseidon sub-
marine is an adequate deterrent regardless of the size of the Soviet
forces, SALT II can be considered "adequately verifiable" with no D.S.
intelligence capability at all.
We agree with the Secretary of Defense, Dr. Brown, that the
Soviets are building forces capable of fighting and winning a nuclear
war with the United States and its allies but we strongly disagree with
his view that this aim can be thwarted by ratifying SALT II. Soviet
participation in SALT, or any other arms control treaties, is primarily
designed to further this goal and to elicit U.S. accjuiescence and even
cooperation in creating the necessary Imbalcince of power required by
that goal.
In sum, we urge the Senate of the United States to consider the
grave consequences of ratifying a treaty which will commit this country
to continuation of disarmsunent policies which, however promising when
adopted, have imperilled the security of the United States and its
allies and encourage ever more aggressive Soviet behavior. The SALT
process is not so sacrosanct that we must accept a lopsided and unveri-
flable agreement simply to show "progress."
We who know war cherish peace. We are not warmongers,
oppose SALT II have been dubbed by some.
as all who
As military professionals, and with all due respect for our more
circumscribed colleagues still bound by their active service, we
strongly urge you to reject SALT II as injurious to the security
interests of the United States and its allies.
With Grave Concern,
Admiral Thomas H. Moorer, OSN, Ret.
On behalf of the following retired
generals and flag officers
Rear
Adm.
Rear
Adm,
Rear
Adm.
Brig
. Gen
Rear
Adm.
Brig
. Gen
Rear
Adm.
Rear
Adm.
Rear
Adm.
Elmer P. Abernethy, USN, Ret
Raymond B. Ackerman
Charles Adair, USN, Ret
. Charles J. Adams, USAF, Ret
Frank Akers, USN, Ret
. Frank Albanese, USA, Ret
John W. Albrittain, USN, Ret
Clarence E. Aldrich, OSN, Ret
Leroy J. Alexanderson, USNR, Ret
Maj.
Gen.
Rear
Adm.
Brig,
, Gen
Brig,
, Gen
Maj.
Gen.
Brig,
. Gen
Brig,
. Gen
Brig,
, Gen
Rear
Adm.
Jesse M. Allen, USAF, Ret
John M. Alford, OSN, Ret.
. Lawrence H. Allen
. Richard C. Allgood
John R. Allison
. Conrad S. Allman, USAF, Ret
. Walter F. Alt
. Kenneth G. Althaus, OSA, Ret.
Richard G. Altmann, USNR, Ret.
64
Rear Adm. Stephen H. Aitibruster, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. John G. Ames, III, USNR, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Glenn C. Ames, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Charles C. Anderson, USN, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Earl O. Anderson, USAF, Ret.
Rear Adm. Herbert H. Anderson, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Roy G. Anderson, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Vernon L. Anderson, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Winston P. Anderson, USAF, Ret.
Rear Adm. John D. Andrew, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. R. S. Andrews, USN, Ret.
Maj. Gen. John G. Appel, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Jack J. Appleby, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Howard H. Arbury, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Robert J. Archer, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Wilbur W. Aring, USAF, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Theodore A. Arndt, USA, Ret.
Admiral Jackson D. Arnold, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Kelly Arnold, USA, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Walter E. Arnold, USAF, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Thomas E. Arnott
Rear Adm. G. W. Ashford, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Milton H. Ashkins, USAF, Ret.
Rear Adm. James H. Ashley, Jr., USN, Ret.
Vice Adm. Frederick L. Ashworth, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Raymond Astumian
Vice Adm. Bernard L. Austin, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Edward Austin, USNR, Ret.
Rear Adm. Kenneth A. Ayers, USNR, Ret.
Rear Adm. Leo A. Bachman, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Robert M. Backes
Brig. Gen. Van. N. Backman, USAF, Ret.
Rear Adm. Donald G. Baer , USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. George H. Bahm, USN, Ret.
Maj. Gen. James A. Bailey, 'Jf-AF, Ret.
Rear Adm. William B. Bailey, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. William S. Bailey, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Lee E. Bains, USNR, Ret.
Rear Adm. Duncan S. Baker, USNR, Ret.
Rear Adm. Felix L. Baker, USN, Ret.
Vice Adm. Harold D. Baker, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Felix P. Ballenger, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Richaird R. Ballinger, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Joseph R. Barbaro, USN, Ret.
Lt. Gen. Glenn O. Barcus, USAF, Ret.
Rear Adm. Eugene A. Bar ham
Rear Adm. Christopher S. Barker, Jr., USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Roland J. Barnick, USAF, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Charles H. Barnwell, USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Charles D. Barrett
Brig. Gen. Paul L. Barton, USAF, Ret.
Brig. Gen. John W. Baska, USAF, Ret.
Rear Adm. Thomas E. Bass, III, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Raymond H. Bass, USN, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Joseph E. Bastion, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Harold Bater, USNR, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Harold R. Bauer, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Rudolph C. Bauer, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. George W. Bauernschmidt, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Richard M. Baughn, USAF, Ret.
Maj. Gen. William H. Baumer , USA, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Edward Bautz, Jr., USA, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Kenneth H. Bayer, USA, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Charles Beach
Rear Adm. Charles B. Beasley, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Charles Becker, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Frederick J. Becton, USN, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Theodore C. Bedwell, USAF, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Aaron W. Beeman, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Charles S. Beightler, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. John K. Beling, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. David B. Bell, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Frederick Bell, USAF, Ret.
Maj. Gen. John H. Bell, USAF, Ret.
Rear Adm. Russell J. Bellerby, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Herbert G. Bench, USAF, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Russell A. Berg, USAF, Ret.
Maj. Gen. William W. Berg, USAF, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Kenneth P. Bergquist, USAF, Ret.
Admiral Russell S. Berkey, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Ferdinand V. Berley, USN, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Joseph L. Bernier, USA, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Robert Bernstein, USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Paul D. Berrigan, USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Walter B. Bess, USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Wendell L. Bevan, USAF, Ret.
Rear Adm. Irwin F. Beyerly, USN, Ret.
Maj. Gen. William W. Beverley, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Horace V. Bird, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. John F. Bird, USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. William H. Birdsong, USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Max K. Bitts, USA, Ret.
Vice Adm. Paul P. Blackburn, Jr., USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Donald F. Blake, USAF, Ret.
Maj. Gen. William H. Blakefield, USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Charles E. Blaker
Brig. Gen. R. M. Blanchard, USA, Ret.
Maj. Gen. John R. Blandford
Maj. Gen. Jonas L. Blank, USAF, Ret.
Vice Adm. Albert M. Bledsoe, USN, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Frederick B. Blessee, USAF, Ret.
Rear Adm. Elliott Bloxom, USN, Ret.
General Philip T. Boerger, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Calvin M. Bolster, USN, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Jones E. Bolt, USAF, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Charles R. Bond, USAF, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Thomas Bonner, USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Milton O. Boone, USA, Ret.
Admiral Walter F. Boone, USN, Ret.
Maj. Gen. John L. Boros
65
Rear Adm. John T. Bottoms, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Aubrey J. Bourgeois, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Clarence M Bowley, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. George M. Bowman, USNR, Ret.
Lt. Gen. A. L. Bowser
Brig. Gen. John H. Boyes, USA, Ret.
Lt. Gen. George S. Boylan, USAF, Ret.
Maj. Gen. William A. Boyson, USA, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Russell Boyt, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Anthony A. Braccia, USNR, Ret.
Maj. Gen. William T. Bradley, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Frank A. Braisted, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. William H. Brandenburg, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Frank A. Brandley, USN, Ret.
Maj. Gen. William H. Brandon, USAF, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Arthur F. Brandstatter , USA, Ret.
Maj. Gen. L. Render Braswell, USAF, Ret.
Lt. Gen. Robert A. Breitweiser, USAF, Ret.
Rear Adm. James T. Brewer, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. James R. Bright, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Russell C. Brinker, USNR, Ret.
Brig. Gen. James Brittingham, USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. John C. Brogan, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Douglas B. Brokenshire, USN, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Allison C. Brooks, USAF, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Grady S. Brooks, USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Thad A. Broom, USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Charles R. Broshous, USA, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Charles P. Brown, USA, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Jay G. Brown, USAF, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Thomas W. Brown, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. William D. Brown, USN, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Samuel R. Browning, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Frederick J. Brush, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Albert S. Brussel, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Henry C. Bruton, USN, Ret.
Maj. Gen. William E. Bryan, USAF, Ret.
Vice Adm. Carleton F. Bryanc, USN, Ret.
Maj. Gen. John H. Buckner, USAF, Ret.
Rear Adm. Carl E. Bull, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Ross P. Bullard,
Brig. Gen. Cady R. Bullock, USAF, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Howard G. Bunker, USAF, Ret.
Rear Adm. William O. Burch, Jr., USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Harvey P. Burden, USN, Ret.
Lt. Gen. Allen M. Burdett, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Raymond W. Burk, USN, Ret.
Maj. Gen. William A. Burke, USAF, Ret.
Maj. Gen. John W. Burkhart, USAF, Ret.
Brig. Gen. John C. Burney, Jr., USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. John R. Burns
Maj. Gen. Merrill D. Burnside, USAF, Ret.
Rear Adm. Albert C. Burrows, USN, Ret.
brig. Gen. Ernest H. Burt, USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Charles R. Bushong, USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Chester J. Butcher, USAF, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Benjamin J. Butler, USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Ogbourne D. Butler
Maj. Gen. Robert G. Butler, USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Thomas F. Butt, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. John L. Butts, Jr., USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Victor A. Byrnes
Rear Adm. Jose M. Cabanillas, USN, Ret.
Vice Adm. Malcolm W. Cagle, USN, Ret.
Maj. Gen. William R. Calhoun, USA, Ret.
Maj. Gen. John U. Calkins, USA, Ret.
Vice Adm. William M. Callaghan, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Joseph W. Callahan, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Thomas S. Cameron, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. John M. Campbell, USAF, Ret.
Rear Adm. Robert L. Campbell, USN, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Roland A. Campbell, USAF, Ret.
Maj. Gen. William B. Campbell, USAF, Ret.
Brig. Gen. C. Craig Cannon, USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Robert H. Canterbury, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Daniel Carlson, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Martin D. Carmody, USN, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Edwin H. Cams, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Stephen W. Carpenter, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Bruce L. Carr, USN, Ret.
General W. Reynolds Carr
Brig. Gen. Richard C. Carrera
Lt. Gen. Charles W. Carson, USAF, Ret.
Rear Adm. Harry R. Carson, Jr., USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Joseph M. Carson, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Albert S. Carter, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Jesse H. Carter, USN, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Hugh J. Casey, USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Benjamin B. Cassiday, USAF, Ret.
Rear Adm. George W. Casslercnr, USNR, Ret.
Rear Adm. Gordon L. Caswell. USN, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Richard C. Catledge, USAF, Ret.
Gen. Jack J. Catton, USAF, Ret.
Rear Adm. Cecil T. Caufield, USN, Ret.
Maj. Gen. John H. Caughey, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Robert W. Cavenagh, USN, Ret.
Maj. Gen. William S. Chairsell, USAF, Ret.
Vice Adm. Alvin D. Chandler, USN, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Curtis W. Chapman, USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Harry M. Chapman, USAF, Ret.
Brig. Gen. James W. Chapman, USAF, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Steve A. Chappuis, USA, Ret.
Vice Adm. P. N. Char bonnet, USN, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Carlos F. Chardon
Maj. Gen. Charles H. Chase, USA, Ret.
General Max M. Cherry
Brig. Gen. William H. Cheeseraan, USA, Ret.
Maj. Gen. John H. Chiles, USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Keith L. Christensen, USAF, Ret.
Maj. Gen. James G. Christiansen, USA, Ret.
66
Rear Adm. John S. Christiansen
Vice Adm. Ralph W. Christie, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Gordon P. Chunghoon, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Bradford G. Chynoweth, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Albert H. Clancy, USN, Ret.
General Albert P. Clark
Brig. Gen. Allen F. Clark, Jr., USA, Ret.
Rear Adra. David H. Clark, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Jeane R. Clark, USN, Ret.
Admiral John E. Clark, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. John M. Clark, USAF, Ret.
General Bruce C. Clarke
Admiral Ralph S. Clarke, USN, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Winton R. Close, USAF, Ret.
Brig, Gen. John B. Coates, Jr., USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Ralph G. Coburn, Jr., USNR, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Lor is R. Cochran, USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Samuel G. Cockerhara, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Benjamin Coe, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. James E. Cohn, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Philip P. Cole, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. William C. Cole, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Lewis E. Coley, USN, Ret.
Lt. Gen. R. W. Colglazier
Maj. Gen. Kenneth W. Collins, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. John L. Collis, USN, Ret.
Vice Adm. John B. Colwell, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Walter V. Combs, Jr., USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. J. Richard Compton
Brig. Gen. Ross R. Condit, Jr., USA, Ret.
Admiral Ray R. Conner, USN, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Raymond C. Conroy, USA, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Louis J. Conti
Rear Adm. Albert B. Cook, USNR, Ret.
Rear Adm. Ralph E. Cook, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. William R. Cooke, USN, Ret.
Vice Adm. Damon W. Cooper, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Joshua W. Cooper, USN, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Marcus F. Cooper, USAF, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Paul T. Cooper, USA, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Ralph C. Cooper, USA, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Richard H. Cooper, USAR
Rear Adm. Bennett S. Copping, USN, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Thomas G. Corbin, USAF, Ret.
Lt. Gen. Charles A. Corcoran, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Frederic W. Corle, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Peter Corradi, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Ted H. Corry, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Edward J. Costello, Jr., USNR, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Hugh J. Cox, USA, Ret.
Rear Adra. William R. Cox, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. John S. Coye, Jr., USN, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Jarred V. Crabb, USAF, Ret.
Rear Adm. Kenneth Craig, USN, Ret.
Maj. Gen. William H. Craig, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Wyatt Craig, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Richard S. Craighill, USN, Ret.
General Reginald M. Cram
Brig. Gen. William J. Crandall, USAFR, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Albert B. Crawford, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. B. Hayden Crawford
Rear Adm. George C. Crawford, USN, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Edward I. Creed, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Charles H. Crichton, USN. Ret.
Maj. Gen. Richard G. Cross, USAF, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Thomas H. Crouch, USAF, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Albert B. Crowther, USA, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Harry Crutcher, Jr., USAF, Ret.
Rear Adra. Robert R. Crutchfield, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Allman T. Culbertson, USAF, Ret.
Rear Adm. Charles R. Cundiff, USNR, Ret.
Brig. Gen. John W. Currier, USA, Ret.
Maj. Gen. R. D. Curtin, USAF, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Robert H. Curtin, USAF, Ret.
General Donald Curtis
Maj. Gen. Gilbert Curtis, USAF, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Raymond W. Curtis, USA, Ret.
Vice Adra. Walter L. Curtis, Jr., USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Ben Scott Custer, USN, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Charles S. D'Orsa, USA, Ret.
Lt. Gen. John A. Dabney, USA, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Leo P. Dahl, USAF, Ret.
Rear Adm. Theodore 0. Dahl, USN, Ret.
Rear Adra. Carl M. Dalton, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. 0. T. Dalton
Rear Adm. Winfred P. Dana, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Maurice W. Daniel, USA, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Thomas C. Darcy, USAF, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Carlton S. Dargusch, USA, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Carl Darnell, Jr., USA, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Don O. Darrov?, USAF, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Anthony F. Daskevich, USA, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Frederick J. Dau, USAF, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Lester A. Daughter ty, USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Buddy R. Daughtrey, USAF, Ret.
General Harry J. Davidson, Sr.
Brig. Gen. Joseph H. Davidson, USAF, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Charles L. Davis, USA, Ret.
Vice Adm. George M. Davis, Jr., USN, Ret.
Vice Adm. Glenn B. Davis, USN, Ret.
General Raymond G. Davis
Maj. Gen. Woodard E. Davis, USAF, Ret.
Rear Adm. Thurlow W. Davison, USN, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Donald S. Dawson, USAF, Ret.
Rear Adm. Willard H. Day, USNR, Ret.
Brig. Gen. James K. DeArmond, USAF, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Arthur R. DeBolt, USAF, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Chester B. DeGavre, USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Merlin L. DeGuire, USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. John W. Dean, Jr., USA, Ret.
67
Maj. Gen. Elbert Decoursey, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Russell Defauver, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Clinton G. Defoney, USN, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Robert L. Delashaw, USAF, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Leon Delighter
Maj. Gen. Marvin C. Demler, USAF, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Kenneth C. Dempster, USAF, Ret.
Vice Adm. Francis C. Denebrink, USN, Ret.
Admiral Robert L. Dennison, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Clyde R. Denniston, USAF, Ret.
Brig. Gen. John A. Des Fortes, USAF, Ret.
Vice Adm. Harold T. Deutermann, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. J. P. S. Devereux
Maj. Gen. Lawrence R. Dewey, USAF, Ret.
Rear Adm. E. B. Dexter, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. William J. Deyo, USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. John S. B. Dick, USA, Ret.
Lt. Gen. William W. Dick, Jr., USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. George W. Dickinson, USN, Ret.
Maj. Gen. William A. Dietrich, USAF, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Charles E. Dissinger, USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. John S. B. Divk, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Ernest W. Dobie, Jr., USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. John W. Dobson, USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen Nevin W. Dodd, USAF, Ret.
Rear Adm. Sydney B. Dodds, USNR, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Roy T. Dodge, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Joseph E. Dodson, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Carl R. Doerf linger, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. John W. Dolan, Jr., USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. William A. Dolan, USN, Ret.
Maj. Gen. John M. Donalson, USAF, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Jack N. Donohew, USAF, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Philip J. Donovan
Lt. Gen. Stanley J. Donovan, USAF, Ret.
Rear Adm. Thomas A. Donovan, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Edward M. Dooley, USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Charles R. Doran, USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Paul P. Douglas, USAF, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Williain R. Douglas, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Wallace R. Dowd, Jr., USN, Ret.
Admiral James H. Doyle, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. William C. Doyle, USA, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Abraham J. Dreiseszun, USAF, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Donn R. Driver, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Raymond F. DuBois, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Thomas H. Dubois, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Francis R. Duborg, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. James R. Dudley, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. John H. Dudley, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Clifford H. Duerfeldt, USN, Ret.
Vice Adm. Irving T. Duke, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Robert W. Duke, USA, Ret.
Lt. Gen. Leo J. Dulacki
Admiral Charles K. Duncan, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Donald Dunford, USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. William D. Dunham, USAF, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Frank Dunkley, USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Charles G. Dunn, USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Richard T. Dunn, USA, Ret.
Admiral Lewis W. Dunton, USNR, Ret.
Brig. Gen. James K. Durham
Rear Adm. Willijun H. Duvall, USN, Ret.
Maj. Gen. R. T. Dwyer
Brig. Gen. John R. Dyas, USAF, Ret.
Rear Adm. Victor A. Dybdal, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. E. R. Eastwold, USN, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Robert E. L. Eaton, USAF, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Seimuel K. Eaton, USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Harvey W. Eddy, USAF, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Alan C. Edmunds, USAF, Ret.
Lt. Gen. James V. Edmundson, USAF, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Morris 0. Edwards, USA, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Parmer W. Edwards, USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Clarence T. Edwinson, UAF, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Edward S. Ehlen, USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Milton Ehrlich
Brig. Gen. Charles V. Elia, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Ernest M. Eller, USN, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Frank W. Elliott, USAF, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Howard V. Elliott, USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. John C. B. Elliott, USAF, Ret.
Vice Adm. William E. Ellis, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Ernest B. Ellsworth, USN, Ret.
Lt. Gen. Hugh M. Elwood
Lt. Gen. William J. Ely, USA, Ret.
Lt. Gen. Henry E. Emerson
Lt. Gen. Jean E. Engler, USA, Ret.
Lt. Gen. William P. Ennis, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Horace H. Epes, Jr., USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. William H. B. Erwin, USAF, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Graydon C. Essman, USA, Ret.
Maj. Gen. William E. Eubank, USAF, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Harry L. Evans, USAF, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Thomas B. Evans, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Gordon S. Everett, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Harry G. Ewart, USNR, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Arthur E. Gxon, USAF, Ret.
Rear Adm. Francis L. Fabrizio, USNR, Ret.
Rear Adm. D. S. Fahrney, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. William H. Fairbrother, USAF, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Ivan L. Farman
Rear Adm. Eugene H. Farrell, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Ralph E. Faucett, USN, Ret.
Maj. Gen. James B. Faulconer, USAF, Ret.
Vice Adm. Albert J. Fay, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Edward L. Feightner, USN, Ret.
General James Ferguson, USAF, Ret.
Rear Adm. William E. Ferrall, USfi, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Angelo L. Ferranti
68
Rear Adm. Harold F. Pick, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Richard D. Field, USNR, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Kendall J. Fielder, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Ralph E. Fielding, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Russell R. Finn, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Alvan Fisher, USNR, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Ralph E. Fisher, OSAF, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Richard E. Fisher, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. John A. Fitzgerald, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Phillip H. Fitzgerald, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. W. F. Fitzgerald, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. William H. Fitzgerald, USNR, Ret.
Rear Adm. Michael P. D. Flaherty, USN, Ret.
Lt. Gen. Edward M. Flanangan, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Francis E. Fleck, USN, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Lawrence J. Fleming, USAF, Ret.
Rear Adm. Morton K. Fleming, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. William B. Fletcher, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. William O. Floyd, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. George C. Fogle, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Francis D. Foley, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Harry J. P. Foley, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Joseph F. Foley, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Winston P. Folk, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. J. E. Fondahl
Brig. Gen. Paul P. Foran, USA, Ret.
Vice Adm. Bernard B. Forbes, USN, Ret.
General G. Foreman
Rear Adm. James E. Forrest, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Edward C. Forsyth, USN, Ret.
Lt. Gen. George I. Forsythe, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Newton P. Foss, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm., Walter M. Foster, USN, Ret.
Maj. Gen. C. Lyn Fox, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Claud M. Fraleigh, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. John W. Francis
Rear Adm. Nickolas J. F. Frank, USN, Ret.
Maj. Gen. John F. Franklin, USA, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Wesley C. Franklin, USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Joe N. Frazar, Jr., USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Dewitt L. Freeman, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Mason Freeman, USN, Ret.
General Paul L. Freeman, Jr., USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Leonard F. Freiburghouse, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Leonard Frisco, USNR, Ret.
Brig. Gen. William J. Fry, USAF, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Thomas Fuller, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Samuel G. Fuqua, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Charles M. Fur low, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Frederick R. Furth, USN, Ret.
Vice Adm. Walter D. Gaddis, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Frank L. Gailer, USAF, Ret.
George R. Gallagher
Rear Adm. W. Earl Gallaher, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. William 0. Gallery, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Clarence J. Galligan, USAF, Ret.
Lt. Gen. Walter T. Galligan, USAF, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Jack K. Gcimble, USAF, Ret.
Rear Adm. Wayne N. Garnet, USN, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Robert G. Card, USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. George W. Gardes, USA, Ret.
Maj. Gen. E. Blair Garland, USAF, Ret.
Rear Adm. Francis L. Garrett, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Malcolm E. Garrison, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Ralph S. Garrison, USNK, Ret.
Rear Adm. Norman F. Gar ton, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Eugene W. Gauch, USAF, Ret.
Rear Adm. John D. Gavan, USNR, Ret.
Rear Adm. Donald Gay, Jr., USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. J. Edwin Gay, USNR, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Arthur A. Gentry
Brig. Gen. William F. Georgi, USAF, Ret.
Rear Adm. Harry E. Gerhard, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. John H. Germeraad, USAF, Ret.
Maj. Gen. William K. Ghormley, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Frederic Gibbs, USNR, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Elmer J. Gibson, USA, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Harold B. Gibson, USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Kenneth H. Gibson, USAF, Ret.
Rear Adm. W. M. Gibson, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Raymond A. Gilbert, USAF, Ret.
Lt. Gen. Alvan C. Gillem, USAF, Ret.
Rear Adm. Thomas E. Gillespie, USN, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Charles H. Gingles, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Richard P. Glass, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. James Glore, USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. William R. Goade, USAF, Ret.
Brig. Gen. George W. Goddard, USAF, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Guy H. Goddard, USAF, Ret.
Maj. Gen. George A. Godding, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. William H. Godson, USNR, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Melvin A. Goers, USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Robert R. Goetzman
Rear Adm. William B. Goggins, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Morton J. Gold, USAF, Ret.
General William B. Gold, Jr.
Admiral Henry W. Goodall, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. John C. Gordon, USAF, Ret.
Lt. Gen. Gordon T. Gould, USAF, Ret.
Rear Adm. C. L. Grabenhorst, USNR, Ret.
Lt. Gen. Daniel Graham, USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. James E. Graham
Maj. Gen. Donald W. Graham, USAF, Ret.
Lt. Gen. Gordon M. Graham, USAF, Ret.
Vice Adm. Arthur R. Gralla, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. John G. Gramzow, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Etheridge Grant, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Elonzo B. Grantham, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Alfred M. Granum, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Guy J. Gravlee
69
Rear Adm. Oscar Gray, Jr., USN, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Philip H. Greasley, USAF, Ret.
General William O. Green
Brig. Gen. Jaraes W. Green, Jr., USA, Ret.
Maj. Gen. George B. Greene, USAF, Ret.
Rear Adm. William M. A. Greene, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. John F. Greenslade, USN, Ret.
Vice Adm. Elton W. Grenfell
Admiral Charles D. Griffin, USN, Ret.
Maj. Gen. James A. Grimsley, USA, Ret.
Lt. Gen. Francis H. Griswold, USAF, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Sidney Gritz, USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. August H. Groeschel, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Rowland H. Groff, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. John V. Grombach
Rear Adm. Royce L. Gross, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Donald G. Grothaus, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. William H. Groverman, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Bradford E. Grow, USN, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Richard A. Grussendorf, USAF, Ret.
Rear Adm. William S. Guest, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. William M. Gullett, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Frederick A. Gunn, USN, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Karl W. Gustafson, USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Kermit L. Guthrie, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Frank S. Haak, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Chester E. Haberlin
Maj. Gen. Herbert R. Hackbarth, USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Louis J. Hackett, Jr., USA, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Jaraes F. Hackler, USAF, Ret.
Rear Adm. Ira F. Haddock, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Theodore G. Haff, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Hamilton Hains, USN, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Peter C. Hains, III, USA, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Dudley D. Hale, USAF, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Stewart L. Hall, USA, Ret.
Lt. Gen. William E. Hall, USAF, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Kay Halsell, II
Maj. Gen. Milton B. Halsey, USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Lyle E. Halstead, USAF, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Archelaus L. Hamblen, USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Edward J. Hamilton
Rear Adm. Thomas J. Hamilton, USN, Ret.
Gen. Barksdale Hamlett
Rear Adm. Wellington A. Hammond, USN, Ret.
Maj. Gen. George F. Hamner , USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. William L. Hamrick, USAF, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Jack L. Hancock, USA, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Walter J. Hanna, USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Clifford P. Hannum, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Harry J. Hansen, USN, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Norris B. Harbold, USAF, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Eads G. Hardaway, USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Robert M. Hardaway, USA, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Harold F. Harding, USA, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Donald L. Hardy, USAF, Ret.
General Robert B. Harkness, Jr.
Vice Adm. F. J. Harlfinger, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. John Harllee, USN, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Joseph H. Harper, USA, Ret.
Lt. Gen. Robert W. Harper, USAF, Ret.
Rear Adm. Talbot E. Harper, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Brooks J. Harral, USN, Ret.
General Ben Harrell
Maj. Gen. William S. Harrell, USAF, Ret.
Rear Adm. Alfred R. Harris, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Benjamin T. Harris, USA, Ret.
Vice Adm. Roy M. Harris, USNR, Ret.
Lt. Gen. Bertram C. Harrison, USAF, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Eugene L. Harrison, USA, Ret,
Rear Adm. Lloyd Harrison, USN, Ret.
Maj. Gen. William H. Harrison, USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Gerald A. Hart
Brig. Gen. Frederick O. Hartel, USA, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Thomas J. Hartford, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Charles C. Hartman, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. William H. Hartt, USN, Ret.
Vice Adm. Harry L. Harty, Jr., USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Valery Harvard, Jr., USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Robert A. Harvey
Brig. Gen. David C. Hastings, USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. W. G. Hathaway
Maj. Gen. John J. Hayes, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Hugh C. Haynsworth
Maj. Gen. Stuart G. Haynsworth, USAF, Ret.
Vice Adm. John T. Hayward, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Raymond F. Hebrank
Vice Adm. Truman J. Hedding, USN, Ret.
Lt. Gen. Earl C. Hedlund, USAF, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Edwin C. Hef felf inger , USA, Ret.
Maj. Gen. William T. Hef ley, USAF, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Charles A. Heira, USAF, Ret.
Rear Adm. Roger C. Heimer
Rear Adm. Paul R. Heineman, USN, Ret.
Lt. Gen. John A, Heintges
Lt. Gen. Rolland V. Heiser
Rear Adm. Frank V. Heimer
Brig. Gen. Jack W. Hemingway, USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. William H. Henderson
Maj. Gen. Raleigh R. Hendrix, USA, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Augustus M. Hendry, USAF, Ret.
Maj. Gen. John P. Henebry
Maj. Gen. William H. Hennig, USA, Ret.
Maj. Gen. John B. Henry, Jr., USAF, Ret.
Rear Adm. Karl G. Hensel, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Joseph L. Herlihy, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Vincent Hernandez, USN, Ret.
Maj. Gen. John H. Herring, USAF, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Daniel W. Hickey, Jr., USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. George L. Hicks, USNR, Ret.
70
Maj. Gen. Gerald J. Higgins, USA, Ret.
Rear Adin. Paul L. High, USN, Ret.
Maj. Gen. John M. Hightower, USA, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Jim D. Hill
Maj. Gen. Roderic L. Hill, USA, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Harry L. Hillyard, USA, Ret.
Vice Adra. William 0. Hiltabidle, USN, Ret.
Lt. Gen. John H. Hinrichs, USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. B. J. Leon Hirshorn, USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Howard M. Hobson, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. John H. Hoefer, USNR, Ret.
Maj. Gen. John A. Hoefling, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Herbert L. Hoerner, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Bartholanew H. Hogan, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. R. Wesley Hogan, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Harold R. Holcomb, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. William H. Holcombe, USA, Ret.
Rear Adra. Richard Holden, USN, Ret.
Lt. Gen. James F. Hollingsworth, USA, Ret.
Admiral William R. Hollingsworth, USN, Ret.
General Bruce K. Holloway, USAF, Ret.
Rear Adm. Harland E. Holman, USNR, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Ernest V. Holmes, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Carl O. Holmquist, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Everett W. Holstrom, USAF, Ret.
Maj. Gen. William H. Holt, USAF, Ret.
Maj. Gen. J. Stanley Holtoner, USAF, Ret.
Admiral Ernest C. Holtzworth, USN, Ret.
Vice Adm. Edwin B. Hooper, USN, Ret.
Maj. Gen. John E. Hoover, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Lewis A. Hopkins, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Charles F. Home, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Richard C. Home, USA, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Charles T. Homer, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. John S. Horner, USNR, Ret.
Brig. Gen. John B. Horton, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Herschel A. House, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Edwin B. Howard, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. James H. Howard, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Hamilton W. Howe, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Hugh H. Howell
Rear Adm. C. C. Howerton, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Lester E. Hubbell, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Edward M. Hudgins
Brig. Gen. Oscar Conrad Hudson
Brig. Gen. Ronald S. Huey
Brig. Gen. Harry J. Huff
Brig. Gen. Robert B. Hughes, USAF, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Robert L. Hughes, USA, Ret.
Maj. Gen. H. E. Humfeld, USAF, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Ladd F. Hunt
Rear Adm. Louis H. Hunte, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Albert E. Hunter, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. George P. Hunter, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Raymond P. Hunter, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Robert N. Hunter, USN, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Benjamin Hunton, USAR, Ret.
Rear Adm. Jack E. Hurff, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Richard M. Hurst, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Samuel H. Hurt, USN, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Eugene L. Husdon, USAF, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Vincent G. Huston, USAF, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Charles R. Hutchison, USA, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Joseph C. Hutchison, USA, Ret.
Admiral John J. Hyland, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. John P. Ingle, Jr., USNR, Ret.
Rear Adm. Walter D. Innis, USNR, Ret.
Rear Adm. Donald G. Irvine, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Roy M. Isaman, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Robert M. Ives, USA, Ret.
Maj. Gen. William A. Jack, USAF, Ret.
Rear Adm. David H. Jackson, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Ivan E. Jackson, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Milton C. Jackson, USNR, Ret.
Rear Adm. P. W. Jackson, USN, Ret.
Rear Adra. Robert W. Jackson, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Oscar J. Jahnsen, USA, Ret.
Rear Adra. Williara J. James, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Frederick E. Janney, USN, Ret.
Lt. Gen. Carl H. Jark, USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Irby B. Jarvis, Jr., USAF, Ret.
Lt. Gen. Hal B. Jennings
Rear Adra. M. J. Jensen
Rear Adm. John R. Johannesen, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Ernest F. John, USAF, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Charles E. Johnson, USA, Ret.
Maj. Gen. E. Gillis Johnson
Maj. Gen. Earl L. Johnson, USAF, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Edwin L. Johnson, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Henry C. Johnson, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. John B. Johnson, USNR, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Kenneth L. Johnson, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Ralph C. Johnson, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Richard H. Johnson, USA, Ret.
Admiral Roy L. Johnson, USN, Ret.
General Warren R. Johnson
Admiral Means Johnston, Jr.
Rear Adm. Don A. Jones
Brig. Gen. Bruce B. Jones, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Carlton B. Jones, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. George M. Jones, USA, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Stanley W. Jones, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. William C. Jonson, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Allen R. Joyce, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Charles E. Jung, USAF, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Carl S. Junkermann, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Williara L. Kabler , USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Joseph I. Kane, USN, Ret.
Rear Adra. Constantine A. Karaberis, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Draper L. Kauffman, USN, Ret.
71
Rear Adm. John H. Kaufman, USN, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Louis Kaufman, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Paul Kaufman, USNR, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Albert Kaye, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Edgar S. Keats, USN, Ret.
Maj. Gen. George Keegan, USAF, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Gerald F. Keeling, USAF, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Naiff H. Kelel
Brig. Gen. Harold K. Kelley, USAF, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Arthur W. Kellond, USAF, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Maurice w. Kendall, USAF, Ret.
Maj- Gen. Richard C. Kendall, USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. John M. Kenderdine, USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Kenneth W. Kennedy, USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Thomas B. Kennedy, USAF, Ret.
Rear Adm. Richard A. Kern, USNR, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Redmond F. Kernan
Brig. Gen. H. E. Kessinger, USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Wayne 0. Kester , USAF, Ret.
Vice Adm. Dixwell Ketcham, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Gerald L. Ketchum, USN, Ret.
Vice Adm. Ingolf N. Kiland, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Benjamin H. King, USAF, Ret.
Brig. Gen. James I. King, USA, Ret.
Vice Adm. Jerome H. King, Jr., USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. John J. King, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Philip V. King, USNR, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Thomas H. King, USAF, Ret.
Rear Adm. Leon S. Kintberger, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. John M. Kinzer, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Louis J. Kirn, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Bernard J. Kitt, USA, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Julius Klein
Lt. Gen. Richard P. Klocko, USAF, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Richard A. Knobloch, USAF, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Frank J. Kobes, Jr., USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Herman J; Kossler, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm, William J. Kotsch, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Edgar P. Kranzf elder , USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Frederick C. Krause
Brig. Gen. Martin R. Krausz, USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Philip F. Kromer , USA, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Clifford J. Kronauer
Lt. Gen. Victor H. Krulak
Rear Adm. Howard F. Kuehl, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Chester A. Kunz, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. William B. Kunzig, USA, Ret.
General Laurence S. Kuter , USAF, Ret.
Rear Adm. Paul L. Lacy, Jr., USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. John J. Laffan, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. James A. Lake, USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Kir by Lamar, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Valdemar G. Lambert, USN, Ret.
General F. H. Lamson-Scribner
Maj. Gen. James E. Landrum, USA, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Robert B. Landry, USAF, Ret.
Rear Adm. Richard Lane, USN, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Clarence J. Lang, USA, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Cyrille P. Laporte, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Louis R. Laporte, USNR, Ret.
Maj. Gen. William W. Lapsley, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Wharton E. Larned, USNR, Ret.
Vice Adm. Harold O. Larson, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Harold V. Larson, USAF, Ret.
Maj. Gen. William B. Latta, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Robert E. Laub, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. John T. Lawler
Brig. Gen. John D. Lawlor, USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Baskin R. Lawrence, USAF, Ret.
Rear Adm. Sidney J. Lawrence, USN, Ret.
Lt. Gen. William S. Lawton, USA, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Osmund A. Leahy, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. William H. Leahy, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. John E. Leary, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. John E. Lee, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Lamar Lee, Jr., USN, Ret.
Lt. Gen. Frederick E. Leek
Rear Adm. James E. Leeper , USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. William C. Lemly
Rear Adm. Frederick W. Lemly, USNR, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Kelley B. Lemmon, USA, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Charles F. Leonard, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. William N. Leonard, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Cecil P. Lessig, USAF, Ret.
Rear Adm. Joseph W. Leverton
Maj. Gen. William P. Levine, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. B. E. Lewellen, USN, Ret.
Lt. Gen. John T. Lewis, USA, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Oliver W. Lewis, USAF, Ret.
Rear Adm. Porter Lewis, USN, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Vernon B. Lewis, USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. William D. Lewis, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. R. E. Libby, USN, Ret.
Maj. Gen. David I. Liebman, USAF, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Lawrence S. Lightner, USAF, Ret.
Rear Adm. Walter E. Linaweaver, USN, Ret.
Lt. Gen. Lawrence J. Lincoln
Gen. Rush B. Lincoln, USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Joseph J. Lingle
Brig. Gen. Andy A. Lipscomb, USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. John J. Liset, USAF, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Elmer L. Littell, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Olin A. Lively
Brig. Gen. B. C. Lockwood, Jr., USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Thomas A. Long, USN, Ret.
Vice Adm. Victor D. Long, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. William H. Longley, USNR, Ret.
Rear Adm. Michael Lorenzo, USNR, Ret.
Lt. Gen. Walter E. Lotz, USA, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Charles E. Loucks, USA, Ret.
72
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Kenneth Loveland, USN, Ret.
Jess up D. Lowe, OSAF, Ret.
Sumter L. Lowrv, USA, Ret.
. Bernard R. Luczak, tJSA, Ret.
. Garland A. Ludv, USA, Ret.
Robert P. Lukeman, USAF, Ret.
William S. Lundberg, USA, Ret.
. Reginald P. Lyman, USA, Ret.
George E. Lvnch, OSA, Ret.
. George P. Lvnch, USA, Ret.
John J. Lynch, USN, Ret.
Ralph C. Lynch, USN, Ret.
Nelson M. Lynde, USA, Ret.
. Donald J. Lynn
. Archibald W. Lyon, USA, Ret.
Harvey E. Lyon, USN, Ret.
Hylan B. Lyon, USN, Ret.
Raymond R. Lyons, USN, Ret.
Clinton S. Lvter, USA, Ret.
Donald J. MacDonald, USN, Ret.
Duncan C. MacMillan, USN, Ret.
John J. Maginnis
John B. Macgregor, USN, Ret.
Robert A. Macpherson, USN, Ret.
. Robert S. Macrum, USAF, Ret.
Dashiell L. Madeira, USN, Ret.
Frank M. Madsen, USAF, Ret.
. W. S. Magalhaes
Thomas B. Magath, USNR, Ret.
. J. Maglione, USAF, Ret.
Charles J. Maguire, USN, Ret.
Harrv P. Mahin, USN, Ret.
, Thaddeus F. Malanowski, USA, Ret.
Ralph W. Ma lone, USN, Ret.
Robert W. Maloy, USAF, Ret.
, Ben J. Mangina
Daniel J. Manning
Joseph I. Manning, USN, Ret.
, Alexander Marble, USA, Ret.
, Theodore H. Marshall, USA, Ret.
William J. Marshall, USN, Ret.
Clarence A. Martin, USA, Ret.
, Edward 0. Martin, USAF, Ret.
Sherman F. Martin, USAF, Ret.
David L. Martineau, USN, Ret.
Harrv C. Mason, USN, Ret.
Stanhope B. Mason, USA, Ret.
Theo. C. Ma taxis, USA, Ret.
Paul L. Mather, USN, Ret.
Salve H. Matheson, USA, Ret.
Bob O. Mathews, USN, Ret.
John H. Maurer, USN, Ret.
Azro J. Maxham
William S. Maxwell, USN, Ret.
Walter S. Maver , USN, Ret.
Brig.
Brig.
Mai.
Maj.
Brig. Gen.
Rear Adm.
Maj.
Rear
Gen.
Adm,
Brig. Gen. Richard W. Mavo, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. John H. McAuliffe, USNR, Ret.
Gen. Madison M. McBrayer, USAF, Ret.
Gen. George H. McBride, USA, Ret.
Gen. William D. McCain
Gen. Chester E. McCarty, USAF, Ret.
Admiral J. W. McCauley, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Arthur J. McChrystal, USA, Ret.
Clyde F. McClain, USAF, Ret.
John G. McClaughry, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. William M. McCloy, USNR, Ret.
Charles M. McCorkle, USAF, Ret.
James R. McCormick, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Victor B. McCrea, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Kenneth A. McCrimmon, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Leo B. McCuddin, USN, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Robert H. McCutcheon, USAF, Ret.
Admiral David L. McDonald, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Everett A. McDonald, USAF, Ret.
Rear Adm. Ellsworth D. McEathron, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. John A. McEwan, USA, Ret.
Lt. Gen. Thomas K. McGehee, USAF, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Francis M. McGoldrick, USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Thomas J. McGuire, USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Godfrey T. McHugh, USAF, Ret.
Rear Adm. D. E. McKay, USN, Ret.
Lt. Gen. George H. McKee, USAF, Ret.
Rear Adm. Logan McKee, USN, Ret.
General Seth J. McKee, USAF, Ret.
Brig. Gen. William A. McKee, USA, Ret.
Gen. C. M. McKeen, USA, Ret.
Henrv R. McKenzie, USA, Ret.
Eugene B. McKinney, USN, Ret.
William R. McKinney, USN, Ret.
John R. McKnight, USN, Ret.
John H. McLain, USAF, Ret.
Richard E. McLaughlin
Ephraim R. McLean, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. G. A. McLean, USN, Ret.
Gordon McLintock
Robert McMath
Gen. Henry W. McMillan, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. George J. McMillin, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Edwin E. McMorries, USN, Ret.
James A, McNally
Raymond F. McNelly, USA, Ret.
Melvin F. McNickle, USAF, Ret.
Richard R. McNulty, USNR, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Claude M. McQuarrie, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Charles J. McWhinnie, USNR, Ret.
Gen. John C. McWhorter, USA, Ret.
Gen. Keith E. McWilliams
Rear Adm. States M. Mead, USNR, Ret.
Lt. Gen. Fillmore K. Mearns, USA, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Edward P. Mechling, USAF, Ret.
Maj.
Maj.
Rear
Rea r Adm
Rear Adm
Brig
Gen.
Adm.
Gen.
Major Gen.
Vice Adm.
Vice Adm.
Brig. Gen.
Maj.
Rear
Maj.
Maj.
Adm.
Gen.
Gen.
Rear Adm.
Maj.
Brig.
73
Maj. Gen. John B. Medaris, USA, Ret.
General Vernon E. Megee
Rear Adm. Roqer W. Mehle, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. John L. Melqaard. tJSN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Robert E. Mellinq, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Albert L. Melton, USAF, Ret.
Rear Adm. Corwin Mendenhall, USN, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Chauncey D. Merrill, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Charles H. Mester, Jr.
Briq. Gen. Frank Meszar, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Ralph M. Metcalf, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Alfred B. Metsger, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Edward F. Metzer, USN, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Richard J. Meyer, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Walter C. Michaels, USNR, Ret.
Briq. Gen. Howard E. Michelet, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Bill A. Miles, USNR, Ret.
Rear Adm. Edwin S. Miller, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. George H. Miller, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Harold B. Miller, USN, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Junior F. Miller, USA, Ret.
Briq. Gen. Robert B. Miller, USAF, Ret.
Rear Adm. Ward S. Miller, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Eugene J. Mincks
Maj. Gen. Charles F. Minter, Sr., USAF, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Augustus M. Minton, USAF, Ret.
Rear Adm. Clinton A. Misson, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Burt L. Mitchell, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Cleo N. Mitchell, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. William L. Mitchell, Jr., USAF, Ret.
Rear Adm. S. Edward Mittler, USNR, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Chester J. Moeglein, USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Robert L. Moeller, USAF, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Robert E. Moffet, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. William A. Moffett, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Lloyd W. Moffit, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Edmund W. Montgomery
Lt. Gen. Richard M. Montgomery, USAF, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Harley F. Moonev, Jr., USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Benjamin E. Moore, USN, Ret.
Vice Adm. French R. Moore, USN, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Harlev L. Moore, USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. John B. Moore
Lt. Gen. Joseph H. Moore
Brig. Gen. Leon A. Moore, Jr., USAF, Ret.
Rear Adm. Moore Moore, Jr., USNR, Ret.
Rear Adm. Robert L. Moore, Jr., USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. William T. Moore, USNR, Ret.
Vice Adm. William J. Moran, USN, Ret.
Maj. Gen. James L. Moreland, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Henrv S. Morgan, Jr.
Maj. Gen. Martin J. Morin, USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. William F. Morr, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. John H. Morrill, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Albert R. Morris, USA, Ret.
Briq. Gen. John H. Morrison, USA Ret.
Briq. Gen. Manlev G. Morrison, USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Richard I. Morton, USA, Ret.
Briq. Gen. Alvin J. Moser
Rear Adm. Charles W. Moses, USN, Ret.
Admiral William C. Mott, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Horace D. Moulton, USNR, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Charles F. Mudgett, USA, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Dolf E. Muehleisen, USAF, Ret.
Brig. Gen. E. L. Mueller, USA, Ret.
General Richard Mulberrv, Jr.
Maj. Gen. Hal L. Muldrow, USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Henry J. Muller, USA, Ret.
Lt. Gen. George W. Mundy, USAF, Ret.
Maj. Gen. George P. Munson, Jr., USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. John D. Murphy, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. John W. Murphy, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Robert F. Murphy, USA, Ret.
General S. A. Murphy
Maj. Gen. James L. Murrav
Brig. Gen. Joseph Murrav, Jr., USA, Ret.
Vice Adm. Llovd M. Must in
Brig. Gen. Philip D. Myers, USA, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Warren E. Mvers
Rear Adm. Charles D. Nace, USN, Ret.
General Gus G. Nagv
Brig. Gen. Ezekiel W. Napier, USAF, Ret.
Gen. Joseph J. Nazzaro, USAF, Ret.
Vice Adm. Ray C. Needham, USN, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Spurgeon H. Neel, USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Richard C. Neeley, USAF, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Carson R. Neifert, USA, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Douglas T. Nelson, USAF, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Roy W. Nelson, Jr., USAF, Ret.
Rear Adm. William T. Nelson, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. J. H. Nevins, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. James P. Newberry, USAF, Ret.
Rear Adm. Langdon C. Newman, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Henry C. Newton, USA, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Franklin A. Nichols, USAF, Ret.
Rear Adm. Richard E. Nichols, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Charles A. Nicholson, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Wallace H. Nickell, USA, Ret.
Lt. Gen. Herman Nickerson Jr.
Rear Adm. Hugh R. Nieman, Jr., USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Samuel Nixdorff, USN, Ret.
Admiral A. G. Noble, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Paul R. Norby, USNR, Ret.
Rear Adm. Robert H. Northwood, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. William P. Nuckois
Brig. Gen. Bernard A. Nurre, USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Howard O'Connor
Rear Adm. Michael G. O'Connor, USN, Ret.
Vice Adm. James W. O'Grady, USN, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Charles S. O'Mallev, USA, Ret.
74
Rear Adm. John F. Oakley, USNR, Ret.
Lt. Gen. Arthur W. Oberbeck, USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Joseph C. Odell, USA, Ret.
Maj. Gen. T. C. Odora, USAF, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Russell G. Ogan, USAF, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Milton L. Ogden, USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. William U. Ogletree, USA, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Nils 0. Ohman, USAF, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Clay Olbon, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Richard M. Oliver, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. William M. Oiler, OSN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Alfred C. Olney, Jr., USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Carl B. Olson
Brig. Gen. Gustaf P. Olson, USA, Ret.
Vice Adm. Howard E. Orem, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. William H. Organ, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. David P. Osborne, USN, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Frank A. Osmanski
General J. A. Ostroph
Rear Adm. William W. Outerbridge, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Edwin B. Owen, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Hinton A. Owens, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Norris W. Potter, USNR, Ret.
Rear Adm. Roger W. Paine, Jr., USN, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Ralph A. Palladino, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Charles J. Palmer, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. George G. Palmer, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. George A. Pappas, Jr.
Rear Adm. Charles W. Parker, USN, Ret.
Vice Adm. Edward N. Parker, USN, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Hugh A. Parker, USAF, Ret.
Admiral George A. Parkinson, USNR, Ret.
General Harlan C. Parks, USAF, Ret.
Rear Adm. Joel D. Parks, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Frank J. Parrish
Brig. Gen. Benton K. Partin
Maj. Gen. William A. Patch, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Goldsborough S. Patrick, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Stanley F. Patten, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Alex M. Patterson, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Richard 0. Patterson, USNR, Ret.
Brig. Gen. H. C. Pattison, USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Leonard E. Pauley, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Albert G. Paulsen
Admiral Charles N. Payne, USN, Ret.
Maj. Gen. D. J. Peacher
Rear Adm. Rufus J. Pearson, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Theodore E. Pearson, USNR, Ret.
Lt. Gejj Willard Pearson, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Edwin R. Peck, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Oscar Pederson, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Byron E. Peebles, USA, Ret.
Lt. Gen. Howard W. Penney, USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Donald G. Penterman, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Louis W. Perkins
Brig. Gen. Howard P. Persons, USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Roy W. Peters, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. George E. Peterson, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Richard W. Peterson, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Frank I. Pethick, Jr., USAR, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Robert L. Petit, USAF, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Roger E. Phelan, USAF, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Tobias R. Philbin, Jr., USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Chester G. Phillips, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Eugene Phillips
Lt. Gen. Jammie M. Philpott, USAF, Ret.
Rear Adro. Ben B. Pickett, USN, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Joseph E. Pieklik, USA, Ret.
General Arthur J. Pierce, USAF, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Russell K. Pierce, USAF, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Gladwyn E. Pinkston, USAF, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Ernest A. Pinson, USAF, Ret.
Vice Adm. Robert B. Pirie, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Eli P. Plaskow
Rear Adm. William G. Pogue, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Boleslaw H. Pokigo, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. David P. Polatty, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Douglas C. Polhamus, USAF, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Jack P. Pollock, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Joseph G. Poneroy, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Mackenzie E. Porter, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Robert L. Porter, USN, Ret.
General Robert W. Porter, Jr., USA, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Alton G. Post, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. William S. Post, Jr., USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Edwin L. Powell, USA, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Kenneth R. Powell, USAF, Ret.
Maj. Gen. George T. Powers, III, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Richard R. Pratt, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Arthur W. Price, Jr., USN, Ret.
Admiral Frank H. Price, Jr., USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Oran 0. Price, USAF, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Fay B. Prickett, USA, Ret.
Admiral Alfred M. Pride, USN, Ret.
Maj. Gen. George S. Prugh, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. William M. Pugh, II, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Harold F. Pullen, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. George S. Purple
Rear Adm. Ira D. Putnam, USNR, Ret.
Rear Adm. Frank E. Raab, Jr., USNR, Ret.
Rear Adm. William H. Rafferty, USN, Ret.
Vice Adm. Lawson P. Ramage, USN, Ret.
Vice Adm. Paul H. Ramsey, USN, Ret.
Admiral John E. M. Ranneft
Maj. Gen. Henry A. Rasmussen, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. William T. Rassieur, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Clemens V. Rault, USN, Ret.
General Edwin W. Rawlings, USAF, Ret.
Rear Adm. Ralph W. Rawson, USNR, Ret.
Rear Adm. Clarence C. Ray, USN, Ret.
75
Rear Adm.
Brig. Gen.
Vice Adm.
Maj. Gen.
Maj. Gen.
Brig. Gen.
Rear Adm.
Rear Adm.
Brig. Gen
Maj.
Brig
Herman L. Ray, USN, Ret.
Joseph G. Rebman, USA, Ret.
E. F. Rectanus, USN, Ret.
William H. Reddell, USAF, Ret.
William N. Redling, USA, Ret.
Albert Redman, Jr., USA, Ret.
Allan L. Reed, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Michael J. Reichel, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Leslie L. Reid, USNR, Ret.
George H. Reifenstein, USNR, Ret.
Stewart E. Reimel, USA, Ret.
Richard D. Reinhold, USAF, Ret.
Henry J. Reis-El Bara
Reiter, Jr., USN, Ret.
Reitz
Edward E. Renfro, USN, Ret.
Thomas F. Rew, USAF, Ret.
Vorley M. Rexroad, USAF, Ret.
Reynolds, USA, Ret.
Reynolds, USAF, Ret.
Z. Reynolds, USN, Ret.
E. Reynolds, USA, Ret.
Rice, USN, Ret.
Rice, USN, Ret.
Rice, USN, Ret.
Rich, USAF, Ret.
Richards, USA, Ret.
Richardson, USN, Ret.
Gen.
Gen
Rear Adra. Harry L
Brig. Gen. Ivan A
Rear Adm.
Gen.
Gen
Gen
Gen
Maj.
Brig
Brig
Brig
Emmett R.
George E.
James R.
, William
Lester K.
Joseph E.
Robert H.
Clyde K.
George J.
Alvin F.
Rear Adm.
Rear Adm.
Rear
Rear
Adm.
Adm.
Rear Adm.
Brig. Gen
Rear Adm.
Rear Adm.
Vice Adm.
Brig. Gen
Maj. Gen.
Rear Adir..
Rear Adm. Clifford G. Richardson, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Hugh A. Richeson, USA, Ret.
James B. Ricketts, USN, Ret.
Herman P. Riebe, USN, Ret.
Charles E. Rieben, USNR, Ret.
Robert E. Riera, USN, Ret.
Cecil D. Riggs, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Whitaker F. Riggs, USN, Ret.
General D. E. Riley, USAF, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Richard A. Risden, USA, Ret.
Lt. Gen. James P. P.iseley
Brig. Gen. Robinson Risner, USAF, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Osmond J. Ritland, USAF, Ret.
Rear Adm. B. A. Robbins
Lt. Gen. Jay T. Robbins, USAF, Ret.
Rear Adm. Joe A. Robbins, USN Ret.
Levi J. Roberts, USNR, Ret.
Armand J. Robertson, USN, Ret.
Pearl H. Robey, USAF, Ret.
Ray A. Robinson, USAF, Ret.
Allan B. Roby, USN, Ret.
Harry J. Rockafeller, USAR, Ret.
Walter F. Rodee, USN, Ret.
Jermain F. Rodenhauser , USAF, Ret.
Rafael Rodr iguez-Ema, USA, Ret.
Frederick C. Roecker , USA, Ret.
Andrew W. Rogers, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm.
Rear
Adm.
Rear
Adm.
Maj.
Gen.
Maj.
Gen.
Rear
Adm.
Maj.
Gen.
Rear
Adm.
Maj.
Gen.
Brig
. Gen
Brig
. Gen
Brig
. Gen
Brig. Gen. Jack A. Rogers, USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Kenwood B. Rohrer
Maj. Gen. Andrew P. Rollins, USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Michael R. Roman, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. William K. Rcmioser , USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. David L. Roscoe, Jr., USN, Ret.
Drig. Gen. John M. Rose, Jr., USAF, Ret.
Rear Adm. Philip H. Ross, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Richard M. Ross
Rear Adra. Henry J. Rotridge, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. John A. Rouse, USAF, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Charles H. Royce, US.^, Ret.
Rear Adm. Edward A. Ruckner, USNR, Ret.
Rear Adra. Thomas J. Rudden, USN, Ret.
Vice Adra. Theodore D. Ruddock, USN, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Paul E. Ruestow, USAF, Ret.
Gen. Clark L. Ruffner, USA, Ret.
Maj. Gen. George Ruhlen, USA, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Louis J. Rumaggi, USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Richard G. Rumney, USAF, Ret.
Rear Adra. Joseph W. Russel, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Michael P. Russillo, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Clifford G. Ryan
Maj. Gen. Charles W. Ryder, USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Edward A. Sahli
Maj. Gen. Charles E. Saltzman, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. James G. Sampson, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Crawford F. Sams, USA, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Kenneth O. Sanborn, USAF, Ret.
Rear Adm. E. R. Sanders, USN, Ret.
Vice Adm. Harry Sanders, USN, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Homer L. Sanders, USAF, Ret.
Rear Adm. Ira T. Sanders, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Leo A. Santini, USA, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Edward W. Sawyer, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Valentine H. Schaeffer, USN, Ret.
Lt. Gen. George E. Schafer
Brig. Gen. Evan W. Schear, USAF, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Harold G. Scheie, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Otto A. Scherini, USN, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Edward C. D. Scherrer, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. John J. Schieffelin, USNR, Ret.
Rear Adm. Walter F. Schlech, USN, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Howard F. Schlitz, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. John W. Schmidt, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Raymond J. Schneider, USN, Ret.
Vice Adra. William A. Schoech, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Herbert E. Schonland, USN, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Robert A. Schow, USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Ned Schramm, USAF, Ret.
Rear Adm. Floyd B. Schultz, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Carl F. Schupp, II
Brig. Gen. Francis F. Schweinler, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Albert B. Scoles, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Tom W. Scctt, USAF, Ret.
48-260 0
7 9 Pt.U
76
Rear Adm. Eugene T. Seaward, OSN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Wiltz P. Segura
Rear Adm. F. Gordon Selby, USN, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Moise B. Seligman
Vice Adm. Benedict J. Semmes, USNR, Ret.
Maj. Gen. John W. Sessums, Jr., USAF, Ret.
Rear Adm. Paul E. Seufer, USN, Ret.
Maj. Gen. W. T. Sexton, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. John N. Shaffer, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Leland G. Shaffer, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Louis D. Sharp, Jr., USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Raymond N. Sharp, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. William J. Sharrow
Rear Adm. Charles W. Shattuck, USNR, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Samuel R. Shaw
Brig. Gen. William L. Shaw
William H. Shawcross
Rear Adm. Maurice W. Shea, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. William F. Sheehan, USA, Ret.
General Ralph A. Sheldrick
General Lemuel C. Shepherd
Brig. Gen. Paul D. Sherman
Lt. Gen. James C. Sherrill, USAF, Ret.
Rear Adm. Stephen Sherwood, USN, Ret.
Vice Adm. Ralph L. Shifley, USN, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Clarence B. Shimer, USA, Ret.
Maj. Gen. John G. Shinkle, USA, Ret.
Vice Adm. Allen M. Shinn, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. James M. Shoemaker
Lt. Gen. Raymond L. Shoemaker
Vice Adm. Wallace B. Short, USN, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Anthony T. Shtogren, USAF, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Roland P. Shugg, USA, Ret.
Maj. Gen. William R. Shuler, USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Edwin L. Shull, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Burton H. Shupper , USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Thomas N. Sibley, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. William B. Sieglaff, USN, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Norman D. Sillin, USAF, Ret.
Rear Adm. Rupert M. Simmerli, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Robert H. Simmert, USA, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Cecil L. Simmons, USA, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Henry Simon, USAF, Ret.
Rear Adm. Maurice E. Simpson, USN, Ret.
General William H. Simpson
Maj. Gen. John F. Sims
Brig. Gen. Turner A. Sims, USAF, Ret.
Maj. Gen. John K. Singlaub, USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. William K. Skaer, USAF, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Robert B. Skinner, USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Lecount H. Slocum, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Morris Smellow, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Curtis S. Smiley, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Allen Smith, Jr, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Bertram D. Smith, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. C. Coburn Smith, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Charles H. Smith, USN, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Donald J. Smith
General Frederic H. Smith, USAF, Ret.
Maj. Gen. George F. Smith, USAF, Ret.
Admiral Harold P. Smith, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Hugh R. Smith
Brig. Gen. James M. Smith
Brig. Gen. L. W. Smith
Brig. Gen. Lynn D. Smith, USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Paul E. Smith, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Spencer R. Smith, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Stuart H. Smith, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Wilbur A. Smith, USAF, Ret.
Maj. Gen. William T. Smith, USAF, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Willard W. Smith, USAF, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Ralph A. Snavely, USAF, Ret.
Rear Adm. William O. Snead, USN, Ret.
Vice Adm. Edwin K. Snyder
Maj. Gen. Oscar P. Snyder, USA, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Maxwell C. Snyder, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Albin R. Sodergren, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Leo E. Soucek, USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Richard B. Spear
Brig. Gen. Max H. Specht, USA, Ret.
General John F. Speer
Brig. Gen. William Spence, USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Donald 0. Spoon, USA, Ret.
General R. I. Stack
Brig. Gen. John E. Stannard, USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. George R. Stanley, USAF, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Conrad L. Stansberry, USA, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Allen T. Stanwix-Hay, USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. James B. Stapleton, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Merlin H. Staring, USN, Ret.
General Albert B. Starr
Maj. Gen. Maxwell W. Steel, USAF, Ret.
Vice Adm. George P. Steele, II, USN, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Wycliffe E. Steele, USAF, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Floyd W. Stewart, USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. James L. Stewart, USAF, Ret.
Brig. Gen. LeRoy J. Stewart, USA, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Kenneth Stiles, USAF, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Alden E. Stilson, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. James J. Stilwell, USN, Ret.
General Richard G. Stilwell, USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Lewis W. Stocking
Vice Adm. Thomas M. Stokes, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Jack W. Stone, USAF, Ret.
Rear Adm. Frank B. Stone, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Leslie 0. Stone, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Martin R. Stone, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Aaron P. Storrs, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Charles L. Strain, USN, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Leland S. Stranathan, USAF, Ret.
77
Rear Adm. William W. Strange, USNR, Ret.
Rear Adm. Elliott B. Strauss, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Eugene L. Strickland, USAF, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Robert W. Strong, USAF, Ret.
Rear Adm. William A. Stuart, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Coulter R. Sublet t, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Henry Suerstedt, USN, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Henry R. Sullivan, USAF, Ret.
Brig. Gen. John B. Sullivan, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. William A. Sullivan, USN, Ret.
William F. Suraraerell
Rear Adm. Paul E. Summers, USN, Ret.
Lt. Gen. Alexander D. Surles, USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Frederick J. Sutterline, USAF, Ret.
Rear Adm. Frank C. Sutton, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Daniel J. Sweeney, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Willieim E. Sweeney, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Douglas M. Swift, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Charles A. Symroski, USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Alden P. Taber, USA, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Avelin P. Tacon, USAF, Ret.
Lt. Gen. C. M. Talbott, USAF, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Benjamin B. Talley, USA, Ret.
Vice Adm. George C. Talley, USN, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Lawrence F. Tanberg, USAF, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Robert M. Tarbox, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Raymond D. Tarbuck, USN, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Thomas M. Tarpley, USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. August F. Taute, USAF, Ret.
Rear Adm. Edwin A. Taylor, USN, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Edwin B. Taylor
Rear Adm. Ford N. Taylor, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Joseph I. Taylor, USN, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Leonard B. Taylor, USA, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Robert Taylor, III, USAF, Ret.
Maj. Gen. William A. Temple, USAF, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Joseph N. Tenhet, Jr., USA, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Frederick R. Terrell, USAF, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Roy M. Terry, USAF, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Harold C. Teubner , USAF, Ret.
Lt. Gen. Herbert B. Thatcher, USAF, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Thoralf T. Thielen
Maj. Gen. Arthur Thomas, USAF, Ret.
Rear Adm. Lloyd H. Thomas, USN, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Charles S. Thompson, USAF, Ret.
Brig. Gen. James H. Thompson, USAF, Ret.
Rear Adm. Mark R. Thompson, USNR, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Roy E. Thompson, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Walter G. Thomson, USNR, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Wallace 0. Thompson
Rear Adm. William Thompson, USN, Ret.
Maj. Gen. John F. Thorlin, USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Harrison R. Thyng, USAF, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Paul W. Tibbets, USAF, Ret.
Rear Adm. Murray J. Tichenor, USN, Ret.
Vice Adm. Eramett H. Tidd, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Carl Tiedeman, USN, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Thomas S. Timberraan, USA, Ret.
Maj. Gen. James B. Tipton, USAF, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Benton C. Tolley
Rear Adm. Kemp Tolley, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Rutledge B. Tompkins, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. William A. Tope, USAF, Ret.
Rear Adm. Harold W. Torgerson, USNR, Ret.
Brig. Gen. John D. Torrey, Jr., USA, Ret.
General Salvador Torros
Vice Adm. George C. Towner, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Charles 0. Triebel, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Thomas K. Tripp, USA, Ret.
Maj. Gen. George W. Trousdale, USA, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Orlando C. Troxel, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Herman J. Trum, III, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Richard B. Tuggle, USN, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Benjamin O. Turnage, Jr., USA, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Carl C. Turner, USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Joseph W. Turner, USAF, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Hiram L. Tuttle
General Nathan F. Twining, USAF, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Harold H. Twitchell, USAF, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Achilles L. Tynes, USA, Ret.
Lt. Gen. Edward H. Underhill, USAF, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Edgar H. Underwood, USAF, Ret.
Lt. Gen. F. T. Unger , USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Clarence Unnevehr , USNR, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Fay R. Upthegrove, USAF, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Lee N. Utz
Lloyd W. Van Antwerp
Rear Adm. Clyde J. Van Arsdall, USN, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Lawrence E. Van Buskirk, USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Willicim M. Van Harlingen, USA, Ret
Rear Adm. Blinn Van Mater, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Thaddeus J. Van Metre, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Harry Van Wyk, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. James E. Van Zandt, USNR, Ret.
Rear Adm. Roland B. Vanasse, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Daniel Vance, Jr.
Rear Adm. George Vandeurs, USN, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Walter M. Vann, USA, Ret.
Vice Adm. Frank W. Vannoy, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. K. L. Veth, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Fred W. Vetter, Jr., USAF, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Felix L. Vidal, USAF, Ret.
Rear Adm. Warren C. Vincent, USNR, Ret.
Admiral Quentell Violett, USNR, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Norman H. Vissering, USA, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Edward H. Vogel, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Ernest S. Von Kleeck, USN, Ret,
Rear Adm. Curtis F. Vossler, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. John R. Wadleigh, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Ruben E. Wagstaff, USN, Ret.
78
Rear Adm Charles L. Waite, USN, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Alden H. Waitt, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. George H. Wales, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Edward K. Walker, USN, Ret.
Vice Adm. Thomas J. Walker, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Henry T. Waller
Rear Adm. Harry N. Wallin, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Harvey T. Walsh, USN, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Louis A. Walsh, Jr., USA Ret.
Rear Adm. Wilfred A. Walter, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Ernest K. Warburton, USAF, Ret.
Rear Adm. Norvell G. Ward, USN, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Robert W. Ward, USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Herbert O. Wardell, USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Daniel H. Wardrop, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Thomas G. Warfield, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Aln D. Warnock, USA, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Henry L. Warren, USAF, Ret.
Rear Adm. Hugh Warren, USNR, Ret.
Rear Adm. Jacob W. Waterhouse, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. John R. Waterman,. USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Odale D. Waters, Jr., USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. William W. Watkin, USA, Ret.
Maj. Gen. James H. Watkins, USAF, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Tarleton H. Watkins, USAF, Ret.
Lt. Gen. Albert Watson, II, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Carl E. Watson, USNR, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Harold E. Watson, USAF, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Paul C. Watson, USAF, Ret.
Rear Adm. George A. Weaver, USNR, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Wilburn C. Weaver, USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. John H. Weber, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. David A. Webster, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. George B. Webster, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Charles S. Weeks, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. John F. Wegforth, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Harold F. Weidner
Brig. Gen. Walter D. Weikel, AUS, Ret.
Major Gen. Frank D. Weir
Rear Adm. Robert O. Welander, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Seth L. Weld, Jr., USA, Ret.
Vice Adm. Charles Wellborn, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Joseph A. Wellings, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Benjamin 0. Wells, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. David J. Welsh, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Walton K. Weltraer
Maj. Gen. Donald L. Werbeck, USAF, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Holden C. West
Brig. Gen. Leslie J. Westberg, USAF, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Edward W. Westlake
Maj. Gen. James H. Weyhenmeyer , USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. William J. Whelan, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. David L. Whelchel, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Sherburne Whipple, Jr., USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Richard S. Whitcomb, USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Roger E. Whitcomb, USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Charles F. White, USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Charles H. White, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Donald M. White, USN, Ret.
Maj. Gen. John W. White, USAF, Ret.
Rear Adm. Marshall W. White, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Scott Whitehouse, USNR, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Otis M. Whitney, USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Howard R. Whittaker, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Carlos W. Wieber, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Geoffrey P. Wiedeman, USAF, Ret.
Vice Adm. Charles W. Wilkins, USN, Ret.
Maj. Gen. John H. Wilkins, USAF, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Collin P. Williams
Maj. Gen. George V. Williams, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. James W. Williams, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Macpherson B. Williams, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Richard C. Williams, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Roy D. Williams, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Delbert F. Williamson, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Francis T. Williamson, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. John H. Willis, USN, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Delmar E. Wilson, USAF, Ret.
Rear Adm. Edwin Mark Wilson, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. George H. Wilson, USAF, Ret.
Brig. Gen. James A. Wilson
Maj. Gen. Thomas N. Wilson, USAF, Ret.
Brig. Gen. William R. Wilson
Vice Adm. L. J. Wiltse, USN, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Loren G. Windom, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Walter C. Winn, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Jowell C. Wise, USAF, Ret.
Rear Adm. Narvin 0. Wittmann, USN, Ret.
Lt. Gen. Thomas Wolfe
Brig. Gen. Frank P. Wood, USAF, Ret.
Rear Adm. Hunter Wood, Jr., USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Lester O. Wood, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Robert R. Wooding, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. William R. Woodward, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Edward L. Woodyard, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Francis A. Woolfley, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Joseph M Worthington, USN, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Stanley T. Wray, USAF, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Edwin K. Wright, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Thomas K. Wright, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Henry J. Wuensch
Rear Adm. Don W. Wulzen, USN, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Ira T. Wyche, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. Evan W. Yancey, USN, Ret.
Rear Adm. Earl P. Yates, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Charles E. Yeager , USAF, Ret.
Brig. Gen. George H. Yeager, USAF, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Emmett F. Yost, USAF, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Charles M. Young, Jr., USA, Ret.
Admiral Edwin J. S. Young, USN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. George H. Young, USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Mason J. Young, USA, Ret.
Maj. Gen. Carl A. Youngdale
Brig. Gen. Ninian L. Yuille, USA, Ret.
Rear Adm. William T. Zink, Jr., OSN, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Kenneth F. Zitzman, USA, Ret.
Brig. Gen. Virgil L. Zoller, USAF, Ret.
Admiral Elmo R. Zumwalt, Jr., USN, Ret.
Briq. Gen. Edwin A. Zundel, USA, Ret.
79
The committee will stand in brief recess while the Senators go to
vote. When we come back, we will take our final witnesses. Again,
may I thank you both?
[Whereupon, a brief recess was taken.]
Senator Biden [presiding]. The committee will please come to
order.
Our next two witnesses are retired Gen. David W. Winn and Dr.
Victor Fediay. They will be speaking on behalf of the Institute of
American Relations.
Dr. Fediay, would you please come up to the witness table?
General, thank you very much for your patience in sitting here
as long as you have. I assure you that the lack of attendance is not
due to a lack of interest in your statement but due to the confusion
of voting and other matters taking place on the floor of the Senate
right now. I am sure you know this is a very busy time. I am very
anxious to hear your statement. Please proceed in any way that
would be most comfortable to you.
STATEMENT OF BRIG. GEN. DAVID W. WINN (RETIRED),
POLICY BOARD, INSTITUTE OF AMERICAN RELATIONS,
WASHINGTON, D.C., ACCOMPANIED BY VICTOR FEDIAY,
PRESIDENT, INSTITUTE OF AMERICAN RELATIONS
General Winn. I had a chance to learn a little bit about patience,
so that was no problem, Mr. Senator.
The statement I am about to make reflects my own opinion. It
should not in any way be attributed to my former period with the
Air Force. It does not represent the Air Force.
Senator Biden. Are you speaking on behalf of the Institute of
American Relations?
General Winn. They have arranged for my presence here. To
that extent, yes, but as far as speaking for the Institute of Ameri-
can Relations officially, I do not do so.
I am very pleased to be here to contribute my opinions to this
discussion.
Senator Biden. We are anxious to hear from you.
General Winn. My last job was Commander of the North Ameri-
can Defense Command Combat Operations Center. This facility is
located in the Cheyenne Mountain Complex near Colorado Springs;
with all sources of intelligence available. They watch the Soviet
Union each day around the clock. Our responsibilities were to
provide the President and the National Command authorities
warning and evaluation of any threat to the North American conti-
nent. From that window, Soviet capability was impressive.
For example, they outshot us 5 to 1 in space launchers and 4 to 1
in missiles in 1977. We saw some events that exceeded our own
capabilities and our technological expectations. Sometimes it took
us too long to know what we were seeing, and sometimes we were
not sure at all what we were seeing. Our intelligence collection is
good, but in my opinion it does not support the conclusion that
adequate technical verification of Soviet capabilities is possible.
Yet my concern for the future does not stem from verification
limitations that I know exist. I am concerned about the basic
premise of our strategic arms limitation negotiations. The lopsided
conception of the SALT II Treaty implications worries me far more
80
than the prospect of ICBM's flying both ways over the Arctic. I got
out of the Air Force early because I could not find an arena where
positions, policies, or concepts could be debated.
For example, I tried to raise issues against the decision eliminat-
ing ADCOM [the Aerospace Defense Command]. That decision to
me did not make sense from a military or management point of
view. I objected to killing the only integrated homeland air defense
command we possessed. Nobody even answered the mail. All argu-
ments were totally ignored from start to finish, not just mine. The
ADCOM decision was steamrollered from the top.
Shredding out our only full-time, dedicated heartland defense
command contributes directly to the SALT II imbalance. The mis-
sion of a fully integrated command is now to be split four ways.
It was said that this would save $12 million a year. At the same
time, we were in the process of eliminating all but a handful of
ground radars with combat capability, turning our air sovereignty
over to the FAA with civilian radars and controllers.
I asked a senior officer privately, if the decision to kill ADCOM
were yours to make, would you do it, and he said yes. I turned
away, and he said, Dave, you just don't understand the pressures.
Well, he is right, I don't know the pressures, and I don't under-
stand the pressure for SALT II. Why do we insist on this treaty?
The bottom line of the SALT II advocates is that we are better off
with it than without it. I think the opposite is true. Take for
instance the Backfire bomber problem. B-52's are counted in SALT
II, despite their age and the high threat under which they might
have to fly. The Soviet Backfires are not counted, despite our near
total inability even to detect them, much less to destroy them.
Contrast that with the defense our aging B-52's and FB-lll's
would meet to reach a Soviet target. While we systematically re-
duced both our homeland defense interceptor aircraft and ground
control radars, Russia has built and built and built. The Soviets
took the lesson of the Cuban crisis of 1962 very seriously. This
lesson was simply that the power ratio at that time was wrong for
them. The United States could defend herself. In the early sixties,
it didn't matter where our interests were threatened. The numbers
were wrong for them. Now the numbers are different. You have to
conclude that we haven't paid the price to maintain our military
parity. The reason that Russia arms is to become a force against
which there is no defense. With SALT II, we see in action the belief
that there is a disconnect between raw military power and their
international behavior.
The SALT II issue is more than ballistic missiles, bombers, and
submarines. A lot of history and a few fundamentals are involved.
It has been over 6 years since I returned from Hanoi's Hoa Lo
Prison. During these 6 years, and especially during the last 30
months, a pattern in American dialog has developed that is famil-
iar to me, and that pattern goes back to Hanoi. When my para-
chute popped open over North Vietnam, there was little doubt that
my own freedom was over. The Hanoi prisoner had no choices.
Pressure was total. Control was complete. There was no end short
of yielding. For the prisoner, the inevitable result was inability to
continue resistance.
81
Now America is being challenged, and we have all been condi-
tioned in a sense much like that prisoner in Hanoi.
Freedom throughout the world is being squeezed left, and I
wonder how many of us are aware and anxious about it. The
prisoner in Hanoi was left with nothing to link him to tradition,
family, or country. The United States is not yet cut off from its
traditional, historical, and constitutional strength, but the same
inexorable pressures faced by the prisoner in solitary can be seen
ahead for the American people. America's solitary confinement is
our isolation from the premises on which SALT and other issues
are being faced, and the same temptation to cave in is working on
free people in the same way they did on the captive man in Hanoi.
We are being pushed, and pushed very hard.
The basic question, I think, of the SALT II Treaty debate is, do
we have a choice in this matter? SALT II is an agreement which
we will honor with those whose aim is the destruction of free
choice. Is the SALT II ratification process the final argument that
everything will come out OK if we simply trust those who say they
understand these things?
The American people just as the Soviet citizen may not under-
stand the technicalities of assured destruction, or even when it is
about to occur, but every person understands that life without
choice is the ultimate weakness.
This treaty lacks fundamental logic and ignores history. Its worst
feature is that it is being sold on a mother knows best basis, when
people ought to wonder whether mother knows what she is doing.
We don't have to do this, but the circle of decision gets smaller and
smaller. We risk having fewer choices in deciding when wisdom
needs the strength to say no in meeting its responsibilities.
In its recently published annual report, the International Insti-
tute of Strategic Studies in London warns the free world that the
Soviet Union leaves the United States and its allies far behind in
military force, both strategic and conventional. The new generation
of missiles developed and deployed by the Soviet Union is more
powerful than any of ours, which have not been significantly im-
proved since the sixties. The Institute estimates that the Soviet
Union is in the position of achieving a first strike capability
against the United States.
These conclusions of the prestigious London Institute, plainly
stated, put the ratification of SALT II into a very dubious category.
During the 10 years of SALT negotiations, the balance has clearly
changed in the overall security posture vis-a-vis that of the Soviet
Union. We still have a fundamental policy objective of essential
equivalence.
Defense Secretary Brown, speaking of the uncertainties of Soviet
response, said:
Basically they require us to insist on essential equivalence with the Soviet Union
in strategic nuclear forces.
He also said:
The issue is now to make it clear to the Soviets that they cannot gain any
military or political advantage from their strategic forces. Insistence on essential
equivalence guards against any danger that the Soviets might be seen as superior,
even if the perception is not technically justified.
82
By way of partial clarification of what is understood to be the
essential equivalence, Secretary Brown said:
By essential equivalence we mean the maintenance of conditions such that Soviet
strategic nuclear forces do not become usable instruments of political leverage
coverage, diplomatic coercion, or military advantage. Any advantage in force char-
acteristics enjoyed by the Soviets are offset by U.S. advantages in other characteris-
tics, and the U.S. posture is not in fact and is not seen as, inferior in performance to
the strategic nuclear forces of the Soviet Union.
These conditions exist today, and our objective in the current SALT II negotia-
tions is to maintain them in the future.
The International Institute of Strategic Studies disagrees with
Secretary Brown. The conditions for essential equivalence of Febru-
ary 1978, obviously are not a reality in September 1979. According
to the London Institute, the Soviets are "seen as superior, and the
U.S. posture is in fact seen as inferior."
As if to prove that the strategic forces are usable instruments of
political leverage, diplomatic coercion, or military advantage, the
Soviet Union has special military troops to maneuver jointly with
Cubans on Cuban territory. Under the umbrella of strategic superi-
ority, the Soviets apparently feel free to use their forces in the
proximity of Nicaragua or any country which may become their
next target. The presence of 3,000 Soviet troops is not a direct
threat to the United States, but for wars in Central America it
could be decisive.
It is imperative that a SALT Treaty which the United States
ratifies does not force the United States to look the other way at
every geopolitical move the Soviet Union makes, even in the west-
ern hemisphere. If the U.S.S.R. should decide to test our will today
or tomorrow, how many warheads would be presumed to be aboard
the SS-18? As agreed in the treaty? If they chose to use their
superior navy to close the Mediterranean and the Indian Ocean in
1980, where would the Backfire bombers be based? And what range
would Backfires reach, to what targets, just in case we tried to
respond?
Would SALT II have helped? Treaties do not deter. Negotiations
never reach the bottom line of deterrence.
Without any agreement at all, we halted the B-1 and enhanced
radiation weapons, and stretched out other programs into the
period we now seek to cover with SALT II.
Advocates of SALT II insist that it puts a cap on the number of
MIRV-type warheads the Soviets can install on the 308 heavy
missiles. It is a strange argument. The agreement prohibits the
United States from having any such missiles. By 1985, the Soviets
will probably have improved the accuracy and yield of increased
numbers of warheads. They could increase the MIRV's on each SS-
18 to 20 or even 30.
There is an argument that the M-X will re-establish the strate-
gic balance in our favor, but if the production of the M-X moves
forward as rapidly as possible, it would be ready for initial deploy-
ment only by 1986, and not fully available until 1989. By that time,
the SS-18's could be fully MIRVed with 30 accurate warheads per
missile. That could give the Soviet Union the capability of striking
all M-X and Minuteman missiles in one attack, forcing the United
States to launch on warning or face destruction without retali-
ation.
83
The SALT II numbers game is obviously not in our favor, but
that clearly is not the main reason why the treaty should not be
ratified in its present form. The conditions for negotiation of SALT
III will be even more restrictive for the United States than experi-
enced in SALT II if it is ratified as it stands. The vulnerability of
peace arrangements will be absolute if the conditions of SALT II
permit the maximization of Soviet advantage in space and in the
air while Soviet conventional forces continue to grow.
Simply by having so much to negotiate away, the Soviet Union
has sent us a message. The first line is, let's negotiate if it makes
you feel better. The last line is, let the results speak for them-
selves.
Senator Biden. Thank you very much. General. Your testimony
is very straightforward, and it reiterates some of the points that
have been made earlier by your former colleagues and evidences
the same concern. Consequently, I only had a few questions, but in
light of the fact that I have only SV2 minutes to vote on the next
amendment that is up on the floor, I will not even attempt to ask
those questions. I thank you on behalf of the committee for your
statement. Thank you for your patience.
This hearing will stand in recess until 2 o'clock.
[Whereupon, the committee recessed, to meet again at 2 p.m.
the same day.]
84
Afternoon Session
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:10 p.m., in room 318,
Russell Senate Office Building, Hon. Frank Church (chairman of
the committee), presiding.
Present: Senators Church, McGovern, Biden, Sarbanes, Muskie,
Javits, Percy, and Hayakawa.
The Chairman. The hearing will please come to order.
OPENING STATEMENT
This afternoon we continue to hear from public witnesses on the
SALT II Treaty.
Appearing first will be Hon. Charles Yost, Senator Thomas Mcln-
tyre and Coretta Scott King, on behalf of Americans for SALT.
Next we will hear from three religious groups. Cardinal Krol will
testify for the U.S. Catholic Conference. Dr. Claire Randall will
appear for the National Council of Churches. Albert Vorspan will
testify on behalf of the Union of American Hebrew Congregations.
Ambassador Yost, we will ask you to begin, if you will.
Ambassador Yost. Senator Mclntyre will open for us if that is
agreeable to you, sir.
The Chairman. That is an appropriate way for us to commence
these hearings.
Tom, it does my heart good to see you again.
Senator McIntyre. Even with my bald head?
The Chairman. To see you looking so well. And I think that I
express the feeling of all of your colleagues and friends in the
Senate when I give you a warm welcome back.
STATEMENT OF HON. THOMAS J. McINTYRE, JR., PRESIDENT,
AMERICANS FOR SALT>
Senator McIntyre. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of
the Foreign Relations Committee. Today I offer my testimony on
the importance of SALT II on behalf of Americans for SALT, a
nationwide citizens' campaign of which I am president.
Americans for SALT is a coalition of individuals and major orga-
nizations in support of the ratification of the SALT II agreement.
The individuals include retired military officers, former Govern-
ment officials and other prominent Americans. The organizations
include religious groups, business associations, labor unions, scien-
tific and educational organizations, and public interest groups.
The working consensus of these many Americans is that the
ratification of SALT II is essential for the security of the American
people in several important ways.
First, SALT caps the Soviet strategic threat. The nuclear threat
we would likely face without SALT will be both quantitatively and
qualitatively more formidable than the threat under SALT.
It is precisely because many of us are concerned about an unre-
stricted Soviet strategic buildup that we wish to place SALT re-
strictions on the Soviets. The more one is concerned about the
formidable Soviet threat under SALT, the more one should seek to
avoid an even greater threat, one without SALT.
See page 86 for Senator Mclntyre's prepared statement.
85
Second, under this treaty we will be able to plan our defense
programs more effectively because we will be able to predict with
greater accuracy and greater confidence the size and shape of the
Soviet threat. The treaty requires them to fit their forces into a
well-defined grid of specific limits, sublimits, and qualitative re-
strictions.
Moreover, the treaty prohibits the Soviets from interfering with
our national technical means of monitoring their weapons develop-
ment and deployment. Under SALT, we will be able to focus our
R. & D. moneys much more effectively to counter the Soviet buildup
since that threat itself will be more predictable.
Third, SALT leaves us free to choose the strategic and theater
weapons we need to secure our common defense.
When I served as chairman of the Subcommittee on Military
Research and Development of the Senate Armed Services Commit-
tee, my colleagues and I were especially vigilant on this point. So I
am particularly reassured that the Joint Chiefs of Staff testified
that the United States will be free to exploit its truly formidable
military technology to meet the Soviet challenge.
Fourth, I believe we have an opportunity to reunite our Nation
behind a prudent national defense program through the debate on
SALT. For too long, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee,
we have been divided about both our defense requirements and
SALT.
At the heart of this division is a fallacy, a fallacy that SALT and
national defense are mutually exclusive. The American people
want both a strong national defense and a SALT agreement. The
SALT debate gives us an opportunity to reconstruct a broad work-
ing American middle that will support both a strong defense pro-
gram and arms limitations as a means to that same end.
However, Mr. Chairman, if the treaty is rejected, I fear we will
return to a polarized politics which will make it difficult for us to
rally a stable base of public support behind defense programs. At a
time when we find a deep American desire to get together to
manage our affairs in so many troubling policy areas — inflation,
energy, taxes — we need to demonstrate again to ourselves and our
allies and our adversaries that we can find common ground to
manage the most dangerous of all problems, nuclear weapons.
This suggests my final point. Although it cannot be proved in
any systematic way, we somehow all know that this agreement
enhances our security because it represents the common interests
of both nuclear superpowers in avoiding the use of nuclear weap-
ons.
The treaty will not eliminate the possibility of nuclear war, but
it does, because of this unstated premise, make the use of these
weapons somehow less likely. SALT will not eliminate military
competition, but it will make it less dangerous and more orderly.
In sum, I believe the American people, and in fact people all over
the globe, know they will be more secure in a world in which the
two most powerful nations continue to work in our common inter-
est to reduce the likelihood of nuclear war within the framework of
this treaty.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Hon. Thomas J. Mclntyre follows:]
86
Prepared Statement of Hon. Thomas J. McIntyre, Jr.
Mr. Chairman, members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee: Today I offer
my testimony on the importance of SALT II on behalf of Americans for SALT, a
nationwide citizens' campaign of which I am President. Americans for SALT is a
coalition of individuals and major organizations in support of the ratification of the
SALT II Agreement. The individuals include retired military officers, former gov-
ernment officials and other prominent Americans. The organizations include reli-
gious groups, business associations, labor unions, scientific and educational organiza-
tions and public interest groups.
The working consensus of these many Americans is that the ratification of SALT
II is essential for the security of the American people. I believe SALT will enhance
our security in several important ways.
First, SALT caps the Soviet strategic threat. The nuclear threat we would likely
face without SALT will be both quantitatively and qualitatively more formidable
than the threat under SALT.
As Secretary Brown has testified:
The Soviet total strategic missile and bomber force will likely be 30 percent larger
without SALT than with it.
Their total strategic MIRVed ballistic missiles, both land and sea, will likely be 50
percent greater without SALT than under SALT.
Their MIRVed ICBM's could be up to 75 percent greater if unrestricted by SALT.
Their total strategic nuclear warheads and gravity bombs could easily be half
again as large a force if unrestricted by SALT.
The threat to our ICBM's from their silo killer warheads could double without
SALT restraints on MIRVed ICBM launchers and number of warheads permitted on
each.
Without SALT, the Backfire bomber production could grow unrestricted beyond
its current level. Without SALT, the Soviet SS-16, the only mobile ICBM fully
developed by either side, could be deployed. Without SALT, the Soviets could pro-
ceed to develop their fifth generation of ICBM's without any restrictions.
In sum, it's precisely because many of us are concerned about an unrestricted
Soviet strategic buildup that we wish to place SALT restrictions on the Soviets. The
more one is concerned about the formidable Soviet threat under SALT, the more
one should seek to avoid an even greater one without SALT.
There is a second way SALT will enhance our security. Under this treaty, we will
be able to plan our defense programs more effectively, because we will be able to
predict with greater accuracy and confidence the size and shape of the Soviet
threat. Under SALT, we will know the number and kinds of strategic weapons
developed and deployed by the Soviets, because the treaty requires them to fit their
forces into a well defined grid of specific limits, sublimits and qualitative restric-
tions. Moreover, the treaty prohibits the Soviets from interfering with our national
technical means of monitoring their weapons development and deployment. Since
our own military research and development programs must be designed to hedge
uncertainties about the Soviet threat, the greater the unknown, the more difficult
our own R. & D. task. In other words, under SALT, we will be able to focus our R. &
D. monies much more effectively to counter the Soviet buildup since that threat
itself will be more predictable.
Let me suggest an important way this is true. As we all know, current intelli-
gence projections suggest the Soviets will be able to mount a technical threat to our
ICBM's in the early to mid-1980's. Any of the basing schemes under consideration to
ensure our ICBM's would survive this threat is designed against a specific presup-
posed number of attacking silo-killer Soviet warheads. Under SALT II, we can
predict the maximum number our M-X basing design must be able to counter,
because the treaty will limit the number of MIRVed ICBM launchers and the
number of warheads permitted on each. Without SALT, that number will be much
higher and much more difficult to predict.
This is vividly true in the case of the threat to our ICBM's from the Soviet heavy
missiles. SALT restrict's the SS-18's to 308 with no more than 10 warheads on each.
Without SALT, they could keep their hot production line going and could relatively
cheaply build up to 500 SS-18's. They could also double the number of warheads on
each. So instead of having to design an MX basing scheme that would counter a
threat of 3,000 warheads from the SS-18's under SALT, we would have to design
one to counter 10,000 warheads from the SS-18's. So in this case as in others, SALT
will help us design an effective solution to a critical military problem we will face.
Third, SALT leaves us free to choose the strategic and theater weapons we need
to insure our common defense. With virtually no exceptions and certainly no impor-
tant exceptions, the United States will be free to exploit its formidable military
technology to meet the Soviet challenge. I am particularly reassured that the Joint
87
Chiefs of Staff testified this is the case. When I served as Chairman of the Subcom-
mittee on Military Research and Development of the Senate Armed Services Com-
mittee, my colleagues and I were particularly vigilant on this point. Throughout our
hearings, we consistently inquired about the degree of technological freedom the
emerging agreement would leave us. We urged the Administration to avoid as much
as possible any such restrictions.
I realize that our success in ensuring this freedom is a source of some frustration
to some who wish that SALT would have resolved domestic debates about what
weapons systems we require. I never believed that this was a proper objective of
SALT negotiations. If, of course, we would have been required in the bargaining to
accept restrictions, we could judge that bargain in the aggregate. But I personally
reject the view that it should be an objective of SALT either to preclude or mandate
a particular U.S. weapons system. I always felt that was something we should
decide for ourselves in our councils.
There is a fourth way SALT can enhance our national security. I believe that we
have an opportunity to reunite our nation behind a prudent national defense
program through the debate on SALT. For too long, we have been divided about
both our defense requirements and SALT. At the heart of this division is a fallacy
that SALT and national defense are mutually exclusive. I believe SALT should be a
means to a more effective common defense for our nation rather than as an aspect
of detente or as an end in itself. Further, I believe, the American people want both
a strong national defense and a SALT agreement.
The SALT debate gives us an opportunity to reconstruct a broad working Ameri-
can middle that will support both a strong defense program and arms limitations as
a means to that same end. For the first time since Vietnam, we have an opportunity
to rebuild a working majority on this common ground.
However, if the treaty is rejected, I fear we will return to a polarized politics
which will make it difficult for us to rally a stable base of public support behind
defense programs. At a time when we find a deep American desire to get together to
manage our affairs in so many troubling policy areas — inflation, energy, taxes — we
need to demonstrate again to ourselves, our allies, and our adversaries that we can
find common ground to manage the most dangerous of all problems, nuclear weap-
ons.
This suggests my final point. Although it can't be proved in any systematic way,
we somehow all know that this agreement enhances our security because it repre-
sents the common efforts of both nuclear superpowers to avoid the use of nuclear
weapons. The treaty will not eliminate the possibility of nuclear war, but it does,
because of this unstated premise, make the use of these weapons somehow less
likely. SALT will not eliminate military competition, but it will make it less danger-
ous and more orderly.
In sum, I believe that the American people, in fact people all over the globe, know
that they will be more secure in a world in which the two most powerful nations
continue to work in our common interests to reduce the likelihood of nuclear war
within the framework of this treaty.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator, for an excellent
statement.
I believe that in the interest of time, we should hear from each
member of the panel. Then we will address questions to the panel.
I think that Mrs. King might testify next.
Mrs. King often speaks for the poor, and we would be interested
in knowing what there is in SALT for Americans who are con-
cerned about food, housing, and living standards for our own
people.
Mrs. King, I am very pleased to welcome you this afternoon.
STATEMENT OF MRS. CORETTA SCOTT KING, MEMBER,
AMERICANS FOR SALT
Mrs. King. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and your distinguished
colleagues on the committee.
I greatly appreciate the opportunity to appear before this com-
mittee in support of ratification of the SALT II Treaty. I am doubly
honored to appear before you today, honored by the privilege of
88
speaking to this important committee on a subject of such grave
significance to the peace of the world.
I am honored to be the first woman, the only mother, and the
only representative of any American minority to have this privi-
lege. I am not unaware of the heavy responsibility that this places
on me, Mr. Chairman, because it is exactly the women, the moth-
ers, and the minorities of this country that are the real silent
majority, who pay the highest price for the continuance of the
world's arms race and would pay the highest price for any nuclear
or even nonnuclear war.
In the course of the past few weeks, the committee has heard
voluminous testimony on the merits and shortcomings of this
treaty by experts in the field of nuclear and strategic matters. I,
too, come to you as an expert because I am a citizen of this Nation;
and as a citizen, I know that the issues in this historic debate on
SALT are not confined to missile counts and throw-weight and base
modes.
As we all know, a more basic and fundamental issue tests us and
challenges us today, and it is this: Shall we, in the name of nation-
al security, commit ourselves to a course of confrontation and
potential nuclear annihilation by rejecting this treaty; or shall we
as a Nation seek a more lasting security through the peaceful
resolution of conflict in a way that allows us to free our spirits and
resources for the development of human potential in our society?
These are public policy choices which must be made by citizens,
for they are the true experts. They are the people whose lives are
to be risked, whose children's lives are to be mortgaged, and whose
parents' lives are to be wasted should we choose to pursue a course
of superiority and winability in an arms race that knows no win-
ners.
Yet, most Americans are overlooked and excluded from this
debate. Public polls showing citizen support for the SALT process
are ignored or glossed over because we are told citizens are not
experts.
My husband, Martin Luther King, Jr., knew these same frustra-
tions during another historical national debate. Though a recent
recipient of the Nobel Peace Prize, my husband was informed by
so-called specialists on the Vietnam war that he was not enough of
an expert to discuss this basic issue of war and peace, of violence
and nonviolence.
I fervently hope that we as a Nation, in contemplating the
wisdom of this treaty to limit nuclear weapons, will listen to those
whose lives are directly affected by the outcome of this debate: The
mother in Utah who gives her child milk knowing the dangers of
radiation from nuclear weapons testing— that mother is an expert
on SALT; the unemployed youth who cannot find a job and knows
that military spending creates less jobs than spending on human
need— that youth is an expert on SALT; the elderly American
holding his grandchild, who witnessed the massive loss of life in
past world wars — that American is an expert on SALT.
Indeed, no issue of public policy is more personal than this issue
of limiting nuclear weapons and ending this senseless arms race.
Let me give you an example from an area of personal concerns:
unemployment. Studies have shown that $1 billion of military
89
spending creates about 75,000 jobs. The same amount, if spent on
construction, creates 100,000; on health care, 139,000 jobs; on edu-
cation, 188,000 jobs.
Thus, the military budget swells in the name of national security
while our most precious resources stand idle. Our communities
may be ringed by missiles and our cities surrounded by silos, but
how secure are we if America's future, blighted by high unemploy-
ment, holds only the prospect of deterioration and decay.
The twiii perils of unemployment and inflation are not confined
to our shores. Today, the economically dislocating effects of the
arms race can be felt throughout the world. Children with distend-
ed bellies still suffer for want of adequate food; yet global military
expenditures now exceed $400 billion a year.
This vast expansion of destructive power at the expense of
human needs has served to decrease our global security and leaves
us ever more vulnerable to random annihilation through nuclear
exchange or accident. Yet we recognize these perils and have
shown the vision and moral leadership to engage in a process of
negotiated restraint.
As we in this country reexamine our commitment to the SALT
process, we must ask ourselves this question: What perception will
the world community have of our Nation should we fail, after 7
years of deliberation, to proceed with this historic agreement to
limit nuclear weaponry? Nothing less than our future is at stake.
Without SALT, any prospect of progress toward further arms
limitation is clouded. Without SALT, any hope of replenishing our
human resources is undermined. Without SALT, any dream of
peace for our children and their children is diminished; in its place,
a legacy of tension and fear.
Skeptics will say that the SALT process is untenable in today's
world, that mutual accommodation is unthinkable, and that har-
mony in international relations is impossible. They choose instead
to pursue a policy of confrontation and violence, despite the poten-
tial for human extinction.
I am accustomed to a great deal of skepticism and even outrage
at the thought that the principles of nonviolent social change are
relevant to world affairs. Yet, I firmly believe that the world's
people, though often divided by nationalism and racism, are united
in their instinctive will to live and their civilized will to do so in
peace.
I am reminded of my husband's words almost 15 years ago now,
and I quote: "I refuse to accept the cynical notion that nation after
nation must spiral down a militaristic stairway into the hell of
nuclear destruction. I believe that unarmed truth and an uncondi-
tional love will have the final word of reality."
Mr. Chairman, this treaty to limit strategic weapons is not a
perfect agreement. Indeed, it has been termed "a modest step."
How do you define "modest" when any progress toward bringing
nuclear weapons under some control means a better chance for a
peaceful future for everyone?
I am sure I will be well understood when I say I have learned the
virtue of patience, although patience can seem a terrible taskmas-
ter when every fiber of one's being longs for speed in setting right
what one knows to be wrong.
90
The important thing is to keep pressing forward, to take advan-
tage of every opportunity for making progress, even if it is only one
step at a time. This opportunity to limit nuclear weapons under
the SALT II Treaty, to reduce the probability of destroying civiliza-
tion itself, and to turn our labors toward improving the quality of
all our lives rather than the useless waste of our resources must
not be lost.
My experience, Mr. Chairman, is that the United States is most
respected in the rest of the world where our other virtues are most
recognized, the virtues of quiet rather than noise, of the power to
build rather than the power to destroy, and of the spiritual power
of being a mediator in disputes, a reconciler among nations rather
than a belligerent and demanding nation.
We as a people are by far the most powerful nation in the world,
Mr. Chairman, not only politically, economically, and militarily
but, I firmly believe, spiritually. We have the potential for world
leadership. What other nation could have sponsored a Camp David
peace conference? What other world leader but Jimmy Carter
could have brought together those two ancient enemies to a table
of dialog? What other nation could have sent an Andrew Young to
the United Nations for the healing of the nations and the opening
of conversation and dialog of all peoples until he gained the love
and respect of almost everyone in that most suspicious and conspir-
acy-ridden of all world institutions?
The United States, Mr. Chairman, is a great hope for peace if we
can but learn to use our power with more dignity and restraint.
And finally, Mr. Chairman, let us not delude ourselves out of the
challenge before us. It is not a technical nor a military one; it is a
moral one, a challenge of moral leadership. The whole world is
watching the United States, whether the United States will take
the high road of making the dramatic offer to continue this small
peace process that we already have started with SALT II.
My late husband found it necessary to remind his listeners that
once to every man and nation is given the moment to decide. That
this is an hour for courage and decision. The U.S. Senate can
decide to take one small step forward for dialog and peace with the
Soviet Union, which could be one giant step forward for the
women, the mothers, the children, and the poor, not only for this
country and the Soviet Union, but for the whole world.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Mrs. King, for a very
eloquent statement given with much feeling.
I would now like to ask Ambassador Charles Yost to present his
testimony.
STATEMENT OF AMBASSADOR CHARLES W. YOST,
COCHAIRMAN OF AMERICANS FOR SALT '
Mr. Yost. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I testify before you today as a cochairman of Americans for
SALT and as a former foreign service officer with some 45 years of
experience in international affairs. That service included substan-
tial experience in negotiating with the Soviets at the Dumbarton
Oaks, San Francisco, and Potsdam Conferences, two assignments in
' See page 92 for Ambassador Yost's prepared statement.
91
Vienna under the Four Power occupation, director of the State
Department's Office of Eastern European Affairs, and at the
United Nations for 7 years, including those of the BerHn, Cuban,
and Congo crises.
I have, therefore, no illusions either about Soviet objectives or
about the need for great vigilance in doing business with them.
Senator Mclntyre has described the character and purpose of our
organization. I am submitting as an annex to my testimony a list of
the cochairmen, of the members of our advisory council and of
about 140 prominent persons who are publicly supporting our orga-
nization and our goals.
As you will note, many of those persons are officers or repre-
sentatives of other organizations with substantial nationwide mem-
berships, some of which assisted in the establishment of Americans
for SALT, and many of which have taken a public position in
support of ratification of the treaty.
With respect to the attitude of the American public toward the
treaty, you gentlemen are, of course, aware that a substantial
number of public opinion polls taken over the past year show that
about 70 percent of Americans polled consistently favored a strate-
gic arms control agreement with the Soviet Union.
The Secretaries of State and Defense, the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, and the senior officials of the administration in
their testimony to you before the recess have submitted convincing
evidence that this particular strategic arms control treaty before
you will, on balance, reinforce the security of the United States,
will not inhibit us from further strengthening our armed forces in
ways necessary to our defense, and will in several important re-
spects place the United States in a more advantageous military
position than if the treaty should be rejected or delayed.
Distinguished private citizens with long experience in negotiat-
ing with the Soviets, such as Averell Harriman and John McCloy,
have supported these views and have recommended ratification. So,
indeed, have the principal leaders of our European allies.
After studying the testimony offered to this committee and ex-
amining the provisions of the treaty thoroughly, Americans for
SALT is strengthened in its conviction that the treaty, if ratified,
will serve to reinforce both the security of the United States and
the prospects of world peace.
It therefore, in our view, clearly meets the objective which those
70 percent of Americans who in opinion polls supported an arms
control agreement with the Soviets had in mind. Reports from
public interest groups throughout the country which are alined
with us confirmed that this is the case.
Many of them, like many of you, would have preferred that the
treaty provide for more substantial reductions. However, part of a
loaf is decidedly better than no bread. If the SALT process is
continued and not interrupted, such larger reductions, to which
both parties to the treaty are pledged, can be promptly pursued in
the next stage of the negotiations.
On the other hand, as Mrs. King has just pointed out, rejection
or indefinite delay would seriously increase international tensions
and risks of world conflict. If the treaty is not approved, the Soviets
48-260 0-79 Pt.U
92
would gain specific substantial military advantages which the
treaty would deny them.
They would, instead of being obliged to reduce from 2,500 to
2,250 missile launchers, be able to increase by 1985 to as many as
3,000. Instead of being limited to 10 warheads on each of their 300
heavy missiles, they would be able to install as many as 30 on each,
a difference of 3,000 warheads.
They would be able to deploy three or four new strategic systems
rather than only the one permitted under the treaty. They would
be able to interfere significantly with our monitoring of their mili-
tary activities in ways that would be prohibited by the treaty.
All these options offered to 'die Soviets by rejection of the treaty
could constitute, together, a most serious threat to our national
security. I should like to recedl in this connection the public state-
ment Secretary- Kissinger made in January 1977, just before leav-
ing office, and I qvjote:
I believe that to achieve a usable <"jperiority in strategic n'jclear weapons is
extremely unlikely and relatively easy to prevent, and the obsession vdth it dis-
tracts us.
What I presume Mr. Kissinger meant was that as long as we
maintain a credible second strike capability and show a clear in-
tention to use it if necessary, any superiority the Soviet Union
might have in some weapons is not usable, either militarily or
politically, because their use would bring about almost total devas-
tation of their homeland.
We do certainly have that capability at present and are in the
process of reinforcing it with Trident submarines and missiles and
with air-launched cruise missiles. The SALT II Treaty places no
obstacles in the way of our maintaining that capability. As long^ as
we do maintain it, scenarios of our docilely succumbing to nuclear
blackmail are, in my view, wholly implausible.
The time available to me does not permit my dealing in any
further depth with the substance of the treaty. I should like, there-
fore, to submit for the record a statement of 10 points explaining
briefly why I personally support the Treaty and why the principal
arguments of its opponents seem to me unconvincing.
I trust that a sober assessment of the benefits of the SALT II
Treaty and of the quite predictable consequences of its being reject-
ed will commend themselves to you gentlemen and lead you to the
same conclusions.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Ambassador Charles W. Yost fol-
lows:]
Prepared Statement of Ambassador Charles W. Yost
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee: I testify before you today as a Co-
Chair of Americans for SALT and as a former Foreign Service Officer with some 45
years of experience in international affairs. That service included substantial expe-
rience in negotiating with the Soviets— at the Dumbarton Oaks, San Francisco and
Potsdam Conferences, two assignments in Vienna under Four Power occupation, as
Director of the State Department's Office of Eastern European Affairs, and at the
United Nations for seven years, including those of the Berlin, Cuban and Congo
crises. I have no illusions, therefore, either about Soviet objectives or about the need
for great vigilance in doing business with them.
"Americans For SALT" is a private organization established for the purpose of
mobilizing public support for the conclusion and ratification of the SALT II Treaty.
There is submitted as an annex to this testimony a list of the co-chairmen, of the
93
members of our Advisory Council and of about 140 prominent persons who are
publicly supporting our organization and our goals. As you will note, many of these
persons are officers or representatives of other organizations with substantial na-
tionwide memberships, some of which assisted in the establishment of "Americans
For SALT" and many of which have taken a public position in support of ratifica-
tion of the treaty.
With respect to the attitude of the American public toward the treaty, you
gentlemen are of course aware that a substantial number of public opinion polls
taken over the past year show that about 70 percent of Americans polled consistent-
ly favored a strategic arms control agreement with the Soviet Union. The Secretar-
ies of State and Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the senior
officials of the Administration in their testimony to you before the recess have
submitted convincing evidence that this particular strategic arms control treaty,
SALT n, will, on balance, reenforce the security of the United States, will not
inhibit us from further strenghthening our armed forces in ways necessary to our
defense, and will in several important respects place the United States in a more
advantageous military position than if the treaty should be rejected or delayed.
Distinguished private citizens with long experience in negotiating with the Soviets,
such as Averell Harriman, John J. McCloy, and, subject to some conditions, Henry
Kissinger, have supported these views and recommended ratification of the treaty.
After the study of testimony offered to this Committee and a careful examination
of the provisions of the treaty by its own experts, "Americans For SALT" is
strengthened in its conviction that the treaty, if ratified, will serve to reenforce both
the security of the United States and the prospects of world peace. It therefore
clearly meets the objective which those 70 percent of Americans who in opinion
polls supported an arms control agreement with the Soviets had in mind. Reports
from public interest groups throughout the country which are aligned with us
confirm that this is the case.
Many of them, like many of you, would have preferred that the treaty provide for
more substantial reductions. However, part of a loaf is decidedly better than no
bread. If the SALT process is continued and not interrupted, such larger reduction,
to which both parties to the treaty are pledged, can be promptly pursued in the next
stage of negotiations.
Returning for a moment to Mr. Kissinger, I should like to recall a public state-
ment he made in January 1977, just before leaving office: "I believe that to achieve
a usable superiority in strategic nuclear weapons is extremely unlikely and relative-
ly easy to prevent, and the obsession with it distracts us."
What Mr. Kissinger meant was that, as long as we maintain a credible second
strike capability, and show a clear intention to use it if necessary, any superiority
the Soviet Union might have in some weapons is not usable, either militarily or
politically, because its use would bring about almost total devastation of their
homeland. We do certainly have that capability at present and are in the process of
reenforcing it with Trident submarines and missiles and with air-launched cruise
missiles. The SALT II Treaty places no obstacles in the way of our maintaining that
capability. As long as we do maintain it, scenarios of our docilely succumbing to
nuclear blackmail are in my view wholly implausible.
The time available to me does not permit my dealing in any depth with the
substance of the treaty. I should like therefore to submit for the record a statement
of 10 points explaining briefly why I personally support the treaty and why the
principal arguments of its opponents seem to me unconvincing.
In conclusion I would recall that when the actor Maurice Chevalier was asked
how he felt about getting old, he replied that he was not particularly enthusiastic
about it but he preferred it to the alternative. I believe that a sober assessment of
the benefit of the SALT II Treaty, and of the quite predictable consequences of
rejecting it, should lead us to the same conclusion.
I have carefully followed the debate on the SALT II Treaty during the past year,
including testimony pro and con before this and other Senate committees. To
summarize my conclusions, there seem to me ten major points which emerge in
favor of ratification of the treaty. Several of these points seem to me to refute
convincingly the principal arguments put forward by opponents of the treaty.
1. The highest officials of our Government, including those responsible for our
national defense, have testified unequivocally that this treaty will, modestly but
usefully, strengthen the security of the United States. I see no reason to doubt
either their judgement or their sincerity.
2. The treaty does not prohibit the United States from taking a wide variety of
additional measures to strengthen its national defense, if the Administration and
the Congress deem it necessary to do so. Such permitted measures, several of which
are already under way, include Minuteman modernization, deployment of Trident
94
submarines and missiles, deployment of cruise missiles, deplojonent of the MX
missile, and an unlimited range of improvements in conventional forces.
3. If the treaty is not approved, the Soviets would gain specific substantial
military advantages which the treaty would deny them. They would, instead of
being obliged to reduce from 2,500 to 2,250 missile launchers, be able to increase by
1985 to as many as 3,000; instead of being limited to 10 warheads on each of their
300 heavy missiles they would be able to install as many as 30 on each (a difference
of 6,000 warheads, more than their total present number); they would be able to
deploy three or four new strategic systems, rather than only the one permitted
under the treaty; they would be able to interfere significantly with our monitoring
of their military activities in ways that would be prohibited by the treaty. All these
options offered gratuitously to the Soviets by rejection of the treaty could constitute
together a most serious threat to our national security.
4. One of the principal arguments by opponents of the treaty relates to an alleged
approaching vulnerability of our Minuteman missiles. If such a vulnerability were
to occur, it would occur either with or without the treaty. Personally I consider such
a supposed vulnerability to be purely theoretical. As long as we maintain other
invulnerable systems, such as our strategic submarines, the Soviets will not be fools .,
enough to risk destruction of most of their cities and industries by attacking us.
Moreover, they would not be able to achieve political advantages by threatening to
do so, since both we and they would know that such threats were bluff and would
not be carried out.
5. Our principal NATO allies have publicly urged ratification of the treaty and
several of their leaders have publicly emphasized the dismay they would feel if it
were rejected. In his testimony before this Committee July 31 Henry Kissinger said:
"There is no doubt that failure to ratify the treaty will shake European confidence
in an American government that for seven years assured them that it knew what it
was doing."
6. There can be little doubt that rejection of the treaty, afer seven years of
painstaking negotiation, would lead to a further escalation of the arms race, the
deployment of additional new systems on both sides, and very heavy expenditures
which would not be incurred if the treaty takes effect. There is no warrant for
believing that the Soviets have reached a ceiling of military expenditure. Experi-
ence clearly shows that they will spend whatever amounts they think are required
to keep even with us.
7. On the question of linkage with SALT of Soviet behavior in the Third World,
there is no reason whatsoever to suppose that the Soviets would behave better if
SALT is rejected than if it is ratified. On the contrary, a significant inhibition on
their objectionable behavior — their concern not to risk being too offensive to us —
would be diminished by the interruption of the SALT relationship.
8. There is no reason to believe that, if the treaty is rejected or if amendments are
added which would require renegotiation, such renegotiation could be either begun
or concluded quickly. The United States is about to enter an election year. More
important, the Soviet Union is already preparing for and about to undergo a change
in leadership. It is highly probable that the SALT process would remain in suspense
until that change, which as Mr. Harriman has pointed out could be adversely
affected by rejection of SALT, has been completed and assimilated. By that time any
one of a dozen contingencies could occur, as we have seen so often in the past 7
years, to cause further and indefinite delay.
9. If the treaty ever should be renegotiated, to accommodate amendments pro-
posed by the United States, we would of course, if we expected a new treaty to
result, have to be prepared to make concessions to the Soviets to balance those we
would be asking of them. What concessions would we be prepared to make? We
might in fact end up with no treaty at all or with one worse on balance than the
one we now have before us.
10. Finally, rejection of the treaty would delay indefinitely, perhaps for many
years, the process of negotiating the more substantial reductions which are stipulat-
ed in the Statement of Principles in the present text and which both proponents
and opponents of the treaty solemnly proclaim is their principal objective.
Americans for "SALT
President
Thomas Mclntyre, Former United States Senator.
Cochairs
Marjorie Benton, Delegate to the United Nations Special Session on Disarma-
ment.
Clark Clifford, Former Secretary of Defense.
95
The Reverend Theodore M. Hesburgh, C.S.C, President, University of Notre
Dame.
Townsend Hoopes, Former Under Secretary of the Air Force.
Henry Cabot Lodge, Former United States Senator; Former Ambassador to the
United Nations, and to Vietnam.
Lloyd McBride, President, United Steelworkers of America.
Charles Yost, Former Ambassador to the United Nations.
Advisory council
Thomas Bradley, Mayor, City of Los Angeles.
Marjorie Bell Chambers, President, American Association of University Women.
Norman Cousins, President, World Federalists Association.
Milton S. Eisenhower, President Emeritus, The Johns Hopkins University.
Murray Finley, President, Amalgamated Clothing and Textile Workers Union.
Douglas Eraser, President, United Auto, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement
Workers of America.
Emil Mazey, United Auto, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of
America.
Joyce D. Miller, President, Coalition of Labor Union Women.
Francis B. Sayre, Jr., Associate Director, The Wilson Center, Smithsonian Institu-
tion.
Rabbi Arthur Schneier, Park East Synagogue.
Stuart Symington, Former United States Senator; Former Secretary of the Air
Force.
Foy Valentine, Executive Secretary, Southern Baptist Christian Life Commission.
Jerome B. Wiesner, President, Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
96
Hayward Alker, Pmlenor of Political Science.
Maisachus^-inlCwnite of Technology
Marion Anderson! Employment Research
Auociation
Les Aspin. Member. United States House of
Representatives
Richard Bamet. Senior Fellow. Institute for
Policy Studies
Dons Bato
Roben S. Benismm, Chairman of the Board of
Governors. United Natior.s Association
Meyer Berger. Chairman, Meyer Berger Company
Charles V. Bergstrom, Executive Director. Office
for Governmental Aflairr, Lutheran CoufKil in
the U S. A.
Hans Bethe. Professor of Nuclear Physics, Cornell
University
David Blumberg. Former President. B'nai B'rith
Philip W Bonsai, Form«r United States
Ambassador
Kenneth Bouldmg. Ptofettor of Economics,
University of Colorado
Thomas Bradley. Mayor. City of Los Angeles
Joel Brooke. Former President, Fund for Peace
Helen Caldicon. M.D.
Bob Carr, Member, United States House of
Representatives
Marjone Bell Chambers. President, American
Association of University Women
Charles N. Coilatos. Commissioner of Veteran's
Services, The Commonwealth of Massachusetts
Arthur Collins. Jr.. Lt General. US Army (Ret.)
Randloph P. Compion, Chairman of the Board,
Compton Foundation
Howard R. Conant. Chairman, Interstate Steel
Company
Sister Carol Coston, Executive Director, Network.
Norman Cousins. President, '.Vorld Federalists
Association
Anhur Macy Cox, Former Specialist in Soviet
Affairs. U.S. Central Intelligence Agency
Karl Deutsch, Stanfield Professor of tnternationai
Peace. Harvard University
James A. Donovan. Colonel, United States
Marine Corps (Ret.)
Paul Doty, Director. Program for Science and
International Affairs, Harvard University
Thomas Downey. Member, United States House
of Representatives
Sidney DreH. Deputy Director, Stanford Linear
Accelerator Center
TiUord E. Dudley, President, Property
Management and Maintenance
Charles Dyson, Chairman of the Board, Dyson
Kissner Corporation
Helen W Edey, M.D
Milton S. EiFenhower, President Emeritus, The
Johns Hopkins University
Abraham Femberg. Chairman Emeritus, The
Weinman Institute of Science
Bernard T- Feid, Professor of Physics.
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Joseph Fiiner, President, Nobiemet International
Stanley Fine, Rear Admiral. United Stales Navy
(Ret }
Murray Finley. President, Amalgamated Clothing
and Textile Workers Union
David Fmn, Chairman of the Board. Ruder
& Finn
Douglas Fraser, President, United Auto,
Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers
of America
John Kenneth Gaibranh, Profe*sor Emeritus,
Department of Economics, Harvard University
Edward Garvey. Executive Director, National
Football League Players Association
Robert W Gilmore. Vice Chairman, Narional
Committee on U.S. -China Relations
Ernest Gross. Attorney at Law
C. Jarrett Gray, President. Women's Division of
Global Ministries. United Methodist Church
Morton Halpenn. Director. Center for National
Security Studies
Armand Hammer, President, Occidental
Petroleum
T. Walter Hardy. Jr , Chaimian of the Board,
Hardy Salt Company
Tom Harkin, Member, United States House of
Representative*
SUPPORTERS*
James Herman. President, International
Longshoremen's & Warehousemen's U^ton
Beniamin L. Hooks. Executive Director. National
Association for the Advancement of Colored
People
Proctor W. Houghton. President, Houghton
Chemical Company
Most Reverend Raymond G- Honthausen,
Archbishop of Seattle
Henry George Jacobs, President. H.G. Jacobs
Foundation
Michael F Jacobson, Executive Director, Center
for Science in the Public Interest
Mildred Jeffrey, Former National Chair, National
Women's Political Caucus
Mark Kaplan, Attorney at Law
Donald M. Kendall, Chairman and Chief
Executive Officer, PepsiCo, Inc.
Henry Kendall, Founder, Union of Cor>cerned
Scientists
Isaac C. Kidd. Jr . Admiral, United States
Navy (Ret.)
George Kutiakowsky, Professor Ementus of
Chemistry. Harvard University; Former *
Presidential Science Advisor
Phihp M Klutznick. Senior Panner. Ktutrnick
Investments
Betty Goei? Lall. Associate Director, New Yorn
State School of Indusi'ia! and Labor Reiatic^s:
Oeltgate to United Nations Panel of Experts on
the Relationship between Disarmament and
International Security
Edward Lamb. Chairman of the Board, Lamb
Entc'orises. Inc.
Eugene Lang, Chairman, REFAC Technology
Development Corporation
John Marshall Lee, Vice Admira!. United States
Navy (Pet. I
C. Payne Lucas, Executive Director. Africare
Bishop James K. Maihewi. Washington D.C.
Area United Methodist Church
Robert Matteson. Former Director, Program
Planning Staff. United States Arms Control
and Disarmament Agency
Emil Mazey, Secretary-Treasurer, United Auto,
Ae'ospace and Agricultural Implement Workers
of America
Eugene J. McCarthy. Former United States
Senator
George C McGhee, Former Ambassador, Former
Under Sei.re'.dry of State for Political Affairs
Joyce D. Miller, President, Coalition of Labor
Union Women
Patsy Mink. President. Americans for Democratic
Action
Ins Mitgang. National Chair, National Women's
Political Caucus
Dsvid Mtxner. Mixner Scott Associates
L. Calvin Moore. Citizenship Legislative Director.
Oil, Chemital and Atomic Workers
Kenneth Montgomery, Attorney at Law
Edward P. Morgan. News Commentator
Hans J Morgenthau, Professor of Political
Science, New School of Social Research
Frank E. Moss, Former United Slates Senator
M, Stewart Mott, Ne« York, New York
Paul Newman Actor
Henry E, Niles. Chairman, Business Executives
Move for New National Priorities
Ara Ot^emal, Chairman SATRA Corporation
Wolfgang Panofsky, Director, Stanford Lmear
Accelerator Center
John Aristotle Phillips, Princeton Student who
designed his own bomb
Harvey Picker, Dean, School of International
Affairs. Columbia University
Rabbi Ely Pilchik. President. Central Conference
of American Rabbis
Jo Pomerance, Chairperson, Task Force for a
Nuclear Te^t Ban Treaty
Avery Post. President. United Church of Christ
Max Potash. President, Polyvinyl Chemical
Industries
Neal Potter. President, Montgomery County
Council (Maryland)
William Potter, Professor of Political Science
Tulane University
Bernard Rapoport, Chairman, American Income
Life Insurance Company
AMERICANS FOR SALT Gg>^^
Rudolph Rasin, President, The Rasin Corporation
Roger Raveile, Professor of Science and Public
Policy, University of Cahfornia, San Diego
Joseph Reber, President. The Reber Corporation
Charles Robinson, Chairman. Delaware Trust
Company
Robert V. Roosa. Former Under Secretary of
Treasury for Monetary Affairs
.James W. Rouse, Chairman of the Board, The
Rouse Company »
Ralph Rudd. Clark, Friends Committee on
National Legislation
Jack Rutna, Professor of Electrical Engineering.
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Bruce Russeit. Professor of Political Science,
Yale University
John Ryor, Former President, National
Education Association
Stanley Salen. National Commission for Citizens
in Education
Francis B. Sayre, Jr., Associate Oirectoi, The
Wilson Center, Smithsonian inttilution
Rabbi Alexander Schindler, President, American
Hebrew Congregation
Lo'j'S Schneider, Executive Secretary, American
Friends Service Committee
Rabbi Arthur Schneier, Park East Synagogue
Patricia Schroeder, Member, Uniied States
House of Representatives
Herbert ScoviHe, Jr., Formei Deputy Director
of the Central Intelligence Agency
Peter Scott. Mixner Scott Associates
Glenn T. Seaborg, Former Chairman, Atomic
Energy Commisi.on
Jacob Sheinkman, Secretary-Treasurer,
Amalgamated Clothing and Textile Workers
Union
Sargent Shriver, Former Ambassador to France,
Former Director of the Peace Corps
J. David Singer, Mental Health Research Unit.
University of Michigan
C. Maxwell Stanley, Chairman of I'le Board,
Stanley Consultants, Inc.
Sol Stctin. Senior Executive Vice President,
Amalgamated Clothing and Textile Workers
Union
Philip Stewart, Professor of Political Science
Ohio State University
Robert Stuart. President, National Can
Corporation. Chairman of the Board, World
Federalists Association
Louis Susman. Attorney at Law
Stuart Symington, Former United States
Senator; Former Secretary of the Air Force
William Thompson, Stated C;erk of General
Assen-ibly, United f-reEbyte'ian Churches
Jarnes C. Thomson, Curator. Nieman Foundation
tor Journalism
John Toll. Chairman, Arms Reversal Program
John Topping. President, Ripon Society
Arnold E. True. Rear Admiral, United States
Navy (Ret.)
Kosta Tsipis. Research FeKow. Massachusetts
Institute of Technology
Foy Valentine. Executive Secretary, Southern
Baptist Christian Life Commission
Nan Waterman. Chairperson, Common Cauae
Bernard S Weiss, Former Vice President.
Gimbel Brothers
Charles W. Whaien, Jr., Former Member, United
States House of Representatives
John H Whitaker. Senior Vice President,
Whitaker Cable Company
Jerome B. Wiesner, President, Massachusetts
Institute of Technology; Former Presidential
Advisor
William Winpisinger. President, International
Association of Machinists
Emily Womach, Chair of the Board and
President, Women's National Bank
Jerry Wurf. President. American Federation of
Slate, County and Municipal Employees
William Wynn. President. Retail Clerks Iniernationat
Union
D. Robert Varnail, Jr . Chairman. Yarwey
Corporation
'Inclusion of the rwmet listed above does not necessarily indicate organizational endorsement.
'This is a paaial list.
97
DR. Kissinger's testimony on salt ii
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Mr. Yost, for a very clear
statement of your position. The 10 points to which you refer will be
incorporated in the record.
You refer to Mr. Kissinger and his statement of January 1977 in
which he said, I believe, that to achieve a usable superiority in
strategic nuclear weapons is extremely unlikely and relatively easy
to prevent, and the obsession with it distracts us. Have you read
Mr. Kissinger's more recent testimony on the SALT II Treaty?
Ambassador Yost. I have, indeed. And he referred, I noted, to a
statement somewhat similar to this which he had made in a press
conference, as he described it, in a moment of fatigue and exas-
peration. This particular statement, however, I don t believe was
made in any such context. It was made in a relaxed moment when
he was about to retire. And I have no reason to believe he would
have changed his mind in regard to the statement or that it is not
just as true now as it was then.
The Chairman. You believe that this statement has the candor
that we normally associate with a death statement; that is, he was
approaching the end of his tenure and could consider these matters
in a reflective and candid \yay? [Laughter.]
Ambassador Yost. I do think so. Senator. Actually, if one reads
the statements he made in the last month or two before he left
office, they were characterized by that frankness which I think
reflected exactly the state of mind you describe.
NUCLEAR superiority PROMOTES SOVIET ADVENTURISM
The Chairman. I found his argument unconvincing, that is the
argument that he made when he appeared before this committee
that nuclear superiority, whatever that may be, somehow creates
political advantages that can be used tactically in promoting Soviet
adventurism.
It seems to me that in the past, there is no evidence nor do I
recall that the Secretary was able to cite any evidence to support
that proposition. At times when we have had that nuclear superior-
ity, we have been faced with extreme Soviet adventurism, as in
Berlin and, indeed, in Cuba in 1962. And I hardly believe that the
Russians will withdraw from Angola, Ethiopia, or, indeed, from
Cuba where, we now know, they have deployed a combat brigade,
because of any belief that we will nuke them if they don't.
Ambassador Yost. I would quite agree. Senator. I think both
sides realize that the results of resorting to nuclear weapons would
rebound on them in such a devastating fashion that they are
extremely unlikely to use them. And since each side knows that
the other feels that way, nuclear blackmail is simply not convinc-
ing.
The Chairman. It is not convincing, and Secretary Kissinger did
not make it so in his testimony, at least not to me.
OVERKILL CAPACITY TO DESTROY
Would you agree that once the two countries have achieved that
degree of nuclear strength that both have overkill capacity to
destroy the other even after surviving an initial attack, that then
98
the further accumulation of these weapons becomes irrational,
wasteful and, indeed, can only increase the level of danger that
any nuclear war that might result from such gross miscalculation
or some tragic mistake would prove to be utterly devastating to
both civilizations?
Ambassador Yost. It certainly seems so to me. Nor do I think
that we can rely — if, for example, the treaty should not be ap-
proved— on the Soviets not continuing to match whatever we felt
we should spend on nuclear weapons. I noticed that one of the
witnesses this morning expressed the view that they would be
unlikely to do so, that they had reached the limit of their expendi-
tures.
Frankly, I think that is a rather naive point of view. I think they
have demonstrated over many years that at no matter what cost or
sacrifice, they will spend whatever they think is necessary to
match us.
MINORITY AWARENESS OF SALT II
The Chairman. Mrs. King, you spoke from the heart this after-
noon, and I have no question about your personal commitment to
the support of this treaty. What I would like to ask you is, to the
extent that you feel you can answer the question: Does the black
community in this country as a whole really care about SALT, or
does any other minority group, for that matter? Do you think that
there is an awareness of how SALT relates or could relate to these
other problems that you have mentioned, that is, the problems of
poverty, the problems of insufficient food, the problems of inad-
equate housing, that tend to plague so many of our black citizens?
Mrs. King. Yes, I think very definitely that the black community
is aware of this relationship. I think that that awareness was
created during the Vietnam war period when Martin Luther King,
Jr., tied that relationship between excessive spending on an ill-
fated, immoral war to the lack of resources for the disadvantaged
and deprived communities.
Also, the concern is that blacks have in the past been selected in
larger numbers to participate in combat when there was a war,
and we know what that means in terms of broken families and
lives that are destroyed and so on. So I think that the black
community is very much aware of what this could mean.
We are very concerned about the bread and butter issues. Most
black people feel that we can have both. There was a discussion
during the last Vietnam crisis, guns versus butter and so on. I
think black people want the Government to be prepared but they
do not feel that being prepared means neglecting those human
needs that are so vital to the survival of our culture and heritage
and our very being.
The Chairman. I wanted to make a comment on that particular
portion of your testimony because it seems to me a very poignant
example of how weak a given government can be despite the enor-
mity of the arms with which it surrounds itself. That is the recent
case of Iran.
There was certainly no insufficiency of weaponry to protect the
Shah and his regime; yet the lack of solidarity among his people,
the lack of support, rendered those forces impotent when the
99
people once took to the streets against him. And in the long run,
the strength of this country will depend in part upon its weapons
but far more fundamentally upon the cohesiveness of the American
people and their willingness to support the country in times of
danger and to fight for it.
That, in turn, as you have said, does not depend upon surround-
ing our cities with missiles if our cities are full of decadence and
decay and the needs of our people left unattended.
CONTRIBUTION SALT MAKES IN CONTROLLING NUCLEAR ARMS
Senator Mclntyre, I have just one question I would like to ad-
dress to you, and then I will turn to Senator Javits. I ask this
question because Senator McGovern is not here and he might not
return. It is a question I think he might want asked. He has often
brought up the point in the course of the hearings.
If this treaty depends on a cocommitment to a whole series of
new weapons systems such as the M-X missile, the cruise missile,
the Trident submarine, the others that have been urged upon us,
what contribution do you think the treaty makes to the ostensible
objective which it seeks to serve, namely, putting wraps on the
nuclear arms race?
We know that under the treaty, both sides can continue to add
thousands of nuclear warheads to their arsenals. And we are told
that we should ratify the treaty only if we also approve a very
expensive new commitment to the construction and deployment of
additional nuclear weapons systems not prohibited by the treaty.
So there are those, including Senator McGovern, who have asked
whether this is really an arms control treaty or an arms accelera-
tion treaty when viewed in that context.
Senator McIntyre. Mr. Chairman, I think it is regrettable, but it
is a matter of fact of life that the treaty is being subjected to all
forms of linkage. As I said in my statement, I believe the treaty
puts on a cap, some limitations on the Soviet threat. The treaty
continues the SALT process, which hopefully will begin to bring
the levels further down in SALT III and SALT IV.
We do have to recognize, what I know we saw in the R. & D.
subcommittee 6 or 7 years ago, what we considered to be quantum
leaps in the research and development that the Soviets were sup-
porting compared to which had previously been more or less incre-
mental.
So we have to turn our attention to the fact that our land-based
missiles may very well be in jeopardy by the mideighties.
Now, I don't suppose you recall, Mr. Chairman, but when the
M-X was first broached, it had a $20 to $50 billion price tag, and the
Air Force could not tell your Armed Services Committee how they
were going to do it. I believe I went to the floor and spoke against
the M-X system as being premature. As history shows, the Navy
was wrong to go too fast on the Trident.
But now I do think we are ready to move out with a solution. So
if an M-X system can be put together that will insure that the
land-based missiles will not be at risk in the mideighties, then I
would be for it.
So I regret, too, that this treaty did not do all we wanted it to do.
I regret that the turndown is not more significant. Yet, you want
100
to cite one thing, the Russians are bound to do something under
this treaty. It may be singular, to demolish and destroy some 250 of
their missile launchers.
Now, you can say they are obsolete launchers, but they are as
good as the ones we have on our Minuteman 11. We know the
Soviets are aggressive. They are adventuresome, and nothing will
change them.
If we do not pass this treaty, it is not going to make them worse
or better. If we pass the treaty, it is not going to make them any
different.
As a young man in World War II, I ended up in Czechoslovakia
in the Army of Occupation, in Strakonice, Czechoslovakia. I will
never forget it. We were along side the Russians, and the Russians
were as aggressive as any people I have ever met in my life.
Their soldiers thought nothing of trying to steal our Jeeps, and
the only Vvay you could get it through their head that they were
not to take the Jeep was to take your 45 and put it in their face.
We are dealing with a difficult people. But we must try to
understand them. We must realize that the SALT process is so
important, because, as Ccretta King has said, and I have heard
scenarios as you have of nuclear exchanges, it is just insanity.
So I say yes, we must continue to improve our nilitary system to
be sure to balance, to maintain the essential equivalence and to
continue to strive so that the SALT process will eventually turn
this arms race around.
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
Senator Javits.
Senator Javits. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I would like to join the Chair in welcoming the witnesses.
It is a great service you have produced for the committee today,
and I am very happy to see you going out and answering many of
the questions that many people in the communities ask. You have
great talent. It is a good thing.
We had this morning a very powerful aggregation of organiza-
tions on the other side. That is good, too. It puts us to our proof to
argue with them. But I am glad to see that there is an effective
committee on the pro side.
UNITED STATES SEIZED BY STATE OF EUPHORIA AFTER SALT I
I have one question to ask of you, Senator. We served together.
Retired admirals and generals testified this morning. They say that
in the 5 years after SALT I was ratified, the United States was
seized by a euphoria that disarmament was at hand.
We were sold on the idea of overkill without taking account of
the fact that in the meantime, counterforce had perhaps overtaken
that concept; that, therefore, we allowed the Soviet Union to race
way ahead of us until today we don't have superiority, and even
the doctrine of equivalence has now been, they think, seriously
jeopardized.
Now, from your own experience, would you be kind enough to
make any comment that you wish?
Senator McIntyre. Senator, I have great respect for our retired
military and great respect for the military people I had the oppor-
tunity to work with while in the Senate. I once decided that the
101
difficulty with the admirals of the ocean and sea when they
became Chief of Naval Operations is that they wanted every ship
they could get.
I thought it was our job to try to test their requests in the
Yankee sane way. So I believe that our retired military and other
distinguished people who may have testified this morning — and I
didn't hear their testimony — can recount all our past mistakes, but
when they tell you that the Russians are far superior, I disagree.
We have a new Trident submarine about to go in. We are putting
in F-14's to replace the F-4's that were so successful. We have
more things going for us. I have been constantly amazed with our
technology and with the creativity of our experts. So I don't say we
are second at all. I think we are in a period of essential equiv-
alence.
I deplore the tactics of the people who are against this treaty. It
is so easy to be against, picking away and trying to say that
mistakes have been made in the past when they probably contrib-
uted to those mistakes.
UNITED STATES AT MERCY OF SOVIET BLACKMAIL BY 1985
Senator Javits. The argument is also made by the same wit-
nesses that they believe that a euphoria could seize us again after
we sign SALT II and that we will slip even further behind, so that
by 1985, at the expiration of the treaty period, we will be complete-
ly at the mercy of whatever the Soviets want to do through nuclear
blackmail.
Senator McIntyre. Let me say here, and then I will quit on this,
the question of what we are going to construct and build for our
defense is one that should be taken by itself and not in conjunction
with this important treaty. We should be able to decide in our own
minds, and in your debates on the floor of the Senate and in the
committees, with the help of our military, whether there are gaps
we should close and whether there are weaknesses we should over-
come. These issues should stand by themselves, our Armed Forces
and our defense system. The treaty, which I believe is a step
toward what we all want, sanity and peace, should be judged on its
own.
Senator Javits. So you would not subscribe to Dr. Kissinger's
proposition either, would you, that when you sign this treaty, you
have to have a flat commitment of x dollars or x programs, or
whatever else you have to promise in order to guarantee in ad-
vance?
Senator McIntyre. No. I do not subscribe to the theory of tran-
quilizers. I think we can in our own House, Senate, and administra-
tion decide what we need to close any gap. We have the technology
to do it and more.
Senator Javits. And that this is a democratic country, Senator,
and that that is the way it is done, not by generals writing condi-
tions.
Senator McIntyre. Right.
Senator Javits. Now, I had the great privilege of serving with
Ambassador Yost in the United Nations in 1970. I have very high
regard for him. I have read your 10 points, by the way, and I
102
believe they are excellent. I wish you had read them to us. They
could very well be a syllabus for the debate on this treaty.
Ambassador Yost. Thank you, Senator.
UNITED STATES WILLPOWER TO USE TRIAD
Senator Javits. I would like to call one thing to your attention.
It is a very important point which I will be raising time and again.
We have a Triad. That is our defense. The Soviet Union, in effect,
has a unitary system, to wit, land-based missiles.
The rest of it is coming aboard, the Navy SLBM's, et cetera, but
they hardly pretend that it represents a major part of their offen-
sive nuclear capability.
Now, all the witnesses are arguing as if we had nothing but land-
based missiles, as if we had no SLBM's and no bombers. They are
just disregarding them, pushing it out of the window. And yet we
have spent billions on these programs.
The Secretary of Defense testified here that these legs of the
Triad are critical to us, that they are a significant part of our
counterforce capability certainly for the next 5 years until we get
the M-X missile.
Now, I notice that you say: "As long as we maintain other
invulnerable systems such as our strategic submarines, the Soviets
will not be fools enough to risk destruction of most of their cities
and industries by attacking us." Well, if you listen to Dr. Kissinger,
Ambassador Yost, you would not believe that.
He says no President of the United States will dare to use them
when the showdown comes.
Now, you have been our representative at the United Nations
and this is your paper. What do you say about that?
Ambassador Yost. Senator, I have heard that argument not only
from Dr. Kissinger but from many others, and it has never seemed
to me convincing. After all, why did we build a Triad if we didn't
intend to use it? The purpose, of course, is deterrence. And to
simply assume that if one element of the Triad is outmoded or for
any reason is unusable, that we are going to throw up our hands
and abandon the other two seems to me to run counter to the
entire purpose of our defense programs for the last 30 years.
So I would entirely agree with you that we do have other ele-
ments of our Triad, unlike the Soviets, who rely almost entirely on
their land-based missiles, and we are in the process of reinforcing
the sea-based missiles and we are about to go in for air-launched
cruise missiles.
So I would say that regardless of whether or not our land-based
missiles become vulnerable, that we are in a very safe, secure
situation.
Senator Javits. We should not duplicate everything the Russians
do man-for-man, tank-for-tank, plane-for-plane, missile-for-missile.
On the contrary. I am a tennis player. I know the surest way to
lose is to play the other fellow's game.
justification for advocacy of salt
Mrs. King, I have just one question of you. I am delighted that
you are with us.
103
This is a very rough game for poor people. A huge part of our
budget is going for defense with more in the mill. So much going
for military spending is pretty sad stuff, and more will go, I regret
to tell you. Under those circumstances, how do you justify, in the
interests of the poor, your advocacy of SALT?
It certainly maintains the level of roughly present expenditures
and may involve us in more. Can we explain to the poor — and you
are one of the most eloquent exponents — that without this treaty,
if we do turn it down, the desperate of our country could be very
much worse off than they are today?
Mrs. King. I think, as difficult as it is to explain to people who
are struggling with the necessities of life that the alternative is
Senator Javits. Worse.
Mrs. King. Total destruction, almost, we have to try to do that.
In some of my lecturing in talking to college students who are very
idealistic, I have had to try to answer some of these questions. And
I am a practical idealist, you know. I dream of a day when we
actually will have a disarmed world, you know.
I share the views that my husband had that we have to move
toward that time. But I realize that we are not nearly there and we
have a long, long way to go. And as long as there are the realities
of being destroyed by other nations, responsible people in govern-
ment must make preparation.
So I have said as far as I am concerned I do believe in disarma-
ment. I am a nonviolent person. I believe that ultimately we have
to disarm the whole world. But I can only say to people that I talk
to that it is very unrealistic to think, even to equate not spending a
certain amount for defense in the real world we live in, and to use
the argument that we must take away from the preparedness in
case there is a war, that we must take away from that and use that
money for the resources to feed the poor.
The poor must be fed. We must do that. But to use that as an
argument and say that, there are some people who feel that some-
how there is no justification for spending the enormous amount for
our military defense and spending so little for the human needs.
I subscribe to that, too, but I am realistic enough to know that
our Government is not going to do that at this time. Until we can
somehow sit down together and work these things out between the
Russians and ourselves, we have to somehow destroy the feeling of
fear, eliminate the feeling of fear within people.
As my colleague has said here, it is a process. We have to start
this process, and I think this is the beginning. We are a long way
from having the answer, but I feel it is important for me to be here
to say something in support of this treaty because without this, I
fear what the alternative will be for all of us.
Senator Javits. I can assure you, Mrs. King, without it there will
be no limit whatever on the stakes of the game.
Mrs. King. Yes.
Senator Javits. Therefore, any limit is better for the poor who
are bound to get the worst chewed up in a war.
Mrs. King. Right.
Senator Javits. So, the most we can do is limit the stakes and
cut down the possibilities.
Thank you.
104
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Javits.
When I asked Senator McGovern's question, I didn't know he
was going to return in time to ask it himself. So he will now ask
the questions I had intended to put to you. [Laughter.]
Senator McGovern. You probably did a better job with it than I
would have, Mr. Chairman.
I just want to observe that we have three unusually thoughtful
and qualified witnesses here today in Ambassador Yost, Mrs. King
and our colleague. Senator Mclntyre. I wanted to ask a couple of
general questions.
OVERALL STANCE OF UNITED STATES-SOVIET RELATIONSHIP
I would like to begin with you, Mr. Yost, if I may.
Last spring, Richard Barnett wrote an article in the Foreign
Affairs Quarterly in which he pleaded for a more comprehensive
approach to the Soviet Union. He makes this observation in the
opening paragraph of the article.
He observes that the strategic arms limitation negotiations in
Geneva and Moscow have been exhausting, and the arguments
over ratification in Washington promise to be embittering. The
process has not led to an improved international climate. Indeed, a
strong case can be made that in the last few years, the SALT
negotiations have exacerbated tensions between the two superpow-
ers.
Do you feel that through the whole SALT process — and this
article was written 4 or 5 months ago and we have now had the
experience for several weeks of the ratification process — we are
improving our overall stance and our relationships with the Soviet
Union, the relationship between the so-called superpowers, or are
they being exacerbated.
Ambassador Yost. No, Senator, I don't agree that without the
SALT negotiation, the SALT process over the past few years, our
relations with the Soviet Union would have been better. I think
they would have been decidedly worse. With all the other differ-
ences of opinion and conflicts that we have with the Soviets, at
least the SALT process, although in my opinion it moved much too
slowly, requiring 7 years, nevertheless was an anchor and it did
serve as one common objective that we were both agreed on pursu-
ing.
And while, of course, there was sharp argument about some
elements in it, on the whole it served to keep us from drifting
further apart. It is, after all, the knowledge of the two governments
that their peoples are hostage to each other, that either can de-
stroy the other, that provides some limits on the ambitions or
adventurism that might otherwise be shown.
And the fact that both are engaging and have been willing to
engage now for 10 years in this process of trying gradually to n.ove
toward some more stable situation is a positive factor that has
improved relations.
I am confident that had that process not existed, or if it should
now end, our relations would be infinitely worse and, as Senator
Javits has just said, both sides would be spending far more on
armaments than they have been.
105
Senator McGovern. Well, I am inclined to agree with what you
have said, that the effort has been worthwhile. However it has also
been frustrating. It is one process that will help remove some of
the ambiguity between the two superpowers. How much it will do
in the way of actual arms limitation, to say nothing of arms
reduction, I am not at all clear on. But I do think it helps remove
some of the elements of confusion and ambiguity between the great
powers and in that sense is important.
All three of you now have argued, I take it, that it is in the
interest of the United States that this agreement be ratified. Is
that correct?
[Mrs. King nods affirmatively.]
[Senator Mclntyre nods affirmatively.]
[Ambassador Yost nods affirmatively.]
LINKAGE TO OTHER ASPECTS OF UNITED STATES-SOVIET RELATIONSHIP
Senator McGovern. If that is true, it seems to me, then, that we
ought not surrender that interest. If it is in the U.S. interest to
ratify this treaty, we ought not surrender that because we are
peeved or concerned or alarmed by developments in some other
aspect of the Soviet-American relationship. Would you agree with
that?
Ambassador Yost. Yes, I would. It has been my experience over
the last 30 years that clashes between us and the Soviet Union in
many parts of the world are simply bound to occur. As regrettable
as they are, they are, I am afraid, unavoidable in the present
climate.
I feel that if we should, whenever there is a clash of this kind,
suspend the arms control process, it would aggravate rather than
improve the situation.
Senator McGovern. I don't think there is any doubt about the
judgment of some of the Senators who have said that the presence
of the Soviet forces in Cuba is going to make it harder to ratify this
treaty. On the other hand, in terms of logical thinking about what
is in the interest of the United States, it does seem peculiar that
we would punish ourselves by denying ourselves this treaty be-
cause we are unhappy about something else the Soviets do.
If the treaty is in our interest, how does it serve the U.S. interest
then to reject it because we are unhappy about something that has
taken place elsewhere in the world? That is to inflict punishment
on ourselves, is it not?
Ambassador Yost. I would feel so. Senator. I feel, for the reasons
I stated in those 10 points, that the treaty is very definitely in our
security interests and that it should stand on its own feet. The
Soviets are doing a great many things in many parts of the world
of which I strongly disapprove.
Nevertheless, I continue to think that it is in our interest to
make this particular agreement with them and ratify it.
Senator McGovern. I do think it is important for us to empha-
size that this treaty is not a reward for Soviet good behavior, and
rejecting the treaty is not a logical form of punishment for Soviet
misbehavior.
If you are going to accept the proposition that this treaty helps
the United States, it seems to me that the so-called linkage argu-
106
ment on how we are going to use our support or withdrawing our
support from the treaty to regulate the Soviets elsewhere around
the world does not carry much weight.
Ambassador Yost. I agree.
Senator McGovern. My time is just about up but I just want to
underscore again here what Mrs. King and Senator Mclntyre and
you have said, Ambassador Yost. I think there are sources of
American strength that are very important for us to use around
the world. But the one area where we do not have a clear advan-
tage over the Soviet Union is in the military field.
There are a good many other fields where we do: the field of
economics, the field of human rights, and in our ability to use
intelligent diplomacy. Those are the areas where I would hope
more of the competition would be directed rather than keeping so
much of it focused on the military struggle.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you. Senator McGovern.
Senator Hayakawa.
Senator Hayakawa. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Let me start by saying to you. Senator Mclntyre, it is a pleasure
to see you again. Let me also welcome Mrs. King and Ambassador
Yost.
I would like to ask Ambassador Yost something, to start with. He
just said the Soviets are doing many things in many parts of the
world of which you profoundly disapprove. Ambassador Yost.
Ambassador Yost. [Nods affirmatively.]
ANTICIPATED SOVIET BEHAVIOR AFTER SALT II
Senator Hayakawa. What bothers me is so many of the things of
which you disapprove — and I am sure you and I agree on what we
disapprove of, Soviet adventurism in Angola, Ethiopia, South
Yemen, weapons and military advisers to 40 or more African na-
tions, stirring things up in the Middle East, Latin America and so
on — so many of these things happened after the signing of SALT L
What is going to happen after the signing of SALT II?
It seems as if SALT I gave them the assurance that they could go
ahead with these things.
Ambassador Yost. Well, Senator, I would not be inclined to
associate those two elements so closely. I would think that we
should combat those particular examples of Soviet adventurism
which you have cited and that we should find appropriate means of
doing so. It differs in each case, of course. There is no across-the-
board solution.
I personally would like to see the United Nations used a good
deal more than it is in dealing with some of those problems you
mentioned. But I do not think that it would be either desirable or
effective to try to link all of them with the SALT Treaty or the
SALT process.
As I mentioned earlier, I am sure, since incidents of this kind are
bound to keep occurring, that would be the end of any arms control
negotiation because they will keep occurring.
If, for example, the treaty should be rejected or indefinitely
delayed, I don't think it would improve Soviet behavior one iota.
They would go right on doing, in Angola or wherever else, exactly
107
what they have been doing. In fact, they might behave a little
worse because this one element of restraint, their expectation and
desire to have an arms control agreement with us, would be elimi-
nated.
So, while I agree with what Senator McGovern has said, that
there is an obvious political connection which affects American
public opinion necessarily, I do think that we should try to sepa-
rate these issues to the extent that we can because in our view the
SALT Treaty is so much in our security interest that it would be
very foolish indeed to throw it away in the hope that it might
make the Soviets behave better in Angola, Cuba or wherever,
because I don't think that they would.
SALT I NOT TIED TO ADVENTURISM
Senator Hayakawa. Your reply essentially, then, is that the
signing of SALT I is not to be connected with the adventurism.
Ambassador Yost. I don't think it made any difference in their
behavior in the past.
SALT II MAY DIMINISH ADVENTURISM
Senator Hayakawa. Are you not also saying the signing of SALT
II may diminish that adventurism in the future?
Ambassador Yost. I think the whole SALT process, as long as it
goes on, not simply the fact that we have signed and ratified SALT
II but that we have immediately, as the statement of principles in
SALT II provides, started the negotiation of SALT III, will have
some moderating effect on their behavior. It certainly will not stop
all the behavior of which we disapprove, but it will, in my opinion,
be less serious, less troublesome than if there were no SALT proc-
ess.
Senator Hayakawa. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador.
EFFECT OF CUBAN PROBLEM ON SALT POSITION
The next question I would like to ask, and I address it to all
three of you and any one of you is free to answer it in any way you
like, is: Does the revelation of the existence of a Soviet combat
brigade in Cuba influence in any way your position on SALT II?
That is, not only on the treaty itself but our approach to its
ratification.
Ambassador Yost. Should I say a few words and see if my
colleagues want to?
Senator Hayakawa. Go ahead.
Ambassador Yost. No, Senator, I think not, for the reasons I
have just cited. I think SALT II is in our interest; that we will be
more secure with it than without it; that their arms would be
restrained in ways they would not be without the treaty, and
therefore, we should go ahead and pin down that treaty while we
can.
I dislike seeing Soviet troops in Cuba. I hope we can find other
ways of dealing with that and eliminating that situation. I don't
think there is anything that we need to be panicky about. After all,
we are a considerable power, and 3,000 troops there, while unpleas-
ant, is obviously not going to undermine our national security.
1+8-260 0-79 Pt.4 -
108
That does not mean I think we should ignore it. I think we
should pursue with the Soviets through other means the elimina-
tion of that situation. But I don't think that we should throw away
the benefits I think the SALT Treaty would bring us.
Senator McIntyre. Well, Senator, I always wonder why we are
always surprised. There should be no surprise involved in this
matter. But I would say, and I must say this, too, that you gentle-
men have had the benefit now of yesterday's hearings from which
you have the up-to-the minute information. And I don't have this.
I would say, depending on the nature of those troops and the
amount of them and the possibility of bases being constructed, that
I would want them out of there. And I would also want SALT IL
You see, the reason I want SALT II is so that we can know what
they, our Russian adversaries, are up to.
Mr. Chairman, you must have known that there were Russians
in Cuba before it appeared the other day. I don't know what you
found out yesterday, but let's get them out of there. But let's also
get SALT II.
The Chairman. Senator, I knew there were Russian military
personnel in Cuba engaged in training activities and also certain
communications activities, but not until last week did I know that
there was a Russian combat unit there.
I wish we lived in a world of perfect logic. I have been saying
from the beginning that this treaty should be dealt with on its
merits. I continue to hope that it will be dealt with on its merits.
But I could not truthfully say that the development, the confirma-
tion of the existence of a combat brigade of Russian troops in Cuba
that were placed there secretly, does not have a chilling effect in
the Senate.
You know as a former Senator that it would have such an effect.
Senator McIntyre. As one who knows what that means on the
street corners of Boise
The Chairman. Yes, and throughout the country. I also think
that unless this matter is satisfactorily resolved, I would be mis-
leading you and misleading the country to say that I believe the
Senate would be prepared to ratify the treaty.
It is one thing for the Cubans to move into Angola and Ethiopia,
which has never exercised me very much because I think in the
end it is going to be for the Africans to solve; but it is another
thing to move a combat unit secretly to within 90 miles of our
shores. I think that the Senate is bound to view the two together.
That is just a simple statement of fact, the facts with which we
live.
Senator Biden.
Senator Biden. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will be very brief.
The Chairman. We do have a vote, I might say. The Senators
might want to go vote and come back so that we don't have an
interruption.
Senator Biden. I apologize to the witnesses for not having heard
their testimony, but I have had an opportunity to read the testi-
mony.
109
SOVIETS NOT MILITARILY SUPERIOR TO UNITED STATES
I would like to say one thing which contradicts something that
seems to be gaining some credibility around here. I, for one, do not
believe the Soviets are militarily superior to the United States of
America. None of the witnesses have said that but we have been,
in effect, for the last several weeks talking as if that is true. It is
not true.
We have to look at military posture not just in terms of strategic
capability and conventional capability, but geographic location, po-
tential enemies, reliability of allies and a whole range of other
questions. I don't think there is a military man in this country who
would trade places with the Soviet Union given the entire range of
things they would have to trade if we were in a fighting situation.
But I want to say that for the record because it was mentioned
again here. I don't think George meant much beyond what he said.
He talked about Soviet equality in the military field and the need
to emphasize the other areas. I don't even concede that, if you take
the entire spectrum of military considerations, the Soviets are
superior.
I wonder what would happen. I wonder what Senator Hayakawa
and Senator Garn and others are going to say if, in fact, the
administration is able to, by whatever means would be employed,
force this brigade out of Cuba? If the administration forces the
brigade out of Cuba, does that say that we should have SALT? I
assume that that is what it means.
I assume it means that if they say they cannot have SALT with
the brigade in Cuba because it somehow shows how weak we are,
that if, in fact, the brigade is forced to leave, I assume they will be
prepared to point out how strong we are and why then it would be
useful to have SA.LT.
I am, as you might guess, prepared to make that argument if and
when the brigade leaves.
SALT DISCUSSED IN VACUUM
I would like to compliment you, Mrs. King, on bringing into
focus what often is not focused on here. We tend to become, as
Senator Church says, nuclear theologians when we discuss SALT.
And we discuss it not only in a vacuum in the military — that is, we
discuss strategic and not conventional — but we also discuss it
within a vacuum of what is happening in the rest of the world and
the rest of our economy.
And your point about inflation and unemployment being by-
products of the failure to have a SALT agreement is one which
should be reiterated time and again. It is not in and of itself reason
to vote for SALT if SALT were not a good agreement, if it injured
our security. But if it is at a minimum an even call, even if it is
close, those two factors play very heavily. I would like to compli-
ment you on bringing them out.
And Senator Mclntyre, as usual you have put your finger right
on the thrust of why we need SALT from a security standpoint.
You point out in your statement that there are several reasons but
two main reasons. One, failure to have SALT diminishes our capa-
bility of monitoring and controlling Soviet threat. And second, with
no
the SALT agreement it allows us to do the things we have to do
anyway if we decide we must do them and moves forward in
continuing the process.
But you again don't argue it, as I read your statement, from a
position of anything other than U.S. security. U.S. military security
is enhanced.
The reason why I am not asking any questions is I agree with
what you all say. And I would just like to compliment each of you
on the way in which you have approached it. You seem to have
covered all of the basics.
Ambassador Yost, you point out in your statement that there are
differences between us and the Soviets. They are always going to
be there and we should not reject something just because we have
differences in other areas. I guess I have no desire to be conten-
tious after the testimony I heard this morning from the anti-SALT
people, but I am going to have to go vote.
I would like to compliment you all once again for putting the
issue into what I believe is a proper perspective. I am very anxious
to see, if the administration is successful in moving the troops out
of Cuba, whether or not there will be the same rallying point,
whether or not we will refer to Carter's moving the troops out of
Cuba in the same way we refer to, throughout these hearings, the
Kennedy blockade of Cuba, that we could do it then because we
were strategically stronger and we can't do it now if it were to
occur again.
Well, the opponents of SALT have made it sound like it has
occurred again. It has not. They make it sound like it has. And I
would be very anxious to see what they have to say.
Senator Sarbanes would like to question you all. I imagine he is
on his way back. And I will be back also. I must leave now. Besides,
if I didn't come back, with the Cardinal about to testify, I wouldn't
be allowed back into Philadelphia anyway. So I will be back short-
Thank you very much.
If we could recess for 5 minutes to give Senator Sarbanes time to
come back. I apologize for having to do this.
[Recess.]
The Chairman. The hearing will come to order.
Ambassador Yost. Mr. Chairman, Mrs. King had to leave. She
asked me to apologize to you.
The Chairman. All right. Thank you.
Our next member to question is Senator Muskie.
Senator Muskie. I apologize for not being here when you read
your opening statements, but I have read them all and I have
listened to my colleagues in their question period. It gives me a lot
of reading time as they all tend to use their 10 minutes, which I
think is very useful, and the questions have been good. I really
have nothing to add to them.
I particularly liked Senator Mclntyre's testimony in which he
emphasized two points which tend to get overlooked in the debate
over the details of the treaties and the details of asymmetrical
defense postures in the two countries.
The first is that the Soviets without the treaty would really be
less restrained with respect to future defense spending and arms
Ill
buildup than they would be with the treaty. That point, I think,
needs to be emphasized over and over again. The treaty itself is not
likely to be either the cause or the contributing factor to future
Soviet buildup except to the effect that it restrains their potential.
Without the treaty, their potential is enhanced.
NO UMITATIONS ON U.S. OPTIONS
On the other side of that coin, insofar as I know, based upon the
testimony I have heard, U.S. options for defense buildup, including
strategic nuclear weapons, are not limited in any way that we are
now considering. Am I correct in that. Senator Mclntyre?
Senator McIntyre. That is essentially correct, yes.
Senator Muskie. So the net effect of the treaty from that point of
view is that the Soviets are restrained with respect to options they
would clearly exercise. We are not restrained with respect to op-
tions we are considering with or without the treaty.
Senator McIntyre. The opponents would clearly say we are re-
straining ourselves on our GLCM's and our SLCM's, submarine-
launched cruise missiles and the ground-launched cruise missiles.
But the answer to that, of course, is that these provisions are in
the protocol and do not restrict us in any practical way. We cannot
deploy these systems before the protocol expires. Moreover, there
was no restraint there, really, on our development or testing.
Senator Muskie. And with respect to Ambassador Yost, I did find
your ten points very useful. I think they are an excellent basis on
which to rationalize for the average citizen the pros and cons from
the national interest point.
Ambassador Yost. Thank you, sir.
Senator Muskie. And I think that must be done.
Finally, I would like to say, Mr. Chairman, it is very useful to
bring into these hearings, with the exception of Senator McIntyre
and Ambassador Yost, perhaps, the average citizen's perspective on
these treaties and to emphasize the values and concerns the aver-
age citizen ought to be raising as he or she evaluates the national
interest as represented by these treaties.
I think that is terribly important. The polls continue to point out
that citizens are for arms control. Yet we have witnesses day after
day, technicians, experts getting into the details of the treaty and
tending to overlook or to overshadow or to put into a dim light the
fundamental reasons why arms control is important.
Mrs. King's testim.ony highlighted that point. I remember dis-
cussing that particular point with Mr. Kosygin in Moscow in 1971,
and clearly, we both were influenced by that perspective, the fact
that the resources of this world were being drained away from the
human needs of this planet's occupants to fuel an arms race which
at that time, I think, cost about $200 billion a year. Now Mrs. King
uses the figure $400 billion.
The figure changes upward so rapidly it is difficult to stay on top
of the latest statistic. But that kind of spending on arms, $400
billion, obviously dilutes the capacity of the world's governments or
the will of the world's governments to deal with the problems of
the disadvantaged. And the problems of the disadvantaged underlie
most of the tensions and confrontations upon the face of this globe.
112
Were it not for the problems of the disadvantaged, those who
seek power would not find power so easily attainable as they now
find it. And I think it is those kinds of fundamental concerns that
ought to be highlighted as often as possible in these hearings and
in the public debate over these treaties. There are risks to moving
in the direction of peace. There are incomparably greater risks for
moving in the direction of war.
I know that oversimplifies the situation but I find some of the
experts oversimplifying, too, and occasionally their oversimplifying
ought to be set off against the oversimplification of human beings
interested in simply surviving, getting enough to eat and a decent
environment in which to raise families and to look forward to a
better future.
So I am delighted, Mr. Chairman, that this kind of testimony is
now entering the hearings, and I appreciate the testimony we
received.
I have no further questions. I think the appropriate questions
have been asked and, I think, well answered.
Senator McIntyre. Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Senator McIntyre.
Senator McIntrye. May I request two charts, "Potential Soviet
Strategic Threat in 1985, With or Without SALT," and "U.S. Free-
dom to Develop Strategic Strength Under SALT II," be included in
the record.
The Chairman. Very well. The data will be included in the
record as you have requested.
[The information referred to follows:]
113
i/ai.i_J:REEDOM_TO DrvFLOP Strategic Strfnbth
Undfr salt II
(supplied by Senator Thomas Mclntyrel
SALT
Permits
n SALT
Prohibits
U.S.
Strategic
Forces
At Sea
Trident I Missile
@
Trident II Missile
$
Poseidon Missile Improvements
0
Trident Submarine
0
Advanced Small Strategic Submarine
1
Submarine Survivability — Quietness
§
SALT
Permits
n SALT
Prohibits
U.S.
Strategic
Forces
ON
Land
Air-Launched Cruise Missile —Range
•
Air-Launched Cruise Missile ~
PFNFTRATinN
f
Advanced Strategic Air-Launched
MrssTi F
- 1
•
B-52 Conversion to Cruise Missile
r.ARRTFR
•
Advanced Cruise Missile Carrier
•
B-1
•
Advanced Penetrating Bomber
1
Improved FB-111
•
B-52 Improvements
1
114
U.S. Freedom to Drvelop Strategic Strength
„SALT SALT
Permits Prohibits
U.S.
Strategic
Forces
ON
Land
H-X Missile
•
Minuteman III Missile — Improved
Yield
1
Minuteman UI Missile — Fractiona-
CV..j^ ^«*i^-^ ^ "71.-*// V.th TION
•
Minuteman II — Replacements
•
SuRvivABLE Basing — M-X
•
SuRvivABLE Basing —Minuteman
•
Missile Penetration Aids
•
SALT
Permits
n SALT
Prohibits
U.S.
Theatre
Nuclear
Forces
Ground-Launched Cruise Missile
•
Sea-Launched Cruise Missile
•
Mobile Medium- range Ballistic
Missile
1
. determined at hearings of Senate Armed Services
Committee, Juiy /5, 1979.
115
POTENTIAL SOVIET STRATEGIC THREAT IN 1985
— With and Without SALT ~
[supplied by Senator Thomas Mclntyrel
With SALT Without SALT
Soviet Strategic Missile & Bombers
2250*
3000**
Soviet MIRVed Strategic Missiles
1200*
1800**
Soviet MIRVed Land-based Strategic
Missiles
820*
1300***
Soviet Silo- killer Warheads
6000***
10,000-15.000*^
Soviet Total Strategic Warheads & Bombs
9500***
13.000-18.000*'
From Treaty
Secretary Brown's Statement to the Senate
Armed Services Committee. July 23. 19/9
Determined in Senate Armed Services Committee
hearing. July 2.). 1979. during questioning of
Secretary Brown and Undersecretary Perry
116
Senator Mclntyre and Ambassador Yost, thank you very much
for your testimony. The committee is in your debt.
John Cardinal Krol, the Archbishop of Philadelphia; the Cardi-
nal will appear on behalf of the U.S. Catholic Conference.
Cardinal Krol, we are grateful to you to come to appear as a
witness today, and I would invite you to proceed with your testimo-
ny as you see fit.
STATEMENT OF JOHN CARDINAL KROL, ARCHDIOCESE OF
PHILADELPHIA, ON BEHALF OF THE U.S. CATHOLIC CONFER-
ENCE, WASHINGTON, D.C., ACCOMPANIED BY THE REVEREND
J. BRYAN HEHIR AND EDWARD DOHERTY »
Cardinal Krol. Thank you.
Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, as indicated, I am
John Cardinal Krol, Archbishop of Philadelphia. I speak on behalf
of the U.S. Catholic Conference [U.S.C.C] comprising over 350 bish-
ops in the United States, serving more than 50 million Catholics.
Mr. Chairman, I respectfully request that my full written testi-
mony be submitted for the record.
The Chairman. Without objection, your prepared statement will
be inserted in the record at the appropriate point.
Cardinal Krol. I am accompanied by Father Bryan Hehir, the
one with the Roman collar on my right; Mr. Edward Doherty, on
my left, both from the U.S.C.C.
I will confine my remarks to a summary of the complete testimo-
ny. At the outset, I express the very sincere gratitude of the
Bishops of the U.S. Catholic Conference for the opportunity to
present their views on the moral dimensions of the nuclear arms
race. My testimony, the testimony which I submit, is divided into
three sections. The first section focuses your attention on the moral
and religious principles which are applicable. The second section
focuses these and applies these principles to certain aspects of the
current debate on the SALT II Treaty, and a third section directs
your attention to the future beyond SALT II.
Now, the first section, the moral principles underlying my testi-
mony have been enunciated in papal declarations and in the docu-
ments of the Second Vatican Council. In these statements, the
arms race is condemned as a plague on the human race, a radically
defective way of maintaining the peace, and an aggression against
the poor of this country and of the world.
The imperative of our age is that all must work to put an end to
the arms race and make a real beginning of disarmament, not
unilaterally, indeed, but at an equal rate on all sides, on the basis
of agreements and backed up by genuine and effective guarantees.
These principles are the authentic position of the Catholic Church
and of faithful Catholics.
However, the application of these principles to a particular pro-
posal such as the SALT II Treaty admits of a divergence of views.
Accordingly, the position I present today, while based on generally
accepted principles, is not necessarily a unanimous position among
the bishops, nor does it represent all the Catholics in the United
States. It is, however, the official position of the U.S. Bishops
Conference as adopted by its administrative board. In offering this
' See page 127 for Cardinal Krol's prepared statement.
117
testimony, the bishops seek to fulfill a dual role of responsible
citizenship and religious leadership. That dual role requires that
we speak the truth plainly.
The Catholic bishops of this country believe that for too long we
Americans have been preoccupied with preparations for war. Too
long have we been guided by the false criterion of equivalence or
superiority of armaments. Too long have we allowed other nations
virtually to dictate, albeit obliquely and indirectly, how much we
should spend on stockpiling weapons of destruction.
Is it not time to give priority to steps towards peace, to move
toward it through gradual, bilateral, negotiated disarmament?
I am here, Mr. Chairman, to support ratification of the SALT II
Treaty as a partial and very limited step in the process of halting
the proliferation of nuclear weapons and moving toward real re-
ductions. The support for ratification is severely qualified because
of the moral principles which govern our view of arms control. The
massive complexity of the nuclear arms race is something which
diplomats and analysts grapple with daily. We respect that techni-
cal complexity. We have tried to study and to assimilate it in this
testimony.
For the church, however, the nuclear arms race is principally
defined, as Mrs. King had said, in religious and moral categories
since war in any form raises the question of human rights and
human life.
In a nuclear age, the moral imperative to prevent war has taken
on a qualitatively new character. From Pius XII to John Paul II,
the moral teaching is unequivocal: The nuclear arms race is unre-
servedly condemned, while the process of arms control and disarm-
ament is urgently commended.
The pursuit of peace is not based on a naive or Utopian view of
the world. The Christian tradition is eloquent about the vision of
peace. It is also realistic about the fact of war. Hence, the Second
Vatican Council declared that "governments cannot be denied the
right of legitimate self-defense once every means of peaceful settle-
ment has been exhausted."
The perspective of this testimony, therefore, recognizes that some
forms of war can be morally legitimate, but judges that nuclear
war involving the use of weapons of uncontrolled destructiveness
surpasses the boundaries of legitimate selfdefense.
The prohibition of use: It follows that the primary moral impera-
tive of the nuclear age is to prevent any use of nuclear weapons. It
is this prohibition which is reflected in the following judgment of
the Second Vatican Council:
Any act of war aimed indiscriminately at the destruction of entire cities or of
extensive areas along with their population is a crime against God and man himself.
It merits unequivocal and unhesitating condemnation.
It should be noted, Mr. Chairman, that in the sixteen documents
of the Second Vatican Council, this was the onl}' formal condemna-
tion ^'^sued, there was none other. It reflects the gravity of the
moral problem before us in these hearings. The primary purpose of
the bishops' support of SALT II is to join in any reasonable effort
designed to make nuclear war in any form less likely. Our support
of the treaty remains qualified, however, because of the moral
paradox of the deterrence policy.
118
The moral dilemma of deterrence: The moral paradox of deter-
rence is that its purpose is to prevent the use of nuclear weapons,
but it does so by an expressed threat to attack the civilian popula-
tion of one's adversary. Such a threat runs directly counter to the
central moral affirmation of Christian teaching on war: that inno-
cent lives are not open to direct attack.
In their moral statement on strategic policy in 1976, the Ameri-
can Catholic Bishops argued that:
We must be aware that not only is it wrong to attack civilian populations, it is
also wrong to threaten to attack them as a part of a strategy of deterrence.
This moral judgment that the use of strategic nuclear weapons
and the declared intent to use them in our deterrence policy are
both wrong is a fundamental principle in the U.S.C.C. position. It
means that deterrence can be tolerated as a lesser evil than use, as
long as serious negotiations are pursued, aimed at phasing out
nuclear deterrence. If the pursuit of that goal is forsaken, the
moral attitude of the Catholic Church would almost certainly have
to shift to one of uncompromising condemnation of both use and
possession of nuclear weapons.
Based on these moral principles, we cannot regard the SALT II
Treaty as a major achievement in arms control. It certainly is not
an arms reduction treaty. It is more accurately characterized as a
measure which regulates the expansion of the arms race. Neverthe-
less, it does set some limits. Consequently, the Catholic Bishops of
the United States urge the Senate to ratify this treaty because of
the process of negotiation which produced it and the further negoti-
ations which it permits offer the promise of escape from the danger
of nuclear holocaust, and from the ethical dilemma of nuclear
deterrence.
The second part is the principles governing the current debate on
the SALT II Treaty.
The bishops have taken this position in support of SALT II
conscious of the objections of those who oppose SALT II. We have
serious reservations about the treaty because we know it is a
deceleration, not a reversal of the arms race. The analysis of this
testimony concludes that the quantitative and qualitative limits on
delivery systems and weapons achieved by SALT II are worthy of
support. We are sympathetic, however, to those critics, including
some of my fellow bishops, who cannot find in the SALT process
thus far evidence of real arms reduction. Unless there is movement
beyond SALT II toward more substantial measures of arms control,
our support of SALT II will be hard to sustain.
We are also aware of the far more numerous opponents of SALT
II who criticize the treaty as failing to protect U.S. security. Some
argue that the treaty will not prevent the U.S.S.R. from achieving
a first strike capability against our land-based missiles which they
will then use to change the strategic balance in various parts of the
world. Others argue that the perception of the U.S.S.R. having a
first strike potential will produce a shift in the global political
balance.
I am not a political or technical expert, but I must raise some
questions. To the first criticism: Would not the leaders of the
U.S.S.R. be insane to initiate a nuclear war, even in the possession
of a first strike capability against our ICBM's, when the basic
119
reality of the nuclear age remains deterrence based on the assured
destruction policy? Even those of us who oppose the present policy
of deterrence have to recognize its function.
To the second criticism: Can it be argued that an increase of
strategic power can so easily be translated by the Soviets into an
effective instrument of political influence? Is not the influence of
the strategic balance on a particular political situation most com-
plex and unpredictable precisely in those situations of the develop-
ing world where forces of nationalism and a plethora of ideological
positions are vying for control? Has not the cost of using nuclear
weapons on the part of those who employ them deprived these
weapons of much of their strategic utility and made their political
value equally problematic?
Mr. Chairman, you cited some examples, including Iran and
Soviet adventurism in the past, and I ask, has the military superi-
ority of the U.S.S.R. enabled it to achieve a decisive political ad-
vantage over its neighbor China? I raise these questions to mdicate
that while we have examined the objections of those who oppose
SALT with the arguments just stated, we have not found them
sufficient to deter our support for the treaty. There are risks in the
SALT II process, but we believe that they are worth taking to
solidify what has been achieved by the treaty and to move beyond
it to a more significant reduction.
The third section is beyond SALT II. It is our hope that the U.S.
agenda for future negotiations will be bold, I might say a bit bolder
than it has been, and imaginative, aimed at demonstrable reduc-
tions in both weapons and delivery systems.
We realize, Mr. Chairman, that it has been argued during these
hearings that ratification of the treaty should be linked to new and
massive programs for expanding and improving U.S. strategic nu-
clear and conventional forces. Several witnesses have said that
SALT II is acceptable precisely because it does not prevent the
United States from matching expanding Soviet capabilities. Strate-
gic equivalence has become the new name for the arms race.
At the time of SALT I, Dr. Kissinger was quoted as asking: What
good is strategic superiority at these levels of numbers? Are we not
justified in asking today whether strategic equivalence is an abso-
lute necessity? Why must we accept this criterion which ties our
defense spending to our adversary's decisions, when we now have
the potential of destroying every human being in the world four
times over?
I have come here today, Mr. Chairman, because we believe in
negotiated arms control. Because of that belief, we must question
the logic of an absolute adherence to the criterion of strategic
equivalence. It would radically distort our intention to have our
support of SALT II coupled with plans for new military expendi-
tures. The treaty should be ratified as an arms control measure,
not as a maneuver to increase the strategic budget.
The proposed new strategic systems will require a massive outlay
of funds at a time of increasing fiscal stringency. The Constitution
of the United States calls upon the executive and legislative
branches of government not only to provide for the common de-
fense, but also to establish justice, to promote the general welfare
and secure the blessings of liberty for ourselves and our posterity.
120
Estimates for the M-X missile alone run from $30 billion upward
over the next decade. With the national debt today at over $800
billion, and pressure being exerted on legislative bodies at all levels
to reduce expenditures, the investment of $30 billion in one weap-
ons system inevitably will result in new limits on spending tor
essential human services here and abroad.
It is our recommendation that systems like the M-X, as well as
Trident II, should be considered negotiable in return for compara-
ble concessions by the U.S.S.R. in SALT III. We have been told that
the aim of SALT III will be deep cuts in the strategic arsenals of
both superpowers. We fervently hope, we fervently pray, that this
^ Mr ^Chairman, the attention of the whole world has been cap-
tured by the new Pope John Paul II. He has already taken note of
the significance of the SALT II Treaty for world peace. The treaty,
he said,
is not yet a reduction of weaponry or, as could be hoped, a provision for disarma-
ment But that does not mean that the foreseen measures are not a sign, which we
St to greet with pleasure, of the desire to pursue a dialogue without which every
hope of working effectively for peace could vanish.
The Pope asked for prayers "to bring progress to the great cause
of laying down weapons and pursuing honest, stable and effective
agreements" of peace and concord. It is in this spirit that the U^.
Catholic Conference submits this testimony to the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee. , ^ r j.i.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you, members of the com-
"^The^' Chairman. Thank you very much, Cardinal Krol, for an
extremely well reasoned, comprehensive statement on the position
of the U.S. Catholic Conference on this treaty ^ , , -.u ^
I have been informed that I need to go to the floor to deal with a
resolution that is presently being debated that would call for the
suspension of all further Senate consideration of SALT until writ-
ten assurances are received from the President that Soviet forces
in Cuba pose no threat to the United States nor to U.S. foreign
policy. I think this is an indication of the realities to which 1
^^ But beforfleaving-and I would then extend to Senator Muskie
the balance of my time-I want to say that I appreciate very much
the decision that has been made by the Catholic Church and by
other churches, Protestant and Jewish churches, to speak out on
Siportant political issues when they affect moral principles
Indeed, the core of this whole attempt to bring nuclear arms under
some restraint is essentially moral in nature, and I think your
statement underscores this very persuasively.
I sometimes think that the great moral blindness of the last
century was the institution of human slavery, but the most respect-
able of our leaders in that period, at least m the early part of the
century, were content to raise no questions concerning slavery
Even as the century advanced, it became the subject of a great
nItSnal debate in which the most respectable people found ways to
rationalize and to justify the continued existence of slavery It
Sme at TasHo the\errible tragedy of the Civil War before that
issue was resolved.
121
It may well be that the great moral blindness of our times is the
nuclear arms race, and most respectable, most powerful world lead-
ers and experts of every kind find ways to rationalize its continu-
ation and to justify it on one basis or another. I think that the
great contribution of your statement is to bring us back to the
basic moral questions and force us to confront them. I am grateful
to you for your statement. It is a very important contribution to
the commit iecj's consideration of this treaty.
Seiiator Muskie, please.
Senator Muskie. This is the first time at these hearings I have
had a chance to ask the first question, and I really don't have a
quastion so much as a reaffirmation of what Senator Church has
just said.
NEED ?0R MORAL IMPERATIVE TO BE EMPHASIZED
I was delighted in Augi!st to learn that you were interested in
coming to this hearing because at that point the hearings, by and
large, had emphasized the concerns of people who deal with arms
and arms diplomacy, on the impact upon national security, and
those who believe that national security was not so threatened that
we should ignore the moral imperative involved were concerned
that the moral imperative was not being sufficiently emphasized.
It is not that those who were testifying were unaware of the
moral imperative; it is just that they were so preoccupied and had
been for years in negotiating the means for moving toward a
reduction in arms that I am not sure they were as sensitive as they
ought to be to the fact that this treaty does not produce a reduction
in arms.
At what level a reduction would begin, no one would dare pre-
dict. I would not predict that a SALT III Treaty would result in a
reduction in arms, or even a leveling off of the arms race. And I
think it is important that we be reminded that those kinds of risks
lie ahead of us, and indeed, that they would be exacerbated if this
treaty is rejected.
So I feel I have been privileged this afternoon, Your Eminence,
to listen to your statement. I hesitate to ask questions because your
statement is so clearly, carefully structured, thoughtfully produced,
and based upon a rather careful study of the record, the issues, the
questions, the challenges that have been raised that I doubt that
the effect of your statement would be improved by interpretations
based upon ad hoc questions put to you by Senators on this side of
the table.
RESERVATIONS THAT TREATY DOES NOT GO FAR ENOUGH
There is just one question I would really like to ask, not that the
point would be left ambiguous, if it is ambiguous, in the record.
You were very careful at the outset to point out that this was the
official position of the National Council but that it did not neces-
sarily represent the views of every member or of every bishop.
Would it be accurate to characterize the views of those who have
reservations about the statement or about the SALT II Treaty to
say that their reservations are based upon a conviction that the
treaty does not go far enough in the direction of reducing arms.
122
rather than that it poses a nonacceptable risk to our national
security?
Cardinal Krol. The first part is correct. Their objection is that it
simply does not go far enough. We have expressed that reservation.
They expected that it should have moved in the direction of reduc-
tion, disarmament. And actually it doesn't do that at all. There is
no reversal. All it does is control or regulate the growth. And it is
precisely, I would say, for that reason that there is a divergence of
opinion among the fellow bishops.
It is, I would say, a small minority of bishops, but with great
conviction.
Senator Muskie. I remember. Cardinal Krol, enjoying your hospi-
tality in Philadelphia, and I remember that the bedroom which I
occupied was also occupied by the beautiful painting of the current
Pope whose eyes followed one wherever one moved in the room. I
have seen those kinds of paintings before, but I had never seen
such a dramatic one, or representing a personage whose influence
and authority was so overwhelming. I can't say that I slept the
sleep of the innocent totally that night under such surveillance,
but I would say that your testimony here this morning represents
that kind of surveillance from the enormously significant moral
position of the Catholic Church, and as a Catholic, I am delighted
that it has been used as you have used it here this afternoon.
Cardinal Krol. Thank you. Senator.
Senator Muskie. Senator Percy.
Senator Percy. Your Eminence, we all appreciate your presence
here and we respect the position that you have taken.
TELEVISED COVERAGE OF SALT FLOOR DEBATE
I think one of the most disappointing aspects of my consideration
of SALT II, which may be one of the most important votes that I
will cast in the U.S. Senate, has been the low level of interest
seemingly shown by our constituents. There is no comparison with
the high level of emotion and interest we saw on the issue of the
Panama Canal. Yet in SALT II we are dealing with the future of
the human race. We tried to grapple with one of the problems of
the nuclear age in the Non-Proliferation Act that we passed in the
Congress about 1 year ago, and we are trying to grapple with
another aspect of the problem here. I think broadcasting these
hearings is important. Your presence, speaking on behalf of such a
highly valued group of men and women, is important because it
promotes public understanding and helps focus public attention on
the importance of this issue.
In your opinion, would it be well for us to try to solve the
technical problems and open up the Senate of the United States to
television and radio coverage of the SALT debate so the people of
this country can share in the debate and grasp its significance as
you and the group that you represent have so ably expressed?
Cardinal Krol. Senator, I don't think I would be the best judge
of that. One of the problems that you would have in this is that
you are showing the perfection of refinement of debate on a matter
which is complex and involved. We have tried to apply the moral
principles. There are other principles of security and so on, and I
don't know whether you could convey that even by the intelligent
123
and reasonable debates that you have in the Senate. I don't know. I
don't think I am a good judge of that. The televising of these
hearings has provided some preparation beforehand, and there
could be some interest generated through the media if the debate is
to be televised. The problem is whether the coverage of the media
would be read and to what degree would it be understood. But it
would be very helpful to have the people interested and knowledge-
able.
There is also a question of priorities. If you want to talk about
energy, or inflation, or about the shortage of gasoline, that will
command the interest of people. But it seems the people are willing
to entrust their elected Representatives and Senators with the
SALT II decision. It is your responsibility with clear-minded knowl-
edge and perception and courage to make the decisions. I am here
only to help you by casting some light particularly on the moral
aspects. As Mrs. King said, this was basically and ultimately a
moral issue, which is the same theme that I developed in the first
section. But it is up to you gentlemen who have to be courageous —
and I appreciate fully the risks involved in the democratic process-
es of election. I think it was Churchill who said that democracy is
the worst form of government in the world but better than any
other kind. I realize what you have to face when you have elec-
tions. But there is an area where you have to be true to yourself, to
the truth, and vote with courage.
Senator Percy. Thank you.
MORAL RESPONSIBILITY OF NATIONS TO DEFEND THEMSELVES
I would like to clarify a point you made. You have pointed out
that we ought to move toward de-escalating the arms race and
bilaterally eliminate nuclear weapons, if at all possible, in their
totality. You said this is a moral issue.
Is it not also true, though, that it is a moral responsibility of the
Nation to adequately and properly defend its citizens? We have a
case in Lebanon where a nation saw fit not to provide adequate
defense for its own borders, its own people, and it has been torn
asunder for years now.
Isn't there a moral obligation to see that we adequately provide
for our defense so as to deter any aggression?
Cardinal Krol. Yes, I have emphasized that, that the right of
self-defense is a sound moral principle for individuals and for na-
tions. The right of self-defense is rooted in the law of nature, and of
nature's God. At the same time, there is a basic principle we study
in moral theology, "en inculpate tutelae," that is, you can only use
as much force as is necessary to repel the aggressor.
Now, when a little child comes at you with a toy baseball bat,
you don't run for a machine gun; and it is a crude comparison, but
that is the concept involved there, and when you have these nucle-
ar stockpilings on both sides, the basic moral issue is the unprotect-
ed civilian. If somebody comes at you with a gun, with arms, you
shoot at them, but when you have missiles and nuclear power that
wipe out, as were wiped out in Nagasaki, hundreds of thousands of
innocent people, unarmed, that is morally indefensible. And the
nuclear power inherently has that kind of a potential and for that
reason, the bishops oppose nuclear power as a viable weapon.
48-260 0-79 Pt . 4
124
REJECTION OF UNILATERAL DISARMAMENT
Senator Percy. You, as I see your statement, reject unilateral
disarmament. When you face an adversary of increasing strength
and apparently different moral persuasions than we do, there
would be no sense, I would think, in unilaterally disarming. That is
why this whole process of bilateral negotiation seems to be the
sensible way to go about it.
Do I surmise that you would concur with that conclusion?
Cardinal Krol. Positively, Senator. That was, in fact, Paul VI
speaking at the U.N. in 1965, when he made that statement "No
more war; war never again," and he insisted disarmament was the
first step toward peace. But he added a sentence which is not very
frequently quoted. It is on the first page of my testimony: "As long
as man remains that weak, changeable, and even wicked being he
often shows himself to be, defensive armaments will also be neces-
sary."
On the following page, the "Constitution on the Church in the
Modern World" says this, that: "Since peace must be born of
mutual trust between peoples instead of being forced on nations
through threat of arms, all must work to put an end to the arms
race and make a real beginning of disarmament, not unilaterally
indeed, but at an equal rate on all sides, on the basis of agreements
and backed up by genuine and effective guarantees." That is exact-
ly the principle.
Senator Percy. Thank you, sir, very much indeed.
Cardinal Krol. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Muskie. Senator Biden.
Senator Biden. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Your Eminence, Senator Muskie said that to ask questions in a
sense would detract from the statement and the manner in which
it was put together, but being the product of 13 years of Catholic
education, I can't resist the opportunity to ask a Cardinal a ques-
tion.
ADOPT defense POSTURE BASED ON COUNTERFORCE CAPABILITY
Your Eminence, I am concerned that one of the paragraphs in
your statement might be taken out of context. One of the debates
that has been raging in this committee for the past 2 months has
been whether or not the United States should adopt a defense
posture based upon the concept of counterforce capability.
The argument has been made that the policy upon which our
nuclear deterrent for the past 20 years has been based, which is
mutual assured destruction, is not a good policy, not a workable
policy, not a moral policy because it means just what it says: that
the Soviets should know that if they were to strike the United
States or its allies with nuclear weapons, then, as they say in south
Philadelphia, school is out, it is all over.
Now, along come Dr. Kissinger and others and they say we need
the M-X missile, we need the enhanced radiation weapon, and we
need other things like GLCM's and SLCM's and ALCM's, because
we must counter the counterforce capability of the Soviet Union.
They, with their big missiles, can strike in the mid-1980's our
ground-based missiles and knock out those missiles, and only kill
125
10 to 20 million Americans, and it is suggested that if the United
States were to retaliate massively under that circumstance, then it
would be immoral, because the Soviets would retaliate in turn and
we would have created mutual suicide. In your statement you say:
"The moral paradox of deterrence is that its purpose is to prevent
the use of nuclear weapons, but it does so by an expressed threat to
attack the civilian population of one's adversary. Such a threat
runs directly counter to the central moral affirmation of the Chris-
tian teaching on war: that innocent lives are not open to direct
attack."
What I am leading to is that I don't see how nuclear weapons of
the size that either side has now can be employed in a surgical
way, and that a policy which is designed to deter the use of those
weapons on civilian populations by essentially saying that we have
no option open to us but to respond in kind seems to me to be one
of the only ways to preclude the prospect of it occurring. And I just
wonder whether or not you can help me as a U.S. Senator deal
with that dilemma a little further. Should we be designing weapons
that are designed to be surgically used? Is that what our Church is
saying?
Cardinal Krol. Senator, after 13 years of Catholic education, I
am sure you have heard the expression "the lesser of two evils."
There is a goal, there is an ideal. There is a practical reality. You
can never lose sight of your goal, but you have got to go through
the practical reality to achieve your goal. We do not recommend or
favor a counterforce capability. I have described the criterion of
strategic equivalence as a false criterion: strategic equivalence is
another name for the arms race. What I don't like about it and
what I think every thinking American shouldn't like about it is
that somebody else is dictating how much we are to spend. As I
mentioned in the testimony, we have enough power now to kill all
the people in the world four times over. Our development is more
than sufficient. Well, what are we going to do with the three other
striking forces, and why do we need five? I mean, that is why it is
a plague, it is an insanity.
Senator Biden. I agree.
Cardinal Krol. But in this question of the deterrence, I have
made it plain that we are opposed to the use, even to the threat.
But we will take deterrence in the process as the lesser of two
evils.
I think it was Senator Hayakawa that talked about the Soviets,
what they are doing. I think we have to look not only at their
actions, we must try to understand why they act as they do. I think
we have to look at the basic integrated philosophy of communism.
They refer to it as a dialectical materialism, a dialectic in which
we find theses and antitheses, constant tension, constant struggle,
all directed to the goal of world domination.
For a while we followed the isolation policy. We would not talk
to the Soviets. But that is not the way to pursue truth or get truth
to prevail. We are dealing with a people and we know what their
ideology and goals are. They have never denied that their ultimate
goal is world domination. They have never denied or modified their
goal of the extermination of religion. But we are dealing with them
not because we approve their ideology, not because we approve all
126
of their actions, but for the interests of the human race and the
human family, we have to try to have or at least acknowledge some
principles of truth and agree to some principles. And even when we
reach the agreement, we have to be aware of the fact that the
track record of performance on agreements by the Soviets is not
the best. We come back to another maxim which, as an attorney,
you would know, that the law serves the vigilant and not the
dormant. We must be alert and vigilant.
The SALT II Treaty, as I tried to point out, is not the world's
greatest achievement.
Senator Biden. I was hoping, quite frankly, you would answer
the question that way. My concern — both as a Senator who is a
proponent of SALT and as a practicing Catholic — is that some
might very well take that statement of yours out of context, not
having had the benefit of the scholastic education.
I felt certain that Your Eminence did not want to be even
indirectly associated with being a proponent of a counterforce
strategy.
I would like to make one further statement, and although it
sounds somewhat gratuitous, I really mean it. It is a sincere state-
ment. I think the Holy Father is going to do more for opening up
the East- West dialog and opening up the prospects for more free-
dom and tolerance in Eastern Europe, and eventually in the Soviet
Union, than all the arms control agreements and all the agree-
ments that the superpowers have signed so far. I cannot think of a
better choice that could have been made for a Pope. I just got back
from the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe and even Communist
leaders within those countries were talking about the impact the
Pope has had, although some of them clearly were a little worried
about it. And in Western Europe, they are absolutely ecstatic about
the impact the Pope is having.
And he is doing it in such a forthright yet tactful way. He is not
choosing up sides, east and west and good and bad, but he is having
a tremendous impact on the tens of millions of people who had just
lost hope. I am really, really proud. It almost makes me want to be
Polish.
Cardinal Krol. That is a laudable desire. Senator.
Senator Biden. Seriously, I just wanted to tell Your Eminence
that from my perspective the Pope's personality and presence have
had extensive repercussions at the highest political levels through-
out the world. But I am sure Your Eminence already knows that.
Thank you very much for your time.
Senator Muskie. I have been trying for years to get Senator
Biden to make that kind of a statement about the Poles.
Senator Biden. My Irish mother had problems with that, but we
may be able to work it out.
Senator Muskie. Well, Your Eminence, clearly you made an
impression on the committee. I am sorry that other members were
not present because of preoccupation with similar duties elsewhere
on the floor, but I repeat that I am delighted that you could come,
that you made your statement. I think you have made an impor-
tant contribution, and I look forward, too, to the visit of the Pope,
We Poles have got to stick together.
Thank you very much.
127
[Cardinal Krol's prepared statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of John Cardinal Krol
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee: I am Cardinal John Krol, Arch-
bishop of Philadelphia. I speak on behalf of the U.S. Catholic Conference (USCC)
comprising over 350 bishops of the United States, serving more than 50 million
Catholics.
I express the sincere gratitude of the USCC for the opportunity to present the
views of the Catholic Bishops of the United States on the moral aspects of the
nuclear arms race.
I. THE PERSPECTIVE OF THE TESTIMONY
The moral principles underljdng my testimony have been enunciated clearly in
papal documents and speeches, and in Vatican Council II. Pius XII pleaded on the
eve of the World War II: "Nothing is lost by peace, everj^hing may be lost by war"
(Aug. 24, 1939). Paul VI speaking to the General Assembly of the U.N. said: "No
more war, war never again. Peace must guide the destinies of all peoples and of all
mankind. . . . Disarmament is the first step toward peace. ... As long as man
remains that weak, changeable and even wicked being he often shows himself to be,
defensive armaments will also be necessary" (Oct. 4, 1965).
Vatican Council II, in its "Constitution on the Church in the Modern World,"
declared: "The arms race is one of the most grievous plagues of the human race,
and it inflicts an intolerable injury upon the world" (para. 81); "The arms race is
not a secure way of maintaining true peace, and the resulting balance of power is
no sure and genuine path to achieving it" (para 80); "Since peace must be born of
mutual trust between peoples, instead of being forced on nations through dread of
arms, all must work to put an end to the arms race and make a real beginning of
disarmament, not unilaterally indeed, but at an equal rate on all sides, on the basis
of agreements and backed up by genuine and effective guarantees" (para 82).
These principles reflect the authentic position of the Catholic Church and of all
faithful Catholics. The manner and degree to which these principles are reflected in
a particular proposal, such as the SALT II Treaty, admits a divergence of views. For
this reason, I recognize, and I want this Committee to know, that while the princi-
ples to which we subscribe are clear and generally accepted, the position I present
here today is the view of the majority of the Administrative Board of the Bishops
Conference; it is not a unanimous position within the Conference of Bishops, nor it
it the unanimous position of all Catholics in the United States. It is however the
official policy of the U.S. Catholic Conference, and in expressing it, we Bishops seek
to fulfill a role of responsible citizenship, as well as the religious leadership.
This role requires me to speak the truth plainly. The Catholic Bishops of this
country believe that too long have we Americans been preoccupied with prepara-
tions for war; too long have we been guided by the false criterion of equivalence or
superiority of armaments; too long have we allowed other nations to virtually
dictate how much we should spend on stockpiling weapons of destruction. Is it not
time that we concentrate our efforts on peace rather than war? Is it not time we
take that first step towards peace: gradual, bilateral, negotiated disarmament?
It is impossible to regard this Treaty as a spectacular achievement in the field of
arms control. But we support its ratification as a partial and imperfect step in the
direction of halting the proliferation of nuclear weapons and as part of an ongoing
process, begun in 1972, to negotiate actual reductions in nuclear arms. Our support
is, however, heavily qualified precisely because of the moral principles which govern
our view of arms control.
No question of foreign affairs surpasses the arms race in terms of moral complex-
ity and moral content. Along with the correlative issue of world poverty, the arms
race forms the heart of the moral agenda of foreign policy.
The massive technical complexity of the arms race in its political and strategic
dimensions is something that people in our government grapple with daily. V'e
respect that technical complexity and have tried to assimilate it in this testimony.
At the same time, for the Church the arms race is principally a problem defined in
religious and moral categories. The specter of war, in any form, raises for Christian
ethics the central question of the taking of human life. Since the life of every single
human person bears the sacred dignity of the image of God, the question of the
religious and moral significance of warfare has received more sustained reflection in
Roman Catholic theology than almost any other moral problem. From St. Augus-
tine's masterful treatment of war in Chapter 19 of "The City of God" to the Vatican
Council II's injunction to the Church that it should "undertake a completely fresh
128
appraisal of war" there has been present in Catholic tradition an abiding determi-
nation to limit the impact of war on the human family.
In the nuclear age, the moral sanctions against war have taken on a qualitatively
new character. From Pius XII to John Paul II, the moral argument is clear: the
nuclear arms race is to be unreservedly condemned and the political process of arms
control and disarmament is to be supported by the Christian community. This
pursuit of peace is not based on a naive or Utopian view of the world. The Christian
tradition is eloquent about the vision of peace; it is also realistic about the fact of
war. Hence, Vatican Council II, recognizing the inadequate nature of the political
structure of the international community, stated that "governments cannot be
denied the right of legitimate self-defense once every means of peaceful settlement
has been exhausted". (Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern World,
para. 79.)
The perspective which shapes this testimony, therefore, recognizes that some
forms of war can be morally legitimate, but judges that nuclear war surpasses the
boundaries of legitimate self-defense. The application of this basic moral principle to
our present situation requires that we distinguish two problems of the nuclear age:
the use of nuclear weapons and the strategy of deterrence. Both are pertinent to our
assessment of the SALT II Treaty.
The prohibition of use. — The primary moral imperative of the nuclear age is to
prevent any use of strategic nuclear weapons. This prohibition is expressed in the
following passage of Vatican Council II: ' Any act of war aimed indiscriminately at
the destruction of entire cities or of extensive areas along with their population is a
crime against God and man himself. It merits unequivocal and unhesitating con-
demnation". (The Pastoral Constitution, para. 80.)
This was the only formal condemnation of the Council and indicates the serious-
ness with which the bishops of the world viewed the possible use of what they called
"modern scientific weapons". Our first purpose in supporting SALT II is to illus-
trate our support for any reasonable effort which is designed to make nuclear war
in any form less likely. I have said that our support of the Treaty is qualified; one
reason for this is the paradox of nuclear deterrence.
The moral dilemma of deterrence. — The moral paradox of deterrence is that its
purpose is to prevent the use of nuclear weapons, but it does so by an expressed
threat to attack the civilian population of one's adversary. Such a threat runs
directly counter to the central moral affirmation of the Christian teaching on war:
that innocent lives are not open to direct attack. The complexity of the moral
dilemma is reflected in the statement on deterrence of the American Bishops in
1976: "With respect to nuclear weapons, at least those with massive destructive
capability, the first imperative is to prevent their use. As possessors of a vast
nuclear arsenal, we must also be aware that not only is it wrong to attack civilian
populations but it is also wrong to threaten to attack them as part of a strategy of
deterrence. We urge the continued development and implementation of policies
which seek to bring these weapons more securely under control, progressively
reduce their presence in the world, and ultimately remove them entirely' . (To live
in Christ Jesus: 1976.)
The moral judgment of this statement is that not only the use of strategic nuclear
weapons, but also the declared intent to use them involved in our deterrence policy,
are both wrong. This explains the Catholic dissatisfaction with nuclear deterrence
and the urgency of the Catholic demand that the nuclear arms race be reversed. It
is of the utmost importance that negotiations proceed to meaningful and continuing
reductions in nuclear stockpiles, and eventually to the phasing out altogether of
nuclear deterrence and the threat of mutual-assured destruction.
As long as there is hope of this occurring. Catholic moral teaching is willing,
while negotiations proceed, to tolerate the possession of nuclear weapons for deter-
rence as the lesser of two evils. If that hope were to disappear the moral attitude of
the Catholic Church would almost certainly have to shift to one of uncompromising
condemnation of both use and possession of such weapons.
With this in mind, the Catholic Bishops of this country ask the Senate of the
United States to ratify this Treaty because the negotiations which produced it, and
the further round of negotiations which it permits, offer the promise of escape from
the danger of a nuclear holocaust and from the ethical dilemma of nuclear deter-
rence.
II. THE SALT II TREATY
Nevertheless, we have serious reservations about this Treaty. SALT I had created
a hope among people that SALT II would require real reductions on both sides. This
hope has not been fulfilled and there is no clear indication that SALT III can revive
129
that hope. That is why some of my fellow bishops and many more concerned
Catholics refuse to support SALT II.
The U.S. proposals of 1977 had significant reductions in view but these were
rejected by the U.S.S.R. The present Treaty limits strategic nuclear delivery systems
to 2,250 (after 1981) on both sides and this will require the dismantling of about 250
Soviet launchers. Such a reduction is not very significant considering the destruc-
tive power (3,550 megatons for the U.S., and 7,868 megatons for the U.S.S.R.) that
will remain and continue to increase on each side.
Secondly the Treaty does not preclude either side from proceeding to replace its
present land-based ICBMs wth a new system, or modif3ring existing systems within
limits, it is true, as to size and number of warheads but obviously embodjdng
significant improvements in accuracy. These systems will obviously be more destruc-
tive.
On the other hand it cannot be argued, as do some critics, that the Treaty does
not constrain Soviet strategic weapons expansion. Under the Treaty the U.S.S.R.
will not be permitted to deploy an already-tested mobile missile (SS-16); it must
count all SS-18 missiles as having multiple warheads though some may not; it must
stop its current program of deplojdng additional missiles with multiple warheads by
about 1982 and may not increase the number of warheadls in existing missiles.
SALT II is thus basically a deceleration, not a reversal of the nuclear arms race.
Wliile the weight of this testimony comes to the conclusion that the quantitative
and qualitative limits on delivery systems and weapons constitute an arms control
achievement worthy of support, that conclusion becomes harder to defend if one
assumes SALT II to be the end of the process. Much more remains to be done.
By far the most numerous opponents of ratification are those who reject the
Treaty as failing to protect U.S. security. In particular, there are those who argue
that this Treaty will permit the U.S.S.R. to achieve a first-strike capability against
our land-based ICBM s, and that they will use this threat to challenge and change
the strategic balance in various parts of the world. Can this really be reliably
predicted? With the U.S. in possession of a large nuclear arsenal and varied means
of delivery would not the leaders of the U.S.S.R. be insane to start, or threaten to
start, a nuclear war, even in possession of a first-strike capability vis-a-vis our land-
based ICBM's? Can we gainsay the tragic reality that deterrence is still based on the
posture and policy of mutual-assured destruction? Even if the U.S.S.R. were to
acquire the capability to neutralize the U.S. Minuteman force of ICBM's, is it not
clear that the other legs of the Triad will continue to deter a Soviet first-strike, if
indeed that were the Soviet intention?
Some critics of the Treaty, however, do not base their opposition mainly on the
premise that the U.S.S.R. would risk a first-strike. Rather they argue that the
perception in the world of the U.S.S.R. having first-strike capability will lead to an
adverse shift in the global political balance. I do not pose as a political or technical
expert, but I must ask whether, in the nuclear age, it can be argued that an
increment of strategic power can so easily be translated into an effective instrument
of political influence. This translation from the strategic balance to specific political
conflicts seems particularly complex precisely in those situations in the developing
world where forces of nationalism and a plethora of ideological positions are vjdng
for control. The cost of using nuclear weapons on the part of those who employ
them has deprived them of much of their strategic utility and has made their
political usefulness equally problematical. For example, the U.S.S.R. has not been
able to achieve a decisive political advantage vis-a-vis China, despite the former's
admitted military superiority.
On balance, we are satisfied that while the Treaty does not require a reduction in
nuclear weaponry on either side, at the same time it will not substantially endanger
U.S. security. Whatever risks may be involved are worth taking for the sake of
ensuring that the SALT II negotiations will be followed quickly by a third round
aimed at more significant reductions.
III. BEYOND SALT II
By itself SALT II is no more than a beginning. It creates a certain momentum
which should make possible more impressive arms control achievements. If not, our
confidence may have been misplaced. What are the prospects?
It is our hope that the U.S. agenda for future negotiations will be bold and
imaginative, and that the aim of the negotiators should be real, demonstrable
reductions in both weapons and delivery systems. Our negotiating posture should
not sacrifice long-term possibilities for real disarmament in the name of short-term
tactical advantages in the strategic competition.
It can hardly be a source of satisfaction or pride that the ratification of this
Treaty may be in doubt or that an arms control agreement can only be purchased in
130
conjunction with substantially increased expenditures for other arms. There is a
prevalent belief in this country that our national security can only be preserved by
the djTiamic of technlological development and investment in new and ever more
destructive weapon systems. One reads that the decision to deploy the MX missile is
a response to such perceptions but perhaps still not sufficient to reconcile opponents
of the Treaty.
We have already referred to the opportunities which the Treaty affords for
further escalation of nuclear weaponry by both sides. It has been argued during
these hearings that ratification of the Treaty should be linked to a new and massive
program for expanding and improving U.S. strategic nuclear as well as conventional
forces. If the (Congress accepts this advice, the hope which I referred to earlier for a
reversal of the nuclear arms race will grow even dimmer.
Many of us remember being told by the then Secretary of Defense McNamara in
the late sixties that U.S. security depended on U.S. strategic forces being main-
tained at a level 2 or 3 times greater than that of the U.S.S.R. in terms of
deliverable warheads. The United States now has 9,200 strategic nuclear weapons
(re-entry vehicles and aerial bombs) compared to 5,000 for the U.S.S.R.; yet we are
told we are no longer superior, in fact are facing strategic inferiority, and must
exert ourselves to maintain or recover "equivalence". Where McNamara once was
confident that neither side would be able to acquire a first-strike capability, we are
now told that the U.S.S.R. is acquiring a first-strike capability and that the United
States must hasten to do likewise. Witness after witness have told this Committee
that SALT II is acceptable precisely because it does not prevent the United States
from meeting this challenge. Strategic "equivalence" is the new name for the
nuclear arms race!
At the time of SALT I Dr. Kissinger was quoted as asking, "what good is strategic
superiority at these levels of numbers?". Are we not justified in asking today, is
strategic equivalence an absolute necessity? Is this doctrine not an infallible recipe
for continuing the strategic arms race? Are we not moving inexorably toward a
situation in which each side has a first-strike capability, a posture and a policy, not
of deterrence by mutual-assured destruction, but of readiness for and reliance on
the capability for fighting a nuclear war?
We, the Catholic Bishops, find ourselves under the obligation of questioning
fundamentally the logic of the pattern of events implied by determined pursuit of
strategic equivalence. Our purp)ose in coming before this distinguished Committee is
to speak on moral-religious grounds in support of arms control designed to be a step
toward real measures of disarmament. It would radically distort our intention and
purpose if our support of SALT II were in any way coupled with plans for new
military expenditures. The Treaty should be approved as an arms control measure,
not a maneuver to increase the strategic budget.
These proposed new strategic systems will require a massive outlay of funds at a
time of increasing fiscal stringency. The Constitution of the United States calls
upon the executive and legislative branches of our government not only to provide
for the common defense but also to establish justice, to promote the general welfare
of the nation and to secure the blessings of liberty for ourselves and our posterity.
Estimates for the M-X missile run from $30 billion upwards over the next decade;
with the existing national debt at $805 billion and pressure being exerted on
legislative bodies at all levels to reduce expenditures, the investment of $30 billion
in one weapons system inevitably will result in new limits on spending for essential
human services here and abroad.
This topic of the competition of arms for scarce resources has been an abiding
concern for me. Speaking at the Synod of Bishops in 1971 I argued then, and still
believe now, that: "The armaments race violates the rights of the world's poor in a
way that is fruitless and intolerable. The reason is that it is not the way to protect
human life or foster peace, but on the contrary the causes of war are thereby
aggravated little by little".
It is our recommendation that systems like the MX, as well as Trident II, should
be considered as negotiable in return for equivalent concessions by the U.S.S.R. in
SALT III. We have been told that the aim of SALT III will be "deep cuts" in the
strategic arsenals of both superpowers; we fervently hope this will be true. As we
consider the future of U.S. defense policy, including the deployment of the M-X, it
might be well to review one dimension of the SALT I negotiations. At that time, the
possibility existed of excluding the deployment of MIRVs; we did not take that
option. Now we find that one of the major objections of those opposing SALT II is
the threat posed by the Soviets to our land-based ICBM's. The Soviet MIRV capabili-
ty is a central element of the threat to our ICBM's, a threat which we might have
obviated by a different negotiating posture in SALT I. Our hope is that we will
carefully consider the M-X, and related decisions in the light of their impact on the
131
negotiating process of SALT III. Perhaps the most important single strategic arms
control step would be the elimination of MIRV's from the respective ICBM forces.
Unrealistic as it may seem to hardheaded defense planners, the question should be
raised now whether the United States could try immediately to negotiate a lower
MIRV level for ICBM's.
IV. SUMMARY
The foregoing testimony may be summarized in the following propositions:
1. Catholics reject means of waging or even deterring war which could result in
destruction beyond control and possibly a final holocaust of humanity.
2. In particular, strategic nuclear weapons of massive destructiveness and poison-
ous regional or global aftereffects must never be used.
3. Consequently, the reduction, through negotiated agreements, and eventually
the elimination of such weapons, must be the overriding aim of policy. Without it,
there can be only one alternative: the indefinite continuation and escalation of the
strategic competition. The doctrine of strategic equality, by itself, does not insure
against such competition; rather it almost guarantees it. Some risks must be taken
in the direction of control, both to avoid nuclear war and to rescue us from the
moral dilemma of nuclear deterrence.
4. SALT II, the result of seven years of negotiation, represents a limited but
acceptable agreement which constrains the nuclear forces of both the United States
and the U.S.S.R., does not jeopardize U.S. security, and can be the beginning of a
continuing and necessary process for obtaining meaningful and progressive reduc-
tions. The Treaty should be ratified by the Senate.
5. This process must not be sacrificed to a narrow and technologically oriented
insistence upon exploitation of new nuclear options, including counterforce options.
In particular, final decisions regarding deployment of the M-X and Trident II
should be deferred until the utility of those options for negotiation in SALT III can
be explored.
6. Failure by the United States to take full advantage of the possibilities for
further restraints and reductions will eventually rob U.S. foreign and defense policy
of moral legitimacy.
Mr. Chairman, the attention of the whole world has been captured by the new
Pope, John Paul II. He has already taken note of the significance of the SALT II
Treaty for World peace. The Pope's remarks came in his weekly Sunday talk before
leading the noon Angelus in St. Peter's Square. The SALT accord, he said, "is not
yet a reduction of weaponry or, as could be hoped, a provision for disarmament. But
that does not mean that the foreseen measures are not a sign, which we ought to
greet with pleasure, of the desire to pursue a dialogue, without which every hope of
working effectively for peace could vanish."
"Believers and men of goodwill who feel themselves so impelled by conscience to
pledge themselves as 'artisans of peace' cannot ignore the importance of anything
that favors a climate of alleviating tensions. This helps to encourage other indis-
pensable progress on the road to limitation and reduction of armaments".
The Pope asked for prayers "to bring progress to the great cause of la3dng down
weapons and pursuing honest, stable and effective agreements" of peace and con-
cord. It is with such sentiments that the U.S. Catholic Conference submits this
testimony to the Foreign Relations Committee.
Senator Muskie. Our next witness is Claire Randall, General
Secretary of the National Council of Churches.
STATEMENT OF DR. CLAIRE RANDALL, GENERAL SECRETARY,
NATIONAL COUNCIL OF CHURCHES, ACCOMPANIED BY
ALLEN GUYERi
Dr. Randall. Mr. Chairperson, I am Claire Randall, the general
secretary of the National Council of Churches. I am accompanied
by Dr. Allen Guyer who is one of a very large number of persons
within the churches' ranks who have given serious and careful
thought to these issues and who are the ones who advise and guide
and help boards and agencies and executives as we try to deal with
these complex issues. Therefore we work not only from our moral
' See page 136 for Dr. Randall's prepared statement.
132
understandings but from some of the technical aid that we do
receive.
I would like also to say just briefly that 22 church bodies have
made statements, copies of which will be coming to all Senators
shortly, in support of SALT II, which we think is a very important
matter, and 27 such churches and others have come together in a
coalition, the Religious Committee on SALT II, which is working at
this very hard and is reaching out across the country in education
and information ways.
So it is that we are, as churches, working on this issue.
I might also just interject here as my friend Coretta King inter-
jected some other pieces that perhaps have not been presented
here, that there are many women in this country who not only as
mothers but in other ways are deeply concerned about the issues
that are before us in the SALT II discussion. And certainly the
churches feel that this is a life and death issue, and therefore it is
a theological and moral issue, as has been pointed out.
I would like to share briefly with you some of what the Council
of Churches would have me say in this case, and also to point out
that we are made up of 32 denominations in this country, which
includes the six large black Baptist and Methodist churches and
the eight or so orthodox churches, not just the mainstream Protes-
tant churches, which I think is important to know.
And the National Council of Churches has, since its formation 30
years ago, given leadership among the Protestant and Orthodox
churches to the struggle for peace and justice. The council came
into existence shortly after the world had witnessed the devastat-
ing effects of nuclear weapons, and its leadership and the members
of the churches ever since have been keenly aware of the danger to
all humanity posed by the threat of nuclear war, and in a sense,
the line that we have gone across as we have entered into a
nuclear age.
In the Old Testament, we are told to beat our swords into plow-
shares. In the New Testament we are asked not to return evil for
evil but to love our neighbors. These biblical injunctions, because
we believe these principles expressed in action, create the climate
which leads to just, peaceful relations between peoples and nations.
These biblical injunctions must be listened to in our opinion.
At its meeting in May of this year, the governing board of the
National Council of Churches voted unanimously, and I might say
enthusiastically, in favor of the ratification of the Strategic Arms
Limitation Treaty. It is my purpose in this testimony to set forth
some of the reasons the National Council supports ratification. We
have based our testimony on the short phrases that are a part of
the introduction to the SALT II Treaty. I will not read those
phrases but simply comment at this point on them.
The United States already has in its nuclear arsenal, as you well
know, enough nuclear weapons to kill every man, woman, and
child in the world, not once, but several times. And once is too
much, and more is impossible, and thus an absurd idea. And even
limited use of this power would visit devastation on future genera-
tions as well as the present due to radiological contamination. The
devastation of every major Soviet city by U.S. nuclear weapons
might achieve what defense planners call a strategic objective. But
133
the winds that sweep round the globe would bring deadly radiation
to the United States even if no Soviet bombs explode in the United
States. And so there are devastating consequences for humankind.
In SALT II, the United States and the U.S.S.R. are mutually
agreeing to limit strategic offensive arms. Our country and the
Soviet Union have opposing ideological, political and economic sys-
tems, but unless all humanity is to be endangered, these two major
powers must find ways to improve relations. The treaty provisions
which limit arms are of vital significance, but we must not under-
estimate the symbolic importance of the two superpowers' ability
to reduce tension and danger by mutual agreement without resort
to war. The ratification of the treaty by these two nations with
such opposing views would give evidence to all the world that
differences between nations can be dealt with by peaceful means.
While the treaty is a symbol of mutual trust, it does not depend
for its success on mutual trust, and there have been those who
testified to help us come to that conclusion.
In 1968, under pressure from the United States and the Soviet
Union, many nations renounced nuclear weapons for themselves
and joined the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Article VI contains a
promise made by the superpowers to make progress in reducing
and eliminating their nuclear arsenals and to move quickly toward
completion of a ban on all nuclear testing.
In affirming a statement that was drawn up by leaders of the
National Council of Churches and representative leaders of Soviet
churches this spring, the governing board of the National Council
expressed profound concern about the danger of a precarious bal-
ancing of humanity on the brink of a nuclear catastrophe. We
know that still more terrible weapons are being developed which
can only lead to far greater fear and suspicion, and thus to a still
more feverish arms race. Against this we say with one voice: No. In
the name of God, no.
Neither the United States nor the Soviet Union is ready to
accept a treaty which gives the other nation strategic offensive
superiority. The United States and the U.S.S.R. weapons systems
are not identical. Therefore, an element of judgment is involved in
determining parity. After long, careful negotiations, agreement has
been reached which most American military and intelligence lead-
ers have testified provides equality and equal security. We have
indicated some of those facts which we believe lead us to agree that
this is something which we can believe.
Without an agreement setting limits on the arms race there can
be no strategic stability. Each side will inevitably make huge in-
vestments to achieve what is perceived as superiority. The fear
that the other nation is achieving strategic superiority has fueled
the arms race already between the United States and the U.S.S.R.
SALT II does not reduce U.S. arms. It only sets a ceiling. With-
out such a mutually agreed upon ceiling, both countries would be
tempted to an arms race which would use scarce resources, divert
scientific research from avenues designed to benefit all human
kind, and in fact endanger rather than enhance the security of the
United States. Our Nation's security does not depend solely on its
military might. It depends as much on our economic stability and
134
fairness, our technical competence, and the faith of the people that
our Government is truly benefiting all its citizens.
The nations of the world, in 1978, spent more than a billion
dollars a day on armaments. We are informed that the World
Health Organization required a mere $83 million to eradicate
smallpox from this Earth. The United States now has an unaccept-
able rate of inflation, millions of its citizens are unemployed, and
perhaps more will be, almost 20 percent of the population is illiter-
ate. The true strength of a nation is the strength of its people. The
only rewards of an arms race with no limitations are widespread
moral devastation, cynicism, hopelessness, and possibly even the
end of civilization.
So surely limiting the arms race meets the interests of both
parties.
While pressing for the earliest possible approval of the SALT
accords, the National Council of Churches governing board af-
firmed that while we understand that SALT II does not provide for
more substantial arms reduction, it does provide a new and essen-
tial framework of parity for negotiating substantial and equal re-
ductions in SALT III, and further steps in the direction of general
and complete disarmament. It promises a new opportunity to con-
solidate institutions for halting the spread of nuclear weapons. The
success of SALT II would open the way to decisive progress on
other critical disarmament issues. It would enable our two govern-
ments, speaking of the U.S.S.R. and the United States, to share
more fully in the constructive works of peace in economic, techni-
cal, and cultural affairs. It would help to promote a new climate of
international relations in general.
Limiting the arms race by ratifying SALT II is an important
step, but it is only one step among many that must be taken. SALT
II limits the arms race. It does not reduce it. SALT II does not deal
with the vital matter of nuclear nonproliferation. It does not ban
chemical or radiological arms, but by limiting strategic arms, the
National Council believes SALT II helps to establish a climate in
which work in these vital areas can proceed.
The joint statement on subsequent negotiations, which is at-
tached to SALT II, established the framework for negotiating fur-
ther limitations and reduction in the numbers of strategic arms
and so on. Thus, the ratification of SALT II not only limits the
current strategic arms race but helps make possible negotiations
looking forward to an actual arms reduction.
And so the statement that the governing board of the National
Council affirmed expressed profound anxiety for the future of our
own and all peoples. It was encouraged by certain things that had
been taking place showing that the peoples of the world are calling
for disarmament.
Ratification of SALT II is not full disarmament or the establish-
ment of peace. But we believe it promises a new opportunity to
consolidate institutions for halting the spread of nuclear weapons,
opens the way to decisive progress on other critical disarmament
issues, and enables the governments of the United States and the
U.S.S.R. to share more fully in the constructive works of peace in
economic, technical and cultural affairs. Therefore, we urge ratifi-
cation of SALT II.
135
May I say that actions by this U.S. Senate can and do affect the
well being of all the world's peoples. We urge you to remember
that as you deal with this critical treaty I am sure you do, but we
would emphasize that for you.
And may I be bold enough to close with a challenge to you from
the book of Deuteronomy:
"I have set before you life and death, blessing and curse, said the
Lord. Therefore choose life, that you and your descendants may
live." This is the strongest feeling that we in the churches I think
have. It is embodied in that biblical quotation.
Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Dr. Randall, for an excel-
lent statement, I must say.
NATIONAL COUNCIL OF CHURCHES SPREADING WORD OF SALT
SUPPORT
I wonder what the National Council of Churches is doing to
spread the word. You clearly feel very strongly about the treaty
and the need for the Senate to ratify the treaty. But the Senate,
being a representative body, is influenced by the people who live in
each of the 50 States, and what is the National Council of Churches
of Christ doing to spread this message?
Dr. Randall. There are several things that we are doing. We
have staff and committees that work on these matters in trying to
get the materials and the educational information prepared. We
had this consultation in the spring for three days with church
leaders from the U.S.S.R. in which we were miraculously, I think,
able to make a statement together calling for this kind of under-
standing of the life and death matters that we are dealing with.
This statement has been widely used and is being widely dissemi-
nated, and I think has a strong religious appeal because of its very
basic religious tone.
In addition, I mentioned before you came back in that there are
22 church bodies that have made statements in support of SALT II,
copies of which are being sent to Senators.
We also are part of the coalition, the Religious Committee on
SALT II, which is one way we are attempting to consolidate our
efforts of education and information being sent out. And I have
been informed of the fact that this material and this kind of
education is beginning to spread around, and the interesting thing
is that when such education is made available to people, and the
opportunity to think along these lines, that there is a very real
appreciation and understanding and support for this direction, an
understanding of its limitations, but also of its necessity.
The Chairman. Well, I would expect so, but I am keenly aware
of the money that is being raised and the rather frenetic effort on
the part of certain organizations opposed to the treaty to saturate
the country with arguments and frightening charges with respect
to what the treaty would do. I don't think that advocates of the
treaty have done as much to try and get their message out.
The message you bring to us today is a splendid one, as I have
said, but I would urge you to do everything in your power to reach
your own membership with it.
136
Dr. Randall. We are urging, and have been urging the churches,
the individual churches to work through the many channels that
they have on this.
We are quite aware of the problem which you have expressed,
and we find that a difficult problem to deal with also since, as we
all know, the kinds of monetary resources which such groups have
are not available to the mainstream of the church in the same way.
But we have analyzed and are analyzing that situation, trying to
find those ways in which we can respond, go around or counterbal-
ance that very problem, and we shall continue to do more.
The Chairman. Thank you very much for your testimony.
Dr. Randall. Thank you.
[Dr. Claire Randall's prepared statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Dr. Claire Randaul
My name is Claire Randall. I am general Secretary of the National Council of the
Churches of Christ in the U.S.A.
The National Council of Churches of Christ in the U.S.A. is a cooperative agency
of thirty-two Protestant and Orthodox bodies in this country. I do not purport to
speak for all members of the communions which are constituent to the National
Council of Churches. I am speaking for the Governing Board, the policymaking body
which is composed of persons selected by member denominations in proportion to
their size. It is this group which determines the policy positions through which the
Council seeks to fulfill its expressed purpose "to study, and to speak and to act on
conditions and issues in the nation and the world which involve moral, ethical and
spiritual principles inherent in the Christian gospel."
The National Council of the Churches of Christ in the U.S.A. has since its
formation 30 years ago given leadership in the Protestant and Orthodox churches to
the struggle for peace and justice. The Council came into existence shortly after the
world had witnessed the devastating effects of nuclear weapons, and its leadership
and the members of the churches ever since have been keenly aware of the danger
to all humanity posed by the threat of nuclear war.
In the Old Testament we are told to beat our swords into plowshares. In the New
Testament we are asked not to return evil for evil but to love our neighbors as
ourselves — and, in fact, to love our enemies. We seek peace, but only because of
these biblical injunctions, but because we believe these principles expressed in
action create the climate which leads to just, peaceful relations between peoples and
nations.
At its meeting in May, 1979, the Governing Board of the National Council of
Churches voted unanimously in favor of the ratification of the Strategic Arms
Limitation Treaty. It is my purpose in this testimony to set forth some of the
reasons the National Council of Churches supports ratification. My remarks will be
related to the purpose of the Treaty as stated in its introduction: "Conscious that
nuclear war would have devastating consequences for all mankind (Preamble, SALT
II Treaty, 1979), * * *."
The United States already has in its nuclear arsenal enough nuclear weapons to
kill every man, woman and child in the world, not once, but several times. Once is
too much. And even limited use of this power would visit devastation on future
generations as well as the present due to radiological contamination. The devasta-
tion of every major Soviet city by U.S. nuclear weapons might achieve what defense
planners call a strategic objective. But the winds that sweep 'round the globe would
bring deadly radiation to the U.S.A. even if no Soviet bombs explode in the U.S.A.
Such "devastating consequences for all mankind" must be prevented.
Convinced that the additional measures limiting strategic offensive arms provided
for in this treaty will contribute to the improvement of relations between Parties,
help to reduce the risk of outbreak of nuclear war and strengthen internationally
peace and security (Preamble), * * *.
In SALT II the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. are mutually agreeing to limit strategic
offensive arms. Our country and the Soviet Union have opposing ideological, politi-
cal, and economic systems, but unless all humanity is to be endangered these two
major powers must find ways to improve relations. The Treaty provisions which
limit arms are of vital significance. But we must not underestimate the s5mibolic
importance of the two "super powers' " ability to reduce tension and danger by
mutual agreement— without resort to war. The ratification of the Treaty by two
137
nations with such opposing views give evidence to all the world that differences
between nations can be dealt with by peaceful means.
While the Treaty is a symbol of mutual trust it does not depend for its success on
mutual trust. Article XV provides for verification of compliance. The chief military
and intelligence officers of our nation have said the United States is capable of
verifying Soviet compliance. We believe the Treaty does, in fact, "help to reduce the
risk of outbreak of nuclear war and strengthen international peace and security."
Mindful of their obligations under Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Prolifera-
tion of Nuclear Weapons (Preamble), * * *
In 1968 under pressure from the United States and the Soviet Union many
nations renounced nuclear weapons for themselves and joined the Non-Proliferation
Treaty. Article VI contains a promise made by the super powers to make progress
in reducing and eliminating their nuclear arsenals and to move quickly toward
completion of a ban on all nuclear testing.
The Governing Board of the National Ck)uncil of Churches, in May, 1979, ex-
pressed profound concern about the danger of a precarious balancing of humanity
on the brink of nuclear catastrophe. We know that still more terrible weapons are
being developed which can only lead to greater fear and suspicion and thus to a still
more feverish arms race. Against this we say with one voice — No! In the name of
God— No!
Guided by the principle of equality and equal security (Preamble), * * *
Neither the United States nor the Soviet Union is ready to accept a treaty which
gives the other nation strategic offensive superiority. The U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R.
weapons systems are not identical. Therefore, an element of judgment is involved in
determining parity. After long, careful negotiations, agreement has been reached
which most American military and intelligence leaders have testified provides
"equality and equal security." We note the United States now has almost twice as
many deliverable strategic nuclear warheads as the Soviet Union. The U.S.S.R. has
1,400 land based missiles versus 1,054 in the U.S.A. and 950 submarine launched
ballistic missiles to 656 in the U.S.A. Both nations in the Treaty have agreed to an
overall ceiling of 2,250 nuclear delivery vehicles by 1985, with equally important
sub-limits in various categories (U.S. Department of State, 1978). The agreed upon
verifiable limits, we believe, do provide "equality and equal security."
Recognizing that the strengthening of strategic stability meets the interests of the
Parties and the interests of international security (Preamble), * * ♦
Without an agreement setting limits on the arms race there can be no strategic
stability. Each side will inevitably make huge investments to achieve what is
perceived as superiority. The fear that the other nation is achieving strategic
superiority has fueled the arms race between the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R.
SALT II does not reduce U.S. arms. It only sets a ceiling. Without such a
mutually agreed upon ceiling both countries would be tempted to an arms race
which would use scarce resources, divert scientific research from avenues designed
to benefit all human kind and, in fact, endanger rather than enhance the security
of the United States. Our nation's security does not depend solely on its military
might. It depends as much on our economic stability and fairness, our technological
competence, and the faith of the people that our government is truly benefiting all
its citizens.
The nations of the world, in 1978, spent more than a billion dollars per day— 400
billion per year— on armaments. We are informed that the World Health Organiza-
tion required a mere 83 million dollars to eradicate smallpox from the face of the
earth. The United States now has an unacceptable rate of inflation, millions of its
citizens unemployed, almost 20 percent of the population illiterate. The true
strength of a nation is the strength of its people. The only rewards of an arms race
with no limitations are widespread moral devastation, cjTiicism, hopelessness, and
possibly even the end of civilization.
Surely limiting the arms race "meets the interests of the Parties and the interests
of international security."
Reaffirming their desire to take measures for the further limitation and for the
further reduction of strategic arms, having in mind the goal of achieving general
and complete disarmament (Preamble), * * *
While pressing for "the earliest possible approval of the SALT II accords," the
National Council of Churches Governing Board affirmed: "While we understand
that SALT II does not provide for more substantial arms reduction, it does provide a
new and essential framework (of parity) for negotiating substantial and equal reduc-
tions in SALT III, and further steps in the direction of general and complete
disarmament. It promises a new opportunity to consolidate institutions for halting
the spread of nuclear weapons. The success of SALT II would open the way to
decisive progress on other critical disarmament issues. It would enable our two
138
governments to share more fully in the constructive works of peace in economic,
technical and cultural affairs. It would help to promote a new climate of interna-
tional relations in general."
Declaring their intention to undertake in the near future negotiations further to
limit and further to reduce strategic offensive arms (Preamble), * * *.
Limiting the arms race by ratifying SALT II is an important step, but it is only
one step among many that must be taken. SALT II limits the arms race. It does not
reduce it. SALT II does not deal with the vital matter of nuclear nonproliferation. It
does not ban chemical or radiological arms. But by limiting strategic arms the NCC
believes SALT II helps to establish a climate in which work in these vital areas can
The joint statement of Principles and Basic Guidelines for Subsequent Negotia-
tions on the Limitation of Strategic Arms which is attached to SALT II establishes
the framework for negotiating "further limitation and reduction in the numbers of
strategic arms, as well as for their further qualitative limitations." Thus the ratifi-
cation of SALT II not only limits the current strategic arms race but helps make
possible negotiations looking forward to an actual arms reduction.
The NCC Governing Board's May 1979 statement expressed "profound anxiety for
the future of our own and all peoples." It was encouraged by the unprecedented
range of disarmament negotiations; by the strengthening of the more significant
measures taken by the United Nations for disarmament; by the renewed vitality of
nongovernmental organizations in the disarmament field; and by the indications
that the peoples of the world are calling for disarmament.
Ratification of SALT II is not full disarmament or the establishment of peace. But
we believe it promises a new opportunity to consolidate institutions for halting the
spread of nuclear weapons, opens the way to decisive progress on other critical
disarmament issues, and enables the governments of the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. to
share more fully in the constructive works of peace in economic, technical and
cultural affairs. Therefore, we urge ratification of SALT II.
Actions by this United States Senate can and do affect the well being of all the
world's peoples. We urge you to remember that as you deal with this critical Treatjs^.
Therefore, may I close with a challenge to you from the book of Deuteronomy: 'I
have set before you life and death, blessing and curse. Therefore choose life, that
you and your descendants may live" (Deuteronomy 30:19).
NOTES
Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on
the Limitation Df Strategic Offensive Arms, Vienna, Austria, June 18, 1979.
U.S. Department of State. SALT and American Security, November 1978.
Preamble to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union
OF Soviet Sociaust Repubucs on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms
Vienna, Austria, June 18, 1979
The United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, herein-
after referred to as the Parties,
Conscious that nuclear war would have devastating consequences for all mankind,
Proceeding from the Basic Principles of Relations Between the United States of
America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics of May 29, 1972,
Attaching particular significance to the limitation of strategic arms and deter-
mined to continue their efforts begun with the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-
Ballistic Missile Systems and the Interim Agreement on Certain Measures with
Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, of May 26, 1972,
Convinced that the additional measures limiting strategic offensive arms provided
for in this Treaty will contribute to the improvement of relations between the
Parties, help to reduce the risk of outbreak of nuclear war and strenghten interna-
tional peace and security. . , ^ , XT T> 1 x-
Mindful of their obligations under Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Prolitera-
tion of Nuclear Weapons,
Guided by the prinicple of equality and equal security.
Recognizing that the strengthening of strategic stability meets the interests of the
Parties and the interests of international security.
Reaffirming their desire to take measures for the further limitation and for the
further reduction of strategic arms, having in mind the goal of achieving general
and complete disarmament, r „lu i.
Declaring their intention to undertake in the near future negotiations further to
limit and further to reduce strategic offensive arms.
139
The Chairman. Our last witness this afternoon is Albert Vor-
span, who represents the Union of American Hebrew Congrega-
tions here in Washington.
Mr. Vorspan, it is a pleasure to welcome you to the committee
this afternoon. I am sorry that you have had to wait so long. It is
now a little after 5 o'clock, so please proceed with your testimony.
STATEMENT OF ALBERT VORSPAN, VICE PRESIDENT, UNION
OF AMERICAN HEBREW CONGREGATIONS,' ACCOMPANIED BY
RABBI DAVID SAPERSTEIN, DIRECTOR, RELIGIOUS ACTION
CENTER OF REFORM JUDAISM, AND COCHAIR, RELIGIOUS
COMMITTEE ON SALT
Mr. Vorspan. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and despite
the lateness of the hour, I do want to thank you and the committee
for this opportunity. I am really grateful for this opportunity be-
cause I think what happened here this afternoon — I am grateful
that I had to sit through it, too — what I think happened this
afternoon is something which, to me, is indispensible to the SALT
debate — that this debate has been placed in a moral framework.
The issue of what is right, the issue of the future of the human
race has been voiced and echoed this afternoon not only from the
profound testimony of Roman Catholic and Protestant religious
leaders, but if I may say so, from that side of the podium as well.
And if I can say, I think we have all failed to some extent in
posing the issue in terms of these very fundamental dimensions. I
think most Americans, while they in general support the idea of
SALT, are intoxicated with and mystified by what they read about
this debate and these issues. And the reason I believe that the
discussion this afternoon was very important is that in my under-
standing of what SALT signifies, the testimony of the Cardinal, the
testimony of the distinguished Protestant leader, the testimony of
rabbis and other religious leaders are as relevant to the deepest
issues involved here as the testimony of a general or an admiral
presently serving or retired, and I am very grateful for the oppor-
tunity to have been part of that.
My name is Albert Vorspan. I am the vice president of the Union
of American Hebrew Congregations. This is the central body of
Reformed Judaism in the United States of America.
In the interest of time, Mr. Chairman, being very conscious of
the weight of discussions here, including many repetitive discus-
sions, I am going to be very brief. I would like the opportunity to
submit a longer, more detailed statement for the record.
The Chairman. Of course.
Mr. Vorspan. But I will only spend a few minutes summarizing
in sharp telescope some of the things that seem to me to be very
important.
The organization that I represent includes 720 Reform syna-
gogues throughout the United States, roughly 1 million members.
Like the distinguished people who sat here earlier today, I do not
pretend for one moment that every member of every one of those
synagogues shares the view adopted by the board of the Union. But
I do say that it was very significant that after a study of an entire
year, with proponents and opponents of the SALT Treaty being
' See page 143 for Mr. Vorspan's prepared statement.
48-260 0-79 Pt.i+ - 10
140
brought before our group, in the end, the decision that was made
was a unanimous decision, I think an enthusiastic decision, and I
think, the onus is on us as it is on every other religious group to
bring that message to our people, to the people in this country, and
to oppose it in terms of the issues of choosing life.
With me today is Rabbi David Saperstein, who is the director of
the Religious Action Center of the Union of American Hebrew
Congregations here in Washington. I want to echo what has been
said, but I will do it very, very briefly. I think many Americans
have been led to believe that the choice faced by the Senate and
the American people is a choice between SALT II and some ideal
treaty. The choice, as I think we have heard it today, is that
however disappointed many of us are that SALT II does not go
nearly far enough, that SALT II is in some measures almost cos-
metic and atmospheric; despite that, what we are talking about is a
SALT II compared to what? And it seems to me that the "com-
pared to what" is the nightmare of chaos which can lead ultimate-
ly, inevitably only to profound tragedy for the human race.
I am one of those who shares the disappointment that this step is
too small, but I am also one of those who believes that this treaty
must be weighed against events happening in an onrushing way
every minute of the day. SALT II cannot be seen in a vacuum
because it seems to me that forces are converging on us, on all the
human beings on this planet which make it absolutely essential
someday, somehow, for the human race to get a handle on this
struggle. And those events include the following: The immense size
of the superpowers' arsenal; the fact that the nuclear club is ex-
pected to increase sevenfold by the year 1990, from 5 to 35 nations;
the massive resort by dozens of countries to nuclear technology as
an energy source following the energy crisis of 1973 and 1974; the
mounting prospects of the utilization by terrorist groups of stolen
fissionable material, or even tactical nuclear weapons; the rising
curves of hostility and violence in regions such as Southeast Asia,
the Korean Peninsula, the Persian Gulf, Southern Africa, and
Latin America, and the potential that these tensions can trigger or
escalate a nuclear conflict; the ongoing conventional and nuclear
arms race, reaching $400 billion in military expenditures this year
alone; the lack of firm or coherent policies of security and disarma-
ment at the highest levels of the Government of the United States
and U.S.S.R.
I share with the distinguished witnesses who sat here earlier
today the belief that mankind faces, as the Senate faces, a penulti-
mate choice, a moment of truth, the kind of choice which God set
out for us in the book of Deuteronomy: "I have set before you this
day the blessing and the curse, life and death, good and evil.
Therefore, choose life in order that you may live."
I speak also as a representative of a Jewish organization and
that Jewish organization has deep concerns about our fellow broth-
ers and sisters in all parts of the country, and one of the aspects of
this debate which resonates within the Jewish community is the
question: Does our support for SALT II relate to our concern for
Soviet Jewry and progress toward peace in the Middle East and
would it be good or bad for those issues? Proponents of linkage
argue that we should refuse to ratify SALT II unless the U.S.S.R.
141
improves its human rights performance and supports progress
toward peace in the Middle East. Deep as is our concern for Jews
in the Soviet Union and other people in the Soviet Union, deep as
is our commitment to peace in the Middle East, we believe that
SALT II must be examined and measured and judged on its own
merits. Our support for SALT II in no way signifies our approval of
Soviet domestic or international policies. The SALT Treaty is of
momentous intrinsic moral and strategic interest. It is deserving of
ratification on its own merits. If the world disappears into a nucle-
ar holocaust, our concerns for human rights and peace become
irrelevant. Human life is the ultimate civil and human right.
In fact, however, SALT II can only help to improve the situation
of Soviet Jewry and other dissidents, and others seeking to emi-
grate. Recently Senator Kennedy put this problem to Andrei Sak-
harov, one of the truly courageous fighters for human rights in the
Soviet Union. Senator Kennedy reported, and I quote.
When I met last year with Andrei Sakharov in Moscow he stressed that the
greatest threat to humanity and human rights is the threat of nuclear war. His plea
to us is to ratify SALT: not only to reduce the threat of nuclear war but also to
create the mutual confidence necessary to resolve the other important issues be-
tween the Soviet Union and the United States. Let the advocates of linkage explain
how the cause of human rights in the Soviet Union will be served by Senate refusal
to ratify SALT.
I firmly believe that it is in the interest of Jews in the Soviet
Union, of persons of all religious faiths, seeking liberalization and
seeking the right to emigrate, if the stability that is involved in
SALT II can be formalized and extended.
I want to conclude, Mr. Chairman, by indicating that I believe
religious organizations in this country and the U.S. Senate share in
one sense a certain responsibility, and that responsibility is what
you, Mr. Chairman, spoke to, I believe with great eloquence, earlier
today.
One of the great moments in my life in dealing with public issues
in the United States was on that day when Protestant, Catholic
and Jewish religious bodies stood together in this Chamber, in this
Senate, to speak for civil rights at a time when that issue was in
danger of becoming embroiled in political considerations only. And
I think SALT is in a similar condition today.
And I want to pledge at least for my small group that we will do
all in our power to raise the moral issue, to educate our people, to
expose them to both sides and to deal with the fundamental reli-
gious and moral message which I believe SALT bears for the
human race. What this Senate can say can be a proclamation
heard throughout the world, a proclamation unlike that made by a
person named Isaiah centuries ago, that the joint benefits for both
sides outweigh even deep differences, that there are ways besides
bloodshed for nations to redress grievances and resolve disputes,
that nations need not be prisoners and hostages of a bitter, unre-
mitting past. We can be the shapers of a better world and a more
hopeful future, that humankind is not inexorably doomed to repeat
the disasters of history. What always was, need not always be.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Mr. Vorspan.
I have been reading from your statement parts that you were
unable to recite in order to save time. I must say that it is an
142
extremely moving and profound statement, and I would want it to
appear in the record in its entirety.
Mr. VoRSPAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. You made an argument that is often overlooked
which is that the most fundamental human right of all is the right
to exist. The development of nuclear weapons has put the right of
existence in jeopardy, the existence of our people, our national
civilization, that of the Soviet Union, and indeed, who knows,
depending upon the scope and ferocity of the nuclear holocaust, a
full scale nuclear exchange, perhaps the survival of the human
race itself. And all other rights, however important they may be to
the condition of life, rest upon that base.
Mr. VoRSPAN. I made that argument not as a unilateral disarma-
ment advocate in any way, but I do believe that there is a kind of a
readiness, a kind of a weariness that prepares people for talking in
terms of 10 million, 20 million, 40 million, 60 million in ways in
which those figures lose all sense of meaning whatsoever. And then
somebody comes along and says well, we have miscalculated, there
is a way to survive this thing. It really is only 35 million. But there
is an obscenity involved in that, and I think it is the weary accept-
ance of the fundamental premise of the way we have been doing
business as a civilization, about which I am talking now. And
therefore I think that the reverence for life, the concern for the
preciousness of life, while it sounds like a cliche and a sermon that
we ask clergymen to come and deliver to us, is really the heart of
the matter that we are talking about.
So I am grateful to you for your question.
The Chairman. I think that the answer must be found in the
mutual recognition of the foolishness and futility of an unre-
strained nuclear arms race, and the need for both the United
States and the Soviet Union as the two so-called superpowers to
not only check the acceleration of nuclear arms, but to begin to
reverse the trend, reduce the danger, and ultimately, if a sufficient-
ly effective inspection and control system can be devised, to elimi-
nate nuclear weapons entirely from the face of the Earth.
When you consider the importance of that goal and how far we
are from it, SALT II becomes a very small step indeed, but it is
something, it moves in the right direction, and it keeps the journey
alive.
Mr. VoRSPAN. The alternative to it, if I may say so, may doom
forever the possibility of the kind of dream and the kind of vision
we have been talking about here.
The Chairman. There is that risk.
No one knows for sure but there is that risk.
Thank you very much for your statement.
Mr. VoRSPAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Senator Javits.
Senator Javits. Thank you.
Thank you very much also, Mr. Vorspan. I join the chairman in
the observations which he has made and I assure you that it is a
matter of deep gratification to me that there is such a parallel
approach between a Jewish representative here as with the Catho-
lic and Protestant representatives. I was not here when the Cardi-
nal testified, but I read his statement and I had a verbatim report
143
of it; there is an extraordinary parallelism. That, I think, is ex-
tremely gratifying. Of course, Dr. Claire Randall who testified for
the Protestant denominations took exactly the same attitude.
So I can only tell you that all of us here on this committee,
whether we are for or against the treaty, have the same motiva-
tion, and I think for Senator Church and myself and many other
members, you can be sure that we know that in this matter we are
trying to do the Lord's work. Therefore, it deserves, more than
diligence, more than skill, more than dedication; it deserves pas-
sion, which I am trying to give it and so is the chairman. I am very
impressed by your testimony and it is extremely useful.
Mr. VoRSPAN. Thank you. Senator.
[Mr. Vorpan's prepared statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Albert Vorspan
Good afternoon. I am Albert Vorspan. With Rabbi David Saperstein, the Director
of the Religous Action Center of Reform Judaism and co-chair of the Religious
Committee on SALT, I am here today to share with you the position on SALT II of
the Union of American Hebrew Congregations which I serve as Vice-President. The
UAHC represents over one million American Reform Jews in 700 congregations
throughout the country. After a year of investigation and discussion, the Board of
Trustees of the Union of American Hebrew Congregations voted unanimously in
favor of ratification of the SALT II Treaty explaining, in part, that "in keeping with
our mandate to 'seek peace and pursue it,' we see in the SALT process the most
realistic chance for checking an insane, wasteful and potentially catastrophic nucle-
ar arms race."
A JEWISH imperative
This is not the first time that members of the Jewish community have testified
publicly on behalf of arms control and disarmament. "They shall beat their swords
into plowshares and their spears into pruning-hooks; nation shall not lift up sword
against nation, neither shall they learn war any more." These words of Isaiah,
echoing down through the centuries have been eloquent testimony of our commit-
ment to disarmament. To ignore those words now is to impreil humankind. Since
Hiroshima the prospect of warfare has been raised to a qualitatively different order
of risk. We have always had warfare — but never the capacity to destroy human life
and to make the world unliveable. Nuclear warfare requires a moral revolution, a
revolution in which human life and peace must take precedence over worshipping
the idols of production, technics, strategic superiorities and the military-industrial-
complex. Because we address the issue of SALT II in this context, we have joined
with 26 other national Catholic, Protestant and Jewish groups in the Religious
Committee on SALT.
We all share a sense of the urgency of the time. Religious values must be given a
chance. If not it may well be too late. Increasing numbers of experts maintain that
nuclear war is likely by the end of this centry. This contention is supported by a
number of political and military factors in the world today including:
1. The immense size of the superpowers arsenal — the equivalent of 3 tons of TNT
for every human being on Earth.
2. A nuclear club that is expected to increase seven-fold by the year 1990, from
five to thirty-five nations.
3. The massive resort by dozens of countries to nuclear technology as an energy
source following the energy crisis of 1973-74.
4. The faltering prospects for a strong and stable non-proliferation agreement to
prevent the spread of nuclear weapons to additional countries.
5. The mounting prospects of the utilization by terrorist groups of stolen fission-
able materials or tactical nuclear weapons.
6. The rising curves of hostility and violence in regions such as Southeast Asia,
the Korean Peninsula, the Persian Gulf, Southern Africa and Latin America, and
the potential that the tensions in these areas can trigger or escalate to a nuclear
conflict.
7. The on-going conventional and nuclear arms race, reaching $400 billion in
military expenditures this year.
8. The fragility of United States-U.S.S.R. detente.
144
9. The commitment on both sides to a quahtative build-up of increasingly sophisti-
cated strategic weapons which go beyond the reach of verification and threaten to
destabilize arms control negotiations, and
10. The lack of firm or coherent policies of security and disarmament at the
highest levels of the governments of the United States and U.S.S.R.
Thus today, we are faced in fact with precisely the choice God set out for us in
The Book or Deuteronomy, "I have set before you this day, the blessing and the
curse, life and death, good and evil; therefore choose life in order that you may
live."
Through the millennia, the Jewish tradition heis psiinfully developed a set of
values limiting war which must serve as our guide in evaluating this treaty;
1. The use of force is permissible for self-defense. Thus SALT II must be evaluated
in terms of legitimate U.S. security needs.
2. The goal of humankind is shalom. Shalom is more than the cessation of war. It
is the opportunity for national and personal fulfillment and completeness.
3. Any use of force must guarantee absolute protection of non-combat and civilian
populations.
4. Any use of force must be guided by a concept of proportionality which insists
that no more damage should be inflicted than is necessary to pursue the limited
goal of defense.
The dilemma of our age is that the values and positions described above are now
faced with a stark reality of new and incomparable proportions — weapons of mass
destructions which threaten to erase distinctions between offense and defense;
which if used would be a massive violation of the protection of noncombatants and
proportionality; which would eliminate the possibility of shalom-indeed, threatens
the very possibility of all of God's creation. Since any use of nuclear weapons
threatens these values, the goal of the American people must be first, the limita-
tion; then, the reduction; and finally, as President Carter pledged in his inaugural
address, the elimination of all nuclear weapons. Thus, SALT must be regarded as a
process which transcends SALT II and in which lies our ultimate security.
THE QUESTION FOR THE SENATE: ARE WE MORE SECURE WITH SALT II OR WITHOUT
SALT II
Will we be further along the path to achieving the values discussed above with
SALT II or without SALT II? After careful and lengthy evaluation, the UAHC
concluded that in every way we will be more secure when this treaty is ratified.
If SALT II should be rejected by the Senate it will be a serious set-back for the
cause of arms limitation and control. The SALT process provides the best hope for
arms control. It has been accepted by the United States and U.S.S.R. Recently, it
has been accepted by China. It is accepted by the rest of our allies who are members
of the nuclear club. Indeed, the leaders of these and many other countries have
called for the ratification of the treaty. The General Assembly of the United
Nations voted 127-1 in favor of SALT. The likelihood of successful renegotiation
with the U.S.S.R. of any substantive change is very slim. For this reason, the UAHC
would like to see the treaty passed in its present form with no amendments or
actions which would result in the need for renegotiation. A failure to ratify the
treaty would result in a major crisis of confidence among our allies and friends. It
would be a major set-back for detente between the United States and U.S.S.R. Thus
the failure to ratify SALT II would adversely affect American security.
Without SALT II, United States and Soviet military spending will rise even more
rapidly than now planned. Each side will redouble its efforts to achieve illusory
superiority. Dangerous and provocative weaponry will be developed and deployed.
Trends toward "limited" nuclear wars, massive civil defense programs and a garri-
son state mentality will ensue.
The economic costs to the United States and the U.S.S.R. would be enormous.
Between $30 and $100 billion more would be spent on military expenditures, by
1985. Balanced budgets and inflation controls would be sacrificed. The ability of the
United States to increase its security by providing employment and educational
opportunities to its citizens; decent health care and housing; and welfare assistance
which provides a minimally decent living — all these would be sharply undercut. The
result would be the development of an underclass of Americans who are out of jobs
and out of hope — filled with frustration and despair. Intergroup tensions would be
greatly exacerbated. The spirit and soul of America would be drained by its inability
to maintain a fundamentally decent quality of life for its citizens. No country which
erodes its internal strength can long endure — no matter how large its military
budgets and how great its military forces might be.
Without SALT II, we will be hurt strategically, as all of the compromises and
concessions made by the Soviets in the negotiations of this treaty would be lost. In
145
the sometimes mean spirited and hawkish tone of the recent debate over SALT II,
we have constantly emphasized the concessions we made and ignored the conces-
sions which .he Soviets made. Without SALT II:
1. The Soviets will have 3-4,000 missile launchers rather than the 2,250 to which
they have agreed (a reduction of 250 launchers for them).
2. We would have no common data base as opposed to that to which the two
countries agreed under the treaty.
3. The United States and U.S.S.R. would have a number of new land-based
missiles as opposed to the one allowed by the treaty.
4. We would face 20 to 30 warheads on some Soviet missiles as opposed to the
limit of 10 to which they have agreed.
5. There will be no production limits on the Backfire bomber as promised the
United States in an agreement outside the treaty.
6. The Soviets might have thousands more new warheads than they would have
with the treaty.
7. Whatever qualms the United States might have on verification, can any sane
human being believe that we would be more secure and more capable of verifying
what the Soviets did, if they had not accepted our counting rules; if they had not
promised to continue their policy of non-interference with our national technical
means; if they had not restricted their encryption of missile tests?
In the abysmal ignorance which our inability to monitor the Soviets would create,
the military hardliners in both countries would be strengthened. An atmosphere of
intense fear and mistrust would blanket the world. Efforts to negotiate further
reductions through SALT III or any other arms control agreement would be severe-
ly restricted. Successful negotiations on a comprehensive test ban treaty would be
unimaginable. Negotiations aimed at checking proliferation of nuclear and conven-
tional weapons would likely break down.
Despite the accusations of some SALT critics, the U.S. negotiators struck a fair
bargain in SALT II. They did not undermine our security. The Soviets agreed not to
limit our forward-based missiles. They accepted no limitation on air-launched mis-
sile range. They gave up their demand for a non-transfer clause. They gave up their
demand for a limit on ground-launched or sea-launched cruise missile testing. They
permitted an average 28 cruise missiles per bomber. They accepted limitations on
the upgrading of the Backfire bomber. They accepted our definition of what consti-
tuted a "new ' missile. While, of course, as critics of SALT pointed out, the United
States has made numerous concessions to the Soviets — compromise is the essence of
a successful agreement. Our negotiators have successfully embodied the notion of
nuclear parity in SALT II. This offers a real hope for reduction in the future.
THE SALT DEBATE — SO FAR
Indeed, the debate so far seems to have ignored the basic reality that the SALT II
Treaty has balanced the needs of two fundamentally different and asymetrical
military forces. The rhetoric of the debate has implied that for each compromise the
United States made, the U.S.S.R. must have made a similar one. Such a provision
by provision comparison is not grounded in reality. We must rather measure the
total effect of the treaty. It is the position of the UAHC that when this standard is
applied, the two superpowers have reached an accord which limits arms growth in a
way which protects our security and the security of the U.S.S.R.
The debate has been particularly distressing in two other ways. First, the debate
has lost sight of the goal of arms reduction and elimination. Instead, SALT II has
been used as a political football by those who would seek greater growth of the U.S.
nuclear arsenal; a higher military budget or would seek to end the SALT process
altogether. Senators who only a few months earlier had voted reductions in military
spending now demand, in banner headlines, a sharp rise in the military budget. If
SALT II is a bad treaty then no amount of spending will make it a good one.
More importantly, new weapons systems and increased military spending ought to
be decided on their own merits. For Senators today to lock the country into new
systems, new weapons and higher budgets for years to come after a couple of
months of debate on the SALT Treaty, does not appear to be the most responsible
way of dealing with the real security and defense needs of our country. The series of
extravagent pay-offs which marked SALT I should not be permitted to plague SALT •
II. We must be most careful to avoid the technological trade-offs of SALT I. Because
we led in certain types of technology in the early seventies — MIRV technology,
cruise missiles and large submarines — we exempted limitations on such arms. As a
result, the Soviets felt compelled to undertake a major "catch-up" program. Today,
the Soviets now are MIRVing their missiles. The result is that our land-based
ICBM's may soon be theoretically vulnerable to destruction on the ground. Today,
because we lead in mobile missile technology, we seek to set time limits on the
146
controls of mobile missile deployment and thus risk escalating the arms race into a
new and dangerous stage. We will soon introduce the unverifiable, destabilizing
cruise missUes into the strategic picture. The decisions on the M-X missile and any
other new system ought to be carefully evaluated on their own merits with a full
public debate after the SALT Treaty has been ratified.
Perhaps even more threatening in the debate has been the virtually unchallenged
contentions of those who would provide the United States with the capacity to fight
a "limited" nuclear war. This "counterforce" theory has increased its attraction as
the Soviets develop the capacity to target U.S. land based missile silos. The ability
to destroy accurately military nuclear targets raises the theoretical spectre of a
nuclear war which would inflict "acceptable" damage to industri£il and human
targets. Various basing modes of the proposed mobile missiles seriously raise the
spectre of a counterforce capacity.
Increasingly, the rhetoric of counterforce theory has been infused into the SALT
n debate. While counterforce theory presumes solutions to strategic and technologi-
cal problems which may be unsoluble in this century, as a religious presence in this
country we are more concerned about the devastating moral implications of this
theory. The counterforce theory creates the dilemma that by seeking to give either
country various limited strategic options, it makes the use of nuclear weapons more
thinkable. Because the effects of the use of limited nuclear strikes appear to be
selective, discriminate and controllable, strategic planning and analysis would
accept them as real options. If counterforce becomes a part of the strategic relation-
ship, the likelihood of nuclear war would greatly increase.
Given the present state of the arms race, both technologically and politically, it
seems more prudent to accept only those weapons and strategic doctrines that seek
to prevent any use of nuclear weapons; that renders them "unthinkable" in political
£md moral terms. Only from this position is it possible to begin reduction of strate-
gic arms in a reasonable, balanced and prudent manner, bring them more surely
under control; and decrease their significance and legitimacy in world affairs. This
is the theory of SALT, and SALT II is essential to its process. We believe that the
whole issue of counterforce theory deserves far more analysis and attention than it
has been given so far.
PAST SALT II
Opponents of SALT II have attempted to discredit the notion and the rhetoric of
the SALT process. We categorically reject such aspersions. The pursuit of peace and
the elimination of nuclear weapons must be a constant and continuous effort by all
of us. The notion of a process is inherent in SALT and we must look past SALT II.
The UAHC is disappointed in the modest limitations of SALT II. We would have
wished that this had been a treaty embodying real arms control.
Arms control must be the essence of the next SALT agreement. This goal should
be reflected in understandings and reservations to SALT II which would not require
renegotiations. The SALT II limits must be regarded as ceilings not as targets which
must be reached. There should be an explicit rejection of the concept of "limited"
nuclear war as an element of U.S. foreign or strategic policy. We should clarify that
we are prepared to seek meaningful bilateral reductions even before the expiration
of SALT II.
The symbolism of the Soviet dismantling of missile launchers without replace-
ment, as required by SALT II, must not be lost in the debate. It should be empha-
sized as the tjrpe of action that will take on real meaning in SALT III. Just this
week Senator Biden, upon returning from a series of meetings with Soviet leaders,
indicated that they were prepared for real reductions in future arms agreements.
The initiative created by those meetings must be seized by the Senate. The United
States should clearly set out its intentions as to how these two countries will
achieve real reductions and work for that goal as quickly and effectively as possible.
The example which the superpowers sets in controlling nuclear arms will have a
significant impact on future efforts to control horizontal proliferation of nuclear
weapons. No dynamic in the 1980's so threatens to destabilize the world and lead to
nuclear war as the numerical growth of those countries which will soon possess a
nuclear capacity. The United States and U.S.S.R. have succeeded in making the
possession of nuclear weapons a "status" symbol of power and influence in the
world. We must act dramatically to change that. Ratification of SALT II is an
important step in that direction. On the eve of the Second Non-Proliferation Treaty
Conference, rejection of SALT II would inevitably undermine any hope to check the
proliferation of nuclear weapons to other countries.
147
ISRAEL AND SOVIET JEWRY
As Jews, we have a special concern for our brothers and sisters throughout the
world. Repeatedly we have been asked how does our support for SALT II relate to
our concern for Soviet Jewry and progress toward peace in the Middle East?
Proponents of linkage argue that we should refuse to ratify SALT II until the
U.S.S.R. improves its human rights performance and supports progress toward
peace in the Middle East. We reject that notion. Our support for SALT II in no way
signifies our approval of Soviet domestic or international policies. The SALT Treaty
is of momentous intrinsic, moral and strategic interest. It is deserving of ratification
on its own merits. If the world goes up in a nuclear holocaust, our concerns for
human rights and peace become irrelevant.
In fact, however, SALT II can only help to improve the situation of Soviet Jewry.
Recently Senator Kennedy put this problem to Andrei Sakharov, one of the truly
courageous fighters for human rights in the Soviet Union. Senator Kennedy report-
ed: "When I met last year with Andrei Sakharov in Moscow he stressed that the
greatest threat to humanity and human rights is the threat of nuclear war. His plea
to us is to ratify SALT: not only to reduce the threat of nuclear war but also to
create the mutual confidence necessary to resolve the other important issues be-
tween the Soviet Union and the United States * • • Let the advocates of linkage
explain how the cause of human rights in the Soviet Union will be served by Senate
refusal to ratify SALT."
To the extent that the United States can influence Soviet performance on human
rights it can do so best in an atmosphere of detente and cooperation. If SALT II is
defeated it is unlikely that the United States will have any impact on U.S.S.R.
policies regarding human rights.
The ability of the United States to act as a constructive partner in further
progress towards reaching a peaceful resolution of Mid-East problems will be
strengthened by SALT II as well. First, progress towards peace requires stability —
stability among the superpowers and relative stability among the parties involved in
the Mid-East conflict. To the extent that SALT II allows for continued stability on
the nuclear front, it permits Israel and its neighbors to focus on their regional
concerns.
Secondly, the danger of horizontal nuclear proliferation threatens to engulf the
Middle East in a nuclear confrontation. Recent evidence indicates that Pakistan,
which may explode a nuclear device in a matter of months, has been bankrolled in
its efforts to develop "the bomb" by Libya. Reports indicate that Pakistan will
supply Libya with nuclear weapons, in return for its help. No leader on Earth would
so threaten nuclear stability as would Qaddaffi. It would be difficult to determine
whether his weapons would be aimed first at Egypt or Israel. Such proliferation
poses a massive threat to U.S. interests in the Middle East, to Israel's survival and,
indeed, to the survival of the world.
Finally, the strategic impact of the SALT Treaty would have little effect on the
ability of U.S. forces to maintain a deterrence in the Middle East to Soviet designs.
Indeed, by diverting limited U.S. budgetary funds from a senseless and endless
strategic weapons arms race, we can better strengthen our conventional forces
which would increase our capacity to help our friends in Europe and the Mediterra-
nean basin.
Thus, ratification of the SALT II Treaty will enhance the ability of the American
government to further both peace in the Middle East and the cause of human rights
in the Soviet Union. During the past year we have made significant progress in both
these areas. The peace treaty between Israel and Egypt and the unprecedented
levels of Jewish emigration from the U.S.S.R. have been due in large measure to a
sense of stability in the relationship of the global powers. We cannot continue to
progress towards peace and freedom in the atmosphere of suspicion, mistrust and
intense superpower competition which would inevitably follow the failure of the
Senate to ratify the SALT II Treaty. Rather, the spirit of cooperation and detente
which would be furthered by this treaty is essential to such progress in both of
these areas.
conclusion: the responsibility of the SENATE
The United States has not yet met the issue of arms reduction and control as
firmly as the situation requires. Both the religious community and the Senate must
bear the responsibility for that failure. The religious community has not posed the
moral challenge of the arms race with sufficient clarity and immediacy to capture
the imagination and concern of the American people. The Senate has too often
permitted the SALT II debate to deteriorate into rhetorical battle of militarism and
fear.
148
Rabbi David Polish points out an insightful lesson in the story of Samson. Before
he was born, Samson's mother was told that he was to grow up as a mighty savior
of Israel. He was to be set aside as a Nazirite, as a special kind of person, dedicated
to God, forbidden to drink wine or to cut his hair. When he was born, he was called
Shimshon, meaning sunperson, symbolizing that the brightness of the very sun
glowed within his being. What great promise burned within this man who grew to
be a powerful figure and who, indeed, did rescue Israel from its enemies. But this
giant of a man, this dazzling, brilliant judge in Israel soon forgot the source of his
power and his greatness. He was tricked into having his hair shorn. He was
captured by his enemies. They put out his eyes. They set him to work in the prison
yard, grinding grain. Day in, day out, chained to a huge stone wheel, he trod his
blind course, round and round like a beast. Time passed, and his hair grew and his
strength was restored. On a festive day, when the enemies of Israel were all
assembled in their Temple, he made his way there with the aid of an unsuspecting
lad. Planting himself between two huge pillars, he pushed mightily agamst them,
and crying, "let me die with the Philistines," he brought the Temple and its
celebrants crashing down upon him.
What do we know from this episode? We learn of the tragic and fatal combination
of power and blindness. Samson was once the union of strength and vision. But with
vision gone, all that Samson could do was to feed his renewed strength with the
venom of revenge, destroying himself with his enemies.
The story of Samson is a warning to America. Our nation arose m this new world
like a special being, blessed and nurtured by the sun, the source of light and of life.
This giant of a nation was born in the midst of a struggle against tyranny and
consecrated to a higher order of political existence than had ever been known. This
nation was a kind of Nazirite among the nations, denying itself the temptations of
rule by caste and the heady wine of government by the few. It was endowed in its
birth with the might of the continent which it straddled and the vision which it
drew from its unique history. But we stand in danger of seeing the eyes of the
sunblessed giant gouged out, not by its enemies, but at its own hands. Its strength
cannot be impaired, but its vision can be mortally impaired. Nothing can be as
destructive as the well-meaning power of a bewildered and frightened giant. How
well our prophets understood this when they said, "Where there is no vision the
people perish." , ^ , , , .... t> .l -x -n
Together we can ensure that the United States does not lose its vision. But it will
be your decision as to whether the debate over this treaty will focus attention on
the necessity of multilateral nuclear disarmament. You alone will decide what
message SALT II will carry beyond its substantive provisions. It might be a message
that this is but one stepping stone in an inevitable escalation of nuclear prolifera-
tion. Or the message of SALT II can be a proclamation heard throughout the world:
That the joint benefits for both sides outweight even deep differences;
That there are ways besides strife for nations to redress grievances and resolve
disputes; „ , . .,,. .. v, i.u
That nations will not be prisoners of a bitter, unremitting past— we can be the
shapers of a better and more hopeful future;
That humankind is not inexorably doomed to repeat the disasters of history—
what always was need not always be. , „ , ,, j
Just as the Bible tells us "the effect of righteousness shall be peace so do we
know— from observation and intuition— that we who share this vulnerable planet
can never come into our full human inheritance until we can put bloodshed and
war behind us. SALT II can help us achieve this goal.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Mr. Vorspan.
Mr. Vorspan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. That concludes the hearing this afternoon.
[Whereupon, at 5:24 p.m., the committee adjourned, to reconvene
at 10:30 a.m., September 7, 1979.]
SALT II TREATY
FRIDAY, SEPTEMBER 7, 1979
United States Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, D.C.
The committee met, at 10:30 a.m., pursuant to notice, in room
318, Russell Senate Office Building, Hon. Frank Church (chairman
of the committee) presiding.
Present: Senators Church, Glenn, Stone, Javits, and Percy.
Senator Percy [presiding]. The committee will come to order.
opening statement
We apologize to our witnesses for the delay this morning. Obvi-
ously, the events of the last few days have torn into the schedules
of many of our Senators, including our chairman.
Today the Senate Foreign Relations Committee continues to hear
from public witnesses on the SALT II Treaty. This morning we
have a panel consisting of Robert Schmidt, vice president of the
Control Data Corp., appearing on behalf of the American Commit-
tee on East-West Accord, Dr. Herbert Scoville, who serves as co-
chairman of the New Directions Task Force on Arms Control and
Disarmament; Peter Baugher, testifying for the Ripon Society; and
John Carey, appearing for the American Legion.
Following the panel. Lane Kirkland will deliver a statement for
the AFL-CIO.
Gentlemen, I understand that you each have 10-minute oral
presentations. Your longer written statements will be put in the
record. After your presentations, the committee will direct its ques-
tions to the entire panel.
I think the best way to proceed is in alphabetical order. We will
hear from the American Committee first, followed by the American
Legion, and so on. Mr. Schmidt, if you would please begin, and as
the Senators pay reasonably good attention to the lights, we would
appreciate your keeping them in mind as well. They will be just a
friendly warning to you. I think when the yellow light goes on, you
have 1 minute left. Thank you very much.
STATEMENT OF ROBERT D. SCHMIDT, PRESIDENT, AMERICAN
COMMITTEE ON EAST-WEST ACCORD, WASHINGTON, D.C.>
Mr. Schmidt. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I
am Robert D. Schmidt, president of the American Committee on
East- West Accord, and executive vice president of Control Data
Corp. The group I represent today, the American Committee on
See page 153 for Mr. Schmidt's prepared statement.
(149)
150
East-West Accord, is a diverse one. On its board and among its
officers and members are people of international repute, represent-
ing academia, industry, the world of science, diplomacy, private
foundations, labor unions, the legal and publishing professions, and
lay people who believe that only through normalization of relations
with the Soviet Union can we maintain a workable and lasting
peace on this planet.
The American Committee has a strong and continuing interest to
promote the SALT process. We have a strong and continuing inter-
est to promote United States-Soviet trade. Both are essential. Trade
and the SALT process reinforce each other. They both contribute to
lessening those international tensions we know must be controlled
lest our acknowledged ability to destroy life on Earth as we know it
■jo ii'Til^fisriGH
The hearings on SALT II thiis far have placed primary emphasis
on military relations between the Unites States and the U.S.S.R.
Who is ahead in what weapon? Who will be ahead in 1985? Which
nation is likely to get a scientific breakthrough providing a mili-
tary advantage? Which nation is spending more for military re-
search and development?
Both societies put more effort and money into planning for a war
than on planning how to get along. Both societies act as though the
best way to preserve peace is to prepare for war. There has been no
apparent progress from this kind of activity. We believe that the
SALT Treaty represents some progress.
Perhaps the best way to preserve peace is to adopt a new strat-
egy that depends more on negotiation than confrontation.
I am not so naive as to believe that either the United States or
the Soviet Union is about to summarily transfer research and
development funds from military purposes to peaceful purposes.
Nevertheless, there are many activities we might carry on in
tandem with our potential antagonists which may lessen the likeli-
hood of military confrontation.
SALT AND UNITED STATES-SOVIET TRADE
One of those areas is trade. I emphasize the importance of trade
because the American Committee believes Senate approval of
SALT II is essential to preserve and promote a climate in which
nonstrategic trade, joint development of energy, and other projects
of common interest may be carried out to the mutual advantage of
both societies, economically and politically.
Trade is a path to understanding. It costs us nothing. It costs the
Russians nothing. Trade is engaged in only if both parties receive
benefits for themselves.
Granted that ill-conceived trade policies can generate negative
relationships among countries, nevertheless, as Prof Thomas
Schelling has written, "Aside from war and preparations for
war * * * trade is the most important relationship most countries
have with each other. Broadly defined * * * trade is what most of
international relations is all about."
Accepting the importance of trade in international relations, it
follows that an even-handed, realistic, and vigorously pursued
trade policy can produce positive results. Trade can be a weapon of
war or an instrument for peace; or put more delicately, trade can
151
promote confrontation or negotiation. That is for the parties to
choose.
If SALT II is rejected, the temptation to use trade as a weapon
which will exacerbate conflict will be very great. On the other
hand, if SALT is approved, trade between the United States and
the Soviet Union will be expanded, and the ability of the United
States to influence the Soviet Union in ways which will serve our
long-term security will be enhanced.
There is another benefit for the American economy that will
flow from a successful SALT Treaty. It is the benefit based on the
common sense proposition we all recognize, that both parties bene-
fit from trading. If we are moving ahead in the mutual control of
strategic weapons, the climate of United States-Soviet relations will
be propitious for expanding United States-Soviet trade. Our ad-
verse balance of trade over the past few years demands expansion
of our export market, including exports to the Soviet Union. We all
know of the importance of Soviet purchases of grain and the help
that that has given to balance our trade deficit with the world, as
well as to maintain farm prices.
We have not done as well in the export of industrial products to
the Soviet Union. Discrimination against Soviet trade imposed by
the Jackson- Vanik and Stevenson amendments and the use of
trade as a political weapon to try to force Soviet emigration policy
into line with our concept of free emigration have seriously im-
paired American sales to and purchases from the Soviet Union, to
the detriment of our economy and our political relations.
Furthermore, these measures have not, in my view, been as
effective as would have been the encouragement of mutually bene-
ficial programs in science, culture, and nonstrategic trade.
There is another advantage to the United States in expanding
trade with the Soviet Union. It is that our system of free enterprise
is so much more efficient than the Soviet system that in time I
believe we will promote greater Soviet awareness of western
values. Those of us who have spent substantial periods of time in
the Soviet Union over the past decade have observed changes,
liberalization, if you will, which we would have thought impossible
a decade ago.
For example, 10 years ago, the word "profit" did not seem to
exist in the Soviet vocabulary, at least with the people to whom I
spoke. Now, it is commonplace to discuss profit. Five years ago it
was not possible to discuss questions of joint ventures. Now a
number of elements of Soviet society are exploring ways to accom-
modate joint ventures.
Five years ago the Soviets never mentioned the Voice of Amer-
ica. Indeed, Voice of America broadcasts were regularly jammed by
the Soviet Union until 1973. Not so long ago, in Novosibirsk, half-
way around the world from my home office in Minneapolis, Minn.,
a Soviet scientist remarked to me about a news item he heard the
previous evening on the Voice of America.
Western views are beginning to seep into Soviet society.
SALT AND AMERICAN SECURITY
Thus far, I have emphasized the importance of SALT to the
expansion of trade and U.S. influence in the Soviet Union, and one
152
might believe that I ignore the effect of SALT on our military
strength. In the words of Secretary of Defense Brown:
National security is more than a matter of military strength. It includes economic
strength. It includes, in the case of the United States, our enormous agricultural
production. It includes our technological capabilities, and it includes also our self-
confidence, self-cohesion, and will.
So much of the emphasis in these hearings has been on what I
consider to be the exaggerated strengths of the Soviet Union that
we forget our own tremendous strengths.
Consider, for example, some of the security advantages we have
over the Soviet Union — borders with friendly nations, Canada and
Mexico. In contrast, the Soviet Union has as neighbors China and a
number of Eastern European ethnic groups always threatening
turmoil. Consider our NATO allies in contrast to the Soviet
Warsaw Pact allies. And consider the Soviet domestic situation in
contrast to our own, a situation well summed up by Prof. J. S.
Berliner, an eminent Soviet specialist at Brandeis University and a
member of the Harvard Research Center.
Berliner writes that Soviet policy is in a shambles and believes
that they have lost most of their sources of influence around the
world that they had once hoped to have, to the point that their
economy has lost its djmamism and is no longer a model for the
Third World or anywhere else.
"It is ironic," Berliner writes, "that they have only one major
source of influence left, military prowess. That should be small
comfort for all that they do not have."
I will skip some of my oral testimony because I see the red light
is on.
The Chairman [presiding]. It is always surprising how fast 10
minutes does go by. It comes to only about 4 pages of written
testimony.
Mr. Schmidt. Let us look at the assertion that the one major
source of influence left to the Soviet Union is military prowess.
In the last few weeks we have heard opponents of the SALT
Treaty repeat and repeat that the United States is behind the
Soviet Union in military strength. For that reason, opponents
argue, the U.S. Senate must reject SALT II.
This makes no sense to me for the simple reason that if there
were no SALT agreement there would be no limitations whatsoever
on the production of nuclear weapons by either side. With SALT,
for the first time, we have an agreed overall limit on the number
of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles for each side — 2,250.
But it is not to the numbers and the footnotes of the SALT
Treaty to which Americans must look to determine whether the
treaty is in our security interests. We need, rather, to apply our
own commonsense.
Is it reasonable to believe that for 7 years the Russians have
managed to out-negotiate American representatives of three Presi-
dents?
Is it reasonable to believe that our Joint Chiefs of Staff would
recommend the treaty to the Senate if they thought it would
damage their security interests?
Is it reasonable to believe that all of our NATO allies would urge
ratification of SALT if they did not mean it?
153
Is it reasonable to believe that American security will be promot-
ed by a reversion to the cold war, that we are more secure in a
world of confrontation than negotiation?
Even if one believes the United States is behind the Russians in
some categories of weapons, or that we are inferior militarily
across the board, which I do not accept, the problem is the failure
of our own system to use our resources wisely to achieve a qual-
ity— rather than quantity — defensive strategy.
In conclusion, though SALT may not be all we want, we will
invite a disastrous escalation of the arms race if it is rejected, but
with the approval of SALT, I believe we will move toward further
arms reductions which we and the Russians want and need, and
there will be a basis for improvement in United States-Soviet rela-
tions in other fields as well, including trade.
Mr. Chairman, the American Committee on East-West Accord
has recently adopted statements on SALT II and on trade, and I
ask that they be included at the end of my remarks. Thank you.
[Mr. Schmidt's prepared statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Robert D. Schmidt
Mr. Chairman and members of the C!ommittee: I am Robert D. Schmidt, President
of the American Committee on East- West Accord, and Executive Vice President of
Control Data Corporation.
The group I represent today — the American Committee on East-West Accord — is a
diverse one. On its board, and among its officers and members, are people of
international repute, representing academia, industry, the world of science, diplo-
macy, private foundations labor unions, the legal and publishing professions, and
lay people who believe that only through normalization of relations with the Soviet
Union can we maintain a workable and lasting peace on this planet.'
The American Committee has a strong and continuing interest to promote the
SALT process. We have a strong and continuing interest to promote United States-
Soviet trade. Both are essential. Trade and the SALT process reinforce each other.
They both contribute to lessening those international tensions we know must be
controlled lest our acknowledged ability to destroy life on Earth as we know it is
unleashed.
The hearings on SALT H, thus far, have placed primary emphasis on military
relations of the United States and the U.S.S.R. Who is ahead in what weapon? Who
will be ahead in 1985? Which nation is likely to get a scientific breakthrough
providing a military advantage? Which nation is spending more for military re-
search and development?
Both societies put more effort and money into planning for a war than on
planning on how to get along. Both societies act as though the best way to preserve
peace is to prepare for war. There has been no apparent progress from this kind of
activity.
Perhaps the best way to preserve peace is to adopt a new strategy that depends
more on negotiations than confrontation.
SALT AND united STATES-SOVIET TRADE
I am not so naive as to believe that either the United States or the Soviet Union
is about to summarily transfer research and development funds from military
purposes to peaceful purposes. Nevertheless, there are many activities we might
carry on in tandem with our potential antagonist which may lessen the likelihood of
military confrontation.
One of those areas is trade.
' Officers and members of the Board of the American Committee are: John Kenneth Gal-
braith — Co-Chairman, Donald M. Kendall — Co-Chairman, George F. Kennan — Co-Chairman,
Robert D. Schmidt — President, Fred Warner Neal — Executive Vice President, Stephen Schloss-
berg — Vice President, Carl Marcy — Secretary-Treasurer & Co-Director, William Attwood, Meyer
Berger, Tilford Dudley, Joseph Filner, Curtis Cans, Theodore M. Hesburgh, C.S.C, Vice Admiral
J. M. Lee, Jeanne V. Mattison — Co-Director, Stewart R. Mott, Harold B. Scott, Jeremy J. Stone,
Kenneth W. Thompson, Mrs. James P. Warburg, Jerome B. Wiesner.
154
I emphasize the importance of trade because the American Ck)mmittee believes
Senate approval of SALT II is essential to preserve and promote a climate in which
non-strategic trade, joint development of energy, and other projects of common
interest may be carried out to the mutual advantage of both societies, economically
and politically.
Trade is a path to understanding. It costs us nothing, it costs the Russians
nothing. Trade is engaged in only if both parties perceive benefits for themselves.
Granted that ill-conceived trade policies can generate negative relationships
among countries, nevertheless, as Professor Thomas Schelling has written:
"Aside from war and preparations for war . . . trade is the most important
relationship most countries have with each other. Broadly defined . . . trade is
what most of international relations is all about."
Accepting the importance of trade in international relations, it follows that an
even-handed, realistic, and vigorously pursued trade policy can produce positive
results.
Trade can be a weapon of war, or an instrument for peace; or, put more delicate-
ly, trade can promote confrontations, or negotiations. That is for the parties to
choose.
If SALT II is rejected, the temptation to use trade as a weapon, which will
exacerbate conflict, will be very great. On the other hand, if SALT is approved,
trade between the United States and the Soviet Union will be expanded and the
ability of the United States to influence the Soviet Union in ways which will serve
our long term security will be enhanced.
But there is another benefit for the American economy that will flow from a
successful SALT Treaty. It is the benefit based on the common sense proposition we
all recognize — that both parties benefit from trading.
If we are moving ahead in the mutual control of strategic weapons, the climate of
United States-Soviet relations will be propitious for expanding United States-Soviet
trade. Our adverse balance of trade over the past few years demands expansion of
our export markets — including exports to the Soviet Union.
We all know of the importance of Soviet purchases of grain and the help that has
given to balance our trade deficit with the world, as well as to maintain farm prices.
We have not done as well in the export of industrial products to the Soviet Union.
Discrimination against Soviet trade imposed by the Jackson-Vanik and Stevenson
amendments and the use of trade as a political weapon to try to force Soviet
emigration policy into line with our concepts of free emigration have seriously
impaired America sales to, and purchases from, the Soviet Union — to the detriment
of our economy and our political relations. Furthermore, these measures have not,
in my view, been as effective as would have been the encouragement of mutually
beneficial programs in science, culture, and non-strategic trade.
There is another advantage to the United States in expanding trade with the
Soviet Union. It is that our system of free enterprise is so incomparably more
efficient than the Soviet system that in time I believe we will promote greater
Soviet awareness of Western values. Those of us who have spent substantial periods
of time in the Soviet Union over the past decade have observed changes — liberaliza-
tion, if you will — which we would have thought impossible a decade ago.
For example:
Ten years ago, the word "profit" didn't seem to exist in the Soviet vocabulary — at
least with the people to whom I spoke. Now it is commonplace to discuss "profit."
Five years ago, it was not possible to discuss questions of joint ventures. Now, a
number of elements of Soviet society are exploring ways to accommodate joint
ventures.
Five years ago, the Soviets never mentioned the Voice of America. Indeed, Voice
of America broadcasts were regularly jammed by the Soviet Union until 1973. Not
so long ago, in Novosibirsk (halfway around the world from my home office in
Minneapolis, Minnesota) a Soviet scientist remarked to me about a news item he
heard the previous evening on the Voice of America.
Western views are beginning to seep into Soviet society.
SALT AND AMERICAN SECURITY
Thus far I have emphasized the importance of SALT to the expansion of trade
and U.S. influence in the Soviet Union and one might believe that I ignore the
effect of SALT on our military strength. In the words of Secretary of Defense
Brown, "national security is more than a matter of military strength. It includes
economic strength. It includes in the case of the United States our enormous
agricultural production; it includes our technological capabilities; and it includes
also, our self-confidence, self-cohesion, and will."
155
So much of the emphasis in these hearings has been on what I consider to be the
exaggerated strengths of the Soviet Union that we forget our own tremendous
Consider, for example, some of the security advantages we have over the Soviet
Union— borders with friendly nations, Canada and Mexico. In contrast, the Soviet
Union has as neighbors China and a number of Eastern European ethnic groups
always threatening turmoil.
Consider our NATO allies, in contrast to the Soviets' Warsaw Pact allies.
And consider the Soviet domestic situation in contrast to our own— a situation
well summed up by Professor J. S. Berliner, an eminent Soviet specialist at Bran-
deis University and a member of the Harvard Research Center.
Berliner writes that Soviet policy is in a shambles, and believes that they have
lost most of their sources of influence around the world that they had once hoped to
have, to the point that their economy has lost its dynamism and is no longer a
model for the Third World or anywhere else.
"It is ironic," Berliner writes, "that they have only one major source of influence
left, military prowess. . . . That should be small comfort for all that they do not
have." (Taken from article to be published in the forthcoming issue of Commentary.)
Let us look at the assertion that the one major source of influence left to the
Soviet Union is military prowess.
In the last few weeks we have heard opponents of the SALT Treaty repeat and
repeat that the United States is behind the Soviet Union in military strength. For
that reason, opponents argue, the U.S. Senate must reject SALT II.
This makes no sense to me for the simple reason that if there were no SALT
agreement there would be no limitations whatsoever on the production of nuclear
weapons by either side. With SALT, for the first time, we have an agreed overall
limit on the number of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles for each side— 2,250.
But it is not to the numbers and the footnotes of the SALT Treaty to which
Americans must look to determine whether the Treaty is in our security interests.
We need rather to apply our own good sense.
Is it reasonable to believe that for seven years the Russians have managed to out-
negotiate American representatives of three Presidents?
Is it reasonable to believe that our Joint Chiefs of Staff would recommend the
Treaty to the Senate if they thought it damaged our security interests?
Is it reasonable to believe that all our NATO allies would urge ratification of
SALT if they didn't mean it?
Is it reasonable to believe that American security will be promoted by a reversion
to the Cold War, that we are more secure in a world of confrontation than negotia-
tion?
Even if one believes the United States is behind the Russians m some categories
of weapons, or that we are inferior militarily across the board— which I do not
accept— the problem is the failure of our own system to use our resources wisely to
achieve a quality— rather than quantity— defense strategy.
In conclusion, though SALT may not be all we want, we will invite a disastrous
escalation of the arms race if it is rejected. But with the approval of SALT, I believe
we will move toward further arms reductions which we and the Russians want and
need, and there will be a basis for improvements in United States— Soviet relations
in other fields as well, including trade.
Mr. Chairman, the American Committee on East- West Accord has recently adopt-
ed statements on SALT II and on trade. I ask that they be included at the end of my
remarks.
U8-260 0-79 Pt.U - 11
156
PAGE FIVE JUST FOR THE PRESS
AMERICAN COMMITTEE POLICIES
ON SALT, TRADE, AND EDUCATIONAL AND CULTURAL EXCHANGES.
The purpose of ihe American Commiitee is to strengthen public understanding of arms control initiatives, and to encourage
mutually beneficial programs in science, culture, and non-siraicgic trade beineen the U.S. and the Soviet Union. The Committee
believes this course of action is the most effective way of furthering human rights, liberalized emigration policies, exchange of
information, and freedom to travel for peoples of all nations.
The Board of Directors of the American Commiitee approved the following statement at its meeting on April 18. 1979:
STATEMENT ON SALT
The Amencan Commiitee on Easi-Wesi Accord supporis ihe draft treaty negotiated between ihe United States and the USSR on the
limitation of strategic arms and sirongK urges ils approval by the United Stales Senate.
The stakes are high. Either we move ahead with arms limitation and reduce the threat of nuclear war. or we slip back into an era of
confrontation and escalating arms competition. The dangers of such a setback are obvious and serious. The increasing sophistication of
strategic weapons on both sides seems to accord an advantage to the side which stnkes first. Even if. as we believe, neither side would
coniemplate such a step, growing vulnerabilities would be exploited on both sides b> those wishing lo escalate ihe arms race,
■ The proposed ireai> is the culmination of efforis b\ four US Administrations — two Democratic and tuo Republican — to stabilize the
nuclear threat posed b\ each superpower against the other. These efforis have won the increasing support of the American pubhc; ioda\ four
out of five approve the effort to reach a SALT agreement. Just as Americans have a high siake in the outcome of ihe Senate vote, so do our
allies, who could — and probably would — be destroyed along with ihe two major powers b> a U.S. -Soviet nuclear conflict.
Any agreement limiting strategic arms must meet one overriding requirement; it must enhance the securiu of the United States. We believe
This treaty meets that requirement. The strategic forces of the United States and the USSR are nol identical; ihe\ differ widel\ in structure,
deployment, and weapons systems, as geography makes it natural they should. But the treaty will bring these forces into overall balance. It will
for the first lime cause a reduction in the stockpiles of strategic delivery vehicles. It will place restrictions upon development and deployment
of certain types of strategic weapons It will moderate arms competition between the two great powers and ihus contribute to the maintenance
of the present essential equivalence in strategic nuclear arms.
We regret that SALT II does not place more effective controls upon improvements in the nuclear arms permitted under the treaty. Ii does
not prevent the development of a counterforce capability on either side and thus prolongs the danger that mutual fears and suspicions could
precipitate nuclear »ar in a critical situation. It might even encourage more intense arms competition m weapon systems nol limited or
proscribed b\ the treaty. We therefore call upon both governments to reexamine their military concepts and strategies and to clarify and
cunail their commitments to existing and contemplated arms programs.
Despite these weaknesses, SALT II isanindispensablesiepin the continuing process of lifting from mankind notonly the terrible shadow of
nuclear war but the dcbiliiaiing economic burden of arms expenditures. The resources of both countnes are already strained by the need to
maintain and to strengthen their militarv establishments. Without further progress on arms control be>ond SALT 11. both nations will
increase their arms ex|>enditures. thus diverting human and material resources from uses beneficial to mankind, causing both countries to
overtax their financial and material resources and — certainly in the United States — contributing to inflationar> pressure.
A failure to ratify SALT II would not only undermine the strategic balance which is achieved by the draft treaty but would scuttle arms
control for years to come. The fears and uncertainties which would ensue would make even more difficult than at present the problem of
pursuing a consistent and effective foreign policy insuppori of US, interests around the world Above all. it would be widely interpreted as a
sign that the American people had lost interest in reducing U.S. -Soviet tensions and improving the prospects for world peace.
Approval of SALT II should usher in a new- era in U.S. -Soviet relations. It will reduce mutual fears and suspicions. It will ease the resolution
of disputes between the two nations. It will create an atmosphere m which trade and cooperation can prosper. In such an atmosphere lies the
greatest chance not only for world peace but for the sort of liberalization in Soviet society that we would like to see.
We recognize that SALT II will not produce any sudden or dramatic abatement of the U.S. -Soviet competition for world influence. But in
approving the agreement and in continuation of the SALT process lies the greatest prospect that both countries will carry on that competition
by peaceful means and reduce their reliance upon military power.
The SALT 11 agreement deserves the overwhelming support of the American people and of its legislative representatives.
STATEMENT ON TRADE j^,^. ^ ^^-j^
While welcoming reports that the Caner Administration is about to sign a trade agreement with China, the American Committee has grave
misgivings as to the agreements impact on SALT II.
We are deeply concerned that the U.S, be even-handed in its treatment of China and the Soviet Union with respect to extension of
Mosi-Favored-Nation treatment of imports from both nations. We believe it would be a grave mistake ai this time to take any action which
would be viewed either in the US,, China, or the Soviet Union, as tilting toward China. Any discrimination in the treatment of the two
communist countnes on matters of trade could onK damage prospecis for SALT II.
The American Committee is in fa\or of a Presidential waiver, under ihe authority which the President now posesses. to extend
Mosi-Favored-Naiion treatment to both countries and Amendments to the Trade Act which would honor U.S. commitments under the 1972
Trade Agreement to extend unconditional and non-di*.criminator\ MFN tariff treatment and Export-Import Bank credits to the USSR and
China simultaneous!)
The American Committee believes such moves are in ihe national interest of the United States and also of importance for the American
economv.
The Committee believes these moves should proceed at the same iime as Administration efforts to obtain approval of SALT II
157
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Mr. Schmidt, for an
excellent statement. I am sorry to have to urge witnesses to limit
their presentations to 10 minutes, but in order for the committee to
remain on schedule and to give members an opportunity to ask
questions, I think that is just going to be necessary.
Our next witness is John Carey. Gentlemen, we will ask for each
of you to give your statements, and then we will question the panel
as the Senators may care to do.
John Carey is the immediate past national commander of the
American Legion.
Mr. Carey, we are very pleased to have you here and to have the
benefit of your testimony this morning.
STATEMENT OF JOHN CAREY, PAST NATIONAL COMMANDER,
THE AMERICAN LEGION, WASHINGTON, D.C.»
Mr. Carey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I appreciate the opportunity to present the views of the Ameri-
can Legion on a matter of vital interest to our organization and to
the Nation. We are well aware of the situation in Cuba, where the
Soviets have deployed a combat brigade, including armor, infantry,
and artillery units together with combat support units. We believe
this constitutes a violation of the Monroe Doctrine. We also believe
that the presence of this brigade constitutes a military base prohib-
ited in the 1962 agreements with the Soviets.
The American Legion 3 weeks ago at its national convention
urged Congress to take whatever action is necessary to oppose
spread of communism within the Western Hemisphere. This fla-
grant stationing of Soviet troops in nearby Cuba certainly violates
the unanimous position taken by our delegates. Accordingly, we
urge this committee to postpone any further action on the strategic
arms limitation agreement currently pending until such time as all
Soviet combat troops have been withdrawn from the island of
Cuba.
All members of the organization, Mr. Chairman, are veterans of
wartime service, and many of us have personally experienced the
horror of war. As veterans, we realize full well that if conventional
wars are horrendous, nuclear war would be an unspeakable catas-
trophe for mankind. Thus it should not be surprising that we have
long supported the concept of strategic arms limitation. Our funda-
mental position has been that a strategic arms limitation treaty
should be equitable, should actually halt the arms race, should
reduce tensions and the likelihood of war, and should be fully
verifiable.
We have insisted that such a treaty should not place the United
States in an inferior strategic position. We realize that each of the
contributions made by the treaty is subject to violations, and that
many experts have expressed concern over what they consider to
be our Nation's limited ability to detect violations.
Our organization, although likewise concerned, feels that it can
contribute very little to any serious debate on verification since we
have no information on the highly classified intelligence gathering
techniques which would be the focal points of any such debate.
' See page 160 for Mr. Carey's prepared statement.
158
We are aware that it was determined at an early stage of the
SALT negotiations that the total number of missiles and warheads
could not be limited because of verification problems, and that
therefore the criterion becomes the number of launchers, but we
strongly recommend that the United States not abandon the princi-
ple of counting all nuclear arms during the SALT III negotiations,
even if that means demanding onsite inspection.
The treaty's prohibition on the production of any heavy missiles
is tantamount to legitimizing the Soviet throw-weight advantage in
its land-based ICBM's as gained through deployment of the SS-18.
We believe there should be a counting rule adopted under the
treaty as an adjustment for the awesome power of the SS-18. Each
SS-18 should be counted as more than one launcher.
This provision would not require dismantling any of the heavy
missiles, but would necessitate some changes in the makeup or
other components of the Soviet arsenal.
The American Legion is fully aware of how firm Soviet negotia-
tors have been in demanding full complement of the SS-18. It
therefore might be advisable for this committee to consider the
adoption of a new heavy missile counting rule with an effective
date perhaps in 1981 to allow the Soviets time to make the neces-
sary adjustments to their arsenal.
Our next major concern over the pending treaty deals with the
failure to include the Soviet Backfire bomber as a strategic nuclear
delivery vehicle under terms of the agreement. There is general
agreement that the Backfire can reach targets in the continental
United States by aerial refueling or making one-way flights. We
have two recommendations to make relevant to the Backfire
bomber.
The first is that the Soviet Union be required to sign and official-
ly acknowledge the letter presented by Secretary General Brezhnev
to President Carter which promised the bomber would not be de-
ployed in intercontinental mode and that its production would not
exceed 30 per year.
Our second recommendation is that the United States develop
and deploy a similar number of comparable aircraft. Another
aspect of the treaty that essentially disturbs us is the provisions
regarding encryption of telemetry data. The treaty prohibits the
encoding of radioed missile test data that would be needed to verify
compliance with the treaty. Each side, however, is allowed to deter-
mine whether or not such data would be needed to verify compli-
ance.
Our recommendation is that both sides formally agree not to
encrypt any missile test data.
We are also concerned with the treaty's protocol which bans the
development or flight testing of ICBM's from mobile launchers, and
the deployment of cruise missiles with ranges of more than 600
kilometers until the end of 1981, "will assume a life of its own,"
and that the United States will give in to Soviet demands that the
protocol remain in force during the course of SALT III negotia-
tions.
We recommend that the Senate approve an understanding or
reservation stating that the protocol will expire on schedule unless
this extension is specifically approved by the Senate. We agree
159
with the critics of SALT II who express concern that the treaty
may prevent us from transferring cruise missile or other technol-
ogy to our NATO allies. We believe it is necessary that the Senate
clarify U.S. intentions regarding technology transfer by adopting a
reservation or understanding. It is very clear to anyone who consid-
ers himself a student of arms limitation talks that our NATO allies
in Western Europe have more than a passing interest in the pend-
ing agreement.
Since the Soviets would rather the United States not assist
NATO in improving its defenses, especially in the area of nuclear
weaponry, they have disputed the United States' right to continue
to exchange nuclear weapons technology with Western Europe. A
Senate understanding that nothing in the treaty precludes a con-
tinuation of U.S. technology transfer with NATO would reaffirm
our commitment to the alliance, and would create Soviet uneasi-
ness over having a formidable opposing nuclear strike on the same
continent.
Mr. Chairman, the American Legion seeks an adjustment in the
procedure for reporting treaty violations. The treaty now provides
that all actual or suspected violations be reported to a standing
commission for consideration. We propose a reservation or under-
standing that would require a simultaneous reporting of all such
actual or suspected violations to the Senate for referral to the
appropriate committee.
Such reporting of violations would strengthen the United States
commitment for Soviet compliance with the agreement.
Our final recommendation to correct what we consider to be a
flaw in the treaty deals with the agreed statements and common
understanding. It appears as though these explanations of treaty
provisions have been presented as separate documents and there-
fore are not subject to ratification process. If this is the case, then
we demand formal Soviet agreement that these agreed statements
and common understandings be made part of the treaty text.
The treaty would be simply unmanageable without such an
agreement.
Mr. Chairman, we have called for several modifications to the
treaty, some of which seek amendments to the language, and
others which seek unilateral declarations by you and your col-
leagues, and there is little doubt in my mind that the American
Legion will be accused by some of proposing so-called killer amend-
ments and accused of trying to sabotage the treaty.
I began my statement by saying that our organization has
historically endorsed the concept of limiting strategic arms. I came
here today with that attitude, and presented these recommended
modifications in that spirit.
In fact, our organization would have been happy if both sides
were forced to reduce their strategic arsenals by 50 percent or
more, but of course we realize that such reductions ignore the
realities of negotiating an arms agreement in an environment of
unprecedented weapons production.
I have asked you to consider three amendments, to address the
ovei-whelming Soviet advantage in heavy missiles, to prohibit the
encryption of telemetry, and to insure that the agreed statements
and common understandings are legally binding. Up to this point
160
we have recommended certain amendments to the treaty, reserva-
tions by the Senate for weapons programs to help compensate for
Soviet strategic advantages. These measures alone, ho^vever, are
insufficient to ensure essential equivalence and effective deter-
rence.
As I mentioned earlier, our organization believes that the time
has come to reconsider our fundamental nuclear strategy. Again, I
shall have to skip in the interest of time, sir, and will say that we
are very concerned about the position of the United States people
and their apathy toward what may happen if a treaty is signed.
In sum, Mr. Chairman, we believe that although the SALT II
Treaty, if it is adhered to fully and in good faith, has certain
positive features, it also has a number of serious deficiencies. An
even greater danger than the deficiencies of the treaty, however, is
the prospect that the people of the United States will be lulled into
a false sense of security and assume that the treaty will eliminate
the likelihood of nuclear war.
We must realize that we can have peace only through strength.
The Soviet Union is already ahead of the United States in a
number of strategic areas, and by all projections we have seen that
the gap will grow in years to come. The American Legion will
consider support of the SALT II Treaty only if we are assured that
the United States will strengthen its defenses along the lines we
have outlined, and the treaty as amended and modified in the
areas that we have mentioned. Thank you, sir.
[Mr. Carey's prepared statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of John Carey
Thank you Mr. Chairman: I am Jack Carey, immediate past National Commander
of The American Legion. I appreciate the opportunity to present the views of The
American Legion on a matter of vital interest to our organization and to the
nation— the limitation of strategic nuclear arms. All members of The American
Legion, Mr. Chairman, are veterans of wartime service, and many of us have
personally experienced the horror of war. As veterans, we realize full well that if
conventional wars are horrendous, nuclear war would be an unspeakable catas-
trophy for mankind. Thus, it should not be surprising that we have long supported
the concept of strategic arms limitations.
Our fundamental position has been that a strategic arms limitation treaty should
be equitable, should actually halt the arms race, should reduce tensions and the
likelihood of war, and should be fully verifiable. We have insisted, however, that
such a treaty should not place the United States in an inferior strategic position.
The Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty now before the Senate does not fully meet
those criteria, but before we enumerate the treaty's shortcomings let us acknowl-
edge that it does make certain positive contributions.
Although both sides— especially the Soviet Union— will continue to add consider-
ably to their nuclear arsenals, upper limits are established on the total number of
strategic launchers, the number of ICBM's and SLBM's and MIRVed warheads, and
so on.
The treaty restricts the number of reentry vehicles either country can install on
the various types of ICBM's and SLBM missiles.
The treaty prohibits certain basing modes for strategic launchers.
The treaty prohibits the placing in orbit nuclear weapons of any kind including
fractional orbital missiles. , j , i. *■ j
The treaty establishes maximum parameters for the development, testing, and
deployment of new missile types. , . , .
We realize that each of these provisions is subject to violations and that many
experts have expressed concern over what they consider to be our nation s limited
ability to detect violations. Our organization, although likewise concerned, feels that
it can contribute very little to any serious debate on verification since we have no
information on the highly classified intelligence-gathering techniques which would
be the focal points of any such debate.
161
Perhaps the most serious flaw in the pending treaty is that it covers not the total
number of missiles and warheads possessed by each side. The Soviet Union could
legally stockpile an unlimited number of missiles. Although the treaty pledges both
sides to a rather vague commitment not to develop a "rapid reload" system, the
Soviets can launch most of their missiles from a "cold launch" mode. Even without
improving existing technology, they could launch a second, or perhaps third, salvo
from their silos in a matter of hours. Furthermore, many of the reserve missiles
could be stored in such a way that they could be fired in place within a short period
of time. Then, of course, there is the possibility of outright cheating, of concealing
full-fledged launchers in violation of the treaty. In the event of a war or a major
crisis, the existence of such a "ready reserve" could give the U.S.S.R. an enormous
strategic advantage. o a t m ■ •
We are aware that it was determined at an early stage of the SALT negotiations
that the total number of missiles and warheads could not be limited because of
verification problems, and that therefore the criterion became the number of
"launchers". But we strongly recommend that the United States not abandon the
principle of counting all nuclear arms during the SALT III negotiations, even if that
means demanding on-site inspections.
Another glaring deficiency of the treaty is that the Soviet Union is allowed a
monopoly on heavy missiles— the SS-18. As has been pointed out numerous times in
the course of these hearings, those missiles will be sufficiently accurate by the early
1980's to pose a significant threat to our land-based ICBM's. While we realize that
equivalence does not necessarily require our nuclear arsenal be a mirror image of
the Soviet Union's, we strongly recommend that the United States urgently proceed
with the development, production, and employment of the M-X missile, which will
give us roughly the same hard-target capabilities as the Soviet Union and a highly
survivable back-up system to our increasingly vulnerable land-based ICBM's.
The treaty's prohibition on the production of any heavy missiles is tantamount to
legitimizing the Soviet throw-weight advantage in its land-based ICBM's as gained
through deployment of the SS-18. There are those who would argue that U.S.
advantages in SLBM and cruise missile technology provides an overall strategic
balance. However, we view the heavy missile prohibition under SALT II as an
inequitable provision and one which must be addressed. We believe that there
should be a counting rule adopted under the treaty as an adjustment for the
awesome power of the SS-18. Each SS-18 should be counted as more than one
launcher. This provision would not require dismantling any of the heavy missiles
but would necessitate some changes in the makeup of other components of the the
Soviet arsenal.
The American Legion is fully aware of how firm the Soviet negotiators have been
in demanding a full compliment of SS-18's. It, therefore, might be advisable for this
Committee to consider the adoption of a new heavy missile counting rule with an
effective date several years in the future to allow the Soviets ample time to make
the necessary adjustments in their arsenal.
The value of the SS-18 is fully realized when evaluating the most often cited
nuclear exchange scenario— one in which the United States accepts a Soviet first
strike from its land-based ICBM force. With continuing improvements in Soviet
missile accuracy we could expect to lose more than half of our retalj-^.tory capability
during such an attack while the Soviets would retain as much as 75-80 percent of
their strike potential. This indeed is a rather shocking possibility and one which
should encourage our war planners to reconsider the wisdom of accepting a Soviet
first/ st^riiC6
We believe that one of the most effective ways of countering the SS-18 is to
minimize the damage inflicted by the weapon through the adoption of a "launch on
warning" policy. It s rather obvious that Soviet weapons experts have built such
explosive power into the SS-18 for one reason— to give it a hard target kill capabili-
ty, the sort of hard targets found in and around U.S. missile silos. If we adopt a
policy under which the S'^-18 would strike an empty silo then we have (1) substan-
tially reduced the effectiveness of an otherwise inflexible weapons system and (2)
created some doubt in the minds of Soviet war planners; thereby, reducing their
confidence that a Soviet victory can be achieved as a result of nuclear exchange.
I will expand upon our justification for "launch on warning" later in my state-
ment.
Our third major concern over the pending treaty deals with the failure of includ-
ing the Soviet Backfire bomber as a strategic nuclear delivery vehicle under terms
of the agreement. There is general agreement that the Backfire can reach targets in
the continental United States by aerial refueling or by making one-way flights.
We have two recommendations to make relevent to the Backfire bomber. The first
is that the Soviet Union be required to sign and officially acknowledge the letter
162
presented by Secretary General Brezhnev to President Carter which promised that
the bomber would not be deployed in an intercontinental mode and that its produc-
tion would not exceed 30 per year. Our second recommendation is that the United
States develop and deploy a similar number of comparable aircraft.
Another aspect of the treaty that especially disturbs us is the provision regarding
the encryption of telemetry data. The treaty prohibits the encoding of radios missile
test data that would be needed to verify compliance with the treaty. Each side,
however, is allowed to determine whether or not such data would be needed to
"verify compliance." Our recommendation is that both sides formally agree not to
encrypt any missile data.
Putting this matter in its simplest terms, we know that the United States does
not engage in the practice of encrypting telemetry and that the Soviets have
promised not to encrypt any telemetry which would impede verification. It seems
only logical that both sides should agree to ban all encryption. Such a ban would be
a demonstration of Soviet good faith as well as a commitment by them to the
maintenance of a verifiable treaty.
We are also concerned that the treaty's Protocol, which bans the development or
flight testing of ICBM's from mobile launchers and the deployment of cruise mis-
siles with ranges of more than 600 kilometers until the end of 1981 will "assume a
life of its own , and that the United States will give into Soviet demands that the
Protocol remain in force during the course of the SALT III negotiations. We recom-
mend that the Senate approve an understanding or reservation stating that the
Protocol will expire on schedule unless its extension is specifically approved by the
Senate.
There are those who argue that the Senate already has the power to veto an
extension of this or any other treaty protocol. However, our reasons for seeking
such an expression by the Senate is to put you and your colleagues firmly on record
and to put the Soviets on notice that there will be no tampering with the Protocol
termination date.
We also agree with critics of the SALT II Treaty who express concern that the
treaty may prevent us from transferring cruise missile and other technology to our
NATO allies. We believe it necessary that the Senate clarify U.S. intentions regard-
ing technology transfer by adopting a reservation or understanding. It is very clear
to anyone who considers himself a student of arms limitation talks that our NATO
allies in Western Europe have more than a passing interest in the pending agree-
ment. The Soviets view themselves as a people surrounded by enemies — a percep-
tion which has led to upgrading the armament of Warsaw Pact nations in Eastern
Europe. The activity, of course, poses a direct threat to the NATO nations and
demands a realistic response.
Since the Soviets would rather the United States not assist NATO in improving
its defenses, especially in the area of nuclear weaponry, they have disputed the U.S.
right to continue to exchange nuclear weapons technology with Western Euroj>e. A
Senate understanding that nothing in the treaty precludes a continuation of U.S.
technology transfer with NATO would reaffirm our commitment to the alliance and
would create Soviet uneeisiness over having a formidable opposing nuclear strike
force on the same continent.
We believe that such a Senate expression would provide the additional service of
promoting a continental balance between the NATO alliance and the Warsaw Pact
nations; thereby, creating a stabilizing factor. Maintaining a viable nuclear strike
force in Europe also gives the Soviet war planners yet another contingency to be
concerned with, a fact which we believe reduces the threat of nuclear war.
Another step we should take to bolster the security and confidence of our NATO
allies is to deploy updated theatre nuclear weapons in Europe to help offset the
Soviet SS-20 intermediate range missile, which was not covered by the treaty. By
the early 1980's the Soviets are expected to have deployed in Eastern Europe 300
SS-20's with 3 warheads each.
Mr. Chairman, The American Legion also seeks an adjustment in the procedure
for reporting treaty violations. The treaty now provides that all actual or suspected
violations be reported to a standing commission for consideration. We proposed a
reservation or understanding that would require a simultaneous reporting of all
such actual or suspected violations to the Senate for referral to the appropriate
committee. Such reporting of violations would strengthen the U.S. commitment to
force Soviet compliance with the agreement.
Our final recommendation to correct what we consider to be a flaw in the treaty
deals with the agreed statements and common understandings. It appears as though
these explanations of treaty provisions have been presented as separate documents
and, therefore, not subject to the ratification process. If this is the case— and we
defer to your ruling on the matter — then we demand formal Soviet agreement that
163
these statements and understandings be made part of the treaty text. The treaty
would be simply unmanageable without such an agreement.
Mr. Chairman, we have called for several modifications of the treaty some of
which seek amendments to the language and others which seek unilateral declara-
tions by your and your colleagues. And there is little doubt in my mind that The
American Legion will be accused of proposing so called "killer amendments" and.
accused of trying to sabotage the treaty.
I began my statement by saying that our organization has historically endorsed
the concept of limiting strategic arms. I came here today with that attitude and
presented these recommended modifications in that spirit. In fact, our organization
would have been happy if both sides were forced to reduce their strategic arsenals
by 50 percent or more. But, of course, we realize that such reductions ignore the
realities of negotiating an arms agreement in an environment of unprecedented
weapons production.
I have asked you to consider three amendments — to address the overwhelming
Soviet advantage in heavy missiles; to prohibit the encryption of telemetry; and to
insure that agreed statements and understandings are legally binding. The first of
these creates obvious negotiating difficulties but the existing treaty provisions
simply guarantee the Soviets a superior hard target kill capability which must be
addressed in one of the ways we've recommended. The issue of heavy missiles will
continue to be a problem during SALT III and beyond unless we stand firm. The
second and third recommended amendments do not seek any significant changes in
the terms of the treaty. They are honest attempts at (1) making the agreement more
verifiable and (2) insuring that its provisions are precise enough to be manageable.
Up to this point we have recommended certain amendments to the treaty, reser-
vations by the Senate, or weapons programs to help compensate for Soviet strategic
advantages. These measures alone, however, are insufficient to assure "essential
equivalence" and effective deterrence. As I mentioned earlier, our organization
believes that the time has come to reconsider our fundamental nuclear strategy.
Our present strategy essentially dates back to the early 1960's when Defense
Secretary McNamara ordered a study to, for the first time, determined the specific
criteria of effective deterrence to serve as a guide for U.S. nuclear war planners. We
wanted to determine how much capability the United States would need, after
absorbing a Russian first strike, to retaliate and inflict "unacceptable damage" on
the Soviet Union. His planners concluded that the "unacceptable damage" thresh-
hold was the destruction of 20-25 percent of Russia's population and at least 50
percent of its industrial capacity. Any capability beyond that would be "overkill"
and could only "rearrange the rubble".
McNamara s "Assured destruction" led to the concept of MAD (Mutual Assured
Destruction) toward the end of the 1960's, by which time the Soviet Union had
developed a roughly equivalent strategic posture. The MAD concept denies any
significance to superiority in force levels, makes "sufficiency" the standard of deter-
rent capability, and requires that deterrence be mutual. Professor Richard Pipes
summed up the MAD concept with the ironic comment that "to feel secure the
United States actually requires the Soviet Union to have the capacity to destroy it".
To avoid upsetting mutual deterrence, the MAD concept requires that neither side
should threaten the survivability of the other's retaliatory forces.
U.S. nuclear strategy underwent another modification in 1974, when Defense
Secretary James Schlesinger, who continued to adhere to the Assured Destruction
concept, made explicit a second goal, that the U.S. Strategic forces should be
capable of limited attacks on selected economic or military targets, to provide the
President with "limited nuclear options" in situations short of an all-out nuclear
strike on U.S. cities.
During a recent appearance before this committee, Defense Secretary Brown
stated that, "We have today . . . survivable forces capable of massive destruction of
Soviet cities and industry, even after an all-out surprise attack on our forces by the
Soviets. We also have both the forces and the targeting and employment policies to
allow selective use of nuclear force to respond to more limited provocations". Thus
the Carter administration essentially retains the strategy of the previous adminis-
tration, the concept of assured destruction tempered with the concept of "limited
nuclear options".
It is evident that since the early 1960's we have taken what is essentially a
"second strike" posture. We have indicated, directly and indirectly and at the
highest levels, that we would absorb a first strike, and our basic strategy has
centered around that assumption. In recent months, high-ranking U.S. officials have
on several occasions sought to suggest that the United States might not absorb the
first blow, but in each instance they have hastened to add" of course, that is not our
164
policy", or some other disclaimer. If their intent was to inject an element of doubt
into the minds of Soviet war planners, it is doubtful that they have succeeded.
The only problem with the Mutual Assured Destruction thesis is that it is not
mutual. Western experts on Soviet military thought agree almost unanimously that
Soviet strategists have never regarded nuclear war as unthinkable or unwinnable.
In the words of one American analyst. "The only Soviet 'doctrine' is found in its
concept of fighting and winning nuclear wars".
Thus the Soviets refuse to accept any concept that would increase Soviet vulner-
ability, and believe that "deterrence" cannot lead to "victory" and that there is no
sense in absorbing an enemy strike merely to retaliate. During the SALT I negotia-
tions, the American delegation officially disavowed the "launch on warning' con-
cept which, it claimed, could result in automatic escalation or even in starting a
nuclear war by accident. But efforts to elicit a statement on Soviet policy toward
"launch on warning" met with silence. The only Soviet response was that such
matters went beyond the proper scope of the SALT talks.
Soviet military writers have clearly and consistently indicated that the Soviet
Union will, if attacked, "launch on warning". That policy was affirmed by Secretary
Brezhnev at the 24th Congress of the CPSU: "Any potential aggressor is well aware
that any attempt to launch a missile attack on our country would be met by
devastating retaliation." This fundamental difference in strategic outlook helps
explain the Soviet Union's relative lack of concern over the vulnerability of its
ICBM silos. At present, its land-based ICBM's carry about 70 percent of its strategic
warheads, which account for more than 80 percent of its megatonnage. In contrast,
U.S. ICBM's account for about 35 percent of our megatonnage.
Offensively, the Soviet Union has increasingly emphasized the deployment of
"hard target killers" — very large and accurate ICBM's such as the SS-18 s — which
according to the MAD doctrine are "destabilizing". As has been pointed out many
times in the course of the Senate SALT II hearings, by the early 1980's the Soviet
Union, with the improved accuracy of its powerful missiles, will be capable of
launching a counterforce strike that could well destroy 90 percent of our land-based
ICBM's (which account for about 35 percent of our megatonnage), at least half of
our B-52's (which carry about half of our total nuclear explosive power), and
perhaps one-third of our nuclear submarines. As a result, our total megatonnage
would be reduced by about 60 percent with the expenditure of only about 20 percent
of the Soviet nuclear force. The number of remaining U.S. ICBM's, SLBM's, and
bombers that could reach targets in the Soviet Union would be reduced by normal
systems failures (about 15 percent), improved Soviet anti-bomber and anti-subma-
rine capabilities, and ABM s. The damage the United States could inflict on the
Soviet Union would be further limited by the Soviet civil defense system, which is
not so much intended to cope with an all-out attack on its urban/industrial centers
as to minimize the damage that might result from U.S. strategic forces that have
been significantly reduced by a Soviet first strike and by active Soviet defenses.
Since it would, for example, require more than 100 SLBM's on target to inflict 40
percent damage on a city the size of Leningrad, it is quite possible that we would
not be capable of inflicting "unacceptable damage" on the Soviet Union with our
surviving forces, largely highly vulnerable B-52's and relatively inaccurate SLBM's.
That would be especially true if we had to expend a significant percentage of our
remaining delivery vehicles on counterforce targets. But our major concern is that
in view of the enormous nuclear disparity between the United States and the Soviet
Union following a Soviet first strike our leadership, especially if the Soviets left
many major U.S. population centers untouched as "second strike hostages", may
decide not to retaliate.
Instead of opting for a "surgical" first strike aimed only at our strategic nuclear
forces, the Soviets might attempt to strike a "knock out" blow, to paralyze the
United States by destroying all significant military targets, communications instal-
lations, transportation hubs, airfields, ports, refineries, power plants, governmental
centers, etc. 'The prospect that the Soviets might opt for more than our ICBM silos
on a first strike was reinforced by the late Marshal Krylov, Commander of Strategic
Rocket Forces, who in one of the most authoritative public comments on Soviet
targeting strategy, revealed that the principal targets of his forces would be the
enemy's delivery systems and weapons storage and manufacturing sites, military
installations, military industries and centers of political-military administration,
command and control. Such a massive assault by as many as 10,000 warheads (the
Soviets are expected to have deployed about 14,000 warheads by the early 1980's
might leave us with little capability or will to retaliate.
It should be pointed out that the first half of the 1980's, during which time the
Soviets will be capable of launching a perhaps decisive counterforce strike, will
precede the scheduled deployment phase of the M-X missile system (1986-1989). It
165
will also coincide with the period during which about half of the Polaris-Poseidon
fleet may have to be retired but before the full Trident fleet has been put into
service.
In our view, the most effective way of countering the vulnerability, of preventing
our ICBM's from being knocked out, assuring the maintenance of essential equiv-
alence and effective deterrence, and lessening the temptation for the Soviet Union
to launch a counterforce or nation-paralyzing first strike, would be to adopt a
"launch on warning" posture. The adoption of such a policy would also help nullify
any strategic advantages the Soviet Union might obtain by violating the SALT II
Treaty^ by concealing more than the stipulated number of launchers, by increasing
the number of reentry vehicles in MIRVed warheads, and so forth. In other words,
no matter what the Soviet Union did would be assured of an effective deterrent.
Those who oppose the "launch on warning" policy cite two principal objections.
One is the danger of accidental war, that our radar and monitoring systems are not
sufficiently reliable. We believe that there is virtually no chance of such an "acci-
dent". General James C. Hill, Commander of NORAD/ADCOM, recently remarked
that, "We do have the capability now to detect and assess a large-scale ICBM attack
on the United States — and so notify the President," although he warned that there
are deficiencies if the objective is to extend launch on warning to flexible response
and similar kinds of graduated retaliatory actions. Our ICBM warning network
consists of a number of redundant systems. First, there are the early warning
satellites which detect missile firings at the moment of launch. Confirmation and
assessment are provided by the Ballistic Missile Early Warning System [BMEWS].
The Perimeter Acquisition Radar Attack Characterization System (formerly part of
the Safeguard anti-ballistic missile system) has been integrated into our ICBM
warning system. In addition, the PAVE PAWS coastal phased array radar system
provide radar confirmation and assessment of SLBM launches to corroborate early
detection by early warning satellite systems. We should give the highest priority to
further improving our monitoring and communications systems, with the goal of
eliminating, to the extent that is humanly possible, the chance of accidental war.
The second major objection to a "launch on warning" policy is that it would
restrict the President's ability to employ limited nuclear options. In the words of
Secretary Brown, "While I have serious doubts about whether a nuclear war, once
started, could be kept limited, it would be imprudent to place the United States in a
position in which uncontrolled escalation would be the only course we could follow.
Massive retaliation may not be appropriate, nor will its prospect be sufficiently
credible in all circumstances to deter the full range of actions we seek to prevent."
We take issue with the views that a launch on warning policy is destabilizing or
may prevent uncontrolled escalation. In the first place, the Soviet Union now has,
and has long had, such a policy. Second, if there is a destabilizing factor in the
nuclear deterrence equation it is that Soviet war planners may be at least 90
percent certain that, according to our present policy, we would absorb a first strike
no matter what its magnitude. That could tempt the Soviet Union to try for a
"knock out" blow. The possibility of their opting for such a course would be greatly
diminished if they knew that their missiles would impact on empty silos.
Furthermore, we believe that there is little likelihood that the Soviet Union
would play our game of "limited nuclear options". They would in all likelihood
attempt to inflict maximum military-economic damage on the first strike, although
perhaps leaving certain population centers "hostage" to a second strike. We would
be left with shattered military forces, a shattered economy, and a bag full of limited
nuclear options.
In sum, we believe that the United States can no longer afford to pursue a
strategic policy that would oblige us to absorb a first strike. We must make it clear
to the Soviet Union and while we will not be the first to start a nuclear war, we are
prepared to retaliate immediately. This would decrease the likelihood of nuclear
war, not increase it.
Although the adoption of a "launch on warning" posture would go a long way
toward assuring that we could maintain an effective deterrent, we realize that at
the crucial moment the President may fail to act or that there may be some
breakdown in the communications link. We, therefore, believe that the M-X pro-
gram would be a good investment. It would provide the United States with a highly
survivable back-up system and with an accurate, powerful hard-target system simi-
lar to that of the Soviet Union. But deployment of the M-X system alone is not
enough. We must recommit ourselves to the modernization of our strategic Triad—
the concept developed as the basis for providing the President certain options
during a crisis. The survivability and strike capability of our submarine fleet are
matters of debate as the aging Polaris and Poseidon ships quickly approach their
166
scheduled retirement dates. The schedules for full deployment of the Trident
system, therefore, must be accelerated.
A manned penetrating bomber capable of delivering cruise missiles close to Soviet
targets is especially critical since B-52 vulnerability to Soviet air defenses is almost
a certainty. Our nation's war planners should also examine the feasibility and cost
effectiveness of deploying a portion of our current land-based ICBM force in a
mobile mode during the early 1980's since it will be a decade before the M-X system
is fully deployed.
We are aware that these recommended actions to modernize the strategic Triad
are expensive and there are many people in this country who have expressed
concern that the SALT II hearings have provided a marketplace in which defense-
minded groups and individuals have presented military hardware shopping lists
with the totals being the costs of their support of the agreement. We present our
recommendations as necessary expenditures, whether SALT II be approved or re-
jected.
The Soviet Union is a formidable opponent but the greatest potential danger
facing our nation today in terms of its security is not the threat of any foreign
power but the unwillingness of our citizenry to pay the price of pursuing peace
through a position of strength. Regardless of the disposition of this treaty, we will
be required to step up defense spending in order to counter improvements in the
Soviet strategic arsenal.
Our final recommendation is that the United States should make a much greater
effort in civil defense preparedness. The Soviet Union has long realized that civil
defense is an integral part of strategic policy. It has devoted a good deal of effort to
"hardening" key economic and military installations and in developing evacuation
capabilities, with special emphasis on evacuating essential industrial and political
personnel. An effective civil defense system would also give the Soviets a strategic
advantage in that in the event of a developing crisis they could evacuate their major
population centers, perhaps on the pretext that they fear a U.S. preemptive strike,
thus presenting U.S. war planners with empty cities while ours are filled with
people and panic. In addition to matching the Soviet Union in strategic nuclear
weapons, we must also endeavor to match it in terms of civil defense.
In sum, Mr. Chairman, we believe that although the SALT II Treaty, if it is
adhered to fully and in good faith, has certain positive features, it also has a
number of serious deficiencies. An even greater danger than the deficiencies of the
treaty, however, is the prospect that the p>eople of the United States will be lulled
into a false sense of security and assume that the treaty will eliminate the likeli-
hood of nuclear war. We must realize that we can have peace only through
strength. The Soviet Union is already ahead of the United States in a number of
strategic areas, and by all projections we have seen, that gap will grow in the years
ahead. But if such a disparity is allowed to exist, that will be not so much the fault
of the treaty as the lack of national will, as the result of our own deliberate policies.
We are willing to support the SALT II Treaty only if we are assured that the
United States will strengthen its defenses along the lines we have outlined and the
treaty is modified in the areas that we've mentioned.
The Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Carey, and congratulations. I did
not think you were going to manage to keep your presentation
within 10 minutes. You had a 15-page statement, and you incorpo-
rated all of the major points as well.
Mr. Baugher is our next panelist. Mr. Baugher is the past chair-
man of the national governing board and present member of the
national governing board of the Ripon Society.
STATEMENT OF PETER VINCENT BAUGHER, PAST CHAIRMAN
AND PRESENT MEMBER, NATIONAL GOVERNING BOARD,
RIPON SOCIETY, WASHINGTON, D.C.*
Mr. Baugher. Good morning, Mr. Chairman.
My name is Peter V. Baugher. I am a Chicago attorney, and past
chairman of the national governing board of the Ripon Society, on
whose behalf I am testifying this morning.
' See page 170 for Mr. Baugher's prepared statement.
167
The debate over the SALT II treaty has been vigorous and far-
ranging. We are mindful, Mr. Chairman, of the serious concerns
expressed by those who feel that passage of this agreement would
threaten U.S. security. We are also aware that the treaty more
closely resembles a set of marginal regulations on the nuclear
weapons buildup already planned by the parties than it does the
strict arms control accord we would have preferred.
These considerations notwithstanding, we believe that the case
for ratification remains clear and convincing. The principal bene-
fits of SALT II can be easily summarized.
The treaty places certain qualitative and quantitative limitations
on the nuclear arms race. These limitations are not as stringent as
we had hoped, but they are nonetheless a significant improvement
over the alternative, which is to have no ceilings at all.
The proposed treaty, moreover, is verifiable, and in fact will
enhance our ability to monitor Soviet strategic forces. At a mini-
mum, the treaty's precise limits should enable the U.S. and the
U.S.S.R. to avoid building excessive forces based on worst case
estimates.
Finally, ratification of SALT II, while not impairing our efforts
to maintain strategic equality, can provide the basis for further
negotiations with the Soviet Union out of which more substantial
arms control measures, including real reductions in the number
and quality of atomic weapons, might emerge.
Opponents of SALT II argue that approval of the treaty would
jeopardize our national security. They are wrong. These critics take
an inordinately narrow view of what elements contribute to real
security. The security of this Nation depends not only upon the
status of our nuclear arsenal, but also upon the strength of our
political institutions, the health of our economy, and the will of the
American people.
Even in terms of military security, our strategic weapons can
provide little more than a "force de frappe" if U.S. conventional
forces are inadequate.
These components of national security, and the debilitating effect
of a profligate nuclear arms race upon them, have been for the
most part ignored by SALT II's opponents.
Contrary to the fears of those who oppose the treaty, SALT II's
effect upon the strategic balance will be generally favorable. The
agreement is based on the principle of "equality and equal secu-
rity." The United States no longer enjoys nuclear superiority over
the Soviets, but only an essential equivalence. SALl" II acknowl-
edges and reflects this shift in power. But the treaty is not the
cause of the shift, nor will refusing to ratify the agreement reestab-
lish our nuclear preeminence.
Indeed, while SALT II places a lid on certain improvements in
the force levels of the two countries, these limits will impinge most
immediately on the Soviet Union. By contrast, the treaty interferes
with none of the prospective U.S. nuclear defense programs now
under consideration.
It is said that we should withhold approval of the treaty because
of the Soviet Union's aggressive behavior in the Third World.
Without a doubt, Soviet conduct has been disruptive and provoca-
tive. Clearly, our attitudes toward the Soviet Union and our will-
168
ingness to enter into agreements with it are, as a practical matter,
linked to what the Soviets do in other parts of the world.
We do not negotiate with the Soviet Union, however, because we
admire its policies. We negotiate with the U.S.S.R. because it is to
our advantage in the long run to compete diplomatically, political-
ly, and economically, rather than just militarily. The SALT II
agreement must accordingly be evaluated on its own merits. It
ought to be ratified because it offers significant benefits to the
United States, and not defeated because our adversary shows every
sign of continuing to displease us.
Finally, the rejection of SALT II would inevitably heighten ten-
sions between the United States and the U.S.S.R. The political
repercussions of such new tensions could adversely affect our allies,
as well, who rely on us to manage a stable East- West relationship.
Rejection of the SALT II Treaty would also further undermine the
credibility of the Carter administration and its ability to manage
our international relations. While as Republicans we have fre-
quently been critical of the administration's foreign policy, as
Americans we believe that it is important to present a reasonably
unified front to the rest of the world, and especially to the Soviet
Union.
Secretary of Defense Brown and General Jones both testified
that, while today our nuclear forces are essentially equivalent to
those of the U.S.S.R., the trend is that the Soviets will possess
advantages in most of the major indicators of strategic force within
the next few years. In particular our land-based ICBM's are pro-
jected to be critically vulnerable by the mid-1980's.
The danger of this deterioration in our once dominant strategic
position is not that the Soviets would be tempted to launch a
nuclear first strike against the United States. In view of the very
substantial U.S. retaliatory capacity that would survive any Soviet
attack, this eventuality seems highly unlikely.
Rather, as General Jones suggested, the growing disparity would
probably be reflected in a more confident Soviet leadership, in-
creasingly inclined toward adventuresome behavior in areas where
our interests might clash, and where America's ability to respond
by conventional means could be circumscribed. This is not a devel-
opment the United States can afford to permit.
The trend to which I refer has emerged over the past 15 years as
a consequence of unilateral decisions by the United States and the
U.S.S.R. It is not the result of SALT, nor will ratification of the
proposed agreement in any way aggravate our problem. Indeed, in
that it places limits on the further growth of the parties' atomic
forces, it should act to stabilize the arms race and to minimize
whatever apparent strategic advantage the Soviets may have
achieved by the first half of the next decade.
SALT II, however, is not a substitute for a strong defense; nor
are America's hopes for SALT III an alternative to an ongoing
program of upgrading our strategic forces. This means that within
the life of the SALT II Treaty, the United States must develop and
deploy several major new atomic weapons systems and modernize
those strategic systems already in existence.
As the fact of the Soviet arms buildup has become more general-
ly known, many have assumed that the solution to our projected
169
strategic deficiencies is to bolster the military budget — typically by
3 to 5 percent, in real dollars. This approach misses the mark. The
new weapons systems we need will be costly, but this is exactly
why the multibillion dollar programs now envisioned must be
judged on an individual basis, not as part of a mandatory quota for
overall spending. Dollars alone will not buy national defense.
In order to meet the Soviet challenge and to maintain strategic
parity we may be required to boost our real outlays for defense by
5 percent or more every year for the next 5 to 10 years. But this is
a conclusion that should be reached after the relative cost-effective-
ness of each potential new weapons system has been carefully
evaluated. It is not a goal to be sought as an end in itself.
One way of meeting the Soviet military challenge is to augment
and modernize our forces. Another is to challenge the Soviet Union
to engage in negotiations about actual reductions of nuclear arma-
ments, not just limitations. We advocate that these approaches be
pursued concurrently.
It is ironic that the SALT debate has become a debate on rear-
mament. The problem, unfortunately, is endemic to arms limita-
tion talk, in which the Soviet Union exhibits little interest in
curbing the weapons race. The Soviet military buildup has been
underway now for 15 years. It began before formal SALT negotia-
tions were inaugurated, and it has continued unabated during the
period following the war in Vietnam when U.S. defense spending
declined markedly.
Under these conditions arms control talks with the Soviet Union
have too frequently served to ratify and legitimize the U.S.S.R.'s
latest plans for military expansion. There is no reason to believe
that SALT III will offer any more meaningful opportunity. The
United States entered the negotiations for SALT I with a pro-
nounced superiority in strategic weapons, and commenced the
SALT II talks with a lesser but still significant advantage. The
likelihood is that SALT III will begin with the Soviets expecting
strategic supremacy by the end of these negotiations.
In such circumstances, the promise of any real arms reduction is
illusory. Our best hope is to obtain agreement for a SALT III
reduction in arms now, while the United States still retains the
power to forestall this shift in the strategic balance. If there are to
be substantial weapons cutbacks in SALT III, the mandate for
those cuts must be written into SALT II.
Toward this end. Senator Mojmihan has proposed an amendment
to the treaty, directing that the United States an'^. the Soviet
Union "effect Significant and substantial reductions in the num-
bers of strategic offensive arms consistent with the requirement for
the maintenance of essential strategic equivalence." If the parties
were unable to conclude such an agr3ement by December 31, 1981,
SALT II would terminate on that date.
Unlike some other proposals that have been made to force the
pace of the SALT III negotiations, such an amendment would not
require undoing the substantive terms of the present SALT II
treaty. A less demanding alternative that could still improve the
chances for a "deep cut" SALT III agreement would be to amend
the resolution of ratification to include a set of explicit and appro-
170
priately ambitious guidelines for the next round of negotiations.
These kinds of approaches deserve your support.
The SALT II Treaty should be approved because it is a useful, if
modest, step in the long-range process of controlling nuclear arma-
ments. But if the SALT process itself is to be preserved, the time
has come to face the real issues and the real prospects of substan-
tial arms reductions.
We hope that your committee wdll recommend the incorporation
of a SALT III mandate into the existing agreement and urge that
the Senate give its advice and consent to the treaty as so amended.
Thank you.
[Mr. Baugher's prepared statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Peter V. Baugher
Mr. Chairman, and Members of the Committee on Foreign Relations: I appreciate
this opportunity to appear befor you to urge that the Senate give its advice and
consent to ratification of the proposed Treaty on the Limitation of Strategic Offen-
sive Arms (SALT II).
INTRODUCTION
My name is Peter V. Baugher. I am a Chicago attorney and a member of the
Chicago Council on Foreign Relations. I also serve on the Republican National
Committee's Advisory Council on National Security and International Affairs and
am past Chairman of the National Governing Board of the Ripon Society, on whose
behalf I am testifying this morning.
Over the past two decades the Ripon Society has studied and taken positions on
many issues of major public importance. Few matters have commanded as much
attention, or aroused as much controversy, though, as has the debate over the SALT
II Treaty. The agreement now before this Committee bears not only upon our
military security and international political relations, but also on what America's
role in the world ought to be, whether we are strong enough to carry out that role,
and whether the American sun is rising or setting on the world scene. SALT II has
thus taken on sjrmbolic importance far exceeding its value as an agreement to limit
nuclear weapons. In evaluating the Treaty we are mindful of the serious concerns
expressed by those who believe its passage would threaten U.S. security. We are
also aware that SALT II more closely resembles a set of marginal regulations on the
nuclear weapons build-up already planned by the parties than it does the strict
arms control accord we would have preferred. These considerations notwithstand-
ing, we believe that the case for ratification remains clear and convincing.
the benefits of salt II
The testimony on nuclear diplomacy received by this Committee during the last
two months has been characterized by a high level of sophistication and expertise.
The principal benefits of SALT II can nevertheless be easily summarized. The
Treaty places certain carefully defined quantitative and qualitative limitations on
the nuclear arms race, which — if permitted to proceed unchecked — would be mili-
tarily and politically hazardous, and which could impose the burden of massive
additional defense spending upon our citizens. These limitations are not as stringent
as we had hoped. But they are nonetheless a significant improvement over the
alternative, which is to have no ceilings at all. The proposed Treaty, moreover, is
verifiable, and in fact will enhance our ability to monitor Soviet strategic forces. At
a minimum the Treaty's precise and agreed upon limits, reinforced by the greater
knowledge each side will have of the other's capabilities, should enable the U.S. and
U.S.S.R. to avoid building excessive forces based on "worst-case" estimates. Finally,
ratification of SALT II, while not impairing our efforts to maintain strategic equali-
ty, can provide the basis for further negotiations with the Soviet Union out of which
more substantial arms control measures, including real reductions in the number of
quality of atomic weapons, might emerge.
More specifically, the major advantages of the SALT II Treaty may be enumer-
ated as follows:
First, the proposed agreement sets important quantitative limitations on the
number of strategic delivery vehicles. Both sides agree in Article III of the Treaty to
the imposition of a common aggregate ceiling (2,400 initially, to be reduced to 2,250
171
by the end of 1981) on ICBM (intercontinental ballistic missile) launchers, SLBM
(submarine-launched ballistic missile) launchers, and heavy bombers. This will
compel the Soviets to dismantle or destroy over 250 of the missile launchers or
heavy bombers they now have deployed. By contrast, because we are below the
SALT II limits, the United States could actually increase the number of launchers
and heavy bombers it deploys.
Article V of the Treaty also places equal subceilings on specific categories of
launchers. There is a limit of 1,320 on the combined total of MIRVed ICBM and
SLBM launchers, together with heavy bombers equipped to carry long-range, air-
launched cruise missiles (Paragraph 1). The total number of MIRVed launchers
cannot exceed 1,200 (Paragraph 2), and the number of MIRVed ICBM launchers —
potentially the most destabilizing weapon system — is restricted to a maximum of
820 (Paragraph 3).
Second, Article IV of the proposed agreement contains a number of qualitative
restraints. The Treaty freezes the number of warheads on existing types of ICBM's
(Paragraph 10) and establishes ceilings of 14 and 10, respectively, on the number of
warheads that can be placed on SLBM's and on any new type of ICBM (Paragraph
11). SALT II, further, bans new ICBM's and new SLBM's that are larger in throw-
weight than the largest current light ICBM, the Soviet SS-19 (Paragraph 7). The
Treaty permits production of only one new type of light ICBM for each side (Para-
graph 9). Article IV also limits improvements to existing t5T>es of ICBM's in such
characteristics as throw-weight, launch-weight, number of warheads, length, diame-
ter, and fuel type.
"There are other qualitative constraints in the Treaty. SALT II (Paragraph 5 of
Article IV) bans rapid missile reload systems which, if made workable, could greatly
multiply the military capabilities of ICBM launchers. To reinforce this restriction,
storage of excess missiles near launch sites is also barred. In addition, Article IX of
the Treaty prohibits development, testing, and deplojTnent of seabed, outer space,
and a variety of other types of weapons not yet deployed by either side.
Third, under the terms of Articles XV, XVI, and XVII of the proposed agreement
our ability to monitor Soviet Strategic systems will be protected and enhanced.
Deliberate concealment measures that impede verification, such as encryption of the
telemetry associated with missile tests, are banned by SALT II, as is any interfer-
ence with national technical means of verification. The Treaty, moreover, requires
the parties to exchange information on the numbers, sizes, and kinds of their
strategic systems, and to notify one another in advance about all planned ICBM
launches. Through the Standing Consultative Commission (Article XVII), an institu-
tional mechanism for discussing compliance and verification problems is also made
available to the parties.
Fourth, ratification of the proposed agreement will facilitate continuation of the
SALT process. The talks on limitation of strategic armaments begun by President
Nixon in 1969, buoyed by the signing of the ABM Treaty and Interim SALT
agreement in 1972, and accelerated by President Ford at Vladivostok in 1974, may
now progress to a new level of negotiations — SALT III— sustaining the forward
momentum generated by the successful conclusions of SALT I and II.
THE ARGUMENTS AGAINST THE TREATY
Opponents of the SALT II agreement argue that approval of the Treaty would
jeopardize our national security. They are wrong. These critics take an inordinately
narrow view of what elements contribute to real security. The security of this
nation depends not only upon the status of our nuclear arsenal, but also upon the
strength of our political institutions, the health of our economy, and the will of the
American people. Even in terms of military security, our strategic weapons can
provide little more than a "force de frappe,' if U.S. conventional forces — those we
are most likely to rely upon in anything short of a nuclear catastrophe — are
inadequate. These components of national security, and the debilitating effect of a
profligate nuclear arms race upon them, have for the most part been ignored by
SALT II's opponents.
Contrary to the fears of those who oppose the Treaty, SALT II's effect upon the
strategic balance will be generally favorable. The agreement is based on the princi-
ple of "equality and equal security" (Preamble); the United States no longer enjoys
nuclear superiority over the Soviets, as it once did, but only an "essential equiv-
alence". SALT II acknowledges and reflects this shift in power. But the Treaty is
not the cause of the shift, nor will refusing to ratify the agreement reestablish our
nuclear preeminence.
Indeed, while SALT II places a lid on certain improvements in the force levels of
the two countries, these limits will impinge most immediately on the Soviet Union.
By contrast, the Treaty interferes with none of the prospective U.S. nuclear defense
48-260 0-79 Pt.U - 12
172
programs now under consideration — the M-X missile, the Trident submarine and
missiles, air, sea, and ground-launched cruise missiles, a cruise missile carrier, or a
possible new bomber. Should we decide to fund these programs, nothing in the
Treaty would prevent us from moving ahead with them on schedule.
Similarly, nothing in Article XII of the Treaty or elsewhere will prevent us from
continuing nuclear and conventional military cooperation with our allies. In partic-
ular, SALT II does not apply to "Eurostrategic weapons" — those nuclear forces
deployed in Europe — and we are free therefore to implement our announced plan to
modernize and upgrade NATO's strategic capabilities. For this reason, among
others, all of our European allies have endorsed the proposed agreement.
It is said that we should withhold approval of the Treaty because of the Soviet
Union's aggressive behavior in the Third World. Without a doubt Soviet conduct in
Africa, Asia, and the Middle East — and, as we learned only this week, its stationing
of combat troops in Cuba — has been disruptive and provocative. Clearly, our atti-
tudes toward the Soviet Union and our willingness to enter into agreements with it
are, as a practical matter, "linked" to what the Soviets (or their representatives) do
in other parts of the world.
We do not negotiate with the Soviet Union, however, because we admire its
policies. We negotiate with the U.S.S.R. because it is to our advantage, in the long
run, to compete diplomatically, politically, and economically, rather than just mili-
tarily. The SALT II agreement must accordingly be evaluated on its own merits. It
ought to be ratified because it offers significant benefits to the United States and
not defeated because our adversary shows every sign of continuing to displease us.
Finally, any examination of the consequences of approving SALT II must be
accompanied by an assessment of what is likely to happen if the Senate refuses to
give its consent to this agreement. The defeat of SALT II would inevitably heighten
tensions between the United States and the U.S.S.R., further eroding whatever may
be left of detente. The political repercussions of such new tensions could also
adversely affect our allies, who rely on us to manage a stable East-West relation-
ship. Rejection of the Treaty would tend, additionally, to reinforce the Soviet's
apparent belief that the only way to attain security is to act unilaterally, and
belligerently, to improve their position as a world power.
Beyond this, we are now engaged in a wide range of arms control ventures with
the Soviet Union and other nations. Although ratification of SALT II will not
guarantee success in these other arms control efforts, the failure of SALT II would
almost certainly damage them, perhaps fatally. In addition to the collapse of the
SALT process itself, the most important casualty of nonratification would be our
attempt to halt the spread of nuclear weapons through the 1968 Nonproliferation
Treaty, Article VI of which commits all parties — including the United States and
the Soviet Union — "to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures
relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date." Nations now poised
on the brink of producing nuclear weapons might well use the breakdown of SALT
as an excuse (or a reason) to reconsider their own commitment to the Nonprolifera-
tion Treaty. It is also likely that rejection by the United States of the SALT II
agreement would impair our ongoing negotiations with the Soviets on a comprehen-
sive nuclear test ban, on the prohibition of antisatelli.e weaponry, and on mutual
and balanced force reductions in Europe.
Defeat of the SALT II Treaty would also further undermine the credibility of the
Carter Administration and its ability to manage our international relations. While
as Republicans we have frequently been critical of the Administration's foreign
policy, as Americans we believe that it is important to present a reasonably unified
front to the rest of the world, and especially to the Soviet Union. This does not
mean that the Senate should abdicate its constitutional r>3sponsibility to pass upon
all treaties between the United States and other nations. It does mean, however,
that in judging such treaties allowance must be made for the President's role as the
chief architect and m.anager of our foreign relations.
CLARIFICATION OF TREATY AMBIGUITIES
Like any negotiated agreement, the SALT II Treaty is not without problems. In
the context of an accord supposedly premised upon equality, we are concerned about
the Soviet Union's unilateral right to deploy 308 modern large ballistic missiles
(MLBM), a carryover from SALT I. Clearly, the desired result would have been a
major cutback in Soviet MLBM's in order to have reduced the U.S.S.R.'s substantial
throw-weight advantage over the United States. For the time being, limiting the SS-
18 to 10 warheads provides a significant restraint on their MLBM potential, but
obtaining sizeable reductions in the number of these heavy weapons should be one
of our major objectives in future negotiations.
173
Lest there be any confusion about U.S. intentions with respect to certain poten-
tially ambiguous provisions of the Treaty, the Senate should ratify SALT II subject
to the following understandings: (1) It should be made clear that the Protocol which,
among other things, bars until January 1, 1982, the deplo3Tnent of ground and sea-
launched cruise missiles with ranges of more than 600 kilometers, cannot be ex-
tended without the advice and consent of the Senate; (2) In order to clarify the
limited scope of our obligations under article XII, the so-called "non-circumvention"
clause, the Senate should state that nothing in the Treaty prohibits the United
States from continuing traditional patterns of allied defense co-operation, including
the transfer of cruise missile technology if it deems such a transfer necessary; (3)
President Brezhnev's statement delivered to President Carter at Vienna on June 16,
1979, pledging that the Soviet Union would not build more than 30 Backfire bomb-
ers a year and that it would not deploy them for intercontinental missions, should
be made a formal part of the Treaty.
These suggested understandings are modest and would not require renegotiation
of the agreement. They would, on the other hand, highlight several ambiguities in
SALT II which, if not resolved now, could conceivably lead to serious disagreements
after the Treaty has gone into effect.
MEETING THE SOVIET MILITARY CHALLENGE
From the outset of these hearings it has been conceded that the days of U.S.
nuclear supremacy are past, and that the momentum of atomic weapons develop-
ment belongs now to the Soviet Union. Secretary of Defense Harold Brown and
General David Jones of the Joint Chief of Staff both testified that, while today our
nuclear forces are essentially equivalent to those of the U.S.S.R., the trend is that
the Soviets will possess advantages in most of the major indicators of strategic force
within the next few years. In particular, our land-based ICBM's are projected to be
critically vulnerable by the mid-1980's.
The danger of this deterioration in our once dominant strategic position is not
that the Soviets would be tempted to launch a nuclear first strike against the
United States. In view of the very substantial U.S. retaliatory capacity that would
survive any Soviet attack, this eventuality seems highly unlikely. Rather, as Gener-
al Jones suggested, the growing disparity would probably be reflected in a more
confident Soviet leadership, increasingly inclined toward adventurous behavior in
areas where our interests might clash, and where America's ability to respond by
conventional means could be circumscribed. "Such a situation," the General
warned, "would carry the seeds of serious miscalculation and run the risk of
precipitating a confrontation which neither side wanted nor intended." Plainly, this
is not a development the United States can afford to permit.
This trend, which (if allowed to continue) will tip the strategic balance precarious-
ly toward the Soviets, has emerged over the past 15 years as a consequence of
unilateral decision by the United States and the U.S.S.R. to invest at sharply
different rates in the acquisition of nuclear armaments. It is not the result of SALT,
nor will ratification of the proposed agreement in any way aggravate our problem.
Indeed, in that it places limits on the further growth of the parties' atomic forces, it
should act to stabilize the arms race and to minimize whatever apparent strategic
advantage the Soviets may have achieved by the first half of the next decade. SALT
II, however, is not a substitute for a strong defense; nor, regrettably, are America's
hopes for SALT III an alternative to an ongoing program for the upgrading of our
strategic forces.
This means that within the life of the SALT II Treaty the United States must
develop and deploy several major new atomic weapons systems and modernize those
strategic systems already in existence. As the fact of the Soviet arms buildup has
become more generally known, many have assumed that the solution to our project-
ed strategic deficiencies is to bolster the military budget — typically, by three to five
percent in real dollars. This approach misses the mark.
The new weapons systems we need will be costly. But this is exactly why the
multi-billion dollar programs now envisioned — whether one is speaking of the M-X
missile with its several competing basing modes (each more expensive than the
next), the Trident submarine or Trident missiles, the several varieties of cruise
missiles, or the B-1 bomber — must be judged on an individual basis, not as part of a
mandatory quota for overall spending. Dollars alone will not buy national defense.
Congressman Joseph Addabbo of New York, Chairman of the House Subcommit-
tee on Defense Appropriations, commented on this subject last month (CJongression-
al Record, August 2, 1979, pp. 7184-7185):
There is a limit to what we can afford to spend each year [on defense], yet
there are certain levels of capability that we must maintain. It is clear that we
174
are spending more and getting less for it, year by year, and that the tough
years lie ahead, not backward.
Budget officers, be they civilian or military, tend to stockpile dollars for a
rainy day. We just cannot afford to let them do this any longer, nor can we
begin a procurement unless we are reasonably sure that it will do the job it is
supposed to do when it comes into the inventory, and unless we are reasonably
sure it can be produced in line with what we anticipate, and unless we are sure
it is not low on the priority list.
These problems have been exacerbated by the failure of the Department of
Defense to improve its weapons program review capability. Without a strengthened
independent review effort it would be wasteful to increase the Pentagon's budget, no
matter how unfavorable the balance of forces might become.
In order to meet the Soviet challenge and to maintain strategic parity we may be
required to boost our real outlays for defense by five percent or more every year for
the next five to ten years. But this is a conclusion that should be reached after the
relative cost-effectiveness of each potential new weapons system has been carefully
evaluated. It is not a goal to be sought as an end in itself.
CHALLENGING THE SOVIET UNION
One way of meeting the Soviet military challenge is to augment and modernize
our strategic (and conventional) forces. Another is to challenge the Soviet Union to
engage in negotiations about actual reductions in nuclear armaments, not just
limitations.' We advocate that these approaches be pursued concurrently.
It is ironic that the SALT debate has become (as Senator Moynihan recently
remarked) a "debate on rearmament." The problem, unfortunately, is endemic to
arms limitation talks in which the Soviet Union exhibits little interest in curbing
the weapons race. The Soviet military buildup has been underway now for 15 years.
It began before formal SALT negotiations were inaugurated in 1969, and it has
continued unabated during the period following the war in Vietnam when U.S.
defense spending declined markedly. It has never ceased because the Soviets have
thus far been unwilling to give up the advantages they perceive in acquiring new
and ever more powerful weapons systems.
Under these conditions arms control talks with the Soviet Union have too fre-
quently served to condone and legitimize the U.S.S.R.'s latest plans for military
expansion. The agreements resulting from these talks have as often as not encour-
aged both sides (and especially the Soviet Union) to enlarge their forces to the
maximum size allowed and to attempt to exploit to the fullest whatever marginal
advantages may be discerned in the accord.
There is no reason to believe that SALT III will offer any more meaningful
opportunities. The United States entered the negotiations for SALT I with a pro-
nounced superiority in strategic weapons and commenced the SALT II talks with a
lesser but still significant advantage. The likelihood is that SALT III will begin with
the Soviets expecting strategic supremacy by the end of those negotiations. In such
circumstances, the promise of any real arms reductions is illusory.
Our best hope is to obtain agreement for a SALT III reduction in arms now, while
the United States still retains the power to forestall this shift in the strategic
balance. If there are to be substantial weapons cutbacks in SALT III, the mandate
for those cuts must be written into SALT II.
Toward this end. Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan of New York has proposed an
amendment to the Treaty that would add a new Paragraph 4 to Article XIX of the
test:
The Parties shall conclude, by December 31, 1981, an agreement which shall,
as a result of the negotiations undertaken in accordance with the Joint State-
ment of Principles and Guidelines for Subsequent Negotiations on the Limita-
tion of Strategic Arms agreed upon at Vienna on June 18, 1979, effect signifi-
cant and substantial reductions in the numbers of strategic offensive arms,
consistent with the requirement for the maintenance of essential strategic equiv-
alence. This agreement shall enter into effect immediately upon the expiration
of the present Treaty or sooner, as the Parties shall decide. If the Parties are
unable to conclude such an agreement by December SI, 1981, the present Treaty
shall terminate on that date. (Emphasis added.)
'The agenda for future negotiations must also include (1) tighter limits on the testing and
development of new weapons, (2) some kind of answer to the concern the MIRVed Soviet ICBM's
will jeopardize the survivabihty of U.S. ICBM's, (3) mutual reductions in European theatre
nuclear weapons systems, and (4) a plan for regular on-site inspection of atomic arms facilities.
175
This kind of approach deserves your support. Unlike some other proposals that
have been made to force the pace of the SALT III negotiations, such an amendment
would not require undoing the substantive terms of the present SALT II Treaty. A
less demanding alternative that could still improve the chances for a "deep cut"
SALT III agreement of the kind we seek would be to amend the resolution of
ratification to include a set of explicit guidelines for the next round of negotiations.
This list of objectives would operate similarly to the amendment to SALT I which
required that future weapons limitations impose equal aggregate ceilings on both
countries.
As Senator Moynihan noted in advancing his proposal:
This much is certain: Our margin for error in SALT has disappeared. We
must rescue the "process" from itself; otherwise, it will present us with ever
more unappealing choices. We must recover for SALT the possibility of arms
limitation and genuine arms reductions. This, so it seems to me, is the major
contribution the Senate can make to preservation of the SALT process that the
President, and others, seek. We must at least make the effort.
This is a challenge, Mr. Chairman, worthy of the United States. The SALT II
Treaty should be approved because it is a useful, if modest, step in the long-range
process of controlling nuclear armaments. But if the SALT process itself is to be
preserved, the time has come to face the real issues and the real prospects of
substantial arms reductions. We hope that your Committee will recommend the
incorporation of a SALT III mandate into the existing agreement and urge that the
Senate give its advice and consent to the Treaty as so amended.
DESCRIPTION OF THE RIPON SOCIETY
Founded in 1962, the Ripon Society is a national Republican research and policy
organization that takes its name from Ripon, Wisconsin, the birthplace of the GOP.
It has chapters in cities across the country and members in all 50 States. The
Society encourages young men and women to participate actively in public affairs.
Ripon also works to formulate the kind of sound programs that will enable our
Party to better fulfill its potential for constructive political leadership. We believe
that we can assist the GOP in identifying and claiming the issues of the future; that
we can help Republicans to raise the questions others will not ask and to grasp
ideas whose times are yet to come. Above all, the Ripon Society seeks to serve as a
spokesman for the progressive Republican tradition whose integrity and vision have
inspired the GOP throughout its history.
The Society maintains its national headquarters at 800 Eighteenth Street, N.W.,
Washington, D.C. 20006 (202-347-6477).
BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION ON PETER VINCENT BAUGHER
Peter Vincent Baugher is an attorney at Schiff Hardin & Waite law firm in
Chicago, Illinois. He was Law Clerk to Judge Philip W. Tone, United States Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, in 1973-74.
Born in Chicago in 1948, Baugher received his legal training at Yale Law School
(J.D. 1973), and his undergraduate education at Princeton University (A.B. 1970),
where he studied in the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs.
Baugher is past Chairman of the National Governing Board of the Ripon Society
and serves on the Republican National Committee's Advisory Council on National
Security and International Affairs. He is a member of the Chicago Council on
Foreign Relations, the American Council on Germany, the Economic Club of Chica-
go, and a variety of other professional, civic, and community associations.
Baugher serves on several boards of directors, including those of the Chicago
Educational Television Association (WTTW/Chicago Public Television), WFMT, Inc.
(which owns and operates WFMT-FM radio and Chicago Magazine), and the Prince-
ton Club of Chicago.
Baugher is married to the former Robin Stickney of Pacific Palisades, California.
They live at 816 Monticello Place in Evanston, Illinois.
The Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Baugher, for your statement.
Our next and final member of the panel is Mr. Herbert Scoville, a
member of the governing board of New Directions, of Washington,
D.C.
176
STATEMENT OF HERBERT J. SCOVILLE, JR., MEMBER,
GOVERNING BOARD, NEW DIRECTIONS, WASHINGTON, D.C.*
Mr. ScoviLLE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate very much
this opportunity to appear before this committee and testify on the
SALT II Treaty on behalf of New Directions. New Directions is a
citizens' lobby for world security whose fuUtime president is former
Congressman Charles W. Whalen, Jr.
I, Herbert Scoville, cochair the New Directions Task Force on
Arms Control and Disarmament with Betty Goetz Lall.
New Directions supports the SALT II Treaty and urges that it be
ratified without amendment. We believe that SALT II improves the
United States-Soviet strategic balance, takes important first steps
in controlling the offensive strategic arms race, and will improve
our knowledge of Soviet military programs, and thereby reduce the
need to procure unnecessary weapons in order to deal with an
uncertain and unlimited Soviet threat.
We believe that a failure to ratify the treaty can only result in
increased tensions, in a less secure and more unstable strategic
balance, in accelerated arms buildups, and in increased and unnec-
essary military expenditures. In such a world, the real security of
the United States will be lower, and the Nation will be less able to
deal with the critical economic and political problems facing it.
Too often in the debate over the SALT II Treaty there has been a
tendency to focus on what the treaty does not do and to pay little
attention to its positive benefits. This, in our view, has led to a
distorted picture of the contribution that this treaty will make to
our national security. We believe that it would be most useful to
consider the treaty as a glass that is half full rather than half
empty.
In my written text, I have summarized some of the important
benefits of SALT, but I believe the committee has heard these
points from many sources already, and in the interest of saving
time, I will not repeat them this morning, but I would like to
address a couple of other points which have received less attention.
While we strongly support the ratification of the SALT II Treaty,
we are increasingly concerned with a tendency during the debate
to turn the SALT II Treaty into a Christmas tree loaded with
presents to be exchanged for SALT support. We have already seen
President Carter's decision only a week before he signed the SALT
II Treaty in Vienna to proceed with a full-scale development of a
new, large model M-X missile.
We, too, are concerned about the theoretical vulnerability of the
Minuteman ICBM, but it is not clear that the weapons procure-
ment rather than the weapons limitation approach is the best way
of solving this problem. In SALT I, the United States opted to
continue the arms race in MIRVed missiles. Then the United
States was more than 5 years ahead, since the Soviet Union had
not yet carried out its first test of such a missile system. Now the
United States is paying the price for its failure to deal with this
problem through arms control. Quite predictably, the Soviets have
followed along behind the United States, and will now in the 1980's
See page 178 for Mr. Scoville's prepared statement.
177
have sufficient numbers of accurate MIRVed warheads at least to
threaten our entire ICBM force.
Now it appears that the United States may be repeating this
failure of the early 1970's by not exploring vigorously enough possi-
ble arms control solutions to ICBM vulnerability. Instead of adopt-
ing with the M-X the new weapons route, which in the long run
may not work and would cost many tens of billions of dollars, we
should be exploring every effort to seek an arms control solution to
this problem and make sure that no doors are shut that would
foreclose such an option in the future.
The most obvious approach is to establish much stricter mutual
limitations on the total number of MIRV missiles and their war-
heads.
We have also seen explicit linkage of a 5-percent increase in the
total military budget as a price for supporting SALT ratification. A
decision to increase the military budget is of paramount national
importance, not only because of its effect on our military posture,
but also because of its effect on the economy of the country.
Dollars wasted on unnecessary strategic weapons means less
money for conventional forces. Dollars spent for the military
means less money available for other pressing national needs. Dol-
lars spent for the military means increased inflationary pressures.
Dollars spent for the military means fewer people employed. All
these facts must be taken into consideration, and the decision on
what funds to spend on nonstrategic weapons should not be tied to
support for SALT.
Furthermore, since in 1985 the relative United States-Soviet stra-
tegic balance will be more favorable to the United States with the
SALT Treaty than without, logic would say that there is less need
for increased military spending if SALT were ratified than if it
were not. Thus a more appropriate linkage with SALT would be an
increased military budget if SALT is not ratified and a decreased
budget if it were.
Tying SALT support to an increased military budget is a mind-
less connection.
Finally, it would be wrong to leave the discussion of SALT II
Treaty ratification without voicing the view that the entire climate
of the ratification debate in the United States is based on a funda-
mental misconception that somehow our Nation has become or is
rapidly becoming inferior to the Soviet Union and subject to mili-
tary coercion and blackmail.
Those who urge boosting military spending above the very high
levels projected for the coming years assume that the Soviet Union
is gradually becoming dominant on the world scene and that the
United States has been standing still militarily. They ignore three
factors: one, U.S. strategic programs and strength, two, Soviet
weaknesses, and three, the unlikelihood of translating nuclear ar-
senals into political advantage.
Let me comment briefly on these points. The United States has a
secure deterrent force composed of a triad of SLBM's, ICBM's, and
long-range bombers. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, has a
less secure force, of which 75 percent are fixed land-based ICBM's
which will become increasingly vulnerable in the 1980's.
178
Furthermore, contrary to the popular impression, the United
States has not been standing still. We have been developing and
deploying new strategic weapons in vast numbers in the last 10
years. In the past decade, the United States has increased the
number of its strategic force loadings, warheads and bombs by
5,250, to nearly 10,000; the Soviets, by 3,590, to only slightly more
than 5,000.
The Soviet Union is a military superpower, and there is no way
to prevent it from having nuclear weapons that can devastate the
United States, but it, too, cannot prevent catastrophic devastation
by the United States. Furthermore, it has major economic and
political weaknesses. The inefficient Soviet economy requires its
leadership to import grain and technology from the west. Accord-
ing to CIA estimates, this dependence will increase as the growth
rate of the Soviet economy dips below 1 percent in the mid-1980's.
After six decades in power, the Soviet leadership has no big
power ally. It is bordered by a hostile China and restive eastern
European countries. Compare this situation with the close ties the
United States has with its NATO partners and with Japan.
Three, the Soviet Union has been unable to use its nuclear
weapons for political advantage or even prevent a number of devel-
opments that are inimical to Soviet power. This situation will
continue into the future unless the United States talks itself into a
position of weakness. Despite their 5,000 strategic warheads, the
Soviets were unable to prevent Pope John Paul from speaking to
millions in Poland and were unable to require Romanian accept-
ance of the military budget increased by the Warsaw Pact.
In conclusion, as the United States faces the decision to ratify or
not to ratify the SALT II Treaty, it must recognize its real strength
and stop exaggerating its weaknesses. Poormouthing military capa-
bilities can only create self-fulfilling prophecies. Statements that
the United States would not retaliate even after a Soviet attack
that killed tens of millions of Americans do more to undercut the
deterrent than all the Soviet heavy missiles.
Implying that the President would have no choice but to retali-
ate against Soviet cities is dangerously misleading, when our capa-
bility and strategy have long been to attack military targets and
the industries supporting the military.
In conclusion. New Directions believes that security lies not in
supporting a self-defeating arms race, but in taking all the steps to
end it. The ratification of the SALT II Treaty is such a step.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[Mr. Scoville's prepared statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Herbert J. Scoville, Jr.
Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, I appreciate very much this opportuni-
ty to appear before this Committee and testify on the SALT II Treaty in behalf of
New Directions. New Directions is a citizens' lobby for world security whose full-
time president is former Congressman Charles W. Whalen, Jr. I co-chair the New
Directions Task Force on Arms Control and Disarmament with Betty Goetz Lall.
New Directions supports the SALT II Treaty and urges that it be ratified without
amendment. We believe SALT II improves the United States-Soviet strategic bal-
ance, takes important first steps in controlling the offensive strategic arms race,
and will improve our knowledge of Soviet military programs and thereby reduce the
need to procure unnecessary weapons in order to deal with an uncertain and
unlimited Soviet threat. We believe that a failure to ratify the Treaty can only
result in increased tensions, in a less secure and more unstable strategic balance, in
179
accelerated arms buildups, and in increased and unnecessary military expenditures.
In such a world the real security of the United States will be lower and the nation
will be less able to deal with the critical economic and political problems facing it.
New Directions believes that a strong case can be made that with the Treaty our
security will be significantly enhanced and the dangerous arms race provided with
important brakes. Too often in the debate over the SALT II Treaty, there has been a
tendency to focus on what the Treaty does not do and to pay little attention to its
positive benefits. This, in our view, has led to a distorted picture of the contribution
that this treaty will make to our national security. We believe that it would be
useful to consider the Treaty as a glass that is half full rather than half empty.
It was never practical to expect that the SALT II Treaty would solve all our
strategic policy problems nor lead directly to the end of the arms race. Negotiated
arnis control agreements are only one means of ensuring that our security is
maintained and of reducing the burden of continued weapons procurement. Nation-
al decisions are equally important if we are to prevent new weapons from increasing
the risks that we will be embroiled in a nuclear conflict which can only lead to
catastrophic devastation of the United States and most of the world.
It is, of course, impossible to list in this testimony all of the benefits which the
SALT II agreements provide, but it might be useful to summarize some of the more
important elements.
1. The Treaty establishes ceilings on all t)^es of offensive strategic weapons,
heavy bombers as well as ballistic and cruise missiles. These ceilings are low enough
to require the Soviet Union to dismantle without replacement about 250 relatively
modern operational strategic delivery systems; therefore it establishes the precedent
of reducing weapons stockpiles rather than allowing continued buildups. Although
this cutback is only 10 percent of the Soviet strategic force, the direction of the
change is of prime importance. Furthermore, since this ceiling primarily affects the
U.S.S.R. and only marginally affects the United States, it will improve the relative
United States-Soviet strategic balance. Without this ceiling the Soviets could during
the lifetime of the Treaty increase substantially their lead in numbers of strategic
delivery vehicles.
2. The Treaty for the first time places an upper limit on the total number of
missile warheads that each side can have by setting ceilings on the number of
MIRVed missiles and the number of warheads each type of missile can carry. While
these limits are much higher than would have been desired, they will at least place
an upper range on the number of warheads, make finite the maximum threat to
U.S. land-based ICBM's and limit the potential advantage of the larger throw-
weight of Soviet ICBM's. They will provide a fixed base for possible future negotia-
tions to reduce the number of warheads on both sides to less threatening levels.
3. The Treaty will prevent the Soviets from deploying their potentially mobile SS-
16 ICBM, and the Protocol will ban the deployment of any mobile ICBM's by either
nation until 1982. The failure to include this prohibition in the Treaty lasting until
1985 is a result of the U.S. desire to keep the option open for the M-X mobile
deployment, but in the long run this loophole may prove to the U.S. security
disadvantage since deceptive mobile basing schemes, such as multiple launch point
systems, may be of greater advantage to the Soviet Union than to the United States.
Verification of future limits on ICBM's and warheads may prove very difficult, and
this could lead to a future breakdown in the ability to control the size of Soviet
strategic arsenals.
4. The Treaty includes air-launched cruise missile carriers within the 1,320 MIRV
delivery vehicle ceiling, and thus controls for the first time this new type of
strategic weapon. Without such provisions the way would be open for an uncon-
trolled race in this alternative to ballistic missiles. Long range ground- and sea-
launched cruise missiles cannot be deployed for the duration of the Protocol, but
their testing is permitted. This loophole could produce a difficult if not insoluble
problem in controlling such weapons after 1982. Although this option was kept open
in order to permit U.S. deployment of such weapons in the future, it could prove in
the long run to work to our detriment by preventing the achievement of verifiable
controls on this class of weapons.
5. The Treaty limits each side to the testing and deployment of only one new type
of ICBM. For many characteristics, modernization of existing types will now be
strictly limited so that any allowed changes would have little military significance.
For example, the launch-weight and throw-weight of current ICBM's cannot be
changed by more than 5 percent; such a change would make little military differ-
ence, particularly since the number of warheads a missile can carry cannot be
increased. However, for other characteristics, such as accuracy, no verifiable limita-
tions could be agreed upon. This loophole could not be closed, unfortunately, with-
out relaxation of U.S. standards for verifying compliance.
180
6. The Treaty contains many provisions that will improve the information on
Soviet strategic forces, without which major uncertainties could develop on the size
and nature of the Soviet strategic threat. Without the bans on deliberate conceal-
ment against national technical means of verification, the Soviets would be in a
position to adopt many techniques for denying intelligence on strategic weapons
developments to the United States. Without this intelligence the United States
would be forced to rely on worst case estimates, which could only lead to excessive
force buildups.
While we strongly supj)ort the ratification of the SALT II Treaty, we are increas-
ingly concerned with the tendency during the debate to turn the SALT II Treaty
into a Christmas tree loaded with presents to be exchanged for SALT support. We
have already seen President Carter's decision, only a week before he signed the
SALT II Treaty in Vienna, to proceed with the full-scale development of the new
large-model M-X missile. We, too, are concerned about the theoretical vulnerability
of the Minuteman ICBM. But it is not clear that the weapons-procurement rather
than the weapons-limitation approach is the best way of solving this problem. In
SALT I the United States opted to continue the arms race in MIRVed missiles when
the United States was more than 5 years ahead, since the Soviet Union had not yet
carried out a first test of such a missile system. Now the United States is paying the
price for its failure to deal with this problem through arms control; quite predict-
ably, the Soviets have followed along behind the United States and will now some
time in the 1980's have sufficient numbers of accurate MIRV warheads at least to
threaten our entire ICBM force. Now it appears that the United States is repeating
this failure of the early 1970's by not exploring vigorously enough possible arms
control solutions to ICBM vulnerability. Instead, it is adopting the new-weapons
route, which in the long run may not work and would cost many tens of billions of
dollars.
Furthermore, the decision by President Carter in June to procure the largest of
the candidate M-X missile models for full-scale development cannot be justified as a
solution to the ICBM vulnerability problem. Because of its large size, the missile
will be harder to make invulnerable than would smaller designs. In fact, the
characteristics of the new missile can only increase the potential vulnerability of
land-based ICBM's, since this M-X missile is designed to have a counter-silo capabil-
ity against Soviet ICBM's. Such a program can only force the Soviets, who rely on
fixed land-based ICBM's for 75 percent of their deterrent force, to take one or more
of the following alternative actions: (1) They could in time of crisis launch a
preemptive strike; (2) place all of their missiles on launch-on-warning, thus increas-
ing the risk of an accidental nuclear conflict, or (3) adopt a mobile basing scheme,
making it impossible for the United States to verify the number and type of missiles
which the Soviets had deployed. Each of these hurt U.S. security.
So far the Administration has not yet determined the exact basing scheme that it
will use for the new M-X missile, but it appears likely that it will involve some sort
of multiple-launch-point system. It is conceivable that a U.S. system could be de-
signed in some Rube Goldberg way so that the Soviets could verify the number of
U.S. ICBM's actually deployed. But the problem for the United States is not Soviet
verification of U.S. compliance, but instead. United States verification of Soviet
compliance. The Soviets may not find it so easy with their liquid-fueled missiles to
adopt a mobile system, a ceiling on which would be verifiable by U.S. intelligence.
Since they will feel threatened by the counter-silo capability of the United States
M-X, tliey may be forced to adopt such an unverifiable basing scheme even if it
were to lead to a breakdown of the entire SALT process. Yet, without SALT
limitation on the number of Soviet warheads the effectiveness of the multiple-
launch-point system for obtaining invulnerability for U.S. ICBM's is lost. There is
no easy solution to the ICBM vulnerability problem, and the United States should
not rush into \/eap>ons programs in order to solicit support for the SALT II Treaty
when these programs could well lead to a collapse in the efforts to establish long-
term controls on strategic nuclear weapons.
Instead, the United States should be exploring every effort to seek an arms
control solution to this problem and make sure that no doors are shut that would
foreclose such an option in the future. The most obvious approach is to establish
much stricter mutual limitations on the total number of MIRVed missiles and their
warhea<^. This should be the highest priority issue to be dealt with in the after-
math of SAL"! II. To be successful in controlling the theoretical threat to land-based
ICBM's, both negotiated agreements and difficult national decisions by the United
States and the U.S.S.R. will be required in the near future.
To date no other specific weapons programs have been directly tied to SALT
ratification, but such linkages could implicitly or explicitly develop at any time. One
can visualize attempts to get commitments for future deployment of ground- and
181
sea-launched strategic cruise missiles in exchange for SALT support. Decisions on
these weapons are very complicated and intimately related to the military and
political relationships with our NATO allies. They should not be taken hastily
during the SALT debate. The reason that provisions relating to these weapons were
placed in the Protocol, which expires in 1981, was to provide time to make these
decisions. One should not, in the heat of the SALT debate, preclude such careful
consideration.
There may also be pressures to add a new manned bomber to the SALT Christmas
tree. President Carter made the decision in 1977 against the B-1 and in favor of air-
launched cruise missiles on purely military-effectiveness grounds, not on arms-
control considerations. It would be a travesty if now a hasty decision were made to
proceed with a new manned bomber as well as cruise missiles to generate support
for an arms control agreement.
We have already seen explicit linkage of a 5 percent increase in the total military
budget as a price for supporting SALT ratification. A decision to increase the
military budget is of paramount national importance not only because of its effect
on our military posture but also of its effect on the economy of the country.
Dollars wasted on unnecessary strategic weapons means less money for conven-
tional forces.
Dollars spent for the military means less money available for other pressing
national needs.
Dollars spent for the military means increased inflationary pressures.
Dollars spent for the military means fewer people employed.
All of these facts must be taken into consideration, and the decision on what
funds to spend on non-strategic weapons should not be tied to support for SALT.
Furthermore, since in 1985 the relative United States-Soviet strategic balance will
be more favorable to the United States with the SALT Treaty than without, logic
would say that there is less need for increased military spending if SALT were
ratified than it it were not. Thus a more appropriate linkage with SALT would be
an increased military budget if SALT is not ratified and a decreased budget if it
were. Tying SALT support to an increased military budget is a mindless connection.
Finally, it would be wrong to leave the discussion of the SALT II Treaty ratifica-
tion without voicing the view that the entire climate of the ratification debate in
the United States is based on a fundamental misconception — that somehow our
nation has become or is rapidly becoming inferior to the Soviet Union and subject to
military coercion or blackmail. Yet Secretary of Defense Harold Brown said in his
January 25, 1979 Annual Report:
"National Security has always been comprised of a number of factors and has
always required a number of strengths — non-military as well as military. The
United States fortunately is by most measures the strongest nation in the world. No
other country — certainly not the Soviet Union — can compete with us in economic
power, political stability and cohesion, technological capability, national will, or
appeal as to way of life and international policies."
Those who urge boosting military spending above the very high levels projected
for the coming years assume that the Soviet Union is gradually becoming dominant
on the world scene and that the United States has been standing still militarily.
They ignore three factors: (1) U.S. strategic programs and strengths; (2) Soviet
weaknesses; and (3) the unlikelihood of translating nuclear arsenals into political
advantage.
Let me comment briefly on each of these points.
1. The United States has a secure deterrent force composed of a triad of SLBM's,
ICBM's, and long-range bombers; the Soviet Union has a less secure force of which
75 percent are fixed land-based ICBM's which will become increasingly vulnerable
in the 1980's. In the past decade the United States has increased the number of its
strategic force loadings (warheads and bombs) by 5,250 to nearly 10,000; the Soviets
by 3,590 to only slightly more than 5,000. As Dr. Kissinger once said when he
worked in the government, it is warheads, not delivery vehicles, that kill people and
destroy targets. Moreover, during the same period the United States deployed
hundreds of new Minuteman III ICBM's; upgraded its existing missiles by adding
new guidance systems and more powerful warheads; hardened the Minuteman silos;
deployed a thousand SRAM air-to-surface missiles; developed the highly accurate
air-launched cruise missiles, which will virtually nullify the large, extremely costly
Soviet Air Defense system; made major modifications in the B-52 bomber; deployed
hundreds of Poseidon MIRVed SLBM's, and developed the quieter "Trident subma-
rine and longer-range Trident I missile. The United States has not been standing
still. The United States has and will continue to have a balanced, enormously
destructive strategic deterrent, capable of retaliating after any Soviet attack and
destro3ring thousands of Soviet military and industrial targets.
182
2. The Soviet Union is a military superpower, and there is no way to prevent it
from having nuclear weapons that can devastate the United States. But it, too,
cannot prevent catastrophic devastation by the United States. Furthermore, it has
major economic and political weaknesses. The inefficient Soviet economy requires
its leadership to import grain and technology from the West. According to CIA
estimates, this dependence will increase as the growth rate of the Soviet economy
dips below 1 percent in the mid-1980's. After six decades in power, the Soviet
leadership has no big-power allies. It is bordered by a hostile China and restive East
European countries. Compare this situation with the close U.S. ties to its NATO
partners and to Japan.
3. The Soviet Union has been unable to use its nuclear weapons for political
advantage, or even to prevent a number of developments that were inimical to
Soviet power. This situation will continue into the future unless the United States
talks itself into a position of weakness. Despite their 5,000 strategic warheads, the
Soviets were unable to prevent Pope John Paul II from speaking to millions in
Poland, unable to prevent Hua Kuo-feng from visiting Eastern Europe, unable to
require Romanian acceptance of a military budget increase voted by the Warsaw
Pact, unable to exert its influence in the Middle East, and unable to dissuade the
Japanese from signing a peace treaty with China. In a world of two nuclear-armed
superpowers, there is no known way for one of them to use weapons of mass
destruction for limited political gains.
In conclusion, as the United States faces the decision to ratify or not to ratify the
SALT II Treaty, it must recognize its real strength and stop exaggerating its
weaknesses. Poor-mouthing military capabilities can only create self-fulfilling
prophecies. Statements that the United States would not retaliate, even after a
Soviet attack that killed tens of millions of Americans, do more to undercut the
deterrent than all the Soviet heavy missiles. Impljdng that the President would
have no choice but to retaliate against Soviet cities is dangerously misleading when
our capability and strategy have long been to attack military targets and the
industry supporting the military.
The SALT II agreements must be understood as useful and important steps, not
end points, toward improved security and toward controlling and reversing the
dangerous nuclear arms race. To this end we urge prompt ratification of the Treaty
without amendment. SALT II must not be asked to bear the burden of all the
complex problems of foreign relations. Neither must the ratification process be used
to adorn the SALT Christmas tree with all manner of new weapons programs, many
of which in the long run could not only decrease security but also make future
agreements to limit nuclear weapons more difficult, if not impossible. The United
States should make decisions on future military programs on the basis of its true
security needs in the light of the limitations that the SALT II Treaty provides, and
not in the light of whether they will provide increased support for its ratification.
New Directions believes that U.S. security between now and the expiration of the
SALT II Treaty would be greatly enhanced by taking further steps to end the
United States-Soviet competition in arms and to curb the spread of nuclear weapons
to additional countries. Among the steps that should be vigorously pursued during
this period are a Comprehensive Test Ban, an agreement banning anti-satellite
weapons, a first-step accord on mutual reductions in conventional forces in Europe,
and some partial agreements in SALT III that can be added as protocols to SALT II.
New Directions is most interested in securing deep cuts in MIRVed missiles in order
to allay fears of surprise attack. In addition, the first accords on medium-range
nuclear weapons could be achieved during this time frame.
Security lies not in pursuing a self-defeating arms race, but in taking all neces-
sary steps to end it.
The Chairman. Thank you very much for your testimony, Mr.
Scoville. I again want to thank the panel for its cooperation.
CONTRIBUTION OF TRADE TO PRESERVATION OF PEACE
I would like to go back first to Mr. Schmidt's testimony and its
emphasis upon the importance of the growth of trade and the
contribution that trade itself can make to stability in our relations
with the Soviet Union and in the preservation of peace. I agree
with that, and I think that the long period of time when we
engaged in no trade with the Soviet Union because we disapproved
of its society was typical of that tendency in our foreign policy, to
183
try and isolate countries that we dislike for one reason or another,
even though such a policy is almost always self-defeating.
I happen to think that our policy toward Cuba through the years
has been self-defeating. We have minimized our influence in that
country by refusing to trade with it for so many years having no
representation there, and we can see the end result in the most
recent developments in that country.
It has been an unproductive, indeed, a counterproductive policy
for the United States. I think we finally came to understand that
the same was true for the Soviet Union, and fortunately we did
commence some years ago to expand our trade with the Soviet
Union. I think that has been a very important step.
My question to you, Mr. Schmidt, is this. Don't you feel that one
of the most important benefits that could flow from the Senate's
ratification of the SALT treaty would be an improvement in the
general climate that could lead to further expansion of trade and
other peaceful contacts with the Soviet Union, and that this would
be stabilizing and beneficial to the prospects for continued peace,
that this indeed could help lay the basis for substantial reductions
in these arms that we must never fire except in the act of commit-
ting national suicide?
Aren't these collateral benefits that could and should flow from
the Senate's ratification of the treaty?
Mr. Schmidt. Yes, sir. I believe you have very accurately stated
those extra benefits that we would receive were the Senate to
ratify the SALT II Treaty. The Soviets are great immitators of the
United States. You see them imitate the United States in a mili-
tary environment. You see them imitate the United States in our
industrialization process, and if we were to ratify SALT II and
stabilize our trade with them, I think you would see a greater
emphasis on their part to imitate the United States in our mutual-
ly beneficial trade relationships. They believe that the United
States is large areas of production, and industrialization, and
maybe we should be given credit for that.
The Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Schmidt. I personally concur in
your position.
Mr. Carey, as a long-time member of the American Legion I
want to say, first of all, that the Legion's position favoring limita-
tion of nuclear arms has always in my judgment been a very
enlightened position; for a veterans' organization, I think it has
been a courageous position.
Your statement today raising, as it does, certain recommenda-
tions for reservations, understandings, and modifications in this
treaty, is one that this committee will carefully weigh. I would like
to call your attention to certain reservations and understandings
that have been proposed by Senator Javits and myself and receive
your response and what you think the response of the Legion
would be to those proposals.
Since I cannot find them at the moment, let me briefly describe
them to you. We will supply you with a text of these proposals.
RESERVATION ON BACKFIRE STATUS IN TREATY
The first is a reservation. You mentioned in your testimony your
concern about the Backfire bomber because it does have a capabili-
184
ty, even though it may be primarily designed as a theater weapon,
in extremis to reach the United States with a refueUng in flight. In
your testimony you have dealt with the commitments that Mr.
Brezhnev made to President Carter in the unsigned statement,
offering the suggestion that we require the statement be signed by
Brezhnev.
Our reservation seeks to accomplish the same thing by making
the consent of the Senate conditional upon the reservation that the
commitments contained in the Soviet written statement, that is the
unsigned statement, and in his oral assurance that the production
of these bombers would not exceed 30 per year are essential, in the
words of the reservation, to the obligations assumed under the
treaty. These commitments are legally binding on the Soviet
Union, and their violation would give the United States the right
to withdraw from the treaty.
In other words, the reservation would in effect incorporate by
reference these gissurances, elevate them to the status of the treaty,
and provide that the violation of those commitments would be the
same as the violation of any provision of the treaty, and thus
grounds for withdrawal.
I take it the Legion would support such a reservation.
Mr. Carey. Yes, sir. I believe from the discussions we had from
our special committee's hours and days spent on this, it would be
acceptable to the organization.
RESERVATION ON COMMON UNDERSTANDINGS AND AGREED
STATEMENTS
The Chairman. A second recommendation you made had to do
with the common understandings and the agreed statements.
Again, we have proposed a reservation to the effect that the agreed
statements and common understandings regarding the treaty and
the protocol transmitted by the President on June 22, 1979, with
the treaty are of the same force and effect as are the provisions of
the treaty itself.
The intent here is to make the Senate's consent conditional upon
an acceptance by both parties that the agreed statements and
common understandings are to be treated as though they were part
of the text of the treaty itself.
I take it that the Legion would also endorse that position.
Mr. Carey. Well, we definitely would like to see it a part of the
treaty. If you are saying that, Senator, I think we will have that.
The Chairman. This will have the same effect, because the con-
sent would be made conditional upon both parties treating these
agreed statements and common understandings as though they
were part of the treaty itself.
Mr. Carey. If I could say one thing, referring to the Backfire
bomber. Senator, it has bothered us very greatly. It bothers us as to
why — why do they have to say that they are going to continue to
build 30 Backfire bombers a year? Why do they need them if we
are supposed to have this peace and live with this peace? That is
the thing that h£is bothered us. We are recognizing that they can
go ahead and continue to build 30 Backfire bombers a year.
Again, in part of my statement that I was not able to make, and
in part of the statement which is on file, I know we want to limit
185
spending and we want to limit the whole situation, but if we are
recognizing and allowing them even to consider building that type
of thing, and we recognize that in this treaty of 30 per year, we
have to have a defense to go against that in this country, we had
better have something that can counteract it as far as that is
concerned.
That bothers us.
The Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Carey. I see that my time is up.
I want to come back to a second round in order to address a couple
of questions to the other members of the panel, but under the 10-
minute rule I will turn now to Senator Percy.
Senator Percy. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Carey, along with Senator Church, I have been a member of
the American Legion for a long time. I think my membership is in
its 34th year. I was very impressed with the statement you made
from the standpoint of the fundamental principles of the Legion,
and I applaud your long-term support for strategic arms limita-
tions.
FULLY VERIFIABLE IN AREAS AFFECTING NATIONAL SECURITY
I would like to ask for clarification on your position on verifica-
tion. The more we have looked into verifications, the more I have
come to the conclusion that it would be unrealistic to look for 100-
percent verifiability, but that if the treaty is sufficiently verifiable
so that we can have enough advanced notice to void the treaty or
withdraw from it and take action, that would be acceptable.
Would you accept the statement that it should be verifiable in
areas that affect the national security interests of the United
States and its allies? Is that the crux of what you are after?
Mr. Carey. That is, sir. As I said in the statement, this concerns
a lot of classified intelligence gathering information. Therefore, we
have to depend upon those people who have that information.
What you are saying is the fact that the statement would be for
those people who have that information and not available to the
general public have to be fully satisfied and concerned with this,
and that we would accept that.
AFFECT OF CUBAN SITUATION ON SALT NEGOTIATIONS
Senator Percy. The support the American Legion has given to
the treaty understandings some of us have proposed, including our
chairman and ranking member. Senator Javits, has been very help-
ful indeed, and we are appreciative. In your opening comments,
you spoke about the Cuban troop situation. What was your recom-
mendation with respect to carrying on these negotiations with the
Soviets regarding the troops in Cuba?
Mr. Carey. We talked about the particular fact. Senator, that we
feel this is a violation of the Monroe Doctrine, and second, we
believe that the presence of that brigade constitutes a military base
which was prohibited in the 1962 agreements with the Soviets in
Cuba.
Our recommendation was that we urged the committee to post-
pone any further action, not hearings, but any further action on
the strategic arms limitation agreement currently pending until
186
such time as all Soviet combat troops have been withdrawn from
the island of Cuba.
Senator Percy. In other words, you feel we should continue with
the process of ratification, but not take final action until such time
as this is clarified?
Mr. Carey. That is right, until some understanding comes out of
that particular situation.
Senator Percy. I think you and I then both disagree with the
State Department as to whether or not this violates the Monroe
Doctrine. I happen to think it does. Department officials feel that
only the spirit of the doctrine is violated, but I am with you in that
I think it really does violate the doctrine. The Soviets in their
sophisticated knowledge of our system must really understand that
this is a fundamental thing that we cannot permit.
Mr. Carey. There are a lot of spirits floating around this coun-
try, Senator, and a lot of types of spirits that we can talk about,
too. [General laughter.]
Senator Percy. I would welcome warmly Mr. Peter Baugher, a
valued constituent. I commend him for the contributions he has
made through the years.
USE OF nuclear WEAPONS TO DEFEND EUROPE
Mr. Baugher, you made a very good point when you argued that
national strength is more than just military strength, that really it
is the whole composite. You mentioned the word "will." It is the
will that is important. Do you have any doubt that if there were an
invasion of Western Europe by the Warsaw Pact countries and our
conventional weaponry appeared inadequate to defend our allies,
we would use strategic nuclear weapons? Should the Soviet Union
be on notice that we would have the national will to use them on
those without hesitation in the case of that kind of provocation?
Mr. Baugher. My own view is that we do have the national will
to protect the security of Europe with the defense umbrella of the
United States, and this would include the use of nuclear weapons.
The more difficult question is whether our NATO allies and the
Soviet Union are persuaded of that point. The decline in recent
years of our military position relative to that of the Soviets, not
only in Europe but in the rest of the world as well, has made some
people doubt that we would ever use our nuclear weapons. But I
think that if we go forward with a sensible plan to strengthen both
our conventional and our strategic armaments, we will be able to
quiet those doubts.
Senator Percy. I agree with Mr. Carey about the horrible nature
of nuclear war and our abhorrence of it, but we have placed these
weapons there as a deterrent and they do not act as a deterrent,
we have to have the will to use them. There should be no ambigu-
ity or misunderstanding about that.
When the Ripon Society, not known for its right-wing positions
through the years, can state through it representative that we have
the will to use those weapons if it becomes necessary, then there
cannot be any ambiguity about it or any misunderstanding. I think
we all stand together on that — the Congress and the executive
branch. You also mentioned that our national strength reflects.
187
among other factors our economic strength. Here we face a
dilemma.
As you well know, I am totally committed to balancing this
budget. I am spending a tremendous amount of time and effort to
accomplish that. I think the strength of the dollar and the strength
of our whole economic situation is factor which is very important
and something that the Soviet Union fully respects. It is our eco-
nomic strength that would give us the ability to sustain an arms
race if that is what the Soviets want to continue to engage in.
BALANCING THE BUDGET AND FUTURE MIUTARY EXPENDITURES
What do we do if we get to the point where the increase in
military spending is such that we cannot balance the budget? I
think we will have to cut some social spending but we still may not
be able to balance the budget with large defense increases. What
do we do then? After all, we are committed as a nation to try to
balance our budget beginning October 1 of next year.
Mr. Baugher. That is correct. Senator. I think the commitment
to balance the budget is very important. In fact, it is essential to
our national security to try to get America's economic house in
order. If I were to list present threats to the United States, the
possible defeat of the SALT Treaty or the nuclear arms race gener-
ally, would not be the first items on my list. The first item on my
list would be the serious economic straits in which we now find
ourselves. The combination of inflation and recession is a problem
that we are going to have to cope with if we want to remain strong
in the world.
Now, as to how one makes the tradeoffs between boosting de-
fense spending and maintaining a ceiling on the overall budget,
this is something that I think has to be done on a program by
program basis. That is why we are critical of those who say, let's
just increase the defense budget by 5 or more percent. That is the
wrong way of going about the process. What we have to do is to
decide: Do we want to be spending our discretionary tax dollars on
the M-X missile system in 1979, or should we be spending that
money on social programs? Should we be devoting our limited
resources to new weaponry, whether strategic or conventional, or
should we be reducing the burden of taxation on our citizens?
Senator Percy. Thank you. Thank you very much.
AFFECT OF TRADE ON U.S. STRENGTH
Mr. Schmidt, I have a quick question for you. You have linked
the passage of SALT to continued U.S. trade with the Soviets.
There are those who would say there should be no trading with the
Soviets. Anything we trade to them somehow adds to their strength
and ability to be an adversary.
I have faith in trade. The Yankee trader certainly might not
always be getting the best of the deal, but we certainly should not
get the worst of the deal time after time.
Do you have confidence that trade can be carried on in such a
way that it does not weaken the United States but in fact actually
strengthens us economically?
48-260 0-79 Pt . 4 - 13
188
Mr. Schmidt. I would certainly agree with the statement that
trade with them does strengthen us economically, but it also
strengthens them economically. As many people argue trade also
strengthens them militarily. I always have been of the opinion that
we can wipe the floor with the Soviets militarily, economically, and
politically any time we decide we are going to exercise our will to
do so.
The Soviet Union cannot and will not get the best of us economi-
cally. You only need to observe that system for a little while to
observe that there is so much inefficiency in it, so much bureaucra-
cy that they cannot possibly compete with us, so it just makes
sense to me that we ought to strengthen our position more and
more with trade.
One of the things you do in business, and I am sure you may
know better than many without business experience, is the follow-
ing. When there is a competitive situation in business, the first
thing one does is to get close to your adversary. You want to know
exactly what he is going to do next. You want to know as much
about him as possible. You want to know about his people. You
want to know about his sales force. You have to get next to him
before you can adequately determine what his strengths and v/eak-
nesses are.
Senator Percy. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman, Thank you. Senator Percy.
Senator Stone is next.
Senator Stone. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
AMERICAN legion's POSITION TOWARD SOVIET TROOP SITUATION
Commander Carey, does the American Legion take a position on
what it feels would be acceptable in this Soviet troop situation?
Specifically, would the American Legion consider that it would be
acceptable if the Soviets left their forces there, but assured the
United States that they would not be used in an offensive mode, or
would it be acceptable to the Legion if most but not all of the
combat union were withdrawn so that a combat union presence
much reduced would be left there or anything short of total remov-
al of the combat union?
Mr. Carey. Sir, what we take and what we look at are the people
we have dealt with for years. I realize we need all the trade and
everything else that we need. We also take what I looked at in my
year of travel all over the world, the pincers movement that I see
and the involvement that I see in Africa, the Middle East, the Far
East, and so on where the Soviets' hands are in. You want to take
a look at the isolationism, what is happening to the United States
as far as the Soviet Union is concerned.
Our feelings at the present time, are that we feel that that whole
group must be removed just like they did in 1962 when they took
the missiles and the missile launchers that they were bringing m,
they put them back on the ships, and took them out of there. They
have no reason to be there, and we are still of the stand that they
should all come out of there before we continue to actually make a
final decision on SALT IL
Senator Stone. So the Legion's position is, it is appropriate to
continue these hearings, to continue our work, but not to take any
189
definitive action on this treaty pending the total removal of the
total combat unit. Is that right?
Mr. Carey. That is right, sir.
Let me make a statement to you that gets us possibly off the
hook. I have made it all year long on public television and in other
fora. We are a group of war veterans who have seen action. We
take care of those who are in the hospital and the families of those
who are killed. We never want to see war again, but we believe, as
history shows us, that peace through preparedness keeps the wolf
away from the door.
I think unless this country comes forth and sets forth, such as
the example in Cuba right now, and shows that we are the No. 1
free nation of the world, and we want the rest to look to us, that
we have to take this type of stand. We don't want to see another
war. We have seen war. But we also feel that there has to be peace
through preparedness, and through particularly not allowing their
actions to infringe on us. They are coming closer and closer to our
shores, and we do not feel they should be there.
Senator Stone. Thank you. Commander Carey.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you. Senator Stone.
Senator Glenn, do you have any questions of this panel?
Senator Glenn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
CAPABIUTIES OF SS-18
Gentlemen, I regret that I was not able to be here earlier.
Commander Carey, I was going through your statement, and I
have only one comment at this time, and it is your particular
concern about the SS-18 and its capabilities. I share your concerns
about that. My main concerns have been expressed in the possibil-
ity that they could do additional testing, have additional warheads
on that booster, and that they could theoretically come up with
some 6,000 to 8,000 additional warheads at least.
I know the intelligence community is doing its very best to try to
recoup the monitoring capability that we at one time had on the
SS-18 out of Iran, but which still, at least as of today, is probably
not a replacement for that monitoring capability that we want
American security to rely on in the future.
I just wanted to make that comment. It is not in the form of a
question, really. It would give them the potential for a breakout
capability later on resulting in a huge preponderance of available
weaponry opposed to the balance that we are trying to set, moni-
tor, maintain, and verify in the whole SALT II process. I was glad
to see that brought out in your statement. I think it is a very key
part of this whole thing.
We have to be able to monitor, as I see it, or we don't know what
is happening with the launch-weights, the throw-weights, and the
additional warheads that you talk about in your statement, which I
think we absolutely must be able to monitor. We want to have this
so that we can get on with SALT III, IV, V, and VI. We want to
scale down the nuclear weaponry arsenals throughout the world,
but it seems to me that we will only do that if we get enough
confidence in the Soviets living up to their agreements to warrant
going on with this.
190
Certainly, the Cuban situation ties into this. If we are building
confidence in each other or trying to, it sure isn't done by moving
troops into Cuba. No one is concerned that 2,000 or 3,000 troops
will attack Washington, D.C., Key West, or New Orleans, or any-
where else over here, but when we see the pattern of worldwide
expansionism going on, whether it be in Afghanistan, the Persian
Gulf, in Yemen or in Africa, where there are Cuban surrogates, we
see a big pattern. We see Cuba involved throughout the Third
World. We see MIG-23's coming into Cuba.
Well, I don't think that the MIG-23 is a big offensive nuclear
delivery system, but it is one more bit of a pattern where we are
being bit and piecemealed to death. We cannot ignore it and say it
has no relationship to SALT II. Of course, no one wants to start
World War III over this, but I share your concern about the
break-out capability and the SS-18 monitoring and various other
points. I just wanted to make that comment. I would, of course,
welcome any comment you wish to make at this time.
Mr. Carey. Thank you, sir. I prefer to leave your statement as it
stands. We do think there should be a new counting system which
is basically what I believe you suggest.
Senator Glenn. Mr. Chairman, I would make one other com-
ment. When it was stated that the negotiations perhaps should
have included some other things in SALT II, I basically agree with
that, but perhaps when SALT II was started so many years ago, I
do not believe anyone could have foreseen at that time the extent
to which MIRVing would take place, and the numbers of additional
warheads that we could put on these boosters.
With the throw-weight that they have on the SS-18, they could
theoretically deliver between 25 and 40 warheads. Although they
are limited to 10 now, we have already monitored them testing
beyond the 10 they are allowed by simulating a couple of additional
RV's.
It seems to me therefore they have already indicated what their
intention is if they can get away with it. That is the reason why I
put so much emphasis on our monitoring capability. I am willing to
sign a treaty with the Russians. I am willing to approve a treaty
and see it ratified, but only if we have high confidence in our
intelligence system, so that we will know what they are doing,
know whether they are living up to the treaty, just as they already
know through the open literature and easy monitoring of us that
we will live up to it.
It is on that basis that we will go on to SALT III, SALT IV, and
SALT V. If we don't do it on that basis, it seems to me we are just
playing russian roulette, and I don't mean to make a horrible pun.
We are playing russian roulette with American security for the
future, and I don't want to see us do that. I still think the Senate's
action should hinge in large measure on the monitoring which you
stress, particularly regarding the SS-18 and the other missiles
which they have tested from their southern site, the site we used to
monitor from Iran.
Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Gentlemen, time seems to be slipping away, so I
would thank you all for your help today.
191
Senator Percy. May I have one additional minute, please?
The Chairman. Of course, Senator Percy.
NEW DIRECTIONS SUPPORT FOR SENATE UNDERSTANDINGS
Senator Percy. Mr. Scoville, you say you support this treaty and
hope the Senate will not amend it in any way. Does New Direc-
tions support the understandings that the chairman has read?
Mr. Scoville. Yes, it does.
Senator Percy. Fine. Thank you.
TELEVISED COVERAGE OF SALT FLOOR DEBATE
I would appreciate a one-word answer from each of the panel on
this question. Do you think it would help public understanding if
we were technically able to work it out so that we had television
and radio coverage of the debate on the Senate floor, that is, the
SALT debate?
Mr. Scoville. Yes.
Mr. Carey. Yes.
Mr. Schmidt. Yes.
Mr. Baugher. Yes.
Senator Percy. Thank you very much. I appreciate all four ac-
ceptances on that.
The Chairman. Senator Percy, you have unanimous support, it
appears. That is an enviable political position.
Gentlemen, thank you very much. I want to acknowledge the
presence here of Carl Marcy, who is now the executive secretary
for the American Committee on East-West Accord, and for many
years has served this committee with ability and distinction as the
staff director of the committee.
Carl, it is nice to see you back again. We appreciate very much
your continued activities in a good cause.
Gentlemen, we thank you all very much.
[Whereupon, a brief recess was taken.]
The Chairman. Our next witness is Mr. Lane Kirkland, Secre-
tary-Treasurer of the AFL-CIO [American Federation of Labor-
Congress of Industrial Organizations]. Mr. Kirkland, the committee
is very happy to welcome you today. We look forward to your
testimony.
STATEMENT OF LANE KIRKLAND, SECRETARY-TREASURER,
AFL-CIO, WASHINGTON, D.C.>
Mr. Kirkland. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
My name is Lane Kirkland. I am Secretary-Treasurer of the
AFL-CIO. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate very much the opportunity
to appear before the committee to advance the views of the AFL-
CIO on the SALT II Treaty which now awaits the advice and
consent of the Senate. The AFL-CIO has consistently supported a
strong national defense, not as a source of jobs, but as insurance of
our freedoms in a very dangerous world of continued social and
economic progress, and of the democratic values that we prize,
including free trade unions.
' See page 193 for the prepared statement of the AFL-CIO Executive Council.
192
We do not subscribe to the notion of inherent conflict between
the equally vital imperatives of necessary defense expenditures and
domestic programs and progress. The Constitution defines the duty
of government as to provide for the common defense and to pro-
mote the general welfare. It does not say to provide for the
common defense or to promote the general welfare. It is scarcely
prudent to finance one's household improvements by neglecting to
pay one's fire and insurance premiums.
Such a folly holds the prospect that all may well be lost. Defense
goals must, of course, be gaged and judged as relative to the threat
that one perceives. We perceive the threat presented by the rate of
expansion and improvement of Soviet strategic nuclear arms as
real and as growing and as not seriously deterred by this treaty or
by public need or opinion in that country, or by any benign inten-
tions on the part of the leaders of that power, present or future.
We believe that the security of our Nation and its allies, which is
the real issue here, can be enhanced by either or both of two
methods, stronger defenses or genuine significant and mutual arms
reduction agreements with our potential adversaries. We certainly
prefer the latter course, but we cannot assume it, and SALT II by
its terms does not assure us that it is yet more than a hope.
We do, however, support the proposition that that hope should be
kept alive long enough, at least, to test it once more, rather than to
abandon it now by rejecting the treaty. But that test should be an
urgent, real, and searching one, and we should be fully prepared to
live with the conclusion revealed by its success or failure. Nor
should we meanwhile permit that process to anchor us further
behind the defense posture that we ought to be in if the result is
failure.
We would welcome a treaty that would require and warrant
drastic dismantling on our part as well as that of the U.S.S.R., and
we would not mourn or grieve over or regard as wasted money the
expenditures negated by that happy event.
Limits to be obtained by dismantling only across the board ought
in fact to be the goal rather than, as in the present treaty, limits
well above levels currently in place in critical categories of weapon-
ry, establishing virtual goals and time tables for the further escala-
tion of an already staggering array of instruments of doom.
We must in the meanwhile do what is necessary to pursue parity
as well as security from the threat that will emerge under the
terms of the treaty before you rather than engage, through unilat-
eral restraint or attrition by neglect, in premature, preemptive
compliance with a treaty that does not yet exist, and may never
come to pass.
We are conscious that despite the administration's assurances of
prudent intent, there are many voices in and outside the Congress
that will ardently press for the consent of the Senate to SALT II
but that will, after the fact, just as ardently oppose the measures
necessary to maintain parity and security under the terms of the
treaty.
Such a posture, it seems to me, is far more dangerous to peace
and stability and destructive of the arms control process, if it
should prevail, than is any criticism of the treaty itself. That is
why we have conditioned our support of SALT II on a strong
193
expression in the instrument of advice and consent of the principle
that parity requires that we continue to modernize and develop our
forces and a further strong expression of a proposition that says, in
effect, that we shall not continue to pursue the beguiling phantom
of a process that produces nothing of consequence but dangerous
illusions. Those are the broad considerations that underly the
statement of policy on SALT II recently adopted by the AFL-CIO
executive council which has been previously provided to the Com-
mittee and which is our essential statement.
I ask at this point that the council's statement be made part of
the record, and I am ready to respond to any questions you may
have.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Mr. Kirkland, your statement will appear at this
point as part of the record.
[The AFL-CIO executive council's statement of policy on SALT II
follows:]
Prepared Statement of the AFL-CIO Executive Council
The Strategic Arms Limitation negotiations, begun ten years ago, have so far
failed either to curb the nuclear arms race or to stabilize the strategic balance of
power. Whatever restraint we have been has been in the form of unilateral U.S.
decisions to cancel or delay new weapons systems, while the Soviet Union has
engaged in the most massive military buildup in peacetime history. The facts are no
longer contested.
Whether SALT II, by contrast, will serve as a significant step toward arms control
depends on what the U.S. government does within its terms. Inaction on the part of
the United States while the Soviets build up to the high limits allowed in the treaty,
would lead the U.S. into a position of gross inequality, from which this nation could
offer the Soviets no effective inducements to accept real arms reductions. The arms
race would continue.
The AFL-CIO will support SALT II if the following steps are taken both to
remedy the emerging strategic imbalance and to move toward genuine strategic
arms control:
(1) In its resolution of advice and consent to the ratification of SALT II, the
Senate should stipulate that under the terms of the treaty, parity requires the
modernization and development of U.S. strategic forces — including, and most par-
ticularly, the MX missile based in such a mode as to survive a first strike by Soviet
missiles.
Without the MX, the U.S. will be restricted to 3 warheads on its Minutemen
ICBMs' compared with 10, 6, and 4 on the Soviet's SS-18, SS-19, and SS-17. The
only way to protect U.S. ICBM's from a Soviet first-strike would then be to rely on
the most dangerous of all strategies: The launch-on-warning of hair-trigger missiles
that virtually fire themselves. If instead the U.S. is to maintain multiple presiden-
tial options in a crisis, this country must proceed to develop the MX in a survivable
basing mode so as to remove the temptation of a first strike.
(2) The way to reduce strategic arms expenditures is not to stand pat on inferior
or vulnerable systems but to proceed forthwith to real and dramatic mutual arms
reductions.
The Senate, therefore, should further stipulate in its instrument of advice and
consent more stringent and specific directives to U.S. negotiators than the vague
and general language now contained in the Statement of Principles for SALT III, so
as to assure that SALT III negotiations will constitute a genuine, early and search-
ing test of whether or not the SALT process will, in fact, lead to significant and
continuing reductions in strategic arms. A time limit for a final response and
evaluation, such as the termination date of the protocol (December 1981), should be
set forth so as to assure urgency and to avoid the endless protraction of negotiations
while the build-up continues beyond the point of no return.
The stipulation should also call for limits not only on launchers but on warheads-
which are the real instruments of destruction and which SALT II permits to
increase dramatically in numbers and accuracy.
The Senate should stipulate that U.S. negotiators in SALT III insist on limits
which would require the dismantling of warheads to a level of parity significantly
194
(at least 30 percent) below the existing level of the higher party in each leg of the
triad (air, sea and land-based strategic nuclear forces). Once these limits are set, the
basis will then exist for further annual across-the-board percentage reductions.
The general, unchecked growth of warheads, combined with the acquisition of
counterforce capability, exposes the inadequacy of Mutual Assured Destruction
(MAD) as a deterrence theory. To compel an American President, in the wake of a
SoAdet first strike, to choose between negotiating terms of surrender or launching an
annihilative retaliatory attack on Soviet civilians is both morally unacceptable and
lacking in the chief prerequisite of deterrence: credibility. The U.S. must move from
MAD to Mutual Assured Non-destruction (MAN). That is, these negotiations must
seek to create conditions which make it impossible for either side to destroy the
other as a viable society through a nuclear attack, or to believe that it can.
Only then can we begin to look forward with optimism to the ultimate goal of
total nuclear disarmament.
The Chairman. I commend you upon the clarity and precision
with which you summarized the statement of the AFL-CIO in an
extemporaneous way. I see that you are speaking from notes. I
always appreciate that, because it contributes to the brevity of the
presentation, and thus enables us to move ahead with questions.
Senator Percy has told me that he has a time problem. Senator
Javits has graciously agreed to permit Senator Percy to open the
questioning.
Senator Percy. Mr. Chairman, I thank you very much indeed.
Senator Javits, thank you. I very much appreciate this.
AFL-CIO COSPONSORSHIP OF NEGATIVE FILM ON SALT
Mr. Kirkland, I think the position taken by the AFL-CIO is a
very, responsible position, and a very powerful voice has spoken
out on this matter. I have no doubt that the direction in which you
have indicated this Nation should go is probably the direction in
which it will go.
There was a film produced within the past year, I believe, by the
American Security Council. It was stated that the film was pro-
duced in cooperation with the AFL-CIO. It was a very negative
film on the whole United States-Soviet military balance and it had
implications for SALT process. Could you clarify whether the AFL-
CIO did sponsor that film, or was that a misimpression?
Mr. Kirkland. Not to my knowledge, sir.
TELEVISED COVERAGE OF FLOOR DEBATE
Senator Percy. Not to your knowledge. Could you tell us what
your reaction might be to having the Senate floor debate opened to
radio and television to permit a better understanding of this whole
process by the American people? Do you think it is essential and
important that the American people follow more closely this debate
and argument and have a better understanding of what the signifi-
cance of this treaty is?
Mr. Kirkland. I think it would be useful, sir.
UNKAGE BETWEEN SALT AND SOVIET TROOPS IN CUBA
Senator Percy. Do you believe the presence of Soviet combat
troops in Cuba should be linked in any way with the SALT debate,
and if so, in what way? What position would you as an individual
or would the AFL-CIO take in this matter?
195
Mr. KiRKLAND. Well, sir, that was not, of course, before the
council at the time we considered SALT II, so the council did not
act with the benefit of the information that is now generally avail-
able. I can, therefore, only speak for myself. I think it is an
exceedingly serious matter that we should press as an issue with or
without SALT. I find it rather difficult to see how the issue of
SALT alone will necessarily resolve it.
I think the important thing is to resolve the question. To put it
in another way, I think it ought to be looked at in terms of its
proper context. In the broad range and scale of Soviet adventures
that have been taking place in recent years this is simply another
episode. It calls into question two elements that I think are very
important in our consideration of arms control negotiations with
the Soviets. Those are the questions of intentions, and the question
of our prudence in relying on their observation of any agreements
that we make. But there are abundant reasons in recent history to
have those questions in our minds before this. I suspect that the
existence of those questions has far more to do with what misgiv-
ings there may be in the public mind about arms control negotia-
tions than anything else, than any appraisal of the particular
balance of forces in the treaty, the general suspicion and lack of
confidence in the Soviet Union as a negotiating partner, but I still
believe that should be tested and explored to its limits because of
the importance of the issues.
With respect to the Soviet troops in Cuba, I personally have
always regarded Cuba, since the advent of Mr. Castro, as a Soviet
colony. I think so far as it relates to the Monroe Doctrine, the
colonization of the Caribbean and that part of the Caribbean by the
Soviet Empire is for all practical purposes as much a matter of
concern as anything that has followed. I regard all troops in Cuba
as soldiers of the Soviet Empire, whether they are Cuban or Rus-
sian. I am somewhat more concerned with the presence of Soviet
troops in Cuba as it is related to the broader question, about the
soldiers of the Soviet Empire who happen to be Cuban, who are
operating widely in Africa, in an active mode, than I am with 2,000
or 3,000 Soviet troops under the same general command and serv-
ing the same general purpose in Cuba in thus far a passive mode.
AFFECT OF SALT DEFEAT ON NATO ALUANCE
Senator Percy. Thank you very much. My last question is this.
Let's assume that the conditions the council has laid down are met
by the Congress and the President, and yet either crippling amend-
ments are adopted by the Senate such that it is impossible for the
Soviet Union to accept the treaty modified in that way or it is just
flatly turned down by the Senate.
How do you feel a defeat of SALT II under such conditions would
affect our relationships throughout the world with our NATO
allies? What do you think would be the reaction of the American
people?
Mr. KiRKLAND. Well, sir, with respect to the question of amend-
ments which would require the renegotiation of SALT II or which
look to the prospect that the Soviet Union will return to the
negotiating table and deal with those issues that we raised through
amendments, I have thought about that very carefully. I have
196
reached the conclusion that I would prefer to see us press forward
with a genuine and real test for SALT III to see whether it is
productive and mate that the acid test of our future view of the
strategic arms control negotiations with the Soviet Union.
If we seek a return to the table on certain elements of SALT II
through amendments looking to renegotiation, I am somewhat ap-
prehensive that it might delay us and hold out some false hopes. It
would delay us from taking the prudent steps in terms of our own
forces that we need to do in the hope that we might accomplish
something through those renegotiations. It would also delay what I
would like to see as an early and severe and searching test of
whether we can achieve really genuine and severe drastic arms
reductions as early as possible. That is why you will note in the
statement of the council that the negotiations should be time
urgent and there should be a deadline for us to evaluate their
response, which would be coterminous with the expiration of the
protocol. I think we ought to be prepared to make that judgment.
There is some reason to say, I suppose, in SALT II that it was a
follow-on of Vladivostok and should have run its course in those
terms, and that these matters such as a search for more severe
cuts ought to be scheduled for the SALT III talks.
But let's get on with that, and get on with it quickly, and make a
judgment fast before we get led further down this path.
Senator Percy. Thank you very much, indeed, Mr. Kirkland. We
appreciate your appearance. And I thank my colleagues for jdeld-
ing to me.
The Chairman. Thank you. Senator Percy. Senator Glenn?
Senator Glenn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
AFL-CIO'S POSITION ON ABIUTY TO MONITOR AND VERIFY
Mr. Kirkland, I was just rereading the statement by the Execu-
tive Council that was adopted in Chicago on August 7 which you
asked be entered into the record. I think as a statement of the
objectives toward which we should be striving, it is an excellent
statement.
My question would be mainly on how we implement such a thing
and still know what the Soviets are doing in a secret society. Our
ability to monitor is not addressed in that statement — our ability to
verify. I think that is the key to whether we are willing to go these
extra steps which I agree with you completely should be our objec-
tives for future negotiations, and we all regret we are not part of
these negotiations.
How we implement those and still know what is going on in a
secret society and know, for instance, that this 30-percent reduction
called for in the statement is being carried out, is a very difficult
situation, and especially post-Iran, where we are not going to have
quite as good a handle on their testing program, and we only know
what has happened, perhaps, after the fact, after the weapons
system is deployed. Then we can measure things to a fine accuracy.
But did the AFL-CIO executive council consider this area of
monitoring and of verification and what their assessment of it
would be in getting on to these very laudible steps that are out-
lined in the statement?
197
Mr. KiRKLAND. Certainly, Senator, we were aware of the issues
raised with regard to verification in our consideration. But the
statement does not specifically address verification. Obviously, it
assumes at least some adequate capacity to verify the critical ele-
ments of an arms control agreement. My own view on verification
as it has affected negotiations in the past is that it has been
somewhat ambivalent, a sort of two-edged sword.
To some extent, I think it may have led us into the measurement
of the less relevant factors in the nuclear strategic arms balance.
The things that are simplest to verify — there is a temptation to
count those, even though they are far less important. Launchers,
for example, have been made largely irrelevant as a measure by
technology. To reduce launchers while letting other aspects of
weaponry run free, warheads specifically, is equivalent to sort of
replacing a muzzle-loaded rifle with an Ouzi or a Kalachnikov or
an Armalite, and I don't regard that as arms control. That is
productivity.
The SALT II agreement does for the first time create an obliga-
tion and a promise that warheads must now be brought within the
purview of our capacity to verify by at least imposing limits on the
number of warheads that can be launched with a particular con-
figuration of a missile. That implies to me that we must undertake
the responsibility of counting warheads and knowing how to count
warheads.
I have had some exposure to verification techniques in connec-
tion with my service on a number of presidential committees and
commissions. I have been generally impressed with our ability to
monitor. There are, of course, as you very well know, further steps
in ultimate verification. It is evaluating what you monitor and
being willing to face the results of that judgment.
I guess, in the last analysis, I think that during the term of the
treaty, and this perhaps bears on the question of the loss of the
stations in Iran, the monitoring stations there, and the time that it
will take to recover what we lost, the levels that are permitted are
so staggering in real weaponry, in warheads particularly, that a
modest infraction is of no great consequence. If you add another
100 when you cheat and produce another 100 or 150 warheads,
when you are up to the 9,000 or 10,000 level is not of earth-shaking
consequence as affecting the real utility of these forces.
I do think that if we succeed and were to get an agreement that
significantly reduces these levels, and that looks to further and
further reductions as we would hope and as we would regard as
necessary to say that this process is productive, as you get lower, I
think the issue of verification increases in importance. But I think
at these levels I tend to agree with the administration that verifi-
cation is probably adequate for all practical purposes.
Senator Glenn. I think both sides have a tremendous overkill
capability right now. What we are trjdng to establish, of course, is
this balance. I thnk we all regret that we did not make warheads
the subject of the negotiation early on in SALT II. I think the
whole process, however, is a step forward if we can work out
sufficient monitoring and verification capability to approve the
treaty as it is.
198
At least it is a step forward in placing some limit where no limit
previously existed, even though it is preposterously high. It is
generally recognized that we have some 10,000 deliverable war-
heads available right now. The Soviets have about five. Under
SALT II, you can set up a scenario of different missiles and num-
bers of warheads permitted that would permit them to triple their
five and for us to go up by 50 percent on ours, so we would come up
at around 15,000 on each side.
Although it is a little hard for me to accept that as much
progress in arms limitation and arms control, at least it is some
limit where none previously existed, and it is a base for getting on
to stressing warhead reduction in SALT III, IV, V, and VI.
Mr. KiRKLAND. I look at it as a way station on to some real test
of whether we are ever going to start turning that curve around.
The curve is still going up and that concerns me very deeply.
You mentioned that within this treaty the Soviet Union can
increase its warheads by a factor of three. I think it is somewhat
worse than that. They can and will increase their accuracy, I think
from something like 1,200 feet to 600 or 700 feet, which, as I am
told, makes a factor of four. It is not just the doubling, since there
is a geometric ratio. You multiply the factor of four on accuracy by
the factor of three on the number of warheads, and you have a
factor of escalation on their side of 12, 1200 percent, which is a far
cry from the kind of arms control that we would hope for if this
were the end of the line, these levels of real redundancy — I ques-
tion whether it would be of any great consequence to us whether
they added further than that, whether it would be cost effective
expenditure and of great concern to us.
But as I said, our final judgment tells us, OK, we will pass this
marker and move to the next, and let the next one be a real test
from which we ought to be willing to hold a position and walk
away from the table if necessary without continually bargaining
with ourselves to formulate a new position and another new
position.
Senator Glenn. My time is up. Thank you. I agree that we
should move on to that next step. I think we can only move on to
that next step, however, if we build enough confidence each step
along the way by knowing what they are doing so that we are
willing to move on to that next step. We are not willing to buy just
a pig in a poke and just assume they are living up to these things.
We have seen too many activities in other areas of the world where
we do not trust them to act in our best interest, to put it very
mildly.
I think I agree with your emphasis on warheads completely.
Unless SALT III is to have as its basis the limitation of deliverable
nuclear warheads, I would be prepared to vote against SALT II and
the whole works right now because it is a sham, a charade. We
should not go any further with it unless subsequent negotiations
are to bear on the subject of deliverable nuclear warheads. That is
what the big bang comes from. You are absolutely right on that.
Mr. KiRKLAND. I agree with that completely, sir.
Senator Glenn. I think that should be the absolute basis for any
future negotiation, and we not continue our emphasis on launch-
ers. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
199
Mr. KiRKLAND. In fact, I have heard some students of this issue
argue that it is far more stabilizing to count warheads and let
launchers run free than the other way around.
Senator Glenn. That might give them a little additional flexibil-
ity that we might not prefer.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Senator Javits?
Senator Javits. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
ATTITUDE OF AMERICANS TOWARD RISKTAKING
Mr. Kirkland, we welcome you here very much, first as an old
friend, and second, because you speak for such a vast constituency
of those who fight wars and make the things with which we fight
wars. One thing that has bedevilled Washington policymakers on
which I would greatly value your view is this. After Vietnam, after
Angola, and after Watergate, what is the attitude of the American
people toward the risktaking which is implied in your statement?
That is, we have certain stopping points, and we go so far and no
further, and then we will face whatever the issue is. We don't
know. That may be a very portentious decision. The way the Krem-
lin works, as we see it demonstrated in from Cuba, in this highly
surreptitious way, is that you don't know what they are liable to
spring, and you are always confronted, therefore, with the worst
case hypothesis.
As you reflect so ably, as you always do, the views of the Execu-
tive Council of the AFL-CIO for us today by their designation,
which is critically important, could you also reflect to us how you
feel the rank and file AFL-CIO members, feel about this issue? Do
you think notwithstanding the disillusionment of Watergate and
the reversals of Vietnam and the frustrations which we have suf-
fered, that they are nonetheless in the great tradition of this
country ready to face whatever it is, putting freedom even above
these dangers?
Mr. Kirkland. I am confident of that, Senator. I think that our
statement and our other statements — we had a parallel statement
on which the Council acted at the same time which addressed the
so-called transfer amendment with which I am sure you are all
familiar, that puts the proposition to you that the price of social
progress and domestic progress has to come out of defense expendi-
tures.
We oppose that. I think in my opening statement I refer to a
view of that principle. I am confident that that view reflects the
general view of the membership of the trade union movement. As
you very well know, we have a constant system of meetings, con-
ventions, conferences, board meetings, and so forth where these
things emerge and come to our attention. The executive council
represents a pretty good cross section of the leadership of the
American trade union movement, and that leadership reflects, I
think, quite accurately their perception of the attitudes of the
members, or they wouldn't survive too long.
I think the problem with any democracy is that we tend to relax
and hope for the best in between perceived crises. When we see a
crisis, when we see a gun at our head, we pull ourselves together
and do remarkable things. The challenge of leadership is how to do
200
those remarkable things when you are not looking down that gun
barrel, but the crisis is a little more vague and a little more
nebulous.
That places a great burden on leadership, but I think it is a
burden that has to be assumed day in and day out, and not just at
crisis time, if we are going to meet the sort of challenge presented
by a totalitarian society, which doesn't really count, and manipu-
lates the public attitudes or the public role.
Senator Javits. Mr. Kirkland, that is tremendously heartening
to me. I think it should be to the policymakers in addition to those
of us who are here. I think these are words the President should
hear and listen to and pay attention to. It is tremendously hearten-
ing to the country and a great tribute to the labor movement.
I personally agree with the two conditions that you set, that is,
tragic as it is, as you have just said, we are going to have to
continue to work to maintain parity. It is compelled upon us. I
agree with you that SALT III is the watershed, that our negotia-
tors of SALT III have to be told that we will reject SALT III if they
bring it back, without making substantial arms reduction.
Beyond that, from what you say, I am deeply heartened that our
people are willing. We must be alert about becoming ensnared time
and again in any euphoria which has been talked about so much
which, after another SALT. We are told it will put us to sleep, will
put us even further behind in negotiating power, and only bring us
to a day which could mean surrender, a word which we hate to
utter, let alone think about, but which the way this world is run,
we cannot simply forget.
I am very hopeful that the desires of the AFL-CIO will be
realized through the reservations we consider respecting this
treaty.
Mr. Kirkland. Senator, if I may just say a word and get back a
little bit to an observation of Senator Glenn's. I think it is true
there is some marginal value in a treaty which in effect sort of
administers and exchanges information and marginal assurances
on the tremendously continuing high level of weaponry. It is sort of
a gross redundant administration procedure. I just doubt whether
that sort of aim or object warrants a treaty, a treaty labeled arms
limitations, and surrounded by the hopes and expectations that we
are going to reduce in any genuine way.
The real treaty ought to have more substance than that. If we
are just going to administer redundancy on a mutual basis with the
Soviet Union, I think there are other procedures that would not
carry with it the expectations and promises that a treaty does. In
that case, I would far prefer to see us set up a bilateral permanent
administrative committee with the Soviet Union and let it sink
into the backwater that mutual and balanced force reduction has
been in for years.
Senator Javits. Isn't the difficulty, however, that considering
where we are and where we came from and the necessity for catch-
up, that you cannot just practically do that? It would put us in a
tailspin that would indicate a condition of instability in the world
which would make it impossible to do exactly what you want done.
If we had come from there, I would be inclined to agree with you,
but we have not, so it seems to me that in view of the situation
201
which we face, your resolution makes the best of a realistic exist-
ing situation, to wit, go ahead with SALT II with these caveats.
Mr. KiRKLAND. I believe so.
Senator Javits. I thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Javits.
REDUCTIONS IN SALT III IF PARITY IS NOT ACHIEVED
I fear we will have to cut this meeting short, because Senator
Javits and I have been asked to go to the White House, so I will
just ask one question, Mr. Kirkland, and with this question I also
want to express my thanks for your testimony. If parity is not
maintained during the period of the treaty, then it is really not
realistic to expect that we could ever secure substantial reductions
in nuclear arms in SALT III. Do you agree with that?
Mr. Kirkland. I agree with that completely, sir.
The Chairman. That is what has led me to believe that these
other weapons systems which have been proposed will be neces-
sary, because I share with you the goal that we must bring down
these hideous levels, and SALT III will be the test. Without parity
in our position there is no prospect that those reductions could be
achieved.
It is a price we have to pay, but it is the necessary price.
Mr. Kirkland. That is a major consideration to us, sir. The
position we are in in the ongoing negotiations and their perception
of our will and our x'esolve and our capacity plus, until we have a
SALT III in hand that tells us that it is worth the candle, we have
to operate on the assumption that this treaty defines the levels we
are going to have to live with, at least for its term, and establishes
the base, if the process fails us in the future.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Mr. Kirkland, for your
testimony.
This afternoon, the committee will resume its hearings on the
SALT II Treaty at 2 o'clock. Senator Stone will chair the afternoon
hearing, and Senator Zorinsky after him. Phyllis Schlafly will be a
witness. Edward Teller and Philip A. Carver are the other wit-
nesses on the agenda for this afternoon. The hearing for this morn-
ing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:30 p.m., the hearing was adjourned, to recon-
vene at 2 p.m. the same day.]
202
Afternoon Session
The committee met, at 2:10 p.m., in room 318, Russell Senate
Office Building, Hon. Richard Stone presiding.
Present: Senators Stone, Javits, Percy, Helms, Hayakawa, and
Zorinsky.
OPENING STATEMENT
Senator Stone. This afternoon we will continue taking testimony
from public witnesses on their views on the SALT II Treaty.
Our first witness is Mrs. Phyllis Schlafly, representing the
American Conservative Union. Mrs. Schlafly is an analyst and
author with interests in national defense, nuclear strategy and
weaponry.
The American Conservative Union [ACU] is the first organiza-
tion we will hear from today. Following the ACU, we will hear
from Dr. Edward Teller, a world-renowned physicist, who will give
us his view as a scientist. Dr. Teller has spent much of his career
working on nuclear weapons and has often been termed the father
of the hydrogen bomb.
Our last witness this afternoon will be Mr. Phillip Karber, an
expert on the European military balance, both conventional and
nuclear.
Because the overall military balance in addition to the strategic
nuclear balance is important to our SALT deliberations, we believe
it important to review the European balance.
Mrs. Schlafly, we welcome you to the committee and ask you to
proceed with your statement.
STATEMENT OF PHYLLIS SCHLAFLY,^ AMERICAN CONSERVA-
TIVE UNION, ACCOMPANIED BY YVONNE CHICOINE AND
SUSIE BLOSSER
Mrs. Schlafly. Thank you, Senator Stone and members of the
committee. I appreciate your courtesy in being willing to hear me
today.
My name is Phyllis Schlafly, of Alton, 111. I am an author, a
journalist and a member of the Illinois Bar. I appear here as a
representative of the American Conservative Union, of which I am
a member of the board of directors. I am accompanied by several
members of their staff, including Yvonne Chicoine, on my right,
and Susie Blosser, on my left.
For the past 15 years, my major field of research and writing has
been strategy. I am the coauthor of five books on nuclear strategy,
books which made a series of remarkable predictions which, unfor-
tunately, have all come true.
At a time when others were discounting Soviet intentions and
capabilities, my books predicted that the Soviets would keep build-
ing nuclear weapons until they achieved decisive strategic superior-
ity, while the United States was opting out of the arms race by a
self-imposed freeze on the building of additional strategic weapons.
It is now obvious that this is exactly what has happened.
' See page 219 for Mrs. Schlafly's prepared statement.
203
Mr. Chairman, I ask that my full statement be printed in the
record and, in the interest of time, I be permitted to summarize it.
Senator Stone. Your full statement will appear in the record at
the appropriate point. Please proceed.
Mrs. ScHLAFLY. Thank you.
My testimony shows that SALT II will deliver to the Soviet
Union three powerful political and economic weapons against
which we will have no defense. First, the oil weapon, the power to
cut off U.S. imported oil. Second, the dollar weapon, the power to
destroy our U.S. dollar by denying us the importation of strategic
materials and thereby unsettling our economy. And third, the Cuba
weapon, the power to put missiles and troops and bombers in Cuba.
We have already had a taste of what these weapons can mean. In
1973, we had oil embargo I when the Soviet Union openly and
flagrantly encouraged the oil-producing nations of the Middle East
to use their oil weapon against the West.
We all know that after an embargo of 5 months, they jacked up
the price fivefold. That was followed by tremendous inflation in our
own country, following which we have lost about one-half the value
of our dollar.
We all know about the troops in Cuba today. In my statement I
show several scenarios of what oil embargo II and Cuba crisis II
might mean to the United States if initiated by the Soviet Union.
Of course, these are just examples of what the Soviets might do.
There are any number of variations.
They could proceed by the salami technique instead of all at
once, say, cut off our oil 5 percent at a time. We already know
what that means after the cutoff of oil by the loss of Iran.
The point is that SALT II gives to the Soviets sufficient superior-
ity of nuclear weapons so that they can use the political and
economic weapons with impunity. Some people think that dropping
bombs is the only utility of nuclear weapons, but superiority would
give to the Soviets such economic and political weapons that they
could, in effect, tremendously upset our way of life.
I brought with me a map which shows how these political and
economic weapons are interrelated to Soviet strategic superiority
and how the Soviets and Cubans are already getting ready in
position to use them. The red countries are these where Cuba has
stationed troops in Africa. Cuba has about 50,000 troops there and,
of course, they are using Soviet weapons.
The red anchors show where the Soviets have, in effect, bases for
their fleet. They have three in the Mediterranean, two around
where Saudi Arabia and Kuwait send out their oil, three on the
eastern side of Africa. In addition to that, they have a bunkering
area in the Indian Ocean, and they have a great presence through
those vessels which are called fishing vessels stationed all around
the coast of Africa.
The red stars are friendly ports where the Soviets can bring
their navy in. We, of course, have no such ports on the continent of
Africa.
The big green stream shows the flow of oil from the Middle East
to Western Europe and to the United States, and the brown stream
is the flow of oil from Africa to western Europe and the United
States. I think the map makes it very clear how easy it would be
U8-260 0-79 Pt.i+ - 14
204
for the Soviets to use either their naval superiority or their strate-
gic superiority through nuclear blackmail in order to cut off the
flow of oil to the West.
It is obviously a much easier job to interrupt that flow than it is
to keep the sea lanes open. The Soviets will have sufficient superi-
ority through SALT II in addition to their tremendous naval
power.
We all know what the gas lines were in June when we lost 5
percent of our oil. I would suggest that, if you liked waiting in
gasoline lines in June, you will love SALT II. Half of our oil comes
from imports at the present time, and 59 percent of our imported
oil comes from Africa and the Middle East. How in the world dare
we give to the Soviet Union the power to cut off that oil, to cause
the economic dislocations that that would mean, with the resulting
effects in inflation, in the closing of plants, in unemployment, and
in all such disruption to the economic life of our country?
I believe that this map shows that the linkage between SALT
and oil and the dollar is tremendous. SALT II, in effect, would pour
salt into the gasoline tank of the free world. Translated into plain
English, SALT II equals Soviet superiority in nuclear weapons,
equals Soviet ability to wage political and economic blackmail in
the Middle East and in Africa, and equals more gasoline shortages
in America.
We have at stake not only our gasoline but the stability of our
U.S. dollar. The Soviets could even unsettle it by delays, by harass-
ments, or by cut-offs of that stream of gasoline flowing to our
country.
The map also shows the linkage between the Soviet strategic
superiority and Russian troops in Cuba and Cuban troops in Africa.
They are all tied in together. If we no longer have strategic superi-
ority, how are we going to make the Russians pull their troops out
of Cuba?
We can ask them. The President can say, please take them out.
Mr. Vance can call up and say, do you realize this is a very serious
matter, as he said the other day. The Soviets must know it is a
serious matter. They must have thought seriously about it before
they sent their troops into Cuba.
But the point is, can we make them? SALT II not only allows the
Soviets to have the power, but also the perception of power. It is
obvious that SALT is so unequal, so unfair, so humiliating to the
United States. It gives so many advantages to the Soviet Union
that I don't know how the Kremlin could have anything but con-
tempt for a country which would acquiesce in such an unequal,
unfair deal.
SALT allows the Soviets to have 308 heavy missiles and doesn't
allow us to have even one. It allows them to have four times the
number of land-based MIRV's that we have, MIRV's which will
have 26 times the power of our land-based MIRV's. It limits the
range of our cruise missiles but it allows their submarines to prowl
our coasts within range of our cities.
It does not allow us to have a mobile missile until 1982, but
allows the Soviets to have hundreds of mobile missiles today. It
forbids us to catch up with the Soviets in numbers of ICBM's, in
205
megatonnage, in throw-weight or in any meaningful measure of
what strategic superiority is all about.
And above all, SALT II gives to the Soviet Union the power to
use the political and economic weapons, the power to cut off our
oil, to destroy our dollar, and to use Cuba as a base.
If we ratify SALT II, that is what it means. If we reject SALT II,
on the other hand, we can be masters of our own destiny. We can
build the weapons that we need to defend the independence of our
country and its economic stability. Rejection of SALT II would
show that we are not going to let the Soviets have the power to cut
off our gasoline at the pump, to cut the value of our dollar to 10
cents, or to put troops, missiles or submarines or bombers in Cuba.
So the specter of gasoline lines and closed plants and unemploy-
ment hangs over SALT II. The linkage is complete. I believe that
our Nation is hungry for Senate leadership to say that the United
States will rebuild our strategic power so that we can assure the
political and economic independence of the United States.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Stone. Thank you, Mrs. Schlafly.
Senator Helms.
Senator Helms. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mrs. Schlafly, we appreciate your coming before the committee
today. You are a distinguished American and I congratulate our
colleague from Illinois for having such a constituent as Mrs.
Schlafly.
Senator Percy. We haven't always seen eye to eye, but I have
always admired her many qualities, her tenacity, perseverence, and
her power of expression. It is one of the best testimonies I have
heard. I am sorry I was tied up and could not hear it from the
start.
Mrs. Schlafly. Thank you. Senator.
Senator Helms. The Chairman and I were just remarking that
there are very few witnesses who, while delivering testimony, could
get up and walk over to a map, describe it, come back and sit down
without missing a syllable. [Laughter.]
IMMORALITY OF MUTUAL ASSURED DESTRUCTION
Mrs. Schlafly, I had an opportunity to read your statement in
advance. In your statement, you refer to the doctrine of mutual
assured destruction, or MAD. Now, Henry Kissinger was recently
quoted in the Washington Star, I believe on September 2 of this
year, in reference to MAD.
In that article. Dr. Kissinger described mutual assured destruc-
tion as, and I quote: "a bloodthirsty doctrine which is immoral,
senseless, demoralizing." A moral issue is raised because the doc-
trine rests upon the idea that we shall use nuclear retaliation
against a civilian population.
Now, on the other end of the extreme of those who would target
civilian populations are those who wish to have the U.S. disarm
itself unilaterally. Their moral position appears to be that all kill-
ing is immoral; therefore, we should not even have arms to defend
ourselves since defense implies killing.
206
POUCY OF CHRISTIAN NATION IN WAR-TORN WORLD
Somewhere, Mrs. Schlafly, between those two extremes must lie
a rational explanation of how a Christian nation can conduct itself
in a war-torn world without losing its moral values. This is the
first question I would like to ask.
Do you agree with Dr. Kissinger that the MAD doctrine is im-
moral?
Mrs. Schlafly. Senator, I think the MAD doctrine is the most
immoral doctrine that anyone ever devised. The MAD doctrine is
based upon the proposition that if there is a war, we must kill the
maximum number of civilians it is possible to kill. That is what
mutual assured destruction means.
It is based on the doctrine that we keep all of our cities like
sitting ducks, open to any incoming missiles from any nation, while
we do nothing whatsoever to protect them. And if deterrence fails,
we have no alternative except surrender. But at that point we then
launch our missiles and kill millions of Russians who had nothing
to do with participation in the decision to make the launch.
I really don't know how anyone could support that theory, but it
is the basic theory of SALT II. As a matter of fact. Secretary
Brown testified before this committee that the MAD doctrine is the
bedrock of our policy and the bedrock of SALT II. Yet it is based on
killing people instead of keeping people alive.
I do not see what good millions of dead Russians will possibly do
for the United States if our cities have been hit. We should direct
our attention toward keeping Americans alive rather than killing
Russians.
On the whole moral issue, I think one of the most immoral
things I can think of is the absolute abandonment and default of
the United States in retaining the great gift of strategic superiority
that we had. Nuclear weapons in themselves are neither good nor
evil. They are instruments of power. In 1945, our country was so
fortunate that God allowed the great atomic weapon to be devel-
oped by the United States instead of by Hitler or Stalin. One can
speculate on what the world would have been like had the Nazis or
Russians gotten it.
But we got it and we built up that nuclear superiority to where
it peaked at 8 to 1 in 1962, at the time of the Cuban missile crisis.
What happened? We don't have the superiority any more. The
Joint Chiefs have said that even essential equivalence will be lost
in the early 1980's. Our superiority is gone. We have defaulted on
our responsibility to maintain the peace of Western civilization.
We proved, from 1945 to 1967 or 1972, that, when possessed by
the United States, nuclear power is the greatest instrument for
peace anyone developed. But in the hands of the Soviet Union, it is
not that at all. It is an instrument of aggression.
The Gospel of St. Luke tells us that, when a strong man armed
keepeth his palace, his goods are in peace. That is really the best
prescription for peace. Our large, wonderful, productive country,
has moral responsibility to defend our people and to defend the
whole of Western civilization, and not to default and give away this
great talent we were given in the nuclear weapon.
207
CONSTITUTIONAL DUTY PARALLEL TO MORAL DUTY
Senator Helms. Well, the constitutional duty of this Government
to provide for the common defense, I judge you are sajdng, is
parallel to a moral duty, for this Government to protect American
citizens from war. Is that essentially what you are saying to me?
Mrs. ScHLAFLY. Yes. To provide for the common defense is the
first constitutional duty of our Government. But I would add to
that the moral duty to defend this great country, the lives of our
people and, in fact. Western civilization against an enemy, the
Soviet Union, which h£is built the most tremendous military arse-
nal in the history of the world and has never abandoned its goal to
use every weapon it has to achieve world conquest.
CONFUCT BETWEEN MORAL DUTY AND IMMORAL KILLING
Senator Helms. How does this moral duty to protect American
citizens at war square with the immorality of killing in the context
of your first eloquent answer?
Mrs. ScHLAFLY. We proved when we had nuclear superiority
from 1945 through 1967 that there was nuclear peace. There was
peace between the nuclear superpowers. And if the United States
has nuclear superiority, there will be no nuclear war. That is the
surest way to peace.
As George Washington said: "To secure the peace it must be
known that we are at all times prepared for war." And nuclear
superiority in the hands of the United States is the surest, best
means of peace. We proved that when we had it.
The only reason we are nervous today and worried is because we
no longer have it. Decisions were made which allowed that great
superiority to shift to the Soviet Union.
SALT II PREVENTS UNITED STATES FROM MEETING MORAL
OBLIGATIONS
Senator Helms. In view of the acknowledged essential equiv-
alence by the early eighties, I take it you believe the SALT II
Treaty will not allow the United States to meet its moral obliga-
tions.
Mrs. ScHLAFLY. That is correct, because SALT II prohibits us
from catching up with the Russians. It is that simple. SALT II
permits the Soviet Union to have all the weapons they need to
control the world. It enables them to have decisive military superi-
ority and it forbids us to catch up. It forbids us to increase our
numbers of missiles. It forbids us all across the board to catch up
with the Soviets in throw-weight, in megatonnage, in MIRV's, in
missiles and so forth on down the line.
SALT II means that, if it is ratified, we will be humbly accepting
a position of inferiority to the Soviet Union. What is our recourse
after that? After that, we can say please, Mr. Brezhnev, be nice to
us, but we will not have the power to force him to do it.
When Khrushchev put his missiles in Cuba in 1962, our great
Strategic Air Command went on airborne alert and could drop
50,000 megatons of nuclear striking power then. That is why we
208
were safe and there wasn't any war. We can't do that today. We
can't even make a credible threat of that today.
Senator Helms. And we will be even worse off.
Mrs. ScHLAFLY. With each succeeding year, we will be worse off.
Senator Helms. Right. My time is up. Thank you, Mrs. Schlafly.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Stone. Senator Hayakawa.
Senator Hayakawa. Senator Percy, would you like to question
now?
Senator Percy. No, please go ahead. I have time.
SOVIET STOPPAGE OF WORLD OIL FLOW
Senator Hayakawa. Thank you, Mrs. Schlafly, for your able and
eloquent presentation. I would like further explanation of that
map, Mrs. Schlafly. There is that heavy green line of Middle East-
ern oil going around the Cape of Good Hope up through Europe
and the United States.
This shipment can be interdicted, interrupted, or stopped, you
are saying, by the Soviet Navy? Or what are the ways in which
this flow of oil can be stopped? What are the ways in which it is
likely to be stopped, given Soviet power and, as you say, Soviet
superiority in nuclear weapons?
Mrs. Schlafly. Once they have the strategic superiority, they
can stop it in any one of a variety of different ways. For example,
they could do it like oil embargo I in 1973. They could simply tell
the Middle East and African nations, we want you to embargo oil
for the next 5 months, and don't worry, you can recoup your losses
after that by jacking up the price 10 times.
The Soviets will have the power to do what they want. With
their great naval superiority, they could simply impose a blockade.
"They could harass our shipping line. They could cut it off at some
of those narrow points where the oil comes through. There are any
number of options. When you have the power, you can deal any
card in the deck,
AFRICAN seaports FRIENDLY TO SOVIET NAVY
Senator Hayakawa. What are the seaports on the east coast of
Africa which would be friendly to and therefore probably usable by
the Soviet Navy?
Mrs. Schlafly. They have several ports there at the present
time, and they have that bunkering facility where there is the
break in the green line.
Senator Hayakawa. Yes. What is that bunkering facility?
Mrs. Schlafly. A major place where they can come in for re-
pairs and do an5rthing they want.
Senator Hayakawa. What island is that?
Mrs. Schlafly. Senator, the technical information for this is
from a congressional source and some of the strategic authorities,
and I will be happy to submit the name of that island to you. I
don't have it right now.
Senator Hayakawa. I should know these things.
Senator Stone. It will be accepted into the record when it is
submitted.
209
Mrs. ScHLAFLY. Thank you.
[The information referred to follows:]
The name of the island is Mauritius. Data for the map was obtained from a House
Committee on International Relations publication of the 95th Congress, dated May
8, 1977 and entitled "The Soviet Union and the Thi-d World."
Senator Hayakawa. But there are seaports along the east coast
which the Soviet Navy could use, would be welcome at, and there
are some on the west coast as well?
Mrs. ScHLAFLY. Yes, they have many friendly ports in Africa —
any place where there is a country with Cuban troops with Russian
arms.
Senator Hayakawa. Like Angola?
Mrs. ScHLAFLY. Ycs, Angola will allow the Soviet Navy to come
in. It is my understanding that all up and down the coasts of both
sides of Africa, they have friendly ports where they can put in for
repairs, and supplies, and so forth.
Senator Hayakawa. They wouldn't have friendly ports in the
former French colonies like Gabon, the Ivory Coast, would they?
Mrs. ScHLAFLY. The French have been doing a great job of main-
taining some very key spots, especially that one where the oil
comes out of Saudi Arabia. The Soviets wouldn't need every coun-
try. But as you can see by the map, they have plenty of countries
with plenty of ports.
Senator Hayakawa. So one of the very real dangers, given nucle-
ar superiority on the part of the Soviets, would be their power to
cut off oil altogether to us at any time they wanted to.
Mrs. Schlafly. Yes. And I think it is very important to face up
to the fact that it is not true that dropping bombs is the only
utility of nuclear weapons. You can use them to threaten, to black-
mail, to achieve political and economic objectives.
U.S. STRATEGIC SITUATION NOT RESULT OF SALT I
Senator Hayakawa. Isn't it a fact that our strategic situation is
not so much the result of SALT I but a self-inflicted condition of
weakness?
Mrs. Schlafly. That is true. The original decisions were made in
the mid and early 1960's.
Senator Hayakawa. But after the passage of SALT I, after the
ratification of SALT I.
Mrs. Schlafly. No. The original decisions were made when the
self-imposed freeze began, and that began right after the Cuban
missile crisis. 1967 was the last year when the United States added
a single strategic weapon.
Senator Hayakawa. I see. So that SALT I really reaffirmed that
which we were already doing insofar as arms limitation is con-
cerned.
Mrs. Schlafly. Yes; and it made public and official the second-
rate status of the United States, which I believe destroyed the
credibility of our nuclear umbrella and thereby led directly to oil
embargo I.
Senator Hayakawa. If the ratification, then, of SALT I didn't
matter one way or the other, in effect
Mrs. Schlafly. Oh, I wouldn't agree with that. I think SALT I
was a dreadful mistake. SALT I was a mistake because, in the first
210
place, we gave up our right to defend ourselves against incoming
missiles based upon the mutual-eissured-destruction rationale.
Second, we accepted inferiority in numbers at the ratio of 3 to 2.
That is, for every three ICBM's the Soviets were permitted to have
under SALT I, we said we will have only two. And for every three
missile-firing nuclear submarines the Soviets had, we permitted
ourselves to have only two.
What SALT I did was to codify and legitimize the self-imposed
freeze that started in the mid-1960's. The Soviets kept us negotiat-
ing until they had that advantage, and then they nailed it down in
SALT L
But time has gone on and the situation gets worse because the
Soviets keep building and we remain in at a freeze.
Senator Hayakawa. And we maintain a self-imposed reticence
about increasing our Armed Forces, our defenses.
Mrs. ScHLAFLY. Yes. I think it would come home to people if they
would realize that the numbers of our strategic weapons that
defend our country today, namely, 1,054 ICBM s and 41 Polaris
Poseidon submarines, and a shrinking number of B-52 bombers,
were the numbers that were set and established in the Eisenhower
administration before Eisenhower went out of office as the force we
needed to defend our country then.
Although some of those weapons kept coming in the pipelines up
to 1967, their numbers have never been changed. And certainly the
danger to us is infinitely greater than it was when Eisenhower was
in the White House.
Senator Hayakawa. So, if we continue in the next 10 years to
behave as we have in the last 10 years insofar as defense is con-
cerned, will not the nonsigning of SALT II be the solution?
Mrs. ScHLAFLY. The rejection of SALT II will enable us to go
ahead and do what we need to defend our country. The ratification
of SALT II would deprive us of that right.
Senator Hayakawa. Of course, I am very nervous about our
determination to go ahead in any case.
Mrs. ScHLAFLY. I am nervous about that, too, Senator, but in any
event, with SALT II our hands would be so tied that we would put
ourselves in a legal bind as well as other kinds of binds.
RATIFICATION TIED TO INCREASE DEFENSE SPENDING
Senator Hayakawa. So when people like Senator Nunn and Dr.
Kissinger say that they would vote for the ratification of SALT II if
we expended x billion dollars a year for the improvement of our
weaponry, would you agree with that?
Mrs. ScHLAFLY. Senator, I would not put it in terms of a percent-
age of the defense budget. Over the past few years, as we all know,
the defense budget has gone up every year but we have not gotten
more strategic weapons. The strategic weapons are only a small
part of the defense budget, but they are the part that makes the
difference.
I think we must build mobile missiles. I think we must build the
B-1 bomber. I think we must build whatever mix and readiness of
weapons we need to defend ourselves. But we put ourselves in a
legal bind with SALT II.
Senator Hayakawa. Thank you very much, Mrs. Schlafly.
211
Mrs. ScHLAFLY. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Stone. Thank you, Senator Hayakawa.
Senator Percy.
SOVIET PRESSURE IN 1973 OIL EMBARGO
Senator Percy. Mrs. Schlafly, we welcome you once again. I have
just a few questions about your testimony first and then a couple of
other substantive questions that I would like to put to you. In a few
of the cases you cite in your testimony I view history a little bit
differently than you do. I would like to have your amplified
thoughts on some of these cases.
You state: "In October 1973, the Kremlin openly, brazenly, and
defiantly goaded the Middle East oil producers to use their oil
weapon against the West." I hope there is no implication on your
part that the Soviets should take credit for that oil embargo. That,
as I saw it, and I was out there at the time in the Middle East, was
entirely motivated by Middle Eastern events.
I think such anti-Soviet countries as Saudi Arabia and Oman
would be highly incensed at the thought that they were just a tool
of the Soviet Union in this regard. They were working entirely
from the standpoint of their own political interests in the Middle
East.
Could you document for us any evidence you have that they
"openly, brazenly and defiantly goaded the Middle East oil produc-
ers" and had any effect whatsoever?
Mrs. Schlafly. Yes; they did openly and brazenly do it through
their radio broadcasts and through their newspapers, through
every means of communication. That is the documentation of that.
Now, with regard to the motivation of the Arabs, of course there
are other factors and controversies in the Middle East. But I think
it is important to remember that in the Middle East, the Arabs and
the Israelis had fought, I believe, three previous wars, and our
policy was always to help Israel.
But before 1973, the Arabs didn't use their oil weapon against us,
and I think that is the big difference. In the previous controversies
they may have been unhappy about what we did. They may not
have liked our siding with Israel. But they did not use their oil
weapon.
And what was it that was different in 1973? It was that the
American nuclear umbrella had been replaced by the Soviet um-
brella, and no longer could the Arabs be in fear that we would send
the Marines in as Eisenhower sent the Marines into Lebanon in
1958, in a nice clean operation. We prevented the threatened coup.
No one got killed. It was a show of strength that everyone respect-
ed. But in 1973, the Arabs didn't need to worry that we were going
to send the marines in.
Senator Percy. I respectfully disassociate myself from that anal-
ysis. I think the Mideastern powers, the OPEC countries, acted
strictly in their own political interests there. I wouldn't want to
give the Soviets credit for that devastating economic blow against
us.
212
SALT I AND II PREVENT BUILDING OF ICBM's
In your statement you say our technique of keeping SALT I and
II negotiations pending for 12 years kept the United States from
building up any additional ICBM submarines or bombers. We have
been building submarines. John Glenn just dedicated the U.S.S.
Ohio, the first Trident submarine, and we have a full-scale pro-
gram underway to continue that.
We have the ability to build more ICBM's. We have just chosen
not to. SALT I has not inhibited us. We also have the right under
SALT I or II to build a B-1 bomber if we want.
Is that statement correct, that SALT I and II keeps us from
building any more ICBM's, submarines, or bombers?
Mrs. ScHLAFLY. Well, it is a fact that that is the way it has
happened.
Senator Percy. That is what happened but it is not because of
SALT I or II.
Mrs. ScHLAFLY. But all those years of the negotiation of SALT I,
from 1967 to 1972, we were all told no, we don't need to build any
more weapons because we are going to have an arms control agree-
ment. And during that period, the Soviets were digging holes like
mad so they would have 1,618 by the time SALT I was signed.
So I think the SALT negotiations were a tactic of the Soviets to
inhibit our adding additional weapons.
Now, you mentioned the submarine. Of course, that Trident that
Senator Glenn christened is not going to be in the water for an-
other year or two. But the U.S. plan for the Tridents that we are
supposedly building is to take out and throw away a Polaris for
every Trident built. The number 41 has never changed since 1967
and it is not planned to change.
That is the shocking thing that has happened to this country.
While we have built some new weapons, some new missiles, some
new submarines, we have destroyed one for every one that was
built. As I pointed out in my testimony, one of the really shocking
things is that when we built 550 Minutemen Ill's, we could have
had 550 additional missiles for the puny additional expenditure of
$110 million.
Instead of that, it was the policy of this country to destroy a
Minuteman I or II for every Minuteman III that was built. So the
total figures remained the same. The SALT negotiations kept us
from ever changing the figures of 1,054 ICBM's and 41 submarines.
Senator Percy. From all the testimony we have had from the
Department of Defense, the decision not to go ahead with certain
weapon systems, the B-1, accelerating the Trident program, et
cetera, were all based on questions of cost, need, and effectiveness
rather than on SALT restrictions. We have, after all, in the last
decade doubled the number of warheads we have. There was no
inhibition in SAL'S" I or II from our going ahead with that particu-
lar program, and we did.
Mainly, canceling the B-1 was a decision reached by the Penta-.
gon, the administration, and backed by the Congress, although
some Members disagreed strongly and probably were right that we
have cut back too much. But I don't think we can attribute that to
SALT I.
213
As you know, you and I did disagree on SALT I. We had the
power under SALT I to go ahead with a second ABM site. We
voluntarily chose not to go ahead with it, and you cannot really
find any defenders of an ABM system today who feel that that
expenditure would have been cost-effective.
So whether it was right or wrong is immaterial. We voluntarily
decided not to do certain things.
Mrs. ScHLAFLY. Senator, may I say something to that? I did not
say
Senator Percy. My time is terribly short and I have a couple of
other points to cover with you.
Mrs. ScHLAFLY. I did not say SALT I prevented us from doing
that. I said the tactic of keeping the negotiations pending kept us
from doing it. And you are right, those decisions were made by this
country. But I think they were wrong decisions.
Senator Percy. You mention a scenario, which is an interesting
scenario, of oil embargo No. 2 — and you are quoting, I think, the
Soviet Union's presumed speech — "the oil embargo II will enable
our Middle East friends to become richer and richer at the expense
of the capitalist imperialist nations."
I would hate for any of those nations to get the feeling that they
could somehow become richer by embargoing us again. They have
made all their investments here. I don't know of any investments
any OPEC countries have made in the Communist world. They
have put all their chips here.
Every bit of inflation we have here erodes their base. Every time
prices get higher, everything we build in Saudi Arabia gets more
expensive. And they have their money scattered all over our banks
and our bonds and everjrthing else.
Anything they do to undercut us — and Saudi Arabia has made
this very clear to other OPEC countries — undercuts them because
they have invested so heavily here.
DECUNE OF U.S. DOLLAR TIED TO SOVIET SUPERIORITY
You also indicate that the rapid decline of the U.S. dollar has
exactly tracked the world's perception of the fact that the Soviet
Union is building toward a decisive military superiority. I agree
with the feeling the world has that they are building toward it has
eroded America's position and we must find a way to correct that.
But wouldn't you agree that the thing that has really cut the
dollar is not that perception but low productivity in this country
and an unwillingness to work harder and smarter and better? Our
balance of pajonents is way out of balance. Ruinous inflation and
an excess of Federal spending, excess budgets year after year are
the things that have really eroded the dollar. It is not military
superiority of the Soviet Union.
Do we agree on that?
Mrs. ScHLAFLY. Those are all factors. Senator, but I would sug-
gest that the No. 1, most important factor was the 5-month oil
embargo in 1973 followed by the fivefold increase in oil prices
which unsettled everjrthing and was the start of the tremendous
inflation and other economic changes that resulted.
214
And again, I suggest that oil embargo I was the direct result of
the perception of who has strategic superiority, as explained by the
SALT I statistics.
Senator Percy. Thank you very much. My time is up and I have
a few more questions.
Senator Stone. Would you like to take an extra 2 or 3 minutes
out of my time, Senator Percy?
Senator Percy. I would be happy to.
Senator Stone. Go right ahead.
NECESSARY EXPENDITURE TO SAFEGUARD U.S. SECURITY
Senator Percy. Very quickly. We have a tremendous debate now
in the Congress as to whether our defense spending should be
increased by 5 percent, 3 percent, some lower figure, or some
higher figure. Could you, because of the amount of time, Mrs.
Schlafly, you spend on these matters, give us your judgment of
what expenditure would be necessary to really safeguard America's
security?
Mrs. Schlafly. As I mentioned earlier, I think it is the spending
on strategic weapons rather than the overall defense budget that
makes the difference. I believe that whoever has strategic superior-
ity will determine whether we can survive as a free nation. There
isn't anything that government does that is as important as that.
So I think the first thing is to decide what strategic weapons we
need and then go after that rather than saying that it should be a
2- or 5-percent increase in overall spending. It is not the overall
budget. The budget has been big and growing. It is the strategic
weapons that really matter.
I pointed out in my statement about how, for just a pitiful
expenditure, we could have increased our ICBM force by 50 percent
by simply digging 550 more holes. Exactly the same thing is true
when the Poseidons were built. We destroyed a Polaris for every
Poseidon that we built. For a minimal expense, we could have had
31 additional submarines instead of 31 Polaris-retrofitted-Poseidon
submarines.
Senator Percy. Could you give us some sort of a figure, though?
When we work with the concurrent budget resolution coming up
on the floor, we must work with specific figures. Do you have any
ideas you can give us as to how much you think we need to develop
to increase our overall spending to accommodate the program you
are talking about?
Mrs. Schlafly. If you defeat SALT II, I will come back and give
you those figures. [Laughter.]
But I don't think a specific budget is necessary in order to defeat
the treaty.
BALANCED BUDGET AS IT RELATES TO NATIONAL SECURITY
Senator Percy. A witness this morning said to us that the
strength of our country, and I agreed with him, is not just our
military superiority but it is also the will to use our weapons at the
right time and the right place. It is also our economic strength
which has to be dominant.
215
Now, when we are faced with problems like budget balancing,
and the second concurrent resolution is coming up, we are going to
be faced with some tough decisions. I think we have to cut back
some social programs. I have outlined a number of them which I
think are outrageous for this Nation at this time to be spending
money on.
We must cut some back, and I think we have to increase some-
what our Federal defense spending. But how important do you
think it is for this Nation to stick with its resolve now to balance
the budget and, as we are now projecting, have a surplus in the
fiscal year beginning October 1, 1981.
How important is that insofar as the perception of America's
strength, its will, its ability to manage its fiscal affairs in a sound
and prudent way? How much importance do you attach to that for
sustaining the image of this country as a powerful, strong, leading
nation?
Mrs. ScHLAFLY. There is no question but that our country and
our Government has certain image, credibility, and confidence
problems at the present time. And one of the big areas is money.
But I do think that if we don't rebuild our strategic superiority, the
effect on the dollar will be more disastrous than anjrthing else.
I really think, as I pointed out in my statement, that the whole
matter of cost as related to strategic weapons is a phony issue. It is
such a small part of the budget that it does not really even figure
in the overall total. But I am glad to hear you say that you are
going to cut back some other programs in order to build defense,
because I do believe that that is the first duty of government.
Senator Percy, I think we simply have to. I think we can find a
way to do it and keep our objectives. I hope we do agree on an
objective to keep that budget balanced. It is a very, very high
priority as it relates to our national security and our strength as a
nation. Economic strength is just as important as military
strength. That shows our ability in the long run.
If they want to pursue an arms race and keep at it, we could
beat them hands down on that any time we decide we want to do
that.
The last question, Mr. Chairman, if you will indulge me with one
more.
Senator Stone. Go right ahead.
USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IF EUROPE IS THREATENED
Senator Percy. It is a question that I put to the Ripon Society,
and there couldn't be a group of Republicans more on two ends of
the spectrum than the Ripon Society and the Conservative Union.
But I was pleased that the representative of the Ripon Society from
Evanston, 111., answered the question I put to him because our will
to use our weaponry has been questioned in Europe in recent days,
as you well know, and I think many wars come about as a result of
miscalculation by one of the adversaries as to the intention and
will of the other.
Is there any question in your mind that if, for instance, the
Warsaw Pact powers in the Soviet Union moved in with conven-
tional weaponry to threaten Western Europe, that we would and
should, if Western Europe was in danger, use our ultimate weapon,
216
which none of us want to use but which we have there as a
deterrent? Will it ever be a deterrent if we don't use it under those
circumstances?
Would you agree with the Ripon Society, who, I was pleased, said
yes? He thinks the country would have the will, as he knows it.
There are very few people who get around the country more than
you do and know more people. From the standpoint of conserva-
tives in the country, do you feel they would support the will to use
those weapons and that Russia should never miscalculate our first
line of defense being NATO and Europe?
Mrs. ScHLAFLY. I believe the country has the will. But it is not
the American people who have their finger on the button; it is the
President. And I must tell you truthfully that I don't believe the
President has the will to use it. And he is the only one who will
decide.
When Secretary Brown went on "Meet the Press," he was asked
the question: What are we going to do if the Soviets fire their
missiles at our Minutemen? And he refused to say that we would
launch them before the Soviet missiles arrived. He is going to sit
there and let them be sitting ducks.
If they would simply say, out in public for everyone to see, that if
we get verified word of a Soviet launch, the "birds" will fly and
there will be nothing but empty holes for the Soviets to hit, that in
itself would be a tremendous deterrent. But when the Secretary of
Defense leaves it unsure, uncertain, then I don't believe he would
push the button and I don't believe the President would. And it
will not matter what the American people want because they are
not the ones who will make the decision.
Senator Percy. I will let others speak for the President. I don't
feel I can or should in this particular case. But whatever reason
Secretary Brown might have had for not enunciating what he
would do, I have known him for many, many years and I think he
is a man of a very strong will and a man who would recognize that
the potential use of a deterrent must always be present if it is to be
a deterrent.
Mrs. ScHLAFLY. But if I am not sure, how are the Soviets to be
sure? The important thing is to let them know in advance. It
makes no sense to say that after they hit us, we will pause and
then we will think about it, and then we don't know what to do or
not, so we will have a conference in the situation room in the
White House.
It should be known in advance.
Senator Percy. Well, I feel very strongly that we should leave no
doubt in the minds of the Soviets where we would draw the line. I
have tried to draw that line with China on Formosa, and I have
tried to draw that line on Western Europe with the Soviet Union.
And I don't think the American people would tolerate the Govern-
ment which would not stand up for what we believe in and the
avowed pledge that we have to protect Europe.
I cannot conceive of the President of the United States not
having the will to carry that out, whether he be Democrat or
Republican.
Mrs. ScHLAFLY. But the real issue is not whether we will or not,
but it is what the men in the Kremlin think we will do.
217
Senator Percy. That is right.
Mrs. ScHLAFLY. And if I am unsure, you must admit that perhaps
they are unsure, too.
Senator Percy. That is why I wanted then and always to con-
stantly repeat, so that they at least know how one Senator feels
and interprets the will of the country and the Government of the
United States of America, so that tney never underestimate our
ability just because of Vietnam.
This is a different matter. Vietnam was never a matter of our
total national security. Our national security does depend upon
NATO countries. I think they know it and I think the Kremlin
knows it.
Thank you very much.
Mrs. ScHLAFLY. But the best way to send the message is to defeat
SALT II. That would send a big message.
Senator Percy. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate very much your
yielding some of your time to me. I thank you very much and my
colleagues.
Senator Stone. Since I yielded my time to Senator Percy, I would
offer Senator Hayakawa and Senator Helms a second round, and
then I will do mine.
Senator Helms. No, you go right ahead.
[Senator Hayakawa indicating.]
Senator Stone. Thank you.
difference between soviet numbers and united states
NUMBERS
Mrs. Schlafly, early in your testimony, you provided quite a
remarkable summary, which is, I think, probably the most lucid
that I have heard, of the difference between Soviet numbers and
the American numbers as limited by SALT II. Would you repeat
that briefly?
You were talking about their heavy weapons as opposed to ours.
And in about 2 minutes you summarized the strategic numerical
differences at the very least in this treaty. Would you repeat that?
Mrs. Schlafly. SALT II allows the Soviets to have 308 heavy
missiles. It does not allow us to have a single one. SALT II allows
the Soviets to have — well, they did have 1,618 ICBM's. I think they
are claiming they have only about 1,500 now. But it allows us to
have only 1,054.
SALT II allows them to have almost 4 times as many MIRV's on
their land-based ICBM's as we have, and it allows those Soviet
MIRV's to be 26 times more powerful than our land-based MIRV's.
SALT II allows the Soviets to have their submarines prowling
our coast with weapons that can reach all of our major cities. But
we are prohibited from building a cruise missile that will reach
Soviet territory. It allows them to build all the Backfire bombers
they want, but we are strictly limited on our bombers and, in
effect, are very handicapped in building the B-1 bomber if we
choose to build it.
Nobody knows how many mobile missiles they have. Of course,
mobiles were the big loophole in SALT I. They had the legal right
and the capability to build a couple of thousand mobile missiles
under SALT I. We don't know how many they have built and
I 218
hidden. But under SALT II we would be prohibited from deploying
a mobile missile until 1982.
The disparities are so tremendous that the whole thing is humil-
iating to us. In addition to the actual differences in power and
numbers and throw-weight and megatonnage, there is the percep-
tion of power. Again, I don't see how they could respect us for
signing such an unequal agreement.
QUAUTY EDGE VERSUS QUANTITY EDGE
Senator Stone. Mrs. Schlafly, the administration argues that we
have a quality edge, while the Soviets under the treaty have a
quantity edge. What is your understanding of that quality edge in
the strategic missiles and other strategic weapons included in this
treaty?
Mrs. Schlafly. We did have a quality or accuracy edge, but I
think most people believe that most or all of that is gone now.
Recent tests show that the Soviet ICBM's are very accurate, possi-
bly as accurate as ours. The whole rationale originally for saying
that we would not build heavy missiles was a kind of pride that our
missiles were more accurate so we didn't need heavy missiles.
But now that their missiles are almost as accurate as ours, our
advantage is gone. It is like the old saying that a good big man can
always beat a good little man. If missiles are bigger and accurate,
they are going to be tremendously more powerful than smaller and
accurate missiles.
WINDOW OF vulnerability OF ICBM's
Senator Stone. Mrs. Schlafly, witnesses in opposition to the
treaty have expressed their military opposition, their prime mili-
tary opposition in regard to the window of vulnerability of our
land-based missiles, our current Minutemen III missiles, during the
mid life of this treaty, roughly from 1981 through 1984, maybe as
late as 1985, until the M-X mobile missile is deployed in sufficient
quantity.
Those opposition witnesses have advanced the thought that the
quickest way to even this out so that the vulnerability of our land-
based missiles would be reduced substantially would be to permit
by specific provision in this treaty multiple protective shelters,
vertical shelters or some other form of mobile basing. What do you
think about that?
Mrs. Schlafly. I think the window is very serious. Secretary
Brown talks about it as starting in the early 1980's, and that is
only about 4 or 5 months from now. I think the quickest way, the
easiest way, as I mentioned in my testimony, is to adopt a launch
on verification of warning strategy. In other words, the President
should proclaim that, if we pick up word that the Soviets have
launched, then our Minutemen fly; so the Soviet missiles would hit
nothing but empty holes.
That would give immediate invulnerability to the Minuteman
missile force.
I do agree that the next move should be the mobile basing.
219
INITIATION OF COUNTERFORCE STRATEGY
Senator Stone. Now, in regard to them flying, the way they are
targeted now, most people think, is against civiHan populations,
mainly; some hardened military targets, but mainly, because of the
doctrine of mutual assured destruction, they are targeted against
the Soviet civilian populations.
Others, mainly those in opposition to this treaty, have advocated
a counterforce approach in which, as soon as we can, we would
target the force, against the strategic missiles, of the Soviet Union,
What is your view about that?
Mrs. ScHLAFLY. Of course we should have a counterforce strat-
egy. The question is do we have the weapons that can do it? It is
not believed that our Minuteman missiles are sufficiently powerful
to knock out Soviet missiles in their hardened silos.
Senator Stone. That is part of this window of vulnerability until
we get a larger M-X missile, isn't that right?
Mrs. ScHLAFLY. That is correct. And that is the reason why
SALT is so unfair in not permitting us to have heavy missiles,
because that is the value of a heavy missile. It can knock out a
missile in its hardened silo.
need for heavy missile during ufe of salt
Senator Stone. And you are saying we need a heavy missile and
we need it during the life of this treaty; is that right?
Mrs. ScHLAFLY. I think we need everything, a mix, and readiness.
I think we need whatever it takes to stay ahead of the Soviet
Union. We have a nation that will support it. We have an economy
that will support it. We are blessed with a GNP twice that of the
Soviet Union. And I am convinced that the American people will
support it.
And if they find that some months hence we are all sitting in
gasoline lines because half of our gasoline has been cut off, and if
they find that we are absolutely unable to do anything about
Soviet troops or bombers or missiles in Cuba, I think they are going
to come right back and say: how did that happen?
ACU'S acceptance of resolution of CUBAN SITUATION
Senator Stone. Mrs. Schlafly, speaking of that Cuban situation,
would you or would you think the American Conservative Union
would accept a resolution of this problem at less than the full
withdrawal of the combat unit?
Mrs. Schlafly. No, we want them out. It is a real test and it is
only the harbinger of things to come.
Senator Stone. Thank you, Mrs. Schlafly.
Mrs. Schlafly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[Mrs. Schlafly's prepared statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Mrs. Phylus Schlafly
My name is Phyllis Schlafly of Alton, Illinois. I am an author, a journalist, and a
member of the Illinois Bar. I appear here as a representative of the American
Conservative Union, of which I am a member of the board of directors.
For the past 15 years, my major field of research and writing has been strategy. I
am the co-author of five books on nuclear strategy, which have sold in the hundreds
of thousands of copies. Beginning in 1964, these books made a series of remarkable
48-260 0-79 Pt.4 - 15
220
predictions which, unfortunately, have all come true. At a time when others were
discounting Soviet intentions and capabilities, my books predicted that the Soviets
would keep building nuclear weapons until they achieve decisive strategic superior-
ity, while the United States was opting out of the arms race by a self-imposed freeze
on the building of additional strategic weapons. It is now obvious that this is what
happ)ened.
Strategy is the science of planning and using your assets to achieve your objec-
tive. Many people seem to assume that the only utility of nuclear weapons is to kill
millions of people. Nothing could be further from the truth, and nothing could be a
more dangerous assumption. Today I ask you to consider the other uses of nuclear
weapons, and how ratification of the SALT II Treaty would allow the Soviet Union
to have powerful political and economic weapons against which we would have no
defense.
Ratification of the SALT II Treaty would deliver to the Soviet Union: (1) the
power to cut off U.S. imported oil, (2) the power to destroy the U.S. dollar, and (3)
the power to use Cuba as a Soviet base. Ratification of the SALT II Treaty will
prevent the United States from effectively interfering with or stopping the Soviet
exercise of the Oil Weapon, the Dollar Weapon, or the Cuba Weapon.
Rejection of SALT II, on the other hand, will not give the Soviet Union any
additional power which is realistically usable, but it will permit the United States to
control our own destiny, politically and economically.
I. THE OIL WEAPON
The great American industrial nation, a people on wheels to whom gasoline is
almost as much an essential of life as water, is now facing the prospect of gasoline
rationing. What is it that has brought us to the point of accepting rationing?
President Carter says he needs standby power to cope with a sudden, massive oil
shortage. Obviously, all the oil wells in the United States will not dry up at the
same time. The very request for rationing power reveals our humiliating depend-
ence on the whim of the OPEC nations thousands of miles away, in the shadow of
the Soviet Union.
In October 1973, the Kremlin openly, brazenly, and defiantly goaded the Middle
East oil producers to use their oil weapon" against the West. Use of the "oil
weapon" was so very simple: just embargo oil to the West for five months, and then
jack up the price fivefold. It cost the Soviets nothing. With the higher prices, the
Arabs quickly recouped their temporary losses. And the United States was exposed
as an impotent giant who could do nothing, absolutely nothing, to force the Arabs to
respect U.S. property and contracts.
We have had six years since Oil Embargo I to prepare and defend our nation
against the contingency of Oil Embargo II. Instead of improving our situation, we
have become dependent on imported oil for an even larger percentage of our
consumption. Nobody likes to talk about it publicly, but the only reason there is the
slightest need for gasoline rationing is the clear and present danger from the threat
of Oil Embargo II. Dr. Ghazi A. Algossibi, Saudi Arabia's Minister of Industry and
Electricity, said in a July speech in Los Angeles: Your industrial way of life for the
coming decades will collapse without Arab oil. The independence of the Arab
countries in the face of expanding Communism cannot be maintained without your
strength and resolve. No interdependence could be more complete."
Translated into plain English, SALT 11 = Soviet superiority in nuclear
arms = Soviet ability to wage political nuclear blackmail in the Middle East = more
gasoline shortages in America. So, let's consider a possible scenario of what Oil
Embargo II might mean to America.
scenario: oil embargo ii
Time: Early 1980. Scene: The Kremlin, Moscow. Members of the Politburo are
hosting a meeting of the chiefs of the Middle East oil-producing states. Brezhnev (or
his successor) is doing all the talking.
"Comrades of the Middle East, we all have a common interest in world peace and
prosperity. Although we have been enjoying apparent peace, our great leader Lenin
warned us that, so long as Capitalist Imperialism exists, war is a constant danger.
Our courageous intelligence agents have uncovered a massive plot by the Capitalist
Imperialist Warmongers to launch a new world war. This would bring death and
destruction such as the world has never seen before. This would be bad for your
business. Your good customers, the United States and Western Europe, would be
destroyed by our necessary retaliation. Since your economies are based on continu-
ing revenues from your great oil resources, you have a vital interest in preventing
such a senseless Armageddon.
221
"Fortunately, there is a peaceful way to avert this nuclear destruction, and that is
why I have invited you to Moscow. I want you all to agree to impose immediately a
total embargo on sales of oil to the warmongering United States and her NATO
allies. Within a few weeks, hardly a wheel will be turning in Western factories.
They will have little electricity. They will be on their knees to you, pleading for oil
on any terms. Then you and the great peace-loving U.S.S.R. will impose our joint
terms. The Western democracies will pay any price you set for your oil and you can
easily recover tenfold the revenues you lost during the embargo.
"For our part in the settlement, the Soviet Union will demand that the Capitalist
Imperalist Warmongers surrender all their nuclear and conventional weapons to
the United Nations. And, since most UN members do not possess the technology to
handle the takeover of nuclear weapons, the U.S.S.R. will gladly take custody for
the UN.
"Do you want to know what the United States will do to pressure you into
terminating your embargo? The answer is NOTHING. Just remember back to your
first courageous and innovative use of your oil weapon back in 1973. What did the
United States and Western Europe do then? Nothing! They meekly agreed to pay
you a fivefold increase in the price of oil, even though that increase disrupted the
stability of their economies. It was your courageous action in 1973 which brought
about so much costly inflation and unemployrnent in the Western nations.
"The United States had far more conventional military power than any of the
Middle East nations. Yet the United States did not dare to use its conventional
military power because the great peace-loving Soviet Union gave you the protection
of our strategic nuclear umbrella.
"The United States will never again dare to send in the Marines as President
Eisenhower did to avert a threatened coup in Lebanon in 1958.
"Our technique of keeping SALT I and II negotiations pending for 12 years kept
the United States from building up any additional ICBM's, submarines, or bombers,
whUe we built up continuously and massively. The Soviet nuclear umbrella is now
three times more powerful than it was in 1973. During the last six years, we have
tripled the throw-weight of our strategic forces. We have replaced a thousand of our
older ICBM's with advanced models many times more powerful and more accurate.
We have deployed 29 of our huge Delta-class missile-firing submarines and hundreds
of new strategic bombers.
"Thus, Oil Embargo II will enable our Middle East friends to become richer and
richer at the expense of the Capitalist Imperialist nations, and it will give the great
Soviet Union the power to enforce world peace, on our terms of course. The massive
nuclear power we were allowed to retain under the terms of the SALT II Treaty has
made all this possible. SALT II prevented the United States from building any
weapons to challenge our use of the Oil Weapon.
"We realize that Saudi Arabia recently established a friendly relationship with
the United States, selling them oil at less than world prices and increasing produc-
tion to help them alleviate their shortages. However, in view of the massive shift in
the world's strategic balance, it would be very foolish of the Saudis to remain
friends with the Capitalist Imperialists. We can stop the flow of oil with our naval
superiority alone. It is in your own best interests to cooperate with our plan for
world peace."
II. THE DOLLAR WEAPON
The second power that the SALT II Treaty, if ratified, would accord to the Soviet
Union is the power to destroy the U.S. dollar. The value of a nation's paper
currency is based directly on that nation's promise-to-pay credibility and on the
public's perception of the government's ability to survive and redeem its paper-
money promises. "The rapid decline of the value of the U.S. dollar in the last few
years exactly tracks the world's perception of the fact that the Soviet Union is
building toward a decisive military superiority which will soon be able to dictate the
terms of surrender-or-survival to the United States.
From 1945 to 1967, the United States had clear and undisputed nuclear superior-
ity which peaked at the ratio of 8-to-l. During those years of undisputed U.S.
nuclear superiority (which were disparagingly known as the Cold War), we had hard
currencies, a stable dollar, and inflation only in that controllable degree which
accompanies an increase in the Gross National Product. The U.S. nuclear umbrella
was the basis for the stability of relationships in the Western world, not only for
political freedom, but for trade relationships and agreements, for the stability of the
flow of raw materials in and finished products out, and for the availability of oil and
other energy sources at reasonable prices.
"The year 1967 was the last year in which the United States added a single
strategic weapon (ICBM, nuclear missile-firing submarine, or strategic bomber) to
222
our forces. Many of us knew that the United States that year opted out of the arms
race at a time when the Soviets were building toward a first-strike capability, but
most Americans refused to believe it. The U.S. nuclear umbrella remained credible,
and therefore effective, for another five years because of the lag in international
perception that the strategic balance was shifting in favor of the Soviets.
The SALT I Agreements signed in Moscow on May 26, 1972, made it officially and
publicly apparent that the United States had voluntarily and unilaterally put
ourselves in a nuclear-weapons freeze and abandoned our once-overwhelming strate-
gic superiority. Under the SALT I Treaty (on defensive weapons), the United States
gave up our right to defend our population against incoming nuclear missiles, and
under the SALT I Interim Agreement (on offensive weapons), we agreed that, for
every three ICMB's and every three nuclear missile-firing submarines the Soviets
build, we will limit the United States to only two, respectively.
Publication of the SALT I statistics in Alay 1972 destroyed the credibility of the
U.S. strategic umbrella. The newly credible Soviet strategic umbrella protected the
Arabs in their effective use of the oil weapon against the great oil-consuming
Western nations. Although the conventional military power of the Western nations
overshadowed that of the Arabs by a factor of about 1,000-to-l, that was no help
whatsoever in the face of the soviet nuclear umbrella.
Thus, mere possession by the Soviets of nuclear weapons of sufficient numbers
and power rendered impotent all other forms of American power, including conven-
tional military power, industrial power, financial power, technological power, popu-
lation power, and even food power. All those other factors, however mighty in
themselves, even in combination are not enough to challenge Soviet nuclear power.
It is not even necessary to discuss the point of whether the 3-to-2 numbers
superiority in ICBM's and nuclear missile-firing submarines did or did not give the
Soviets an across-the-board strategic superiority. The fact is that the SALT I gave
the Soviets a worldwide perception of nuclear superiority, and it gave the Soviets a
sufficiency of nuclear power to use the Oil Weapon and the Dollar Weapon.
THE FINANCIAL COST OF SALT I
When we plot on a graph what has happened to the U.S. dollar, it is clear that
our runaway inflation started with the signing of SALT I in 1972. If our leaders
don't learn the lesson of the financial cost of SALT I, we will find to our sorrow that
the cost of SALT II is far higher.
The (Consumer Price Index is based on the 1967 dollar (the last year the United
States acquired an additional strategic weapon). The Consumer Price Index, which
stood at 100 in 1967, had risen only to 125 by 1972 (the year of SALT I). However,
subsequent to SALT I and Oil Embargo I, we slid into double-digit inflation. By 1979
the Consumer Price Index had shot up to 217, and inflation is now running at 13.4
gercent a year. It now takes $2.17 to buy what $1.00 would buy the year the United
tates stopped building nuclear weapons. This means that more than half of all our
savings in bank accounts, savings and loan companies, life insurance, pensions, and
other money investments has been stolen from us by those who changed American
strategic policy from superiority to inferiority.
According to conventional wisdom, stocks are supposed to be a good hedge against
inflation. From 1950 to 1968, stocks did as expected, rising 436 percent during a
period of relatively low inflation. But since 1968, while consumer prices have more
than doubled, stocks have fluctuated widely and the 1979 average is a pitiful two
percent higher than in 1968. This means that stocks in 1979 have really lost half
their 1968 value, because the dollars they are worth will buy only half as much.
And the price of gold rose from $60 in the year of SALT I to $329 in the year of
SALT II.
American history provides a tragic lesson of what happens to paper money when
the government which issues it lacks the military weapons necessary to maintain
itself as an independent nation. In the South, children of the second generation
after the War Between the States in impoverished households had a unique toy.
Instead of play money, they had quite literally scores of thousands of dollars in
genuine American currency. Thousands of southern patriots had turned in their
gold for this currency in order to buy essential food and war materials from abroad.
The first postwar generation still treasured this paper, hoping that some day it
might be redeemed. They finally learned the bitter lesson that the paper-money
promises of a government which has been militarily destroyed will never again be
honored.
However, Confederate paper money did not lose its value overnight. When it was
first issued, it was accepted at face value in the South. Progressively, as it became
apparent that the industrial North was building toward decisive military superior-
ity, the credibility of the Confederate Government's promise-to-pay began to deterio-
223
rate. As it was perceived that the North's power would soon become overwhelming,
C!onfederate currency began its slide down to nothingness.
This is what is happening to the American dollar as the power centers of the
world progressively grasp the fact that the Soviet Union is building toward decisive
military superiority. The progressive attainment by the Soviet Union of the military
power which will enable it to fulfill what it has openly declared to be its "historic"
mission (to destroy the Western capitalist nations) hgis resulted in a growing loss of
confidence in the U.S. dollar.
SALT I and Oil Embargo I which resulted cut the value of the U.S. dollar in half.
SALT II and any resulting Oil Embargo II will complete the destruction of the U.S.
dollar.
ra. THE CUBA WEAPON
The recent relevation that there are thousands of Russian combat troops in Cuba
is only the tip of the iceberg of what a Cuban Crisis II could mean to the United
States. What will we do if the Soviets send 200 Backfire bombers or 225 SS-20
missiles to Cuba?
At the time of Cuban Crisis I (the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962), the United States
was able to face down Khrushchev because our Strategic Air Command put our
then-new and impressive B-52 fleet on airborne alert. This constituted a credible
threat that we could deliver up to 50,000 megatons of nuclear striking power on
Soviet territory.
No U.S. President could make that threat today. It would not be credible to the
Soviets or to anyone else. So what will our President do if the Soviets send Backfire
bombers or nuclear missiles into Cuba? Plead with them to take them out? Humbly
appeal to their good faith? Tell them we will denounce them in the UN or the OAS?
Is that what the great United States is reduced to when it comes to the supreme
matter of protecting the lives and property of our own citizens?
First, let's consider a scenario of the Soviets sending 200 Backfire bombers to
Cuba. Basing Backfire bombers in Cuba would give the Soviets a dramatic option to
exercise their strategic power without the launching of a single missile or the
dropping of a single bomb.
"rhe Kremlin could send a flight of 200 Backfire bombers to overfly New York,
Boston, Philadelphia, Baltimore, Washington, Pittsburgh, Detroit, Cleveland, Chica-
go, St. Louis, Atlanta, and any other cities convenient to a plan of concentrating on
areas of dense population. The flight could be timed to arrive over the cities during
late-afternoon rush hours. No bombs would be dropped, but they would be on board.
The force of 200 could be divided into flights of 10 Backfires each, and they could
sweep in low over our great cities at, say, ten-minute intervals; each flight could
make two sweeps over each city. The Backfires are large and impressive, and they
fly at mach 2.2. Sonic booms would break windows by the thousands. Motorists on
the freeways would abandon their cars, attempting to find shelter from what they
would think was a bombing attack. No wheels would be moving because of the
massive traffic jams. Telephone systems would be swamped by the volume of calls
from frightened people trying to find out where to go and what to do.
What would our President do? Get on the Hot Line and ask the Kremlin, please
not to drop any bombs? Or please, order the bombers home? There is no way we
could stop the overflights because our policy for years has been one of zero defense
against bombers.
This use of the Backfires to create Cuban Crisis II would be in exquisite technical
compliance with the SALT II Protocol which allegedly (though not directly) prohib-
its the Backfire bombers from "operating at intercontinental distances" or from "in-
flight refueling" or from a production rate of not more than 30 per year. Of course
the Backfires would not run out of gasoline on this overflight mission; they could all
return to their bases in Cuba.
Second, let's consider the scenario of the Soviets' sending 350 SS-20s into Cuba.
The SS-20 is a compact, land-mobile missile launcher having three MIRV warheads.
The 350 SS-20s would give the Soviets a total of 1,050 warheads, or about one
warhead for each of our 1,000 Minuteman missiles and 54 Titan II missiles. It is
reasonable to suppose that U.S. intelligence will be just as slow in discovering SS-
20s in Cuba as it was in discovering offensive missiles in Cuba in 1962 and in
discovering thousands of Russian troops in 1979; so the Soviets could expect to get
them all deployed before a U.S. President recognized the threat.
The strategic power which 350 SS-20s in Cuba would give to the Soviets is almost
incalculable. The Soviets would know that, even if we had instantaneous warning of
a launch from Cuba, it would require 10 to 12 minutes time to launch our ICBMs.
But missiles launched from Cuba would require only 8 or 9 minutes travel time to
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reach most of our Minuteman bases. So the SS-20s could reach our ICBMs before
they could be launched.
The Soviets would not have to violate SALT II to carry out this SS-20 scenario.
The SS-20 is not an ICBM, is not fixed-based, and is not a "heavy" missile, so is not
covered by SALT II.
Again, the question remains, what would the United States do? What could the
United States do? We would be reduced to doing nothing at all except pleading on
the Hot Line for the Kremlin to show compassion, mercy, and good faith. Ask
Alexander Solzhenitsyn how much compassion the Kremlin bosses show when there
is no force able to make them act in a civilized manner. If our State Department
couldn't even make the Soviets accede to our request to let Russian ballerina
Vlasova be interviewed on American soil without the intimidating presence of 12
KGB Iddnappers, how can we make the Soviets respect our demands about Cuba?
RATIFICATION V. REJECTION RISKS
What are the risks of SALT II Treaty ratification versus rejection? If the Treaty
is rejected, we risk a tantrum by Kremlin officials. If the Treaty is ratified, we risk
Soviet use of the Oil Weapon, the Dollar Weapon, and the Cuba Weapon. Is it worth
the risk? I think not.
If SALT II is ratified, the Soviets will be given both the power and the perception
of power to use the Oil Weapon, the Dollar Weapon, and the Cuban Weapon. If
SALT II is rejected, the Soviets will have substantially the same power, but the
worldwide perception of that power will be diminished because of new respect for
the United States in rejecting such an unequal deal. Everywhere in the world,
people will have a new respect for the determination of the United States to control
its own destiny.
The perception of power can be just £is important as the power itself. Neither
idealism nor semantics can conceal the fact that SALT II is an unequal bargain for
the United States. The Treaty does not limit the carrying capacity of either individ-
ual weapons or the total weapons forces of the two superpowers.
The alleged "equality" of SALT II is like saying that two intercontinental freight-
moving firms are equal when each one has 2,250 "delivery vehicles," even though
one firm has all 50-ton tractor-trailers and the other has only one-ton pickup trucks.
Our principal ICBM, the Minuteman, has a "carrying capacity" of one megaton; the
308 Soviet SS-18 ICBMs have a "carrying capacity" of 50 megatons each.
The humiliating inequality of SALT II is also shown by the comparison of what
the Treaty allows each side in the most powerful category of nuclear weapons: land-
based ICBM MIRVs. Article V allows each side to have 820 land-based ICBMs which
can be MIRVed. The Soviets have 308 heavy SS-18 ICBMs. Article IV, Section 10,
allows each SS-18 to have ten MIRVs. That leaves 512 (820 minus 308) other land-
based launchers of ICBMs which the Treaty allows the Soviets to equip with MIRVs.
Since the Treaty allows the Soviets to MIRV any mix of ICBMs they choose, and
since neither the Soviets nor the Pentagon will say how many SS-17s and SS-18s
the Soviets have, they can choose to deploy 512 SS-19s with MIRVs. Article IV
permits six MIRVs on each SS-19. The Treaty thus permits the Soviets to have
3,080 (308 times 10) MIRVs on their SS-18 force, and 3,072 (512 times 6) MIRVs on
their SS-19 force; making a total of 6,152 Soviet MIRVs on their land-based
MIRVed ICBM force alone.
The United States has no heavy ICBMs at all. We have 550 Minuteman Ills, our
only ICBMs capable of being MIRVed, and the Treaty does not permit us to add any
more. The "Common Understanding" of Article FV prohibits the United States from
flight-testing or deplojang the Minuteman III "with more than three reentry vehi-
cles." Therefore, the United States is effectively limited to only 1,650 (550 times 3)
MIRVs on our land-based missile force.
The Treaty, therefore, allows the Soviets to build almost four times as many
MIRVs on land-based ICBM's as it allows the United States to build: 6,162 to 1,650.
But that's not all. The treaty places no limit whatsoever on the power of MIRVed
warheads. The Soviet SS-18 and SS-19 MIRVs are estimated at a power of 1.2
megatons each. Multiplying 1.2 megatons by 6,152 MIRVs gives the Soviets at least
7,382.4 megatons (7 billion, 382 million, 400 thousand tons) of TNT explosive-equiva-
lent in our land-based MIRVed missile force.
The U.S. Minuteman III MIRVs are only 0.17 megaton each. Multiplying 0.17
megaton by 1,650 U.S. MIRVs gives us 280.5 megatons (280 million, 500 thousand
tons) of TNT explosive-equivalent in our land-based MIRVed missile force.
The Treaty thus allows the Soviets to have land-based ICBM MIRVs with explo-
sive f>ower more than 26 times that of ours. The power centers of the world will not
be fooled by calling this fantastic disparity "equality." With SALT II, the Soviets
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will not only have the power, but just as important, they will have the worldwide
perception of power.
Defense Secretary Harold Brown argues that, without SALT II, the Soviets could
build even